Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission issues separate classes of licenses to manufacturers and distillers, wholesalers, and liquor retailers, Tenn. Code 57-3-201. To obtain a license, an individual must have “been a bona fide resident of [Tennessee] during the two-year period immediately preceding the date upon which application is made.” The statute imposes a 10-year residency requirement to renew the license. A corporation cannot receive a license “if any officer, director or stockholder owning any capital stock in the corporation, would be ineligible to receive a retailer’s license for any reason specified” and all capital stock must be owned by individuals who meet the same residency requirements. Anticipating litigation, the state sought a declaratory judgment construing the constitutionality of the durational-residency requirements. The district court found the requirements facially discriminatory; held that state regulations of the retailer and wholesaler tiers are not immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny just because they do not discriminate against out-of-state liquor; concluded that nondiscriminatory alternatives could achieve the durational-residency requirements’ purposes—citizen health and alcohol regulation; and found that the requirements violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and found the unconstitutional provisions severable. View "Byrd v. Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association" on Justia Law

The Hagys took a loan to purchase a mobile home and property on which to park it. In 2010, they defaulted. Green Tree initiated foreclosure. Hagy called Green Tree’s law firm, Demers & Adams, wanting to settling the claim. Demers sent a letter containing a Warranty Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure, stating, “In return for [the Hagys] executing the Deed … Green Tree has advised me that it will waive any deficiency balance.” The Hagys executed the Deed. Demers wrote to the Hagys’ attorney, confirming receipt of the executed Deed and reaffirming that “Green Tree will not attempt to collect any deficiency balance.” Green Tree dismissed the foreclosure complaint but began calling the Hagys to collect the debt that they no longer owed. Green Tree realized its mistake and agreed that the Hagys owed nothing. In 2011, the Hagys sued, citing the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. Green Tree resolved the dispute through arbitration. The court granted the Hagys summary judgment, reasoning that Demers’ letter “fail[ed] to disclose” that it was “from a debt collector” under 15 U.S.C. 1692e(11). The court awarded them $1,800 in statutory damages and $74,196 in attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal and the underlying suit. The complaint failed to identify a cognizable injury traceable to Demers; Congress cannot override Article III of the Constitution by labeling the violation of any statutory requirement a cognizable injury. View "Hagy v. Demers & Adams" on Justia Law

Medical personnel treated three infants, between 19-days old and six-months-old, in the emergency room of Nationwide Children’s Hospital for serious injuries, including skull fractures and a broken leg. Nationwide’s physicians suspected child abuse. They conducted testing to identify additional injuries, then alerted Franklin County Children Services of their concerns. One family did not appeal the finding that the suspicion of child abuse was “substantiated’ or the designation of their case for “ongoing supportive services.” In another case, the county found no evidence of abuse. The parents of the infants filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against Nationwide and the County, alleging that the medical testing violated their children’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and their own right to familial association. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. State action did not prompt Nationwide, a private hospital, to perform the diagnostic tests, and the county had nothing to do with the tests. The court noted that the parents consented to the tests. View "Thomas v. Nationwide Children's Hospital" on Justia Law

John attended a party, drank six beers, then proceeded to a bar and drank more beer and alcohol. He left the bar in the early morning, sufficiently intoxicated that he cannot remember what happened for the remainder of the night. Based on text messages he later found on his cellphone, John knows that he called Jane. The two had engaged in several prior physical encounters. Jane, who had also been drinking, joined John in his bed. According to Jane’s subsequent statement, the two engaged in some consensual sexual acts, but Jane stopped consenting and John continued to engage in non-consensual sexual acts. John was found responsible for violating Miami University’s sexual assault policy and was suspended for four months. John sued Jane, Miami University, and individual University employees. John and Jane reached a settlement. The court dismissed John’s remaining claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of John’s Title IX hostile-environment claim, Title IX deliberate-indifference claim, and 42 U.S.C. 1983 substantive-due-process claim. The court reversed, in part, finding that John sufficiently pleaded procedural-due-process and equal protection claims against one employee based on the claims that she was not an impartial adjudicator and did not fully disclose the evidence against him. The court also reversed a finding of qualified immunity as to that employee and held that John sufficiently pled his Title IX erroneous-outcome claim. View "Doe v. Miami University" on Justia Law

Following a spate of home-invasion robberies around Dallas, police interrupted a robbery attempt that fit the pattern. The robbers fled on foot. Later that day, police arrested Olaya after finding him in a stolen vehicle with a suspected accomplice. The police inventoried the vehicle’s contents, took custody of a cell phone, and obtained a warrant to search the phone. An officer reviewed the phone's contents by hand, found potentially incriminating evidence, took screenshots, then stored the phone in an evidence storage facility. Texas officials then merged their investigation with a federal investigation focused on a multistate criminal enterprise and transferred the phone to the FBI for analysis. The Bureau searched the phone based on the state warrant. Meanwhile, Texas officers came to suspect that Castro had organized the robberies. They followed a signal coming from a stolen cell phone to a house where Castro lived. Officers watched the home, searched it twice, and conducted a brief search of Castro’s cell phones after obtaining her consent. Based on this evidence, a different Texas judge issued search warrants for Castro’s two phones. Officers searched each phone and found incriminating evidence about the robberies. The federal government charged Castro and Olaya with violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The defendants successfully moved to suppress the cell-phone evidence. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that each search complied with the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Castro" on Justia Law

