Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Flint, which previously obtained water from DWSD, decided to join the Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA). The DWSD contract terminated in 2014. Because KWA would take years to construct, Flint chose the Flint River as an interim source. A 2011 Report had determined that river water would need to be treated to meet safety regulations; the cost of treatment was less than continuing with DWSD. Genesee County also decided to switch to KWA but continued to purchase DWSD water during construction. Flint did not upgrade its treatment plants or provide additional safety measures before switching. Residents immediately complained that the water “smelled rotten, looked foul, and tasted terrible.” Tests detected coliform and E. coli bacteria; the water was linked to Legionnaire’s disease. General Motors discontinued its water service, which was corroding its parts. Eventually, the city issued a notice that the drinking water violated standards, but was safe to drink. Subsequent testing indicated high levels of lead and trihalomethane that did not exceed the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) Lead and Copper Rule’s “action level.” The tests indicated that corrosion control treatment was needed to counteract lead levels. The City Council voted to reconnect with DWSD; the vote was overruled by the state-appointed Emergency Manager. The EPA warned of high lead levels; officials distributed filters. Genesee County declared a public health emergency in Flint, advising residents not to drink the water. The Emergency Manager ordered reconnection to DWSD but the supply pipes' protective coating had been damaged by River water. Flint remains in a state of emergency but residents have been billed continuously for water. The Michigan Civil Rights Commission determined that the response to the crisis was “the result of systemic racism.” The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal, as preempted by SDWA, of cases under 42 U.S.C. 1983. SDWA has no textual preemption of section 1983 claims and SDWA’s remedial scheme does not demonstrate such an intention. The rights and protections found in the constitutional claims diverge from those provided by SDWA. The court affirmed dismissal of claims against state defendants as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. View "Boler v. Earley" on Justia Law

Darrah, a Madison Correctional Institution (MCI) inmate, sued medical staff under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Darrah had a severe form of psoriasis that causes debilitating pain from large and deep fissures that form on the bottom of the feet. He had been treated successfully with Soriatane; multiple other treatments had proven ineffective. Soriatane was not listed on the Drug Formulary for Ohio prisons and could not be dispensed without prior authorization. MCI was not able to obtain non-Formulary drugs at the time of Darrah’s arrival. After weeks without the drug, Darrah developed fissures on his heels, pain, and difficulty walking. The doctors tried other drugs. Darrah visited the infirmary repeatedly, filed complaints and a grievance, but a year elapsed before he received Soriatane. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. It was “clearly established” by 2011 that neglecting to provide a prisoner with needed medication, choosing to prescribe an arguably less efficacious treatment method, and continuing on a treatment path that was clearly ineffective could constitute a constitutional violation. The facts could support a finding of deliberate indifference. View "Darrah v. Krisher" on Justia Law

Lincoln Park’s dire financial condition led Michigan officials to place the city under the purview of an Emergency Manager pursuant to the Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 141.1541. Emergency Manager Coulter, with the approval of Michigan’s Treasurer, issued 10 orders that temporarily replaced Lincoln Park retiree health-care benefits with monthly stipends that retirees could use to purchase individual health-care coverage. Retirees filed sui under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting violations of the Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Takings Clause. The district court rejected the Treasurer’s motion to dismiss, arguing qualified immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The court held, as a matter of first impression, that an alleged Contracts Clause violation cannot give rise to a cause of action under section 1983. With respect to other constitutional claims, the claimed property right derives from contract; a state contract action would be sufficient to safeguard the retirees’ contractual property rights. Because the state contract action is available as a remedy for any uncompensated taking the challenges to the constitutionality of Coulter’s orders are not ripe for resolution. As the claims fail on the merits, there is no need to evaluate the alleged immunity defenses. View "Kaminski v. Coulter" on Justia Law

