Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2003, Potter pleaded guilty to various drug and gun crimes, including possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Armed Career Criminal Act imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on repeat offenders—those who have three or more previous convictions for a “violent felony.” After the district court sentenced Potter as a repeat offender, the Supreme Court (Johnson v. United States), held that the Act;s residual clause violates the Constitution’s prohibition against vague criminal laws. Potter asked to be resentenced in a successive 28 U.S.C. motion, claiming he did not qualify as a repeat offender. The district court declined the request on the ground that he sentenced Potter under a different clause (the enumerated-crimes clause) of the Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed because the same district court judge who sentenced him was in a better position than anyone else to know why he applied the Act and because at all events Potter did not meet his burden of showing that the court used the residual clause to increase his sentence. View "Potter v. United States" on Justia Law

Gardner shared a cell phone with his 17-year-old girlfriend, B.H., to facilitate her “sex dates” with other men. Gardner had advertised B.H. on Backpage.com, arranged her transportation and gave her drugs for the encounters, had threatened B.H. when she did not want to participate, and demanded the money clients paid for. When one of B.H.’s clients turned out to be an undercover officer, she agreed to let police search the phone. B.H. was pregnant at the time. A jury convicted Gardner of trafficking a minor for sex and producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 1591(a)(1) and 2251(a), primarily based on evidence recovered from the phone. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Gardner’s challenges to the denial of his motion to suppress and to the sufficiency of the evidence. B.H. consented to let officers search the phone and had actual and apparent authority to do so. Photographs on the phone were relevant to show an element of the sex trafficking charge—that B.H. feared that Gardner would cause her “serious harm” if she refused to prostitute herself. View "United States v. Gardner" on Justia Law

Richardson was arrested after failing to appear at a child-support enforcement hearing. The judge imposed a sentence of up to 30 days for civil contempt, which could be purged and Richardson released upon payment of $2,500. Two days later, Richardson collapsed in his cell. An overhead camera recorded as officers and medical staff responded. Richardson, lethargic and unbalanced, with blood and saliva coming from his mouth, was trying to stand. The officers told Richardson to “stay down,” pulled Richardson from his cell, and placed him face down on the floor. Despite a jail policy prohibiting placing restrained inmates in a prone position and a medic’s appeal to handcuff Richardson in front, Richardson was handcuffed behind his back and restrained face down. Richardson died after a 22-minute struggle during which he continually stated he could not breathe. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 the court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on qualified- and statutory-immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Because Richardson was sanctioned outside the criminal context, the Fourteenth Amendment governs. The court rejected an argument that, as long as they acted without reckless or malicious intent, the officers could apply any degree of force. Existing precedent gave notice that it “[w]as unconstitutional” to create asphyxiating conditions by “forcibly restraining an individual in a prone position for a prolonged period” when that individual posed no material threat. Because the finding regarding defendants’ “knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm” was premised on Richardson’s complaints about his inability to breathe, the qualified immunity inquiry was sufficiently individualized. View "Hopper v. Plummer" on Justia Law

An Ohio jury found Hautzenroeder, a high school teacher, guilty of one count of sexual battery involving a student. Although her state court appeals were unsuccessful, the trial court suspended most of her two-year prison sentence and discharged her early from community control. No court could suspend Hautzenroeder’s statutorily-mandated classification as a Tier III sex offender with lifetime reporting requirements, Ohio Rev. Code 2950.01(G)(1)(a), 2950.07(B)(1). Hautzenroeder’s federal habeas petition alleged a due process violation stemming from insufficient evidence supporting her conviction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for lack of jurisdiction because Hautzenroeder filed it after her period of incarceration and community control expired— she was no longer “in custody.” Changes in Ohio’s registration requirements did not mean that being subject to the requirements would constitute being in custody. View "Hautzenroeder v. DeWine" on Justia Law

Toll was in solitary confinement at Riverbend Maximum Security Institution when he allegedly threw liquid at a correctional officer. The commander decided to extract Toll from his cell. After the cell extraction team (Doss and Horton) removed Toll from his cell, Toll became unresponsive. A doctor pronounced him dead. Toll’s mother, Luna, sued Horton and Doss in their individual capacities for excessive force, and Bell, the warden, for failure to train (42 U.S.C. 1983). In 2013, the district court entered judgments in favor of the defendants. In 2014, the New York Times published an article about the cell extraction team, based on a letter written by a former team member. Based on this new evidence, Luna was granted a new trial. The court declined to award sanctions because the defendants did not act in bad faith in failing to produce the letter and granted summary judgment, rejecting the claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the order granting a new trial and reversed the summary judgment. Luna acted diligently in requesting discovery responses that should have included the letter, which was material, controlling evidence. Summary judgment was inappropriate because the court granted a completely new trial, requiring a new jury to examine anew all factual disputes; the court should have reviewed all material facts in a light most favorable to Luna. View "Luna v. Bell" on Justia Law

