Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, English was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct based on sexual intercourse with a 17-year-old acquaintance while she was asleep. The court sentenced English to 21-180 months’ imprisonment. English has been released. After the trial,“Juror A” revealed that her father had sexually abused her at age eight. English was granted a new trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating English’s conviction. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. A state court denied post-judgment relief. The Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court denied discretionary review, using routine language. English's federal habeas petition was dismissed. The Sixth Circuit concluded that deference to the state courts was improper because the district court failed to make the requisite determination that English’s federal claim had been adjudicated on the merits and applied de novo review. The court found that reasonable jurists could disagree on whether English was denied a fair trial. English made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Juror A’s failure to disclose; the evidence that Juror A would have known that her past abuse was relevant at voir dire; and inconsistencies in her account at the evidentiary hearing, all indicate deliberate concealment, permitting an inference of bias. View "English v. Berghuis" on Justia Law

In 1981, at 18 months old, Carter was removed from his mother, who suffered from schizophrenia. After several foster homes, Carter was adopted when he was 10 years old. In 1997, Carter went to live with his adoptive grandmother, Prince. He was subsequently incarcerated. Carter was released from jail, let himself into Prince’s home, and killed her. He took extensive measures to cover the crime, took money, and left, stopping to steal a license plate. Prince had been stabbed 18 times, had suffered blunt-force head trauma, and had been anally raped. Semen was identified as Carter’s. Carter was detained and, after his Miranda warnings, confessed. At a pre-trial competency hearing, Carter was shackled because he had attempted to commit suicide several times. The court concluded that Carter was competent based upon the testimony of a court-appointed licensed psychologist. Carter entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The defense expert, Dr. King. noted “several subtle signs of a psychotic disorder, ”including inappropriate laughter, auditory and visual hallucinations, and Carter’s musing about killing his lawyer. The judge again found Carter competent, noting that even King acknowledged that the issue was borderline. Carter interrupted opening statements to express his desire to plead guilty and insist that he did not want to attend the trial. After asking whether he would be removed if he “acted up,” he lunged at the judge. Defense counsel stipulated that Carter would monitor the proceedings via television. In 1998, Carter was convicted of aggravated murder and was sentenced to death. Carter unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief, alleging that he was incompetent at trial and that his attorneys were constitutionally ineffective. The Supreme Court of Ohio explicitly recognized Carter’s suicide attempts, his “disagreements with counsel[,]” his desire to “enter a plea and get it over[,]” and his “lung[ing] at the judge.” While Carter’s evidence of incompetence may be “enough,” the question is whether such evidence compels a determination of incompetence. Carter failed to carry his burden under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). View "Carter v. Bogan" on Justia Law

Davis is incarcerated for the assault and murder of Marsha Blakely. His conviction was based on the testimony of an eye-witness, Avery, who changed his story several times before trial. Corroborating evidence permitted the jury to credit Avery’s trial testimony that implicated Davis. Years later, Avery recanted his testimony, claiming that he did not witness Blakely’s murder and that he admitted this to the prosecutor before testifying against Davis. Davis filed a successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, based on the prosecution’s alleged knowing presentation of Avery’s perjured testimony at trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Davis’s petition, which was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations. Davis’s petition was untimely and he cannot show a credible claim of actual innocence to overcome the statute of limitations. For a petitioner to establish entitlement to the actual-innocence exception, he must support his allegations of constitutional error with new, reliable evidence, such as exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence, that was not presented at trial. Davis has not undermined the evidence that corroborates Avery’s trial testimony, and his only proof of innocence, Avery’s recantation affidavit, is unreliable and, in the circumstances, insufficient to establish innocence. View "Davis v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged Michigan’s statutory scheme for resentencing individuals who were convicted of first-degree murder and received mandatory sentences of life without parole for acts they committed as children. Plaintiff’s 2016 amended complaint (SAC) addressed the Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller v. Alabama (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, (2016), and Michigan’s 2014 amendments to its juvenile sentencing scheme. The SAC included allegations that Michigan’s policies and procedures governing parole deny Plaintiffs a meaningful opportunity for release in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count IV); that deprivation of Plaintiffs’ good time and disciplinary credits in Section 769.25a(6) violates the Ex Post Facto Clause (Count V); and Defendants have failed to provide the Plaintiffs with access to programming, education, training, and rehabilitation opportunities in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count VI). The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Counts IV, V, and VI. On remand, the district court granted Plaintiffs summary judgment on Count V and class certification, and ordered permanent injunctive relief that prohibited Defendants from enforcing or applying the credit elimination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Mich. Comp. Laws 769.25a(4)(c), which was enacted in 2014 and eliminates credits for individuals who were sentenced to mandatory life without parole for juvenile first-degree murder convictions, unconstitutional. View "Hill v. Snyder" on Justia Law

After Maslonka robbed two banks to support his drug habit, he pleaded guilty in Michigan state court to armed robbery as a third habitual offender. During his plea-negotiation process, Maslonka began to cooperate with federal authorities in a separate federal investigation. Maslonka did not cooperate to the full satisfaction of the federal authorities. The state prosecutor withdrew the favorable plea offer. Maslonka brought a habeas corpus petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief. Even assuming Maslonka’s attorney was constitutionally deficient, Maslonka has not shown that this deficiency prejudiced him. Maslonka has not shown a reasonable probability that his counsel could have persuaded the state prosecutor not to cancel Maslonka’s plea. The court noted that the Supreme Court has not fully answered the “difficult question” of “the duty and responsibilities of defense counsel in the plea bargaining process” and rejected an argument that a counsel’s mere physical absence from a critical stage of a proceeding, based on the counsel’s own failure to be present rather than any denial by the state, can constitute a constructive denial of counsel under Supreme Court precedent. View "Maslonka v. Hoffner" on Justia Law