Edwards was killed in 1991. In 1999, Defendant, incarcerated on unrelated charges, contacted Chattanooga Police, stating he had information related to the unsolved murder. Detective Mathis interviewed Defendant. Defendant was not under arrest or charged with Edwards’ murder at the time of his recorded confession. Mathis testified he did not promise anything in return for the confession; that Defendant waived his right to remain silent and to an attorney; that he talked with Defendant for some time before reading him his Miranda rights because Defendant stated that he had heard about the murder, not that he was involved; and that he told Defendant that he would tell the district attorney’s office that Defendant had come forward and cooperated. Defendant testified that he asked to speak with his attorney but that Mathis stated he did not need an attorney and that Mathis promised him that Defendant would not be charged with the murder and promised to speak with Defendant’s parole officer and the district attorney about other cases in return for cooperation. A jury convicted him of first-degree felony murder and aggravated robbery. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal; state courts denied post-conviction relief. The district court denied petitions for federal habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The state court’s ruling was objectively reasonable in finding that Defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes. An individual who is not in Miranda custody has no constitutional right to counsel. View "Schreane v. Ebbert" on Justia Law

Wesley was an elementary school counselor in Covington, Kentucky. Seven-year-old J.S., who suffered from psychological problems, told his mother that Wesley had sexually assaulted him. Campbell, a social worker, talked to J.S. and contacted Detective Rigney, Rigney and Campbell interviewed 32 other students who had contact with Wesley; none disclosed any inappropriate behavior. A medical exam of J.S. did not reveal any evidence of abuse. Rigney obtained a warrant for Wesley’s arrest. Rigney did not interview employees who worked near Wesley’s office, although the sexual abuse allegedly occurred in Wesley’s office, with the door ajar and others able to see inside. The charges were dismissed. In Wesley’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the jury found that Rigney lacked probable cause to secure an arrest warrant; facts misrepresented in or omitted from Rigney’s affidavit and warrant application were material; and the misrepresentations or omissions were done intentionally, deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the truth. The jury awarded Wesley $589,000 in compensatory and $500,000 in punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Rigney’s arguments concerning failure to instruct the jury adequately about qualified immunity; the court’s reference to J.S.’s psychological history during the probable-cause jury instruction; the denial of a motion regarding the availability of punitive damages; and the court’s refusal to remit the damage awards. View "Wesley v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The Alger County, Michigan dispatch center received a report that Mitchell had assaulted “Kevin,” had been drinking, and was “swerving all over the road.” Officer Schlabach identified Mitchell’s car, followed it into a parking lot, and stopped alongside. Mitchell sped back onto the highway. Schlabach pursued Mitchell through residential neighborhoods, around cars, and through stop signs, often in excess of 100 miles per hour in pouring rain. Minutes later, Mitchell ran his car into a ditch in a national forest. Schlabach parked 63.6 feet from Mitchell’s car. Mitchell exited the car, looked toward Schlabach, then turned away and crouched toward the ground. Mitchell appeared to be unarmed. Schlabach drew his handgun and slowly approached Mitchell. Mitchell walked toward Schlabach with “[c]lenched fists, wide eyes, coming directly ... towards me, ... refusing to listen to any of my direct commands.” The dash-cam video did not clearly show Mitchell’s facial expressions but left “little room to doubt the hostility of Mitchell’s approach” even after Schlabach began backing away in fear. Mitchell pressed Schlabach all the way across the road. Schlabach fired a shot. Mitchell hunched over slightly but continued moving purposefully toward Schlabach. Schlabach fired again. Mitchell collapsed and died. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment of qualified immunity in favor of Schlabach, noting that the confrontation took less than 20 seconds. Courts must make an “allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments.” View "Mitchell v. Schlabach" on Justia Law