A dog’s sniff alerted law enforcement to a suspicious-smelling package, which contained methamphetamine. The intended recipient was “B. PERKINS,” at his Belvidere, Tennessee address. A trusted confidential informant had known Perkins for 20 years and had purchased methamphetamine from him within the past six months. Local law enforcement also knew Perkins to be a methamphetamine dealer. Based on this information, DEA officer Warren obtained an anticipatory warrant to search Perkins’s residence. An anticipatory search only becomes effective upon the happening of some triggering condition, which establishes probable cause. Warren proposed that DEA officer Brewer pose as a FedEx driver, knock at Perkins' door with the package in hand, and deliver the package: Delivery to Perkins was the triggering event. Brewer went in with the erroneous impression that he simply needed to deliver the package to someone at the residence. Brewer knocked and a woman came to the door. Brewer asked her if she was expecting a package. “Yes, we are,” she said. Brewer did not ask who she was nor did he confirm that “we” referred to Perkins, nor did he know whether Perkins was present. Brewer simply gave her the package. Officers executed the search. Perkins was not present and did not arrive until an hour later. Perkins was charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The Sixth Circuit affirmed an order granting Perkins’ motion to suppress. The “operative transaction” specified in the warrant did not occur. View "United States v. William Perkins" on Justia Law

Maben, a Michigan prisoner, was in line for lunch. The server provided Maben with half a serving, dumping out the rest, stating that he “was doing as told.” Before Maben could speak to a supervisor, Thelen, a prison guard, “began yelling,” “shut the fuck up if you wanna eat.” The supervisor “acknowledged the severely inadequate portion,” and gave Maben the full portion. Thelen stated “if you’re going to complain then you’re going to get a misconduct,” then issued Maben a ticket. Maben claimed that he never became disruptive, but has had shortened portions ever since, because of Thelen's retaliation. A hearing officer found Thelen’s statement “more credible” without viewing video footage, Maben was found guilty of creating a disturbance and lost privileges for seven days. The court rejected Maben's pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part; factual findings made at Maben’s minor misconduct hearing do not have preclusive effect in federal court. The court declined to adopt the “checkmate doctrine,” which provides that when a prison body finds that a prisoner has committed an actual violation of prison rules and the finding is based on some evidence, it "essentially checkmates" a retaliation claim. Maben introduced sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment on his First Amendment retaliation claim. The court affirmed summary judgment on Maben’s official-capacity claim, citing the Eleventh Amendment. View "Maben v. Thelen" on Justia Law

The FBI obtained access to the physical computer running Playpen’s “dark” website, which contained significant child pornography, and kept the website running to catch its patrons. The site required a browser “mask” to conceal users’ IP addresses, so the FBI placed a digital bug in the fabric of the website, to create a digital fingerprint. After collecting identifying data on Playpen’s individual users, the FBI sought separate warrants, explaining how they cross-referenced the user’s digital fingerprint with an IP address, the "Playpen" items the user had viewed, and the physical location of the computer. distinguishing the machine from others at the same address. The warrant affidavit outlined Tagg’s five hours on Playpen but did not state whether Tagg actually viewed or downloaded illegal files. The magistrate approved the warrant, stating that officers had established probable cause that Tagg violated 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5). Searching Tagg’s home, police found 20,000 child pornography files on his personal computers. The Sixth Circuit found the warrant valid. Visiting a website containing child pornography creates a reasonable inference that the user has stored child pornography on a computer; that the website contains both legal and illegal material does not automatically negate probable cause. An officer of reasonable caution would suspect that Tagg had accessed Playpen with “intent to view” child pornography, and that evidence would be found on his home computer. Tagg browsed the site for an extended period, clicking on blatant child pornography advertisements. View "United States v. Tagg" on Justia Law

The FBI obtained access to the physical computer running Playpen’s “dark” website, which contained significant child pornography, and kept the website running to catch its patrons. The site required a browser “mask” to conceal users’ IP addresses, so the FBI placed a digital bug in the fabric of the website, to create a digital fingerprint. After collecting identifying data on Playpen’s individual users, the FBI sought separate warrants, explaining how they cross-referenced the user’s digital fingerprint with an IP address, the "Playpen" items the user had viewed, and the physical location of the computer. distinguishing the machine from others at the same address. The warrant affidavit outlined Tagg’s five hours on Playpen but did not state whether Tagg actually viewed or downloaded illegal files. The magistrate approved the warrant, stating that officers had established probable cause that Tagg violated 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5). Searching Tagg’s home, police found 20,000 child pornography files on his personal computers. The Sixth Circuit found the warrant valid. Visiting a website containing child pornography creates a reasonable inference that the user has stored child pornography on a computer; that the website contains both legal and illegal material does not automatically negate probable cause. An officer of reasonable caution would suspect that Tagg had accessed Playpen with “intent to view” child pornography, and that evidence would be found on his home computer. Tagg browsed the site for an extended period, clicking on blatant child pornography advertisements. View "United States v. Tagg" on Justia Law

Porter, the mayor of Paintsville, Kentucky, steered business and contracts to companies owned by his co-defendant, Crace, and ensured payment of a fraudulent invoice to Crace’s company, in return for payments disguised as loans. Porter was charged with theft concerning programs receiving federal funds, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(A), and bribery concerning such programs, section 666(a)(1)(B) and was sentenced to 48 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the conviction under section 666(a)(1)(B) was unsupported by sufficient evidence and that the admission of a witness’s prior statements to investigators and the admission of another witness’s deposition testimony violated his confrontation rights. A conviction under section 666(a)(1)(B) does not require evidence of a quid pro quo “in connection with” any “official act.” It is enough if a defendant corruptly solicits anything of value with the intent to be influenced or rewarded in connection with some transaction involving property or services worth $5000 or more. Testimony concerning prior statements to investigators did not violate Porter’s confrontation rights because they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The government sufficiently demonstrated the unavailability of the deposition witness to testify at trial, so no Confrontation Clause violation occurred. View "United States v. Porter" on Justia Law