Harrington was convicted in 2009 of seven drug offenses, including conspiring to manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute heroin and at least 50 grams of cocaine base, resulting in death (Count 1); and distributing heroin, resulting in death (Count 7). Citing 21 U.S.C. 841 and 851, the government filed notice that Harrington was subject to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment by reason of a 2002 felony drug conviction. The district court sentenced Harrington to concurrent terms of life in prison on Counts 1 and 7, and 360 months on each remaining count. In 2014, the Supreme Court held, in Burrage, that where use of the drug distributed by the defendant is not an independently sufficient cause of the victim’s death or serious bodily injury, a defendant cannot be liable under the penalty enhancement provision unless such use was a but-for cause of the death or injury. Harrington unsuccessfully sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241. In 2017, Harrington filed a second petition. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Harrington’s claim is properly construed as one of actual innocence. Because Burrage is retroactive, Harrington is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him, if given the proper jury instruction. View "Harrington v. Ormond" on Justia Law

Thomas is a Michigan state prisoner who was convicted of several crimes, including assault with intent to commit murder, after he participated in a violent 2005 home invasion. Thomas unsuccessfully challenged in state court his conviction for assault with intent to commit murder, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support that conviction. He then filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, which the district court denied. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The state presented sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have found that Thomas assaulted Harrison, with an actual intent to kill Harrison, in circumstances where a successful killing would have been murder. The Michigan courts stated that “[n]o actual physical injury is required for the elements of the crime to be established,” and that “[a]n assault may be established by showing . . . an unlawful act that places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.” Any inconsistency in interpreting Michigan law is not a ground for federal habeas relief. “Bottom line, Thomas’s case was not an “extreme malfunction[]” of the Michigan criminal justice system.” View "Thomas v. Stephenson" on Justia Law

In 2012, Raines pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). The court concluded that Raines was subject to a statutory minimum term of 180 months of imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B), because he had a 1991 Michigan conviction for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, a 2002 federal conviction for distributing cocaine base, and a 2002 federal conviction for collecting credit by extortionate means. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a sentence of 180 months of imprisonment. In 2016, Raines filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate, citing Johnson v. United States (2015), which held the ACCA’s residual clause to be unconstitutionally vague. The district court rejected that argument, reasoning that Raines’s assault conviction qualified under the ACCA’s force clause, his drug-distribution conviction qualified as a serious drug offense, and his extortion conviction qualified under the ACCA’s enumerated-crimes clause. After holding that Raines’s Johnson claim was properly before the court on appeal, the Sixth Circuit vacated. Raines’s 2002 conviction under 18 U.S.C. 894(a)(1), for collecting credit by extortionate means should not have been counted as a violent felony under the ACCA because it is not covered by the use-of-force clause and it is not equivalent to the generic crime of “extortion.” View "Raines v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant was convicted for felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)(e); his statutory maximum sentence was 10 years’ imprisonment. The court sentenced Defendant to 24 years, under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), which overrode the statutory maximum and required a minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment. While incarcerated, Defendant was convicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(b)(1)(C); possession of heroin by an inmate, 18 U.S.C. 1791(d)(1)(C); and conspiracy, section 371, and was sentenced to an additional 151 months, to be served consecutively to his existing term. In 2015, the Supreme Court invalidated the ACCA’s residual clause and later held that the rule applies retroactively. Defendant sought resentencing under 18 U.S.C. 2255. The court found the motion meritorious, but rather than conducting a full resentencing proceeding, corrected Defendant’s sentence by memorandum opinion. Defendant had already served 12 years. His Guidelines range, absent the ACCA enhancement, was 51-63 months. Believing that a period of over-incarceration can be calculated and credited toward a consecutive sentence, Defendant asked the court to impose a Guidelines-range sentence--a specific term of months. The court instead imposed a corrected sentence of “time served.” The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court could not lawfully impose a sentence of more than 10 years’ imprisonment; “time served” equated to a term in excess of the statutory maximum. The sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Nichols" on Justia Law

In 2006, Gilmore pleaded guilty to federal offenses and began serving a 188-month sentence. South Carolina, planning to charge Gilmore with assault and battery and failure to pay child support, filed a detainer, requesting that the Federal Bureau of Prisons notify it before releasing him. The Bureau notified Gilmore under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. If he asked South Carolina to resolve the charges, the state would need to try him within 180 days. The Bureau notified the Solicitor of Richland County, South Carolina that Gilmore requested final disposition. Months later, that office replied that it “ha[d] no charges pending” and speculated that any charges originated in the Sheriff’s Department. The Bureau forwarded Gilmore’s request to the Magistrate Court. No one responded. Four years later, South Carolina sent another detainer request for failure to pay child support. Gilmore wrote the South Carolina judge that he had tried to resolve the matter for years; the detainers made it difficult for him to complete rehabilitative programs. No one responded. Gilmore filed federal habeas petitions. The South Carolina district court transferred both petitions to the Eastern District of Kentucky, which dismissed them. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In naming the federal warden, Gilmore sued the wrong official--South Carolina was responsible for the alleged harm. The court noted that Gilmore should determine whether a violation of the Act states a cognizable federal habeas claim; whether exhaustion applies; and whether any limitation on a criminal charge applies. View "Gilmore v. Ebbert" on Justia Law