Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Jones was convicted of robbery in Indiana, Kentucky, and federal courts. Jones’s Kentucky plea deal agreed to a commencement date for Jones’s accrual of time-served credits, not when officers actually took Jones into custody, as would ordinarily be the case, but on an earlier date. The sentencing court failed to adopt the plea agreement and ordered the Department of Corrections to calculate Jones’s time-served credit in accordance with “this judgment,” which made no mention of the negotiated agreement, and “the law.” The court did not provide Jones the opportunity to withdraw his plea. Jones did not appeal or seek correction of his sentence. Jones unsuccessfully asked prison administrators to honor the plea agreement’s time-served provision; doing so would have violated the judgment of conviction. Jones asked the sentencing court for clarification. The court ratified the administrators’ calculations. Jones did not appeal. The court subsequently instructed that Jones be given credit in accordance with the agreement. Jones was then released.Jones filed suit, alleging that Kentucky prison administrators violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights through their alleged deliberate indifference to the prospect of incarcerating him beyond the length of his sentence. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of the defendants’ qualified immunity motions. The defendants—state corrections officials—neither caused nor contributed to Jones’s over-incarceration nor could they unilaterally remedy the matter, which was dictated by court orders. View "Jones v. Bottom" on Justia Law

During his booking at Kenton County Detention Center, Grote could not complete paperwork while standing nor be photographed due to his agitated state. By the time he was examined by LPN Brand, Grote was constantly shaking and twitching and was covered in sweat. With officers, Grote denied that he had taken any substances but told Brand that he had taken a half gram of methamphetamine. Grote’s oxygen level was 89 percent; he was hyperventilating. Brand was unable to take any other vital signs. Brand does not recall communicating to anyone her assessment that Grote was detoxing. Deputies conducted sporadic checks on Grote in his cell before an inmate reported that Grote was unconscious and foaming at the mouth. Grote suffered multiple cardiac arrests and did not regain neurological function before dying. A doctor testified that Grote’s overdose would have been obvious to a layperson and that the situation required urgent medical care. Grote had a blood methamphetamine concentration 14 times higher than “the lowest reported lethal dose.”The KCDC defendants testified received no training on recognizing signs of an overdose or detox and could not call 911 immediately in the event of an inmate overdose, but instead were to notify shift managers. The Sixth Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissal of a section 1983 suit. A jury could find that the medical provider was deliberately indifferent to Grote’s need for medical attention, but not that the deputies acted unconstitutionally. View "Grote v. Kenton County, Kentucky" on Justia Law

After being stopped for a broken headlight, Akima was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated based on his performance on a three-part field sobriety exam and a preliminary breathalyzer test. Arresting Officer Peca determined that he failed the assessments but had both administered the field sobriety tests improperly and misread the breathalyzer. Akima blew a blood alcohol content of 0.02, well below the legal limit of 0.08; Peca read the result as 0.22 and arrested him, causing Akima, a Japanese citizen, to lose his work visa and be deported. A blood test confirmed the Officer’s error. Akima sued, alleging constitutional violations. Peca moved to dismiss, citing qualified immunity.The district court permitted Akima’s constitutional claims to proceed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Officer Peca lacked probable cause to believe Akima’s license was not in his immediate possession or that he was intoxicated. A reasonable jury could find that while driving without any apparent difficulty, Akima was stopped for a broken headlight; perhaps due to evident communication barriers, Akima took the atypical step of exiting his vehicle. Akima acknowledged he had been drinking “just a little bit,” registered 0.02 on a breathalyzer, exhibited a temperate and responsive demeanor, and maintained steady speech and gait. He completed three field sobriety tests. View "Akima v. Peca" on Justia Law

