Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
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In 2011, defendant-appellant David Lawless detonated or attempted to detonate five homemade bombs in three separate public places. He subsequently pled guilty to one count of using a destructive device to commit a crime of violence and was sentenced to 20 years in prison pursuant to his plea agreement. In 2016, Lawless filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that in light of Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), arson no longer qualified as a section 924(c) crime of violence. The district court denied the motion on March 1, 2017, and he appealed. The Supreme Court invalidated section 924(c) for vagueness, and the Tenth Circuit held that arson was not a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A) in United States v. Salas, 889 F.3d 681 (10th Cir. 2018). The Tenth Circuit granted the parties’ joint motion to vacate Lawless’s 924(c) conviction, to direct entry of a judgment of conviction for arson under 18 U.S.C. 844(i), and to remand to the district court for resentencing. The district court held a hearing and sentenced Lawless to 144 months in prison on the one count of arson, varying upward from the advisory guideline sentence of 60 months. Lawless again appealed his sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable, but finding no abuse of discretion in the sentence, the Tenth Circuit affirmed it. View "United States v. Lawless" on Justia Law

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Defendant-appellant Merle Denezpi, a Navajo tribal member, was arrested by Ute Mountain Ute tribal authorities and charged with violating the Tribe’s assault and battery laws, as well as two provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations on terroristic threats and false imprisonment. He subsequently entered an "Alford" plea to the assault and battery charge and was released from custody for time served. Six months later, Denezpi was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado for aggravated sexual assault. The court denied Denezpi’s motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. At trial, the victim testified Denezpi had previously been incarcerated and implied that he had abused his ex-girlfriend. The court denied Denezpi’s motion to strike that testimony. The jury convicted him and he was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. He appealed the denial of his motions to dismiss and to strike the victim’s testimony at trial. The Tenth Circuit affirmed as to both issues. The Court found that "the ''ultimate source' of the power undergirding' the CFR prosecution of Mr. Denezpi is the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe’s inherent sovereignty. Therefore, the subsequent prosecution of Mr. Denezpi in the federal district court did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against Double Jeopardy." With respect to the victim's testimony, the Tenth Circuit concluded the testimony's admission was harmless: "the evidence against Mr. Denezpi is overwhelming. The SANE examination of [the victim]. revealed substantial injuries to her body, including bruising on her breasts, back, arms, and legs as well as injuries to her genitals. Mr. Denezpi’s DNA was found on [the victim's] genitalia. The SANE nurse testified at trial that [the victim's] injuries were 'consistent with a nonconsensual sexual assault.'" Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Denezpi" on Justia Law

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Defendant-Appellant Eldon Miller challenged his sentence entered upon a guilty plea to one count of assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The charges arose out of Miller’s operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, leading to an accident that caused serious and permanent injuries to his sole passenger. The district court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. Miller challenged his sentence on two grounds: (1) the sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court unreasonably discounted, inter alia, the relationship between his disease of alcoholism and his criminal record, the detrimental effect that a lengthy prison term would have on his rehabilitation, and various mitigating facts related to his background; and (2) the district court’s impermissibly imposed a special condition of supervised release authorizing his probation officer to determine the number of drug tests to which he must submit during his term of supervised release. As to the latter objection, Miller contended the district court’s imposition of this condition unconstitutionally delegated judicial authority in contravention of Article III; and the district court erred in failing to make findings on the record supporting imposition of the challenged condition. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding Miller fell "far short" of rebutting the presumption of substantive reasonableness of the within-Guidelines sentence. With regard to the special condition, the Court rejected Miller's argument that the district court impermissibly delegated to probation judicial authority, and found he failed establish that any of the asserted errors constituted plain error. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

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In 2015, a federal grand jury indicted Defendant Martin Perea on nine counts of production of a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. In 2016, Defendant produced a report by Dr. Alexander Paret, which opined that Defendant lacked competency to stand trial. In light of this report, the Government moved for a psychiatric and psychological examination of Defendant, and Defendant was sent for evaluation. In 2017, Dr. Lisa Bellah, a licensed psychologist with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), reported that Defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect which rendered him unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to properly assist in his defense. Dr. Bellah thus determined Defendant was presently incompetent to stand trial. But she also suggested that Defendant could achieve competency within a reasonable amount of time if he were educated on criminal matters. In response, the district court entered an order finding Defendant incompetent to stand trial. And upon the Government’s motion, the court ordered that Defendant be committed for treatment and restoration. In 2018, Dr. Jacob X. Chavez, another psychologist with the BOP reported that Defendant was incompetent and substantially unlikely to be restored to competency in the foreseeable future. Upon recommendation, the district court ordered a risk assessment. During the pre-risk assessment and risk assessment interviews, however, Dr. Chavez observed that Defendant presented as “notably different” from his previous presentation, revealing a “higher level of understanding than portrayed previously.” Based in part on this observation, Dr. Chavez issued a new report which found Defendant was, more likely than not, competent to proceed. At competency hearings, Dr. Chavez testified, leading the district court to enter an order finding Defendant competent to stand trial. Defendant filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court’s last order. Because a competency determination was a non-final order, and the collateral order doctrine did not apply, the Tenth Circuit granted the Government's motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "United States v. Perea" on Justia Law

