Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Utah police officers discovered Defendant Tevita Tafuna sitting in a parked car with a gun he admitted to possessing. Because Defendant had a prior felony conviction, the Government charged him with unlawful possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the firearm and his confession, arguing that he was detained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that his detention led to the incriminating evidence used against him. The district court denied the motion, and Defendant appealed. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review was whether officers unconstitutionally seize Defendant before they found the firearm or obtained his confession? The Court concluded no, so it affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Tafuna" on Justia Law

Appellants Lorie Smith and her website design company 303 Creative, LLC (collectively, “Appellants”) appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees Aubrey Elenis, Director of the Colorado Civil Rights Division (the “Director”), members of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (the “Commission”), and Phil Weiser, Colorado Attorney General (collectively, “Colorado”). Appellants challenged Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”) on free speech, free exercise, and vagueness and overbreadth grounds. Consistent with Ms. Smith’s religious beliefs, Appellants intended to offer wedding websites that celebrate opposite-sex marriages but intended to refuse to create similar websites that celebrate same-sex marriages. Appellants’ objection was based on the message of the specific website; Appellants would not create a website celebrating same-sex marriage regardless of whether the customer was the same-sex couple themselves, a heterosexual friend of the couple, or even a disinterested wedding planner requesting a mock-up. Appellants brought a pre-enforcement challenge to CADA in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. After summary judgment briefing had concluded, the district court found that Appellants only established standing to challenge the Communication Clause, and not the Accommodation Clause. After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the district court denied Appellants’ summary judgment motion on its Communication Clause challenges. The Tenth Circuit held Appellants had standing to challenge CADA. As to the merits, the Court held that CADA satisfied strict scrutiny, and thus permissibly compelled Appellants’ speech. The Court also held that CADA was a neutral law of general applicability, and that it was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. View "303 Creative, et al. v. Elenis, et al." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Tenth Circuit in this case involved a pretextual search, in which police impounded a car simply as an excuse to look inside for evidence of a crime. The search at issue stemmed from a call complaining to police about defendant-appellant Evan Woodard. The caller said that Woodard was fighting a huge drug case, may have smoked PCP, had three previous gun cases, and violated a protective order. After talking to the caller, police discovered Woodard had an outstanding warrant for misdemeanor public intoxication. With this information, the police looked for Woodard, planning to serve him with the protective order and execute the warrant. Police officers found Woodard in Tulsa, Oklahoma and initiated a traffic stop. Woodard pulled into a parking lot at a QuikTrip convenience store and stopped there. Police told Woodard to get out of the car, arrested him based on the warrant, and took his cellphone. Woodard then asked if he could call someone to pick up the car. One of the police officers responded “I don’t think so,” and the police decided to impound the car. Two officers then opened the front doors and began to search the car. One officer commented that he was looking for verification of car insurance, expressing doubt that Woodard had insured the car. After seeing no verification in the center console, he eventually found proof of an old insurance policy in the glove compartment. By then, however, another officer had found marijuana, cocaine, a digital scale, and a gun. With that evidence, the police obtained a warrant allowing access to text messages on Mr. Woodard’s cellphone. Those text messages provided evidence of drug dealing. Woodard moved to suppress the evidence found during that stop, arguing the officers ordered impoundment as pretext to investigate suspected crimes. The district court denied the motion, and Woodard was ultimately tried and convicted on all charges. The Tenth Circuit concluded the search was indeed pretextual, and reversed the district court's denial of Woodard's motion to suppress. View "United States v. Woodard" on Justia Law

Charles Williams was a Colorado prisoner who practiced a Native American religion that used tobacco in sweat lodges. The ceremonies were possible because prison officials specified where inmates could use tobacco in religious services. In 2018, prison officials confiscated tobacco from a prisoner and suspected that it had come from Williams’s religious group. Prison officials responded with a 30-day ban on the use of tobacco for religious services. Weeks later, prison officials imposed a lockdown and modified operations, including an indefinite suspension of Native American religious services. Despite this suspension, prison officials allowed Christian and Islamic groups to continue their religious services because outside volunteers could provide supervision. The complaint implied that the suspension lasted at least nine days. Williams sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging in part that prison officials violated the First Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion on the ground that Williams’s allegations had overcome qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit concurred: because Williams adequately alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, he has overcome qualified immunity. So the denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss was affirmed. View "Williams v. Borrego" on Justia Law

