Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After Wichita police received a seemingly legitimate call, officers had to make a split-second decision based on fraudulent threats and reports of violence. Unfortunately, that "swatting" call and the subsequent reaction from police resulted in an innocent man’s death. Officers rushed to Andrew Finch's house, where the caller claimed a deranged man who had just killed his father and was holding the rest of his family hostage at gunpoint. Finch had not committed any crime and had no way of knowing why police were surrounding his home. As Finch exited the house, multiple officers yelled different commands. Ten seconds later, one officer thought he saw Finch reaching for a weapon and shot him in the chest. Finch's estate brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force and other constitutional violations. The district court granted summary judgement in favor of some of the responding officers and the City of Wichita, but denied summary judgment as to the officer who fired the fatal shots. Finch appealed the grant of summary judgment to one officer and the City; the officer appealed the denial of qualified immunity. The district court held that a reasonable jury could have found that Finch was unarmed and unthreatening. The Tenth Circuit concluded it was bound by those findings for the purposes of this appeal. Thus, the claims against Officer Rapp could go forward. The Court found the claims against the City were properly resolved. In addition, the Court concluded the district court correctly found that Finch did not put forth sufficient evidence to prevail on his municipal liability claim against the City. View "Finch, et al. v. Rapp" on Justia Law

In his trial for assaulting his uncle with a knife, defendant-appellant Shayne Armajo sought to introduce evidence of his uncle’s assaults in order to bolster a self-defense claim. The issue defendant’s appeal presented for the Tenth Circuit’s consideration was whether the district court abused its discretion when it ruled that this was a permissible use under Rule 404(b) but nevertheless excluded most of the proffered evidence under Rule 403 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. Evidence of a victim’s prior violent acts may be admissible in a self-defense case to prove the defendant’s state of mind, but it is subject to Rule 403’s balancing test. As applied here, the Court found the district court reasonably concluded that the probative value of the victim’s alleged assaults was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Consequently, the Court held the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the contested evidence. View "United States v. Armajo" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Connor Biggs Farley appeals the 630-month (52.5-year) sentence he received after pleading guilty to three counts of producing child pornography. In imposing this sentence, the district court rejected the sentence of 20 to 40 years (240 to 480 months) that was stipulated in Farley’s plea agreement with the government, but the court also varied downward from the 1080-month (90-year) sentence recommended by the presentence report, which corresponded to the statutory maximum sentence of 30 years (360 months) on each count, run consecutively. On appeal, Farley argued the district court’s selection of his sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The Tenth Circuit found that the district court’s method for determining Farley’s sentence involved plain errors of law, rendering the sentence procedurally unreasonable. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded resentencing. View "United States v. Biggs Farley" on Justia Law

Defendant Aaron Shamo was convicted by jury on 12 charges arising from his distribution of controlled substances, including fake oxycodone pills laced with fentanyl. He received a mandatory life sentence on his conviction of being a principal leader of a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE). On appeal, Defendant challenged the sufficiency of evidence of his guilt of the CCE charge because: (1) the government failed to prove that the drug he was distributing was the chemical designated in the criminal statute; and (2) the government failed to prove that he knew he was distributing a controlled substance. He also challenged the admissibility: (a) of screenshots of his illicit online storefront to prove the quantity of drugs distributed; and (b) of testimony by an expert witness who allegedly opined on the meaning of certain language in the CCE statute. He also raised allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in suggesting that he was responsible for uncharged overdose deaths and should be punished because of the social costs of unlawful narcotics. After careful consideration of defendant's arguments, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed defendant's convictions. View "United States v. Shamo" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Jesus Arellanes-Portillo pled guilty to a collection of federal drug-trafficking, money-laundering, and immigration crimes. He challenged the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, arguing the district court misapplied a three-level aggravating-role adjustment in calculating his advisory guideline range for his money-laundering offenses. After review, the Tenth Circuit found the district court plainly erred by basing the aggravating-role adjustment on relevant conduct for his drug offenses and not exclusively for his money-laundering offenses, in violation of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2S1.1 Application Note 2(C) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2018). The sentence was vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Arellanes-Portillo" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Devonte Starks appealed his convictions for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, and possession with intent to distribute heroin. In its closing argument at trial, the government advised the jury that Starts' right to be presumed innocent no longer existed after the presentation of the trial evidence. Starks did not object to this presumption-of-innocence advisement. The Tenth Circuit's review was for plain error, and the court found the district court plainly erred in allowing the advisement to stand uncorrected before the jury, and this error had "some prejudicial effects." Those effects cumulated with the prejudicial effects stemming from two other errors (which the government conceded), Starks' convictions could not stand. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Starks" on Justia Law