Hill’s death penalty sentence was imposed in 1986. Hill brought a habeas petition, arguing that he may not be executed because he is “intellectually disabled,” as defined in subsequent Supreme Court cases. In 2002 the Sixth Circuit remanded for consideration of the Supreme Court’s opinions on the subject. The Sixth Circuit subsequently concluded that the Ohio courts unreasonably applied the Supreme Court’s three-part standard, which requires three separate findings for a diagnosis of intellectual disability: the individual exhibits significant deficits in intellectual functioning—indicated by an IQ score “approximately two standard deviations or more below the mean,” roughly 70; the individual exhibits significant adaptive skill deficits—such as “the inability to learn basic skills and adjust behavior to changing circumstances” in specified skill sets; and the deficits arose while the individual was still a minor. Hill’s IQ ranges from 48 to 71; his disability was documented before he reached age 18. Ohio courts gave undue weight to Hill’s behavior in prison. Hill was universally considered to be intellectually disabled by teachers, administrators, and the juvenile court system. Hill consistently performed very poorly in school; there was consistent documentation that he had trouble maintaining proper hygiene despite reminders; he had trouble making friends and responding appropriately to authority figures; he was described as vulnerable to exploitation. View "Hill v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Caudill and Goforth broke into White’s home and beat her to death with a hammer when she refused to give them money to buy drugs. After ransacking her home, they loaded her body in the trunk of her car, drove to an empty field, doused the car with gasoline, and set it on fire. A Kentucky jury convicted the two of murder, robbery, burglary, arson, and tampering with evidence. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Caudill’s convictions and death sentence and denied collateral relief. The district court denied Caudill’s federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the state courts reasonably rejected her Batson claim and that her lawyers did not provide ineffective assistance by choosing not to call additional witnesses during the penalty phase. Caudill’s claim made too much of Batson’s “sensitive” inquiry language. The Supreme Court has never directed courts to make detailed findings or to solicit the defense attorney’s views before ruling on a Batson motion. Caudill’s jury selection lasted several days. The judge was there the entire time. He observed the demeanor of the jurors and heard their answers. He listened to the prosecutor’s questions, watched the strikes, and considered the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations. The state judge could have explained more fully why those explanations convinced him that no discrimination was involved but the ruling did not violate clearly established law. View "Caudill v. Conover" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion brought by Ohio death-row inmates to enjoin their pending executions. The inmates claimed that Ohio’s midazolam-based, three-drug execution protocol presents a constitutionally unacceptable risk of pain and suffering. The court found that they had not established “likelihood of success on the merits.” The plaintiffs have “fallen well short” of proving a risk that Ohio’s execution protocol is sure or very likely to cause serious pain and needless suffering. Psychological pain or mental suffering cannot, alone, make a method of execution unconstitutional; Ohio is not required to prove midazolam’s effectiveness in rendering an inmate impervious to the pain from the two injections that follow. Nor did the inmates identify an available, feasible, and readily implemented alternative that will significantly reduce the risk of pain. View "In re: Ohio Execution Protocol Litig." on Justia Law

Superior, a nonprofit corporation, operates 21 Michigan radio broadcast stations. The City of Riverview owns a 320-foot broadcast tower. With an FCC permit to operate a low-powered FM radio broadcast station, Superior contracted to operate broadcasting equipment on the city-owned tower. Superior installed a single-bay antenna at 300 feet and a transmitter in the equipment shelter. The agreement limited modifications to Superior’s equipment; upgrades required the city’s prior approval. Without the city’s knowledge, Superior obtained a modification of its FCC permit to allow a significant increase in broadcast power. In response to Superior’s request, the city engaged a consultant, who reported that the proposed four-bay antenna would cause Superior’s equipment to occupy 30 feet of tower space instead of its current three feet of space; would expose individuals around the tower to unsafe levels of radiofrequency electromagnetic radiation; and might create radio interference with other tower tenants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the city, rejecting arguments under the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. 151. The Agreement unambiguously granted the city the right to refuse Superior’s requested upgrade, which the city properly exercised. The city did not enact a “regulation” within the meaning of the Act but acted in its proprietary capacity and had a rational basis for its actions, so that Superior’s constitutional claims failed. View "Superior Communications v. City of Riverview" on Justia Law

Black was convicted of conspiracy to possess and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and escape or attempted escape from custody, 18 U.S.C. 751(a). He was sentenced to an effective term of life in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Black unsuccessfully sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Black then moved for relief under FRCP 60(b). The district court determined that his grounds for relief were second or successive claims under section 2255 and transferred them to the Sixth Circuit, which denied relief. The transferred grounds raise successive claims. Black’s arguments that the district court “applied the wrong standard” to his arguments about counsel’s conflicts of interest and ineffective assistance are "prototypical attacks" on the court's previous resolution. His claim that the Assistant U.S. Attorney “perpetrated fraud on the Court” does not question “the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.” Black did not argue that the allegedly fraudulent conduct at trial s tainted the assessment of his habeas petition. Because Black presented these claims in a prior application, they “shall be dismissed,” 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1). Black did not cite “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court” or “newly discovered evidence” that would establish that “no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty.” View "In re: Black" on Justia Law