Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Robert McCrary challenged his forty-eight-month prison sentence for possessing fentanyl with the intent to distribute it. Although within the twenty-year statutory maximum for that offense, McCrary’s forty-eight-month sentence was four times higher than the high end of the advisory guideline range. The district court varied upward after concluding McCrary’s post-offense rehabilitation did not outweigh the fact that the fentanyl McCrary distributed resulted in another’s death. On appeal, McCrary contended his sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the appeal waiver to which McCrary agreed precluded the Court's review of his procedural arguments and that his sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. McCrary" on Justia Law

Defendant Zachary Babcock appealed the denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate and correct his sentence on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued his counsel failed to object to a sentencing-guidelines enhancement under USSG § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) based on prior Utah convictions of a “controlled substance offense” as defined by USSG § 4B1.2(b). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had previously held Colorado and Kansas statutes that prohibited a "mere offer" to sell a controlled substance, without requiring proof of intent to actually distribute or complete a sale, did not satisfy the definition of "controlled substance offense." The Tenth Circuit found guideline commentary stated that an attempt to commit a controlled-substance offense was itself a controlled-substance offense, and the Court's opinions left open the possibility that an offer-to-sell statute could satisfy the conditions necessary to be considered an attempt-to-sell statute. Defendant contended his trial counsel should have argued at sentencing: (1) that an offer to sell under the Utah statute was not necessarily an attempt to commit a controlled-substance offense; and (2) that the guideline commentary stating that an attempt to commit a controlled-substance offense was also a controlled-substance offense improperly expanded the text of the guideline.The Tenth Circuit determined defense counsel's failure to make those two arguments did not constitute deficient performance because the first argument lacked merit and the second "would have been a stretch at the time." View "United States v. Babcock" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Briar Adams was convicted of aggravated battery. The district court applied U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 2K2.1(a)(4) to defendant who had a prior conviction in Kansas for aggravated battery. In considering that conviction, the court classified aggravated battery as a crime of violence and sentenced Adams to 51 months’ imprisonment. Adams challenged this classification, arguing that Kansas’s crime of aggravated battery included conduct that wouldn’t create a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines. To this, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed: "in Kansas an aggravated battery could stem from battery against a fetus, and the guidelines’ definition of a crime of violence wouldn’t cover battery against a fetus. Because the Kansas crime of aggravated battery doesn’t constitute a crime of violence," the Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

A federal district court concluded that a reasonable factfinder could determine that a law-enforcement officer, Officer Michael DiNapoli, had punched, tackled, and used a chokehold on plaintiff-appellee Greg McWilliams. At the time, McWilliams was suspected only of trespassing on a marina by riding in a golf cart. McWilliams sued DiNapoli under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In response, DiNapoli moved for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) his use of force had been reasonable; and (2) he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, DiNapoli argued: (1) a surveillance video blatantly contradictd the district court’s factual determination that McWilliams had not touched DiNapoli’s chest; and (2) even under the district court’s factual determinations, DiNapoli did not commit a constitutional violation because his use of force was reasonable. The Tenth Circuit concluded it was bound by the district court's factual assessment, and the district court did not err in denying qualified immunity. View "McWilliams v. Dinapoli, et al." on Justia Law