Defendants-Appellants Dalton Hartley and Corey Detter, in separate criminal cases, each moved for early termination of probation under 18 U.S.C. 3564(c). The same district judge denied their motions for the exact same reason. Hartley pled guilty to aiding and abetting the acquiring of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 843(a)(3) and 18 U.S.C. 2. His plea agreement included an appeal waiver. The district court sentenced him to probation for three years, set to expire on August 1, 2022. On January 12, 2022, Hartley moved for early termination of his probation; the district court denied the motion on the day it was filed. Detter pled guilty without a plea agreement to one count of manufacturing counterfeit currency, and to two counts of possessing counterfeit currency. The district court sentenced him to probation for three years, set to end on July 30, 2022. The same district judge who denied Hartley’s motion also denied Detter’s. Hartley and Detter argued the district court abused its discretion by adopting a blanket policy to deny them relief under section 3564(c) and refusing to consider the statutory criteria. The Tenth Circuit found the Government had not and could not meet its burden to show that, absent the district court’s abuse of discretion here, the result would have been the same, especially in light of the court’s finding that each defendant’s conduct on probation was “meritorious. And it has not pointed to anything in the record to suggest that individualized consideration of the section 3553(a) factors and the interest of justice would lead to denial of Mr. Hartley’s and Mr. Detter’s motions for early termination of probation.” The Court denied the Government’s motion to dismiss Hartley’s appeal based on the appeal waiver provision in his plea agreement. Furthermore, the Court reversed the district court’s orders denying Hartley’s and Detter’s motions for early termination of probation under 18 U.S.C. 3564(c) and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Hartley" on Justia Law

Various City of Denver officials, and certain State of Colorado officials, authorized and/or conducted sweeps of homeless encampments throughout Denver, Colorado. The advocacy organization, Denver Homeless Out Loud and several people experiencing homelessness (“DHOL Plaintiffs”), alleged these sweeps violated the rights of persons experiencing homelessness and breached a settlement agreement resolving related litigation. The DHOL Plaintiffs therefore filed this putative class action and corresponding motion for a preliminary injunction, asking the federal district court in Colorado to enjoin all sweeps or, in the alternative, require seven days’ advanced notice for all sweeps. The district court granted the motion in part after concluding the DHOL Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim was likely to succeed on the merits. The district court then issued a preliminary injunction requiring the Denver Defendants to satisfy additional notice and procedural requirements before conducting future sweeps. The Denver Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the injunction. Finding that the district court abused its discretion in ruling the first preliminary injunction factor weighed in the DHOL Plaintiffs' favor (and ultimately granting the preliminary injunction), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order. View "Denver Homeless Out Loud, et al. v. Denver, Colorado, et al." on Justia Law

On June 13, 2014, Beaver County Correctional Facility (“BCCF”) officers responded to reports of a truck running into parked cars. The decedent, Troy Bradshaw, was arrested Bradshaw for driving under the influence and he was transported to Beaver Valley Hospital. A deputy completed the Initial Arrestee Assessment (IAA), which reflected that Bradshaw previously considered suicide; was not thinking about it currently; had a brother who committed or attempted suicide; and was intoxicated. Bradshaw stated that he would kill himself if placed in a cell. After the IAA, the officers placed Bradshaw on suicide watch. Bradshaw beat on the cell door for two to three hours. Officers did not place him in a safety smock or create a suicide watch log, in violation of BCCF’s suicide-prevention policy, but a corporal monitored Bradshaw by sitting in the booking area all night. By June 14, Bradshaw was no longer acting violently, and he was transferred from a suicide-watch cell two to cell three, pertinent here, a cell with bed linens. Just after noon on June 15, Bradshaw was found dead in his cell after he hanged himself with some of the provided bedding. Bradshaw’s mother, plaintiff Kathy George, sued on behalf of her son’s estate, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 that prison defendants violated Bradshaw’s Fourteenth Amendment rights and “Utah Code Article I, Section 7.” The district court granted summary judgment to all prison defendants because the law entitled them to qualified immunity, and no Beaver County policy violated Bradshaw’s constitutional rights. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that although Plaintiff proved that certain officers failed to follow Beaver County’s suicide-prevention policy, “failing to follow prison policy is not a constitutional violation in and of itself.” View "George v. Beaver County, et al." on Justia Law

While defendant-appellant Laquan Shakespeare was serving the supervised-release portion of his sentence for violating 18 U.S.C. sections 1153 and 2243(a) (the “2018 conviction”), he sexually assaulted a fourteen-year-old girl. Based on the events underlying that sexual assault, Shakespeare pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. sections 1153 and 2244(a)(5) (the “2020 conviction”). The government then moved to revoke Shakespeare’s supervised release. The district court set a combined (1) sentencing hearing on the 2020 conviction and (2) revocation hearing on Shakespeare’s supervised release. At that hearing, the district court first sentenced Shakespeare to a term of imprisonment of 293 months on the 2020 conviction. The district court then recessed the completed proceedings relating to the 2020 conviction and turned to the question whether Shakespeare’s supervised release on the 2018 conviction should be revoked. Acting pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 3583(k), the district court concluded it was obligated to revoke Shakespeare’s supervised release and to impose a mandatory-minimum five-year term of imprisonment. For the first time on appeal, Shakespeare argued the district court’s application of § 3583(k) violated: (1) his jury-trial rights, as guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments; and (2) his Fifth Amendment right to be free of double jeopardy. Finding no reversible error, however, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Shakespeare" on Justia Law