Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Steven Henson appealed his convictions and sentence related to his involvement in a drug distribution conspiracy in and around Wichita, Kansas. He argued: (1) his convictions should have been vacated and the case remanded for a new trial because the trial court erroneously deprived him of chosen counsel; (2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury it could find the requisite mental state for his crimes based on a “deliberate ignorance” or “willful blindness” theory of knowledge; (3) the case should be remanded for resentencing based upon the purported procedural and substantive unreasonableness of his sentence to life in prison; and (4) the Tenth Circuit should reconsider a prior precedent and, in doing so, hold that one of the district court’s jury instructions misstated the law. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Henson's convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Henson" on Justia Law

Wyoming state prisoner Gregory Hawes appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 to challenge his kidnapping conviction. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on the issue of whether application of the Wyoming kidnapping statute to him was constitutional under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Tenth Circuit found that under the statute, whether a kidnapping ends with a “safe release” of the victim can affect the defendant’s sentence. At trial, the state district court imposed the burden to show safe release on Hawes. The jury found that he had not proved safe release, which subjected him to higher statutory minimum and maximum sentences. A state court denied his post-conviction challenge to the imposition of this burden, relying on Wyoming Supreme Court decisions holding that a kidnapping defendant had to prove safe release rather than the prosecution having to prove lack of safe release. To the Tenth Circuit, Hawes argued the Wyoming court’s application of the statute violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). The Tenth Circuit found Hawes made colorable arguments, but he could not not surmount the habeas restrictions that required the Court to (1) give deference to the state court’s application of Supreme Court law under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and (2) accept the state court’s interpretation of state law. Accordingly, dismissal of his petition for habeas relief was affirmed. View "Hawes v. Pacheco, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Tajuddin Ashaheed arrived at the Colorado Department of Corrections (“CDOC”) Denver Reception and Diagnostic Center (the “Center”) to serve a short sentence for parole violations. The Center’s policies required inmates to shave their beards at intake but exempted those like Ashaheed who wore beards due to their religion. Ashaheed alleged that he repeatedly invoked this exemption, but Sergeant Thomas Currington, motivated by anti-Muslim animus, forced him to shave his beard. Ashaheed sued Currington under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims for violations of the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. Currington moved to dismiss both claims based on qualified immunity and for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. Finding that Ashaheed alleged facts from which a reasonable jury could infer Currington acted from anti-Muslim animus, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ashaheed v. Currington" on Justia Law

Mark Janny was released from jail on parole in early 2015. His parole officer, John Gamez, directed Janny to establish his residence of record at the Rescue Mission in Fort Collins, Colorado, and to abide by its “house rules.” After arriving at the Mission, Janny learned he had been enrolled in “Steps to Success,” a Christian transitional program involving mandatory prayer, bible study, and church attendance. When Janny objected, citing his atheist beliefs, he alleged both Officer Gamez and Jim Carmack, the Mission’s director, repeatedly told him he could choose between participating in the Christian programming or returning to jail. Less than a week later, Carmack expelled Janny from the Mission for skipping worship services, leading to Janny’s arrest on a parole violation and the revocation of his parole. Janny brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against Gamez, Carmack, and the Mission’s assistant director, Tom Konstanty, alleging violations of his First Amendment religious freedom rights under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. The district court granted summary judgment to all three defendants, finding Janny had failed to: (1) adduce evidence of an Establishment Clause violation by Gamez; (2) show Gamez violated any clearly established right under the Free Exercise Clause; or (3) raise a triable issue regarding whether Carmack and Konstanty were state actors, as required to establish their liability under either clause. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order as to Gamez and Carmack, and affirmed as to Konstanty. The Court found the evidence created a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his claims under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. "And because the basic right to be free from state-sponsored religious coercion was clearly established under both clauses at the time of the events, Officer Gamez is not entitled to qualified immunity on either claim." Furthermore, the Court held the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find Carmack was a state actor, as required to impose section 1983 liability on private parties. However, because no facts linked Konstanty to Gamez, the evidence was legally insufficient for a jury finding that Konstanty acted under color of state law. View "Janny v. Gamez, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants James Hald, Monterial Wesley, and Walter Sands appealed the denials of their district-court motions for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). They were among many prisoners who sought to be released from prison confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic. Each claimed that his underlying health conditions and mounting infections at his correctional facility satisfied the statute’s “extraordinary and compelling reasons” requirement for early release. Before granting a sentence reduction, the district court had to consider whether the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) supported the reduction. The Tenth Circuit found each of the Defendants was denied relief by the United States District Court for the District of Kansas based on the court’s discretionary analysis of the section 3553(a) factors. The principal issue for the Tenth Circuit's review was whether, as argued by Hald and Sands, a district court was permitted to deny relief based on its assessment of the 3553(a) factors without first making a determination on the existence of “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” To this, the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument, holding that district courts were free to deny relief on the basis of any one of section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s requirements without considering the others. The Court also rejected the other arguments raised by Sands and Wesley. Accordingly, the denial of all three motions for compassionate release was affirmed. View "United States v. Hald, et al." on Justia Law