James picked up Herald and Hickerson in a silver car. Driving around, the men got high and plotted to rob the Contreras home. At a gas station, Hickerson picked up black ski masks. Herald went home. Hours later, two armed, masked men invaded the Contreras home and shot Adrian five times, killing him. Adrian’s brothers returned fire, hitting Hickerson. The other intruder escaped in a silver car. Around 4 a.m. that day, James arrived at his friends’ house in a silver car, telling them he had attempted a robbery with Hickerson and that Hickerson had been shot. James later told Herald that he “left Johnny” and had thrown his gun in a lake. Police found a black ski mask two blocks from the Contreras house, with James’s DNA on it.James was convicted of felony murder, home invasion, assault, and firearm offenses. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, finding that Herald’s testimony was supported by “the location of the weapon” and that a “weapon” found near the crime scene had James’s DNA on it. No evidence supported those findings. Police never found the second intruder’s gun and did not find James's DNA on any weapons. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of James’s federal habeas petition. Even serious errors do not warrant habeas relief by themselves. Petitioners need to show a violation of the Constitution or federal law. James has not. View "James v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

Zakhari, in a program to become a cardiothoracic surgeon, engaged in online sexually explicit conversations with a profile (boredcrbgirl) created by a detective, claiming to be a 15-year-old girl. He received an image of an officer. Zakhari sent an Uber to take boredcrbgirl to his apartment for sex. The officer arrived at Zakhari’s residence in the Uber. Zakhari was arrested. The detective interrogated him after giving the Miranda warnings. Zakhari said, “I can answer some questions and then maybe call.” After responding to basic questions, he said: My sister’s an attorney. Asked if he wanted to call her, Zakhari said “yeah,” then paused. The detective interjected that such a call would end the questioning. Zakhari continued to answer questions and made incriminating statements.Zakhari was convicted of attempting to persuade a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), attempting to transmit an obscene image to a minor, section 1470, and attempting to produce child pornography sections 2251(a)(e). Zakhari unsuccessfully moved to suppress his statements. The court declined to strike the third charge on grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness.The Sixth Circuit vacated the convictions. The suppression motion should have been granted. The factual context shows Zakhari had “lawyerly assistance” in mind in wanting to call his sister and the invocation was not ambiguous. The court abused its discretion in failing to require the government to substantiate its explanations concerning Count 3. Zakhari showed enough to presume vindictiveness. View "United States v. Zakhari" on Justia Law

Castro-White died from a drug overdose. Detective Sivert noticed that Castro-White’s phone had many missed calls from Karaplis, who implicated others but lied to Sivert by denying any involvement. Later, after admitting his involvement, Karaplis described the drug dealer, “Red,” Red’s car, Red’s phone number, and, using Google Maps, the specific home where he bought drugs from Red. Sivert traveled to this home and spotted a nearby car p that fit Karaplis’s description and was registered to “Russell Davis,” called “Big Red.” Karaplis identified Davis’s picture with “100 percent” confidence. Sivert had Karaplis set up a phone call with Davis to discuss Castro-White’s death. Sivert then obtained a warrant to search Davis’s Garden Avenue home. During the search, police found the phone and illegal drugs. Davis unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence and was given a mandatory life sentence.The Sixth Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing about what Sivert told the magistrate in person. Although the magistrate described his general practice, he lacked a “specific recollection” of Davis’s case. Sivert was “sure” that he had conveyed the many facts connecting Davis to the home. The court again denied Davis’s motion, despite finding that the affidavit failed to establish a probable-cause nexus between Davis and the home. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Sivert uncovered overwhelming evidence tying Davis to the home and the magistrate (not Sivert) bore any blame for failing to transcribe the additional oral testimony. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Roberts was convicted for federal crimes relating to the death of Caldwell, who was in a child-custody dispute with his ex-wife (Roberts’ girlfriend). Roberts tried to kill, or at least seriously harm, Caldwell by luring him through false guise to a remote location. Caldwell escaped but was later murdered after a family counseling session.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Roberts’ arguments under the Confrontation Clause, federal evidentiary rules, and the attorney-client privilege, that the district court improperly admitted evidence related to the earlier attack and other incriminating proof and his two constitutional challenges to the interstate stalking statute under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. 2261A, claiming that it exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause and that the counts of his conviction are multiplicitous. Testimonial statements are allowed into evidence under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6), for “[a] statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused . . . the declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.” Caldwell was the declarant of the written-witness statement and an affidavit, which were to be used against Roberts, who intentionally caused Caldwell’s unavailability as a witness. The court also upheld the admission of “excited utterances’ made by Roberts to Caldwell’s attorney. View "United States v. Roberts" on Justia Law