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Arapaho James Oldman and Matthew Whiteplume severely beat Charles Dodge III. One of them cut his throat. Dodge died from blunt-force trauma and/or sharp-force injuries. Oldman was convicted by jury of first-degree murder, both as a principal and an aider and abettor. The trial court refused his request for a lesser-included offense instruction on assault resulting in serious bodily injury (ARISBI). On appeal, Oldman argued the trial court erred by refusing to give the ARISBI instruction. He also contended the court erred when it “mishandled” graphic photos of Dodge’s body, allowed a defense witness to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege, communicated ex parte with a juror, and misapplied the spousal privilege. Finally, he claimed his trial counsel was ineffective. Rejecting these arguments, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Oldman's convictions. View "United States v. Oldman" on Justia Law

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Daniel Koch pleaded guilty to receipt of child pornography. The district court sentenced him to a twenty-year term of incarceration, to be followed by a ten-year term of supervised release. Without objection, the district court ordered Koch to comply with a special condition of supervised release (the “Sexual Material Prohibition”). For the first time on appeal, Koch asserts the district court erred in imposing upon him the Sexual Material Prohibition without first making particularized findings justified by compelling circumstances and based on an individual assessment of his case. Koch argued the condition interfered with his fundamental First Amendment right to access legal, sexually oriented materials. Upon review of the relevant Tenth Circuit authorities, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded the district court plainly erred in imposing the Sexual Material Prohibition without first making the necessary case-specific findings. Accordingly, the condition was vacated and the matter remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "United States v. Koch" on Justia Law

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Pretrial detainee Thomas Pratt exhibited alcohol withdrawal symptoms while in a county jail. Healthcare providers diagnosed and treated Pratt’s symptoms, but their course of treatment proved ineffective. Plaintiff Faye Strain, as Pratt’s guardian, sued. "Disagreement about course of treatment or mere negligence in administering treatment do not amount to a constitutional violation." To state a claim for deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must allege that an official acted (or failed to act) in an objectively unreasonable manner and with subjective awareness of the risk. "Indeed, the word deliberate makes a subjective component inherent in the claim." The Tenth Circuit concluded Plaintiff's allegations did not rise to the "high level" of deliberate indifference, and affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's federal claims (in addition to the court's decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claims). View "Strain v. Regalado" on Justia Law

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Defendant-Appellant Jose Jesus Cruz entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of heroin with intent to distribute and to possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. Cruz appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, arguing that evidence should have been excluded because it was the result of an unlawful search and seizure. The district court concluded that there was probable cause for Cruz’s warrantless arrest, and that two exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry into his residence: (1) the destruction of evidence and (2) the hot pursuit of a suspect. Finding "abundant evidence" in the record to support probable cause for Cruz's arrest, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. View "United States v. Cruz" on Justia Law

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Defendant-Appellant Randolfo Librado Chavez, Jr. was convicted by jury of two counts of distributing methamphetamine. His appeal of those convictions centered on the district court’s admission into evidence of three transcripts, which purportedly were of audio recordings of incriminating conversations that he had had in Spanish and in English. The district court did not admit into evidence the audio recordings themselves or play the recordings for the jury. In addition, the district court instructed the jury that they could not question the accuracy of the English-language translations in the transcripts. To the Tenth Circuit, Chavez challenged both the district court’s admission of the transcripts and the jury instructions relating to them, arguing the district court: (1) violated the best-evidence rule by admitting the transcripts into evidence without admitting the recordings themselves; and (2) committed plain error by instructing the jury to accept the accuracy of the translations in the transcripts. As to Chavez’s first contention, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court’s admission of the transcripts, without also admitting the recordings they purported to transcribe, violated the best-evidence rule and constituted reversible error. Accordingly, it reversed and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate Chavez’s convictions and grant him a new trial. In light of that disposition, the Court did not reach the merits of Chavez's jury-instruction challenge. View "United States v. Chavez" on Justia Law

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Defendant David Ansberry attempted to detonate a bomb in front of the Nederland, Colorado police station. He pled guilty to use or attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction against a person or property in the United States. At sentencing, the parties disputed the application of three provisions contained in the United States Sentencing Guidelines: (1) whether Ansberry knowingly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person (which under section 2K1.4(a)(1) would create a base offense level of twenty-four); (2) whether the individual officers who came into contact with the bomb were victims (which under section 3A1.2(a) would increase Ansberry’s offense level by three); and (3) whether Ansberry’s offense involved a federal crime of terrorism because it was calculated to retaliate against government conduct (which under section 3A1.4 would increase his offense level by twelve and convert his criminal history category from I to VI). The district court sided with the government on all three provisions and sentenced Ansberry to 324 months in prison. Ansberry challenged application of each of the three guidelines provisions. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in applying the section 2K1.4(a)(1) base offense level because the court found that Ansberry actually created a risk of death or serious bodily injury, and this finding was not clearly erroneous. But the Court agreed with Ansberry that the court erred in applying: the section 3A1.2(a) enhancement because the court impermissibly relied on relevant conduct rather than on the facts immediately related to his offense of conviction; and the section 3A1.4 terrorism enhancement, because the district court expressly refused to determine whether the conduct Ansberry retaliated against was objectively government conduct. Ansberry’s sentence was vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Ansberry" on Justia Law