Perry conditionally pled guilty to conspiring to possess narcotics with intent to distribute. On appeal, Perry argued that the activities indicating drug sales that were observed over the seven weeks before the issuance of the search warrant were stale evidence because the activities were not individually dated. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of his motion to suppress. Even without specific dates, the amount of suspicious activity observed within the seven weeks in connection with Perry’s apartment was enough to support probable cause. The court noted several complaints from concerned residents about drug sales being conducted in the apartment complex and in a black Chevrolet Impala and naming Perry and his girlfriend as the sellers; Perry had several prior drug charges; an officer observed Perry exchange money and packages, which appeared to contain marijuana, at a fence; the officer observed multiple additional transactions involving Perry and his girlfriend that appeared to be drug transactions. The officer stated that his observations occurred between October 15 and December 3—two to 51 days before the probable-cause determination; his observations of heavy car and foot traffic, repeated transactions, and one particular transaction, all suggested that apartment four was home to a sizeable ongoing drug business. View "United States v. Perry" on Justia Law

Crosby, a tenured professor at the University of Kentucky’s College of Public Health, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, claiming that his removal as Department Chair amounted to a deprivation of his protected property and liberty interests without due process of law. He claimed that the defendants were not protected by qualified immunity and were liable under contract law for monetary damages. Before his removal, Crosby had been investigated for being “[v]olatile,” “explosive,” “disrespectful,” “very condescending,” and “out of control.” The report included an allegation that Crosby stated that the Associate Dean for Research had been appointed “because she is a woman, genitalia” and contained claims that the Department’s performance was suffering as a result of Crosby’s temper and hostility toward other departments. The University declined Crosby’s request to handle his appeal under a proposed Governing Regulation and stated that existing regulations would apply. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of his claims.Crosby identified no statute, formal contract, or contract implied from the circumstances that supports his claim to a protected property interest in his position as Chair; “the unlawfulness” of the defendants’ actions was not apparent “in the light of pre-existing law,” so they were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Crosby v. University of Kentucky" on Justia Law

In 2005, Sutton committed four armed bank robberies in quick succession in Kentucky and Ohio. He agreed to plead guilty to the Kentucky charges in the Southern District of Ohio. Sutton never formally entered a guilty plea to the Kentucky charges but was sentenced as if he had. Five years later, Sutton moved to vacate (28 U.S.C. 2255), challenging his conviction on the Kentucky charges. The Southern District of Ohio vacated the conviction and transferred the case to the Eastern District of Kentucky, where Sutton was arraigned and entered a not guilty plea, 11 years after he was indicted. He moved to dismiss, alleging that violations of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, and the Sixth Amendment. The court denied the motion. Sutton entered a conditional plea and was sentenced to 25 years to run consecutively to the Ohio sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The speedy trial analysis is “necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances.” Even if all four “Barker factors” are satisfied, a court is not required to conclude that a defendant’s speedy trial right was violated. The unique facts of this case demonstrate why such flexibility is necessary. Although the Ohio court and the government were at fault, their collective behavior was consistent with Sutton’s intention to plead guilty. View "United States v. Sutton" on Justia Law

Parrino worked as a pharmacist for NRS. He was responsible for preparing medications, mainly inhalers. After leaving NRS, Parrino was contacted by the FDA and FBI, which were investigating reports that NRS was filling prescription medications for Pulmicort, a steroid used for the treatment of asthma, with a sub-potent amount of the active ingredient. Parrino cooperated and pleaded guilty to introducing misbranded drugs into interstate commerce, 21 U.S.C. 331(a), 352(a), and 18 U.S.C. 2, a strict liability misdemeanor. Parrino was sentenced to one year of probation and ordered to pay $14,098.24 in restitution for Medicaid and Medicare payments. The Department of Health and Human Services notified Parrino that it was required to exclude him from participation in any capacity in the Medicare, Medicaid, and all federal healthcare programs for at least five years, under 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7(a). Rejecting Parrino’s argument that he lacked any mens rea to commit a crime and was convicted of a strict liability misdemeanor, an ALJ and the Appeals Board upheld HHS’s decision. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Parrino’s suit, finding that HHS’s action affected no substantive due process right because “health care providers are not the intended beneficiaries of the federal health care programs” and that the decision to exclude Parrino was “not so shocking as to shake the foundations of this country.” View "Parrino v. Price" on Justia Law