In 2016, Schumaker pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. Schumaker had 14 prior convictions for Tennessee aggravated burglary, involving separate structures, occurring on 13 different dates. In 2017, the Sixth Circuit held that Tennessee aggravated burglary was not a violent felony and did not qualify as an Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e) predicate offense. The district court sentenced Schumaker to 54 months’ imprisonment in 2020. While the government’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that Tennessee aggravated burglary qualified as an ACCA predicate offense. Schumaker then argued that his prior offenses “did not occur on separate occasions” under ACCA. The Sixth Circuit rejected his argument after considering the charging documents.On remand, Schumaker cited the Supreme Court’s 2022 grant of certiorari in “Wooden” and unsuccessfully argued that, in conducting the occasions-different inquiry, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments prohibited the court from relying on the dates and locations of the aggravated-burglary offenses found in the judgments associated with those convictions because the dates and locations are non-elemental facts that the government had to prove to a jury. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The limited remand required the district court to sentence Schumaker under the ACCA. Circuit precedent bars Schumaker’s argument that the non-elemental facts in Shepard documents must be charged in an indictment and found by a jury before a court may rely on those facts in the occasions-different inquiry. View "United States v. Schumaker" on Justia Law

Officers Simpson and Patrick drove to Perez’s house to execute seven felony arrest warrants. Simpson approached Perez behind the house. After a brief exchange, Perez bolted. Perez wove her way through the neighborhood—including across a two-way street—in a chase the length of two football fields. Patrick ordered her to stop. Perez did not comply. Patrick fired his taser but missed. Perez kept fleeing, heading toward another two-lane street, intending to cross. A row of moving cars stood in her way, so she stopped. Perez alleges she raised her hands and stood still, expecting to be handcuffed. Patrick claims she did not raise her hands and instead took off running. Patrick made the split-second decision to fire his taser again. It connected. Perez fell forward and hit her chin on the ground, fracturing her jaw. She later pled guilty to evading police and resisting arrest.Perez filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The district court denied Patrick’s request for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment, 28 U.S.C. 1291, where the decision depended on issues of fact. View "Perez v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Alyssa was visiting her friend when Lundy, intoxicated forced his way into the house. A neighbor called 911 after hearing “a woman crying” and someone “being thrown around.” Lundy left before officers arrived. The women stated that Lundy left in a red Pontiac. Officers, looking for Lundy, received another call. Lundy had returned with a gun. Officer Martin returned to the house in about two minutes, activated his bodycam, and recorded the women saying that Lundy pointed the gun at them, loaded it, and threatened to kill them in front of Alyssa and Lundy’s young children. Officer Brown found Lundy near the house and looked through the window of the red Pontiac. A loaded pistol sat on the passenger’s seat. During booking, Lundy stated that he’d take the gun charge because “it’s mine.”Lundy was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The prosecution introduced Martin’s bodycam footage and Martin’s testimony about that conversation. Lundy argued that because Alyssa did not testify, her out-of-court statement was barred. The Sixth Circuit upheld the admission of that evidence. The excited-utterance exception applied because there was an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement, the statement was made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent, and the statement was made while Alyssa was under the stress of the excitement caused by the event. The statement was nontestimonial, and the Confrontation Clause does not apply. View "United States v. Lundy" on Justia Law