Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In separate claims, appellees Willie Carr and Kim Minor sought disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). In each case, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied the claim, and the agency’s Appeals Council declined to review. While his case was pending in district court, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) ALJs were “inferior officers” under the Appointments Clause, and therefore must be appointed by the President, a court, or head of the agency. Shortly thereafter, Minor also sued in district court to challenge the denial of benefits in her case. In response to the Supreme Court case, Lucia v. S.E.C., 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), the SSA Commissioner appointed the SSA's ALJs to address any Appointments Clause questions Lucia posed. After the Commissioner’s action, Carr and Minor each filed a supplemental brief, asserting for the first time that the ALJs who had rejected their claims had not been properly appointed under the Appointments Clause. The district court upheld the ALJs’ denials of the claims, but it agreed with the Appointments Clause challenges. The court vacated the SSA decisions and remanded for new hearings before constitutionally appointed ALJs. It held that appellees did not waive their Appointments Clause challenges by failing to raise them in their SSA proceedings. On appeal, the Commissioner argued Appellees waived their Appointments Clause challenges by failing to exhaust them before the SSA. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the Commissioner and reversed. View "Carr v. Commissioner, SSA" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Randy Hamett was convicted of kidnapping, possession of a stolen firearm, and possession of firearms while subject to a domestic violence protective order. Hamett was represented by counsel throughout much of his jury trial. Near the end of the government’s case-in-chief, however, Hamett requested a sealed ex parte hearing, where he discussed with the court, with his counsel present, the possibility of representing himself. At this hearing, despite stating that he “ha[d] two great attorneys,” but Hamett asked the district court if he could “talk to another attorney . . . that might be able to answer just some legal [] questions.” The court declined this request, giving Hammett two options: to continue with his appointed counsel, or to proceed pro se. Hamett stated that he did not want to represent himself, and the trial resumed. At the conclusion of the government’s case-in-chief, Hamett requested another sealed ex parte hearing with his attorneys and the court. At this hearing, Hamett asked the court various questions regarding post-conviction relief and his right to appeal. He then told the court that he would like to take over his own representation in order to recall various witnesses to demonstrate “untruths.” Hamett acknowledged he did not know the elements of the crimes of which he was charged, nor had he read the jury instructions. At the conclusion of its colloquy, the district court allowed Hamett to proceed pro se, “based upon [Hamett's] knowledge of the facts in wanting to ask questions that counsel have not asked for their own strategic reasons.” Trial resumed with the assistance of standby counsel. Hamett recalled various witnesses and made his own closing argument. The jury convicted Hamett on all three counts. Hamett was appointed new counsel to represent him at sentencing. The Tenth Circuit reversed conviction, "considering the rigorous restrictions on the information that must be conveyed to a defendant before permitting him to waive counsel at trial," the Court found the district court’s warnings did not adequately ensure Hamett was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Furthermore, the Court held there were no case-specific factors permitting it to conclude that, despite the inadequate warnings, the district court nevertheless correctly determined that Hamett’s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing and intelligent when it was made. Accordingly, the Court concluded the district court erred in finding Hamett knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. View "United States v. Hamett" on Justia Law

In 2016, Defendant-Appellant Timothy Merritt crashed into a vehicle containing a family of three while driving within the borders of the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation. Merritt was intoxicated at the time of the accident and had been driving in the wrong lane. Cecil Vijil, a passenger in the other vehicle, died by the time the ambulance arrived. Cecil’s wife Sallie Vijil, also a passenger, was seriously injured. Their son Creighton, who was driving, suffered minor injuries. The government charged Merritt with second-degree murder for the death of Cecil Vijil, and assault resulting in serious bodily injury for the injuries sustained by Sallie Vijil. At trial, the government introduced evidence of three other drunk-driving incidents involving Merritt. The jury convicted Merritt on both counts. Merritt appealed the murder conviction, arguing that the district court should not have allowed testimony about the facts and circumstances of 2012 and 2014 incidents, and that no evidence concerning the 2016 arrest should have been admitted. Determining that it was within the district court's discretion to admit the facts and circumstances of Merritt's 2012 and 2014 drunk driving arrests, and that any error in admitting the 2016 incident was harmless, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Merritt's convictions. View "United States v. Merritt" on Justia Law

The federal government twice charged Scott Arterbury with the same crime for the same possession of child pornography. In the original prosecution, the district court suppressed the child-pornography evidence seized from Arterbury’s personal computer. The government appealed the suppression order but withdrew its appeal without filing a brief. Once back in district court, the government obtained an order dismissing the case without prejudice. Eight months later, in a case involving a defendant in a different state, the Tenth Circuit reversed an order suppressing child-pornography evidence obtained in reliance on the same FBI search warrant as at issue in Arterbury’s case. The government re-indicted Arterbury on the original child-pornography charge. Arterbury argued that the court was bound by collateral estoppel to enforce its earlier order suppressing the evidence. But the district court disagreed and later denied the motion to suppress on the merits. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erred in its analysis of criminal collateral estoppel, and vacated the order denying Arterbury’s motion to enforce the original suppression order. The matter was remanded for the district court to enforce its earlier suppression order. View "United States v. Arterbury" on Justia Law