The federal government sought to encourage delinquent taxpayers to pay up: by threatening to withhold or revoke their passports until their tax delinquency was resolved. No nexus between international travel and the tax delinquency needed to be shown; the passport revocation served only to incentivize repayment of the tax debt. A challenge to the constitutionality of this approach was a matter of first impression; appellant Jeffrey Maehr was one such taxpayer whose passport was revoked for non-payment of taxes. He argued the revocation violated substantive due process, ran afoul of principles announced in the Privileges and Immunities clauses, and contradicted caselaw concerning the common law principle of ne exeat republica. The district court rejected these challenges. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court on each of these arguments. View "Maehr v. U.S. Department of State" on Justia Law

Joseph Maldonado-Passage a/k/a Joe Exotic, the self-proclaimed "Tiger King," was indicted on 21 counts: most for wildlife crimes, and two for using interstate facilities in the commission of his murder-for-hire plots against Carole Baskin. A jury convicted Maldonado-Passage on all counts, and the court sentenced him to 264 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Maldonado-Passage challenged his murder-for-hire convictions, arguing that the district court erred by allowing Baskin, a listed government witness, to attend the entire trial proceedings. He also disputed his sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by not grouping his two murder-for-hire convictions in calculating his advisory Guidelines range. On this second point, he contended that the Guidelines required the district court to group the two counts because they involved the same victim and two or more acts or transactions that were connected by a common criminal objective: murdering Baskin. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal determined the district court acted within its discretion by allowing Baskin to attend the full trial proceedings despite her being listed as a government witness, but that it erred by not grouping the two murder-for-hire convictions at sentencing. Accordingly, the conviction was affirmed, but the sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Maldonado-Passage" on Justia Law

Between August 2010 and January 2011, Defendant Armando Cervantes prepared for trial on two charges: (1) conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine; and (2) possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. On the eve of trial, defense counsel filed a last-minute motion to continue premised on a breakdown of communication. The district court denied the motion and commenced with jury selection. After jury selection but before opening statements, Defendant absconded. The district court proceeded with trial in Defendant’s absence, and the jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts. Nine years later, Defendant was apprehended and sentenced. This appeal followed. Defendant argued the district court abused its discretion by: (1) denying his motion to continue; and (2) trying him in absentia. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions. View "United States v. Cervantes" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Joshua Mjoness challenged his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for using and carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of transmitting threats in interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. 875(c). The question on appeal was whether 18 U.S.C. 875(c) constituted a crime of violence such that it could serve as a predicate for the 18 U.S.C. 924(c) charge. The Tenth Circuit found that section 875(c) provided separate elements in the form of threats to kidnap or, alternatively, threats to injure, so the Court concluded Mjoness’s offense of transmitting threats to injure in interstate commerce met the definition of a "crime of violence." The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s order, but on alternate grounds. View "United States v. Mjoness" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellee Karl Fontenot was twice tried and found guilty of the 1984 kidnapping, robbery, and murder of Donna Haraway in Ada, Oklahoma. Almost no evidence connected him to the crime other than his own videotaped confession, a confession that "rang false in almost every particular." Nearly thirty years after his second conviction, Fontenot brought a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court, arguing the actual innocence gateway allowed for his constitutional claims to be heard on the merits. The district court agreed, and granted relief on all of Fontenot’s claims, including his assertion that the prosecution suppressed material evidence prior to his trial. The district court ordered the State of Oklahoma to release Fontenot or grant him a new trial. The State appealed, but the Tenth Circuit found its arguments for reversing that order lacked merit. "Mr. Fontenot has brought forth new evidence that is sufficient to unlock the actual innocence gateway and to allow his substantive claims to be heard on the merits. And Mr. Fontenot has also established that evidence suppressed by the State prior to his new trial in 1988 led to a violation of his constitutional right to due process." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s grant of Fontenot’s petition for habeas relief. View "Fontenot v. Crow" on Justia Law

Defendant Nickie Nathanial Rico asserted he was acting in self-defense when he fired several shots in the late hours of the night across a busy downtown Denver street. As a result of his actions, the government charged Defendant with one count of possessing a firearm as a felon in possession under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and he pleaded guilty. At sentencing, the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) applied a cross-reference for attempted murder. Over Defendant’s objection, the district court concluded the PSR appropriately applied the cross-reference and sentenced Defendant to 97 months’ imprisonment. The Tenth Circuit held that for a defendant to invoke self-defense, one must face imminent danger that he did not cause. Defendant contended the district court incorrectly found that he did not act in self-defense, and therefore erred in applying the Guideline enhancement for attempted murder. Defendant also contended that Colorado, and not federal, self- defense law applied. The Court found defendant failed to support his assertions with record evidence: "In fact, the record supports the district court’s factual finding that the evening’s events did not trigger a reasonable belief that Defendant needed to use deadly force in self-defense." Judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Rico" on Justia Law