Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2014, CNB auditors conducted a surprise audit of the Burlington, Kansas Central National Bank (“CNB” or “Bank”) vault. The vault was missing $764,000. When they began to suspect defendant Denise Christy, she forged documents to purport that she had sent the missing cash to the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (“FRB”). A grand jury indicted her on one count of bank embezzlement, six counts of making false bank entries, six counts of failing to report income on her taxes, and 10 counts of money laundering. After a six-day trial, a jury found Christy guilty of all charges except four money laundering counts. On appeal, Christy argued: (1) cumulative prosecutorial misconduct violated her due process rights; (2) the evidence was insufficient for her money laundering convictions; and (3) the jury instructions improperly omitted a “materiality” element for the false-bank-entry charges. The Tenth Circuit: (1) rejected Christy’s prosecutorial misconduct challenge because she has not shown the prosecutor’s comments influenced the jury’s verdict; (2) reversed Christy’s money laundering convictions because the Government did not produce sufficient evidence of the intent to file a false tax return; and (3) affirmed Christy’s false-bank-entry convictions because, even assuming materiality was an implied element of 18 U.S.C. 1005, its omission from the jury instruction was harmless error. The matter was remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate the convictions for money laundering, resentence the defendant, and further proceedings. View "United States v. Christy" on Justia Law

After investigating complaints regarding the tax-preparation services of defendant Donald Iley, the Colorado Board of Accountancy (Board) issued an “Agreement and Final Agency Order” in which Iley admitted to engaging in professionally negligent conduct and agreed to accept certain disciplinary sanctions, including a $10,000 fine and a five-year probationary period. Among the acts for which the Board disciplined Iley was taking a client’s money, ostensibly to pay the client’s payroll taxes, but then failing to promptly and properly pay those funds to the IRS. While serving the Order’s probationary term, Iley executed a fraudulent scheme in which he fleeced his clients of more than $11 million. As part of this scheme, Iley fraudulently misrepresented to his clients that he was taking their funds to pay outstanding payroll taxes to the IRS but, instead, Iley used those funds for personal purposes. After this fraud was discovered, Iley pleaded guilty to wire fraud and aiding in the preparation of a false tax return. At sentencing, the district court enhanced Iley’s sentence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, section 2B1.1(b)(9)(C). The question presented to the Tenth Circuit was whether the court erred in doing so. The Court held that under the particular circumstances of this case, the court did not err in Iley's sentence, and affirmed. View "United States v. Iley" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Richard Roe pled guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 280 grams or more of cocaine base (“crack”) and five kilograms or more of cocaine. Because of the quantities involved, Roe was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the government requested a sentence below the mandatory minimum. The district court sentenced Roe to fifteen years. Roe did not file a direct appeal; instead, he filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, arguing trial counsel was ineffective in failing to: (1) challenge the drug quantity at the sentencing hearing (“drug-quantity claim”) and (2) file a notice of appeal as requested (“failure-to-file claim”). The district court summarily denied the drug-quantity claim, concluding Roe’s guilty plea established the relevant quantity. It held an evidentiary hearing on the failure-to-file claim. Trial counsel testified Roe never told him to file an appeal because they never discussed the issue. In a post-hearing motion, Roe sought to amend his failure-to-file claim so it focused on trial counsel’s failure to consult with him as to whether an appeal should be filed (the “failure-to-consult claim”). The district court rejected, on two separate grounds, Roe’s failure-to-consult claim. It concluded the failure-to-consult claim was an untimely new claim that did not relate back to the failure-to-file claim set out in Roe’s original Section 2255 motion. In the alternative, the district court concluded the failure-to-consult claim failed on the merits. Roe filed and received a certificate of appealability to raise both the drug-quantity and failure-to-consult claims. The Tenth Circuit affirmed denial of Roe's 2255 motion: (1) when a criminal defendant enters a knowing and voluntary guilty plea to an indictment charging a drug conspiracy with an attendant quantity element, the defendant is subject to the enhanced penalties associated with that quantity; and (2) Roe’s failure-to-consult claim did not relate back to his failure-to-file claim and was, therefore, untimely. View "In re: Sealed Opinion" on Justia Law

Defendant Bobby Pullen was sentenced as a career offender at a time when the United States Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory. In 2015, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), holding the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) as unconstitutionally vague. As the residual clause of 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) was identical in wording to the residual clause of USSG 4B1.2. Relying on "Johnson," Pullen moved for authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined Pullen made a prima facie showing that Johnson created a retroactive, new rule of constitutional law applicable to the mandatory Guidelines. The district court, however, concluded Johnson did not actually create a new rule applicable to the mandatory Guidelines and dismissed Pullen’s section 2255 motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 255(h)(2), a provision governing authorization to file a second or successive section 2255 motion. The district court did, however, grant Pullen a certificate of appealability (“COA”). With respect to Pullen’s substantive challenge, the Tenth Circuit found the Supreme Court never recognized a void for vagueness challenge to the Guidelines and so Johnson neither created a new rule applicable to the Guidelines nor dictated that any provision of the Guidelines was subject to a void for vagueness challenge. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Pullen" on Justia Law

