Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Oklahoma prisoner Kendrick Simpson sought habeas relief from his death sentence for two counts of first-degree murder. The district court granted a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) on two of the Simpson's eighteen grounds for relief: (1) the trial court’s alleged improper exclusion of Simpson’s PTSD evidence from the guilt stage of the trial; and (2) an alleged Brady violation, whereby prosecutors withheld impeachment evidence as to a jailhouse informant. The Tenth Circuit subsequently granted a COA on five additional issues: (1) whether alleged prosecutorial misconduct denied Simpson a fundamentally fair sentencing proceeding; (2) whether a jury instruction and prosecutorial statements unduly limited jury consideration of mitigating evidence; (3) whether the heinous, atrocious or cruel ("HAC") aggravating factor determination as to one victim was unconstitutional and unreasonable; (4) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, prepare, and present lay witnesses, failing to request a second-degree murder instruction, failing to object to improper prosecutorial arguments, failing to object to the HAC instruction, and failing to object to the jury instruction limiting consideration of mitigating evidence; and (5) whether there was “cumulative error, limited to errors in the grounds on which a certificate of appealability has been granted.” After careful consideration, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error, and affirmed denial of habeas relief. View "Simpson v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellee Ollisha Easley was onboard a Greyhound bus from Claremont, California, to her hometown of Louisville, Kentucky, when the bus made a scheduled stop in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The Greyhound passenger list showed that Easley’s reservation included a second woman identified as “Denise Moore” - both Easley and Denise Moore had one checked bag and both tickets were purchased with cash. No one named Denise Moore boarded the bus in California, but her suitcase was stowed in the luggage hold of the Greyhound and was identified with the same reservation number and telephone number as Easley’s luggage. While the bus was stopped in Albuquerque, Special Agent Jarrell Perry of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and his partner that day, Special Agent Scott Godier, observed the luggage in the bus’s cargo hold. Agent Perry later testified that the use of a so-called “phantom passenger” is a common method of narcotics trafficking. Ultimately, the agents identified the bags traveling with Easley, searched them and found small bags of methamphetamine in the Denise Moore bag. Easley denied ownership of the bag, denied knowing the bag's owner, and denied ever having seen the bag before. She would be indicted for possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. Easley moved to suppress the evidence seized from the bag, and to exclude a confession she made to Agent Perry. The district court granted Easley’s motion holding that : (1) Easley had not established her bags were illegally searched while the bus was in the wash bay; (2) nor had she established that the bus was subject to an unreasonable investigatory detention; however, (3) under the totality of the circumstances, Easley had been illegally seized. The court found that Easley’s abandonment of the Denise Moore suitcase was the product of a Fourth Amendment violation, so it suppressed the evidence seized from the suitcase. The court also determined the earlier Fourth Amendment violation tainted Easley’s subsequent confession and suppressed her inculpatory statements. In reversing the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit concluded the agents’ search of the Denise Moore suitcase was a valid search of abandoned property; and there was preceding constitutional violation to taint Easley’s confession, suppression of her inculpatory statements. The parties did not brief or argue any other ground to support the district court’s decision on appeal, so the case was remanded to the district court to resolve the admissibility of Easley’s confession in the first instance. View "United States v. Easley" on Justia Law

Darius Johnson was convicted for possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, and for being a felon in possession of a firearm. For these offenses, the district court initially imposed concurrent prison terms of 192 months, relying in part on Johnson’s classification as an armed career criminal because of three prior convictions for violent felonies. The district court later vacated this sentence, concluding that one of the three prior convictions had not involved a violent felony. Having vacated the sentence, the court resentenced Johnson to concurrent prison terms of 120 months and 128 months, relying in part on his classification as a career offender because of two prior convictions for crimes of violence. The government appealed the vacatur of the initial sentence, and Johnson appealed the new sentence. The Tenth Circuit determined the district court correctly ordered vacatur and resentencing based on a new U.S. Supreme Court decision. When imposing the initial sentence, the district court classified Johnson as an armed career criminal because he had three prior convictions for violent felonies. The government conceded this classification was erroneous because the district court had relied on the Residual Clause, which the Supreme Court later struck down as unconstitutional. This constitutional error was not harmless because one of the three prior convictions could have been based on battery of a law enforcement officer, which did not constitute a violent felony. Given this possibility, the district court needed to vacate the initial sentence. Given the concession of another crime of violence, the district court did not err in sentencing Johnson as a career criminal under the sentencing guidelines. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In May 2016, Anthony Bettcher pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. Afterward, a probation officer reviewed Bettcher’s past, including his criminal history, and prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). The PSR informed the district court that in 2013, the State of Utah had charged Bettcher with second-degree aggravated assault. In the PSR, the probation officer recommended treating this earlier conviction as a crime of violence, which if adopted would enhance Bettcher’s base offense level. The government objected when the district court refused to consider the Utah aggravated assault as a "crime of violence" under the federal sentencing rules. The issue was brought before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Specifically, the Court was presented with the question of whether Utah's second-degree aggravated-assault offense categorically qualified as a "crime of violence" under the elements clause in the federal sentencing guidelines. The Tenth Circuit held the Utah offense did qualify, and reversed the district court's decision to the contrary, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Bettcher" on Justia Law

A jury found Clifford Currie guilty of assault with intent to commit murder. Currie splashed gasoline on his supervisor, lit her on fire, attempted to stand on her neck, and attacked her with a straight razor and scissors. Currie worked as a social services assistant at the Munson Army Health Center (“Munson”) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Lieutenant Katie Ann Blanchard, a registered nurse with the army, supervised him. "Currie and Lt. Blanchard had a difficult working relationship." The relationship was strained one day in September 2016 when, after informing him requests for overtime pay would be denied, Currie stepped inside Lt. Blanchard's office, threw gasoline on her and then a lit match. Currie then attempted to stab Lt. Blanchard with a straight razor and scissors. On appeal, he argued prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments denied him a fair trial. His motion challenged nine of the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument and rebuttal. On appeal, Currie grouped the statements into three categories, arguing the prosecutor: (1) misstated the burden of proof for assault with intent to commit murder; (2) misstated the heat of passion defense; and (3) improperly warned the jury about legitimizing violence. After a review of the trial court record, the Tenth Circuit found that even if the jury saw a conflict in the prosecutor’s heat of passion explanations, the prosecutor made clear the judge’s instructions would govern. The prosecutor’s improper statements during closing argument did not render Currie’s trial fundamentally unfair and did not affect the jury’s verdict. The Court found the rest of her comments were not improper. View "United States v. Currie" on Justia Law

Defendant Ricky Malone was convicted in Oklahoma state court of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed Defendant’s conviction on direct appeal and denied his petitions for postconviction relief. Defendant then filed an unsuccessful application for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 with the federal district court. The Tenth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on the following issues: (1) whether the trial court’s giving erroneous jury instructions on his voluntary-intoxication defense was harmless; (2) whether those instructions deprived him of the constitutional right to a fair trial; (3) whether he was deprived of the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel by (a) his trial counsel’s failure to object to those instructions or (b) his trial counsel’s alleged failure to adequately prepare his expert witness in support of the voluntary-intoxication defense; and (4) whether his conviction must be set aside because of the cumulative effect of the above-mentioned errors. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief, largely because of the overwhelming evidence of Defendant’s guilt. View "Malone v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant, Gunther Glaub, was convicted of violating the criminal provisions of the False Claims Act. He argued on appeal that his act of submitting personal bills and invoices to the United States for payment was protected by the First Amendment. Furthermore, he challenged jury instructions given at trial on grounds that they failed to properly define "claim." Finding no support in the trial court record for either of Glaub's claims, the Tenth Circuit affirmed his conviction. View "United States v. Glaub" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop in Arizona, law enforcement discovered evidence linking Deon Martinez to a bank robbery in Utah. Martinez argued that the state trooper who pulled him over lacked reasonable suspicion to do so, and the trial court erred in not suppressing evidence seized from his vehicle. Here, the district court relied on four facts to conclude that the arresting trooper had reasonable suspicion to stop the Cadillac: (1) it noted the similarities between the Winslow robbery suspects and the person driving the reportedly suspicious white Cadillac in Flagstaff; (2) it credited testimony that white Cadillacs “aren’t an ordinary part of the automotive ecosystem on this particular stretch of road;” (3) the travel time from Flagstaff to Winslow was generally consistent with the gap in time between the suspicious-vehicle sighting in Flagstaff and the robbery in Winslow and the travel time from Winslow to the site of the traffic stop was generally consistent with the gap in time between the robbery and the stop; and (4) the district court found that the arresting-trooper’s impression of the driver through the Cadillac’s tinted window matched the general description of a Winslow robbery suspect. The Tenth Circuit found that no one reported seeing a white Cadillac - or any other vehicle - at the Winslow robbery. Instead, “a suspicious vehicle” of that color and make reportedly left a parking lot of a Wells Fargo in a different city (Flagstaff) some 41 minutes before the Winslow robbery. So to reasonably suspect that the white Cadillac he stopped was carrying bank-robbery suspects, the trooper had to first infer that the reportedly suspicious white Cadillac from Flagstaff was also involved in the Winslow robbery. From this and descriptions of the robbery suspects, the arresting trooper had no basis to believe the Cadillac he pulled over 130 miles away was in fact the very same Cadillac. The Court reversed the district court’s order denying Martinez’ motion to suppress and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Following the unexpected death of Defendant Walt Shrum’s common law wife at the couple’s home, Kingman, Kansas police officers “secured” the home, prohibiting Defendant access. Approximately three hours later and without access to his home, Defendant signed a consent to search form permitting an investigator from the Kingman County Sheriff’s Office (KCSO) to enter his home for the express purpose of retrieving his deceased wife’s medication in anticipation of an autopsy. While in the home, the investigator saw ammunition in plain view inside an open bedroom closet. After returning to headquarters, the investigator learned Defendant was a convicted felon and recalled seeing the ammunition in the closet. Several hours later, the investigator, based on what he had seen and learned, contacted a federal agent and asked him to obtain a search warrant for Defendant’s home. A federal magistrate judge issued the warrant at 10:00 p.m. A late night search of the home, which local authorities still would not permit Defendant to access, uncovered not only the ammunition but also two loaded firearms and suspected methamphetamine. A grand jury subsequently charged Defendant with two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition, and one count of possessing methamphetamine. Following the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the incriminating evidence used to charge him, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. After receiving a sentence of time served, Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. This appeal presented the Tenth Circuit with two questions: (1) did the initial securing of Defendant’s home constitute an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment?; and if so, (2) did such seizure taint the incriminating evidence ultimately uncovered in the warrant search of his home? The Tenth Circuit answered both questions yes, and reversed. View "United States v. Shrum" on Justia Law

Defendant Jay Giannukos appealed two convictions involving the illegal possession of firearms. While conducting a parole search of Giannukos’s home, officers found two firearms, methamphetamine, and counterfeiting equipment. A grand jury indicted Giannukos on four counts: (1) possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine; (2) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; (3) being a felon in possession of a firearm; and (4) counterfeiting Federal Reserve Notes with the intent to defraud. A jury convicted Giannukos of all counts. Giannukos appealed Counts 2 and 3, arguing that the district court gave an erroneous constructive possession jury instruction and that the prosecutor made improper statements during her closing argument. After review of the trial court record, the Tenth Circuit agreed, reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. View "United States v. Giannukos" on Justia Law