Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 1988, an ALJ awarded Smith supplemental security income (SSI). Smith received benefits until 2004 when he was found to be over the resource limit. Smith filed another SSI application in 2012, alleging additional medical conditions. The application was denied on March 26, 2014. Smith claims that he mailed a request for review on April 24, 2014. On September 21, Smith faxed a correspondence to the Social Security Administration, inquiring about the status of his appeal, with a copy of his request, dated April 24, 2014. A representative informed Smith that his request was not in the “electronic folder,” that if the Council had received the request, it would have mailed a receipt, and that his appeals request was filed as of October 1, 2014. The Council dismissed the request as untimely, finding no good cause to extend the deadline because Smith could not provide evidence that it was sent within the appropriate time. The district court determined that there was no judicial review available because the dismissal did not constitute a final decision and Smith made no colorable constitutional claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Smith suffered due process violations because his request was timely submitted, different ALJs presided over his hearing and signed his decision, and the ALJ referenced the 1988 decision but failed to attach a copy as an exhibit. View "Smith v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

A jeweler and a coin dealer brought facial and as-applied Fourth Amendment challenges to warrantless search provisions in Ohio’s Precious Metals Dealers Act (PMDA). Section 4728.05(A) allows the state to “investigate the business” of licensees and non-licensees with “free access to the books and papers thereof and other sources of information with regard to the[ir] business[es].” Section 4728.06 requires licensees to maintain records, at the licensed premises in a state-approve form, open to inspection by the head of the local police department and, “upon demand,” to show authorities any precious metal within their possession that is listed in these records. Section 4728.07 requires licensees to keep separate records, available to local police “every business day.” Ohio Administrative Code 1301:8-6-03(D), allows the state to inspect “at all times” all sources of information "with regard to the business of the licensee” and requires that licensees maintain their records and inventory at the licensed location. The Sixth Circuit held that the warrantless searches authorized by O.R.C. 4728.05(A) are facially unconstitutional, as not necessary to furthering the state’s interest in recovering stolen jewelry and coins; nor do they serve as adequate warrant substitutes because they are overly broad. The Sixth Circuit upheld sections 4728.06 and 4728.07 as facially constitutional. The state has a substantial interest in regulating precious metals; the provisions are narrowly tailored to address the state’s proffered need to curb the market in stolen precious metals. The court dismissed as-applied challenges to sections 4728.06 and 4728.07 as not ripe. View "Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman" on Justia Law

Lee pleaded guilty to three crimes in Tennessee state court, served his sentences, and was released from state custody in 1998. While serving time in federal prison for a subsequent crime, 20 years later, Lee sought permission to file a second 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition attacking his state convictions. The Sixth Circuit denied his motions. Federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over Lee’s petition regardless of whether he can meet sections 2244(b)’s requirements. Section 2254(a), authorizing district courts to entertain state prisoners’ habeas petitions expressly limits their jurisdiction to petitions filed by persons “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” Lee is no longer in custody, nor on supervised release, pursuant to the state judgment he seeks to attack. That Lee’s state convictions resulted in an enhanced federal sentence does not affect that analysis. View "In re: Lee" on Justia Law

Peffer, a caregiver, grew marijuana for medical-marijuana patients and sold the excess to Beemer’s Medical Marijuana Dispensary. Beemer became a confidential informant. Driving to meet Beemer, Peffer was stopped by Officer Coon, who found marijuana in Peffer’s vehicle. Peffer was arrested. Months later, Child Services and the School District received letters, purportedly from Coon, expressing concern for Beemer’s children. Coon thought Peffer was responsible. Investigating officers had other suspects. Later, Trooper Glentz, investigating the letters, received what appeared to be marijuana seeds in mailed packages. Fliers identifying Beemer as a confidential informant, with an ostensibly official list of charges against Beemer, were mailed to businesses. Various factors pointed to Peffer. Sergeant Stephens obtained a warrant for the Peffer house, authorizing the search of electronic devices, electronic communications, and mailing items. Stephens asserted that the house “may contain evidence of the crime of Impersonating a Police Officer and Witness Intimidation.” After investigation of items seized in the search, prosecutors declined to pursue charges against Peffer. Peffer sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Stephens. The warrant was supported by probable cause. That the affidavit did not allege that Peffer owned a computer or that he kept one at his residence is immaterial because the averment that he used one in the commission of a crime created the presumption that it would be found at his residence. Stephens was entitled to qualified immunity. Even if sending the letters were not criminal under Michigan law, the law on this point was not clearly established. View "Peffer v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Herald-Leader sells and distributes Community News, a weekly four- to six-page non-subscription publication, containing local news and advertising for Lexington, Kentucky and the surrounding area. Herald-Leader delivers Community News free of charge to more than 100,000 households each week, including by driveway delivery. Lexington adopted an ordinance that permits the delivery of “unsolicited written materials” only: to a porch, nearest the front door; securely attached to the front door; through a mail slot; between an exterior front door and an interior front door; in a distribution box on or adjacent to the premises, if permitted; or personally with the owner, occupant, or lessee. Before the law went into effect, Herald-Leader obtained a preliminary injunction to prevent its enforcement. The Sixth Circuit reversed and vacated the injunction, finding that Herald-Leader had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its First Amendment claim. The ordinance is narrowly tailored to further the city’s goals of reducing visual blight and reducing litter. The court rejected an overbreadth argument and stated that, in determining whether the law leaves adequate alternative methods of communication, the district court failed to balance expense against the harms that can arise when cheap and efficient methods of circulating written materials are abused. View "Lexington H-L Services, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government" on Justia Law