The district court granted Defendant-Appellee Julian Trujillo Morales’s motion to suppress 4.11 kilograms of methamphetamine. Thirty-two minutes after he was stopped for a traffic violation, Morales and his passenger consented to an officer’s search of the car that yielded the methamphetamine. During the first 10 minutes after the stop, the officer questioned Morales and developed reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking. He next questioned Morales’s passenger for seven minutes and then called the El Paso Intelligence Center (“EPIC”), a national law enforcement database, which took another 15 minutes. The district court said that the officer’s actions were reasonable up to the EPIC call, but the EPIC call unreasonably prolonged the detention. The Government appealed. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding the district court erred in granting the motion to suppress. View "United States v. Morales" on Justia Law

In 2018, Defendant Frank Trujillo pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The district court sentenced him to a term of 120 months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Defendant appealed both his conviction and sentence. With respect to his conviction, Defendant argued his guilty plea was constitutionally invalid because he was not advised of the true nature of his charge. As to his sentence, Defendant argued the district court plainly erred by applying U.S.S.G. section 2K2.1(a)(1) to calculate his base offense level because he did not commit the instant offense “subsequent to” sustaining at least two felony convictions for crimes of violence. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction but remanded for resentencing only. Defendant’s advisory guideline range was erroneously calculated at 140 to 175 months’ imprisonment. "It is reasonably probable that the district court’s error caused Defendant to receive a higher sentence, and 'we can think of few things that affect . . . the public's perception of the fairness and integrity of the judicial process more than a reasonable probability an individual will linger longer in prison than the law demands only because of an obvious judicial mistake.'” View "United States v. Trujillo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jorge Corona was a backseat passenger in a car pulled over for a routine traffic stop by Clovis Police Officer Brent Aguilar. Plaintiff was arrested when he did not produce identification in response to the officer's demand for ID. Defendant Aguilar charged Plaintiff with: (1) resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer; and (2) concealing his identity. The district attorney’s office dismissed the concealing-identity charge, and a jury later acquitted Plaintiff of the charge against him for resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer. Plaintiff subsequently sued the arresting officers, Defendant Aguilar and police officer Travis Loomis; the City of Clovis; and the Clovis Police Department for, among other things, alleged constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983. As relevant here, Plaintiff alleged Defendant Aguilar violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful arrest by arresting him without probable cause. Defendant Aguilar moved for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff’s unlawful-arrest claim based on qualified immunity, but the district court denied his motion. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with Officer Aguilar's contention that the district court erred in denying him qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit determined the officer arrested plaintiff without probable cause. "Additionally, clearly established law would have put a reasonable officer in Defendant Aguilar’s position on notice that his conduct violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful arrest. Defendant Aguilar is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity." View "Corona v. City of Clovis" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Goebel was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress, which the district court denied. He pleaded guilty conditioned on his ability to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. On appeal, Goebel argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, contending the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him and his statements were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Further, Goebel argued the district court committed plain error by applying the wrong standard of review to the motion. After review, the Tenth Circuit rejected these arguments and affirmed judgment of conviction. View "United States v. Goebel" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Jordan Sandoval pleaded guilty to committing an assault in Indian Country which resulted in serious bodily injury. He was sentenced to a prison term of 27 months. Sandoval appealed the district court’s sentence as disproportionate by noting crimes either committed with greater intent or causing death are afforded only slightly higher sentencing ranges under the Guidelines. In the alternative, he argued his sentence was substantively unreasonable. Finding that the district court carefully considered Sandoval's arguments before sentencing, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in arriving at his sentence. View "United States v. Sandoval" on Justia Law

In August 2017, Kansas law enforcement officers, after a traffic chase, pulled over Matthew Holmes for suspected vehicular burglary. The officers were from the City of Newton Police Department (“NPD”), McPherson County Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”), and Harvey County Sheriff’s Office (“HCSO”). After Holmes stopped and exited the car, officers wrestled him to the ground. McPherson County Sheriff’s Deputy Chris Somers shot Holmes in the back. He later died from the gunshot wound. Holmes' estate sued, alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983 ad a state law claim. The district court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motions. In particular, it denied each sheriff’s motion to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment immunity because, “with respect to local law enforcement activities, sheriffs are not arms of the state but rather of the county that they serve.” The Tenth Circuit determined the district court did not err in denying the sheriffs' motions, and therefore affirmed. View "Couser v. Gay" on Justia Law