After a jury convicted Jose Hernandez-Calvillo and Mauro Papalotzi (collectively, Appellees) of conspiring to encourage or induce a noncitizen to reside in the United States, they challenged the statute as overbroad under the First Amendment and successfully moved to dismiss the indictment on that basis. The government appealed. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed: 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)'s plain language targets protected speech, and the government’s proposed limiting construction found support in the statute’s text or surrounding context. "And when properly construed, the statute criminalizes a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech, creating a real danger that the statute will chill First Amendment expression." The Court thus held the statute was substantially overbroad, and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the indictment. View "United States v. Hernandez-Calvillo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Abade Irizarry, a a YouTube journalist and blogger, was filming a DUI traffic stop in Lakewood, Colorado. Officer Ahmed Yehia arrived on the scene and stood in front of Irizarry, obstructing his filming of the stop. When Irizarry and a fellow journalist objected, Officer Yehia shined a flashlight into Irizarry’s camera and then drove his police cruiser at the two journalists. Irizarry sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Officer Yehia violated his First Amendment rights. The district court granted the motion, concluding that the complaint alleged a First Amendment constitutional violation based on prior restraint and retaliation. Although the Tenth Circuit had not previously recognized a First Amendment right to record police officers performing their official duties in public, the district court, relying on out-of-circuit decisions, held that the First Amendment guaranteed such a right, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. The district court nonetheless held that Officer Yehia was entitled to qualified immunity because Irizarry had not shown a violation of clearly established law. The Tenth Circuit found the complaint alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim under clearly established law, so Officer Yehia was not entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "Irizarry v. Yehia" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Reed pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the district court concluded Defendant’s previous convictions for drug distribution qualified him for enhanced criminal penalties under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The district court applied the ACCA enhancement and sentenced Defendant to 15 years’ imprisonment—the mandatory minimum. Defendant argued on appeal: (1) his guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary because his counsel erroneously advised him that the ACCA was unlikely to apply; (2) the district court lacked the power to decide whether his prior federal drug-trafficking convictions qualified as ACCA predicate felonies; and (3) he was given insufficient notice that the ACCA might apply to him. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Reed" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Cl.G., on behalf of his minor son, C.G., appealed a district court’s dismissal of his case against Defendants-Appellees Cherry Creek School District (District or CCSD) and various employees for alleged constitutional violations stemming from C.G.’s suspension and expulsion from Cherry Creek High School (CCHS). In 2019, C.G. was off campus at a thrift store with three friends. He took a picture of his friends wearing wigs and hats, including “one hat that resembled a foreign military hat from the World War II period.” C.G. posted that picture on Snapchat and captioned it, “Me and the boys bout [sic] to exterminate the Jews.” C.G.’s post (the photo and caption) was part of a private “story,” visible only to Snapchat users connected with C.G. on that platform. Posts on a user’s Snapchat story are automatically deleted after 24 hours, but C.G. removed this post after a few hours. He then posted on his Snapchat story, “I’m sorry for that picture it was ment [sic] to be a joke.” One of C.G.’s Snapchat “friend[s]” took a photograph of the post before C.G. deleted it and showed it to her father. The father called the police, who visited C.G.’s house and found no threat. Referencing prior anti-Semitic activity and indicating that the post caused concern for many in the Jewish community, a CCHS parent emailed the school and community leaders about the post, leading to C.G.'s expulsion. Plaintiff filed suit claiming violations of C.G.'s constitutional rights. Defendants moved to dismiss, which was ultimately granted. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the First Amendment limited school authority to regulate off-campus student speech, particularly speech unconnected with a school activity and not directed at the school or its specific members. Defendants maintained that C.G. was lawfully disciplined for what amounts to off-campus hate speech. According to Defendants, although originating off campus, C.G.’s speech still spread to the school community, disrupted the school’s learning environment, and interfered with the rights of other students to be free from harassment and receive an education. The Tenth Circuit determined Plaintiff properly pled that Defendants violated C.G.’s First Amendment rights by disciplining him for his post; the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s first claim was reversed in part. The Court affirmed dismissal of Plaintiff’s further facial challenges to CCSD’s policies. Questions of qualified and absolute immunity and Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim were remanded for further consideration. View "C1.G v. Siegfried, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant David Wells brutally assaulted his wife, V.W. A grand jury issued an indictment charging Wells with committing: (1) aggravated sexual abuse in “Indian country;” (2) assault with the intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country; (3) assault resulting in serious bodily injury in Indian country; and (4) assault with a dangerous weapon in Indian country. After a petit jury convicted Wells on all four counts, the district court sentenced him to a lengthy term of incarceration. Wells appealed, challenging his convictions and sentence. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined none of Wells’s challenges to his conviction were meritorious. At sentencing, however, the district court erred in adjusting upward Wells’s total offense level on the basis Wells obstructed justice when he violated an order directing that he have no contact with V.W. The Tenth Circuit remanded the matter to the district court for the narrow purpose of vacating Wells’s sentence and conducting any further necessary proceeding with regard to the section 3C1.1 obstruction-of-justice adjustment. View "United States v. Wells" on Justia Law

Ariza Barreras, T.B., and F.B. (“the children”) were siblings. In May 2017, the children were transferred to the New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department's (“CYFD”) custody. At the time, Barreras was four months old, T.B. was two years old, and F.B. was one year old. CYFD employees Michelle Hill and Lora Valdez placed the children with foster parents Vanessa Dominguez and Justin Romero without evaluating whether Barreras and T.B., who were exposed to drugs in utero, “should have been treated and cared for as ‘special needs’ children and placed with foster parents who had received . . . additional training.” Dominguez and Romero had no experience as full-time foster parents for multiple children under the age of three with special needs. Hill and Valdez allegedly made this full-time placement even though Dominguez and Romero were licensed only as respite care providers. This case arose from allegations of abuse of T.B. and F.B., and the death of Ariza. The specific issue was whether the "special relationship" doctrine exposed five CYFD employees from liability when they all asserted qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the children’s representatives’ allegations stated a plausible claim that two of the CYFD employees—Leah Montano and Gwendolyn Griffin—violated the children’s substantive due process rights. However, the district court erred by concluding that the other three employees—Kim Chavez-Buie, Michelle Hill, and Lora Valdez—committed a constitutional violation. The district court also erred by finding that the clearly established prong of qualified immunity had been waived for purposes of this motion. The Court therefore reversed as to Chavez-Buie, Hill, and Valdez on the constitutional violation prong of qualified immunity because the complaint failed to allege liability under the special relationship doctrine. Chavez-Buie, Hill, and Valdez were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. The Court reversed as to Montano and Griffin on the clearly established prong of qualified immunity because, even though it agreed with the district court that the allegations state a claim under the special relationship doctrine, the Court found the district court incorrectly deemed the clearly established prong waived. The case was remanded for a determination whether Montano and Griffin violated clearly established law. View "Hunt, et al. v. Montano, et al." on Justia Law