Miller was sentenced to death for a 1981 murder. A psychiatrist who examined Miller twice found him competent to stand trial and opined that Miller was not insane at the time of the murder. The court denied Miller’s request to appoint a psychiatrist to assist at trial. His sentence was upheld by the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his section 2254 habeas petition, considering only the denial of state funds for an independent mental-health expert during the guilt phase of Miller’s trial and a challenge to the jury instructions. Seeking to revisit his ineffective-assistance claim, previously found to have been procedurally defaulted, under the Supreme Court’s decisions in Martinez (2012) and Trevino (2013), Miller unsuccessfully moved for relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b)(6). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Supreme Court rulings allow a prisoner to show cause to excuse an otherwise-defaulted ineffective assistance claim by presenting a substantial claim, showing that state law required him to bring that claim during an initial-review post-conviction proceeding, and showing that he received either no assistance or ineffective assistance during that initial state post-conviction proceeding. Given the uncertainty of establishing prejudice, his claim is not “unquestionably meritorious” and he has not presented a clear case of ineffective assistance that overcomes other relevant equitable factors, especially Miller’s lack of diligence in raising his Martinez claim. View "Miller v. Mays" on Justia Law

In 2014, voters approved an amendment to the Tennessee Constitution making clear that the Constitution is not to be construed as securing or protecting a right to abortion or requiring funding of an abortion (Amendment 1). Plaintiffs, individual voters, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that, in counting the votes on Amendment 1, state officials incorrectly interpreted Article XI, Section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution, which states: if the people shall approve and ratify such amendment or amendments by a majority of all the citizens of the State voting for Governor, voting in their favor, such amendment or amendments shall become a part of this Constitution. The district court ordered the state officials to recount the votes in accordance with plaintiffs’ proposed interpretation. The Sixth Circuit reversed. A state-court declaratory judgment on the meaning of Article XI, Section 3 is entitled to conclusive effect and the method of counting votes employed by state officials in 2014 was faithful to the actual meaning of the provision. This is not the “exceptional case” that warrants federal intervention in a lawful state election. There was no cognizable infringement of plaintiffs’ due process rights; plaintiffs failed to identify how their right to vote was burdened by disparate treatment. View "George v. Hargett" on Justia Law

Downs pled guilty to conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. On August 2, 2010, the court orally pronounced a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment, then the mandatory-minimum. The next day, the President signed the Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced to five the mandatory minimum sentence for Downs's crime. On August 16, 2010, the court entered judgment in Downs’s case. In 2012, the Supreme Court held that the Act applied to defendants sentenced after August 3, 2010. Downs moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that he was not “sentenced” until the district court entered its judgment. The district court and Sixth Circuit disagreed. The law uniformly treats the date of the court’s oral pronouncement of sentence as the date of sentencing. While his co-defendants had later hearings and were sentenced under the Act, a court needs” legal grounds, not just equitable ones,” to apply the Act. Downs’s counsel was not constitutionally incompetent; the Act said nothing about having any retroactive effect. District courts are generally bound by the sentences they orally pronounce, so a motion for reconsideration would have been futile, as would a direct appeal. View "Downs v. United States" on Justia Law

Stimmel tried to purchase a firearm at a Walmart store in 2002. The store rejected Stimmel’s offer because a mandatory national background check revealed that he had been convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence in 1997. Stimmel has not been convicted of another crime. Federal law prohibits domestic violence misdemeanants from possessing firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). He unsuccessfully appealed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and challenged the law in district court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his complaint. The law survives intermediate scrutiny and does not unconstitutionally burden Stimmel’s Second Amendment rights. The court noted “the growing consensus of our sister circuits that have unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the domestic violence misdemeanant restriction to firearms possession.” The record contains sufficient evidence to reasonably conclude that disarming domestic violence misdemeanants is substantially related to the government’s compelling interest of preventing gun violence and, particularly, domestic gun violence. View "Stimmel v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Ferndale Officer Jaklic stopped Latits for turning the wrong way onto a divided boulevard after midnight. Latits opened his glove box to retrieve his registration. Jaklic testified that he saw bags that he suspected to contain marijuana, which Latits attempted to move. A dashboard video shows that Jaklic pointed his gun at the ground for about 30 seconds, then pointed it, point-blank. Jaklic broadcast that he was pursuing a fleeing vehicle. Three officers joined the chase. Department policy prohibits more than two cars from pursuing a fleeing car without special permission. Latits can be seen steering away from Jaklic’s car in a vacant parking lot but Jaklic broadcast that Latits “tried to ram my vehicle,” Latits fled, entering a highway. The chase continued through two red lights in an uninhabited area. Officer Wurm twice collided with Latits’s car, causing Latits to lose control. Phillips rammed Latits’s car, which stopped, then slowly moved forward. Latits’s and Jaklic’s cars collided at low speed. Phillips ran toward Latits’s car from behind. Latits started reversing away with Phillips following; gunshots are heard on the recording. Phillips could see that no cars or persons were immediately behind Latits. Latits, struck by three bullets, died. Less than four minutes passed from Latits driving away from Jaklic until the shooting. Phillips violated multiple department procedures and was terminated. In a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, the court granted Phillips summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Phillips’s use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment, but then-existing precedent did not clearly establish the objective unreasonableness under these circumstances; Phillips is entitled to qualified immunity. View "Latits v. Phillips" on Justia Law