Defendant Troy Bong was convicted in 2013 of being a felon in possession of a firearm, for which he was sentenced to 293 months in prison. He appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence. The district court granted Bong a certificate of appealability (COA) on Bong’s claims that he was improperly sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge the ACCA sentencing. The Tenth Circuit subsequently granted Bong a COA as to two additional issues: (1) whether his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the facts of the underlying traffic stop, Bong’s resulting arrest, and Bong’s alleged possession of a firearm; and (2) whether the prosecution suppressed any available video recordings of his stop and arrest. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed the district court erred in treating Bong's prior Kansas state convictions for robbery and aggravated robbery as “violent felonies” under the ACCA, and remanded for the district court for to consider whether Bong’s remaining prior convictions were sufficient to support his sentence under the ACCA. As for Bong’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part: since the trial court erred in basing's Bong's ACCA sentence on his prior Kansas robbery and aggravated robbery convictions, it was unnecessary to address ineffectiveness based on this issue. However, questions remained whether Bong's motion for post-conviction relief was timely filed based on the discovery of police recordings of his arrest, and the arresting officer's alleged false testimony on whether video recordings existed. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Bong" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty based on a plea agreement he struck with the government. The agreement included a waiver of the right to collaterally challenge the conviction. Despite the waiver, defendant collaterally challenged the conviction under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court dismissed the challenge without ruling on the waiver, holding instead that the defendant’s underlying claim failed on the merits. On appeal, defendant didn't question the enforceability or applicability of the waiver. Instead, he contended the government forfeited the waiver by failing to invoke it in district court. The government defended the district court's ruling, adding that the Tenth Circuit should also affirm based on the defendant’s waiver of a collateral challenge. The Tenth Circuit rejected defendant's contention because the government never had an opportunity to assert the waiver in district court. As a result, the Court affirmed dismissal based on the waiver. View "United States v. Lopez-Aguilar" on Justia Law

In 2007, Oscar Almanza-Vigil pleaded guilty in Colorado state court to “selling or distributing” methamphetamine in Colorado, for which he received a four-year prison sentence. In 2009, when the state paroled him, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) initiated expedited removal proceedings against him, declaring that he had committed an aggravated felony. With that designation, he had no right to an administrative hearing before an immigration judge. Within the week, the Department of Homeland Security had issued a final administrative removal order, and ICE agents had sent Almanza-Vigil back across the border to Mexico. Six years later, border-patrol agents found Almanza-Vigil in the New Mexico desert. Charged with illegal reentry, Almanza-Vigil moved to dismiss the indictment by collaterally attacking his previous removal order and arguing, for the first time, that he never committed an aggravated felony. The Tenth Circuit determined Almanza-Vigil’s Colorado felony did not fit the Immigration and Naturalization Act's (INA) definition of an aggravated felony. But the Court also concluded he failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of avoiding removal but for the erroneous classification of his conviction. Therefore, the Court affirmed Almanza-Vigil's conviction. View "United States v. Almanza-Vigil" on Justia Law

I.B. and her mother, Jane Doe (collectively, “Does”), claimed that a caseworker from the El Paso County (Colorado) Department of Human Services ("DHA"), April Woodard, wrongfully searched I.B. at the Head Start preschool, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Without consent or a warrant, Woodard partially undressed I.B., performed a visual examination for signs of abuse, then photographed I.B.’s private areas and partially unclothed body. The Defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion, holding that qualified immunity precluded the Fourth Amendment unlawful search claim and that the complaint failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim. The Does appealed these rulings and the district court’s denial of leave to amend their complaint. Finding no constitutional violation, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Doe v. Woodard" on Justia Law

United States Border Patrol agents found Defendant-appellant John Hargrove, his girlfriend Janelle Richter, and Edgar Silvas-Hinojos in the desert near the border between Arizona and New Mexico. They were all in Hargrove’s truck, along with nearly 300 pounds of marijuana and two firearms. Hargrove was charged with: (1) conspiracy to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana; and (2) possession with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana, and aiding and abetting said possession. Hargrove was convicted by jury on both charges and sentenced to sixty months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Hargrove argued: (1) the district court erred in failing to grant him a mistrial after the prosecutor elicited testimony that the district court had previously barred; and (2) the district court erred in failing to grant him safety-valve relief under section 5C1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court in all respects. View "United States v. Hargrove" on Justia Law

In a span of eleven days, Davion Jefferson committed five robberies. Each was captured by multiple surveillance cameras. The first three robberies occurred on separate occasions at the same Fast Trip convenience store. All three involved Jefferson and an unnamed minor male accomplice. The last two robberies occurred less than two hours apart on the same date but at different locations. Jefferson’s cohort during the latter two robberies was Nicholas Lolar. Both Jefferson and Lolar were armed. After these robberies, Jefferson posted “Can’t wake up broke” on his Facebook page, and included a picture of a hand holding a wad of cash and a number of emojis, including a firearm emoji. Jefferson was indicted with five counts of Hobbs Act robbery (Counts 1-3, 5, and 7) and three counts of use and carry of a firearm (Counts 4, 6, and 8). At trial, he did not dispute his participation in all five robberies but tried to plant seeds of reasonable doubt with the jury as to the 924(c) counts by suggesting the weapons used during the last two robberies were not actual firearms. "Considering the very real possibility of a mandatory 32 years in prison if found to have twice brandished an actual firearm, it was sound trial strategy." The jury, however, was not convinced and he was sentenced to the mandatory 32 years plus a consecutive 70 months for the robberies, for a total sentence of 454 months. Jefferson raised several issues on appeal, namely: (1) Hobbs Act robbery was not a "crime of violence" under 924(c)(3)(A) because the statute required the predicate offense have a force element and Hobbs Act robbery had only a force means; and (2) even if Hobbs Act robbery had a force element, the judge erred in directing a verdict on that element, and should have instead submitted the issue to the jury. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Jefferson's convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Jefferson" on Justia Law