In 2015, the City of Santa Fe, New Mexico amended its Campaign Code to enact disclosure requirements for campaign spending. Plaintiff Rio Grande Foundation was a non-profit organization based in Albuquerque that has engaged in political advocacy since 2000. In 2017, it participated in a Santa Fe election, advocating against a ballot measure concerning a proposed soda tax. Combined spending by advocacy groups on each side of the measure amounted to several million dollars. Plaintiff’s expenditures totaled an estimated $7,700, most of which was attributable to the production of a YouTube video and a website. Those expenditures gave rise to a letter from a City Assistant Attorney informing Plaintiff that it appeared Plaintiff would need to file a campaign finance statement. The day after Plaintiff received that letter, the Santa Fe Ethics and Campaign Review Board (“ECRB”) received a citizen complaint lodged against Plaintiff, triggering an ECRB investigation. Because production of the YouTube video and website was donated in-kind, Plaintiff assumed that it did not need to disclose any information under the Code. The ECRB determined otherwise, citing Plaintiff for failure to comply with the Campaign Code. No penalties or fines were imposed, however. Plaintiff was simply ordered to file the required paperwork. Plaintiff did not think it or advocacy groups like it should have to endure the disclosure requirements in the future. It brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Defendants, seeking only prospective relief: namely, a declaration that section 9-2.6 of the Campaign Code was unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied to Plaintiff, insofar as it was enforced against speech concerning ballot measures. The Tenth Circuit determined Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the Campaign Code and its enforcement by the ECRB, and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Rio Grande Foundation v. City of Santa Fe, New Mexico, et al." on Justia Law

Von Lester Taylor and an accomplice, Edward Deli, murdered two unarmed women who tragically encountered them burglarizing a mountain cabin in December 1990. Taylor confessed to shooting the women; he never denied he fired the first shot in the brutal attack that lead to their deaths. Taylor pled guilty to two counts of first degree murder and was sentenced to death by a Utah jury. He challenged his convictions through a petition for federal habeas corpus, contending missteps by his trial counsel lead to a defective guilty plea. The Tenth Circuit determined Taylor failed to raise his ineffective-counsel claim in Utah state court, and this would have been a procedural bar to federal habeas relief. This notwithstanding, Taylor argued that despite re-affirming time and again he participated in the murders, he was “actually innocent” of them. Thus, he contended, the Tenth Circuit should consider his underlying claims. At the district court, Taylor presented new ballistics evidence that he alleged called into question whether he fired the fatal shots in the two murders. The court credited Taylor’s claim, set aside the convictions, and considered the merits of Taylor’s claims for habeas relief. In its review, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s assessment of Taylor’s actual innocence claim. “To answer the question of whether he can be actually innocent of the crime: He cannot. Mr. Taylor ‘is not innocent, in any sense of the word.’” The district court’s grant of habeas relief was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Taylor v. Powell" on Justia Law

A Utah state court dismissed Petitioner Jeffery Finlayson’s habeas corpus proceeding for failure to prosecute. After appealing that decision, Petitioner brought a petition in federal court under 28 U.S.C. 2254. But the district court found the state court’s dismissal procedurally barred federal relief. So the district court dismissed the petition and granted judgment for Respondent State of Utah, denying a certificate of appealability. Petitioner appealed, and a Tenth Circuit judge issued a certificate of appealability on two issues: whether dismissal for want of prosecution under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) is an independent and adequate state ground for denial of habeas relief; and (2) whether Petitioner could establish cause to excuse the procedural bar under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), and its progeny. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that under Utah’s rule, the state court could look to the meritoriousness of the federal claim to gauge the injustice that might result from dismissal. "But the ultimate decision does not rest on the application of federal law or the answer to a question of federal law. For these reasons, we conclude that a dismissal for failure to prosecute under Utah Rule 41(b) is independent." And, the Court concluded, dismissal for failure to prosecute under that rule was an adequate sate procedural default. Further, the Court concluded Petitioner could not demonstrate cause for the default. Accordingly, dismissal was affirmed. View "Finlayson v. Utah" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Raymond Moya was convicted for distributing heroin that resulted in the death of a then-eighteen-year-old Cameron Weiss. The precise question underlying this conviction is whether the heroin was the but-for cause of Cameron’s death. Moya argued that the district court misinstructed the jury about the “death results” element of the heroin-distribution crime and that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to convict on that element. According to Moya (and his expert witness), the heroin that Cameron injected couldn’t have caused his death hours later. Having reviewed the trial record, most notably the competing expert-witness testimony, the Tenth Circuit concluded a rational jury could have found Moya guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the Court affirmed. View "United States v. Moya" on Justia Law

The elected Sheriff of El Paso County, Colorado, and head of the Paso County Sheriff’s Office (“EPSO”), fired Keith Duda, a patrol sergeant. Duda believed he was fired for supporting candidate Mike Angley, who challenged Sheriff Elder's reelection bid, and for giving an interview to a local newspaper about sexual harassment and other misconduct at the EPSO. Duda brought First Amendment retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At summary judgment, the district court denied qualified immunity to Sheriff Elder. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Sheriff Elder on Duda’s Angley speech claim. The district court did not err in finding a constitutional violation. On the reporting claim, Sheriff Elder did not contest there was a constitutional violation. Instead, he argued no law clearly established it was unconstitutional to terminate Duda for the reporting speech, contending the district court incorrectly relied on Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1989). To this, the Tenth Circuit affirmed because Wulf was substantially similar to the facts of this case. "Under Wulf, it was 'sufficiently clear that every reasonable official [in Sheriff Elder’s position] would have understood' that firing Mr. Duda based on his speech reporting misconduct at EPSO to The Independent was unconstitutional." View "Duda, et al. v. Elder" on Justia Law