Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Rejecting a challenge to Pennsylvania’s ballot laws under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the district court concluded that enforcing the signature requirement, in combination with the Governor’s Orders issued to address the COVID-19 pandemic, imposed only a moderate burden. The court found that the plaintiffs had sufficient time and means to meet the signature requirements under Pennsylvania law, which were reduced by more than 90% in a 2018 suit and that the August 3 deadline for collecting signatures did not constitute a “severe burden” requiring strict scrutiny.The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly applied the Supreme Court’s balancing test and the law survives intermediate scrutiny because it serves the Commonwealth’s legitimate and sufficiently important interests in “avoiding ballot clustering, ensuring viable candidates, and the orderly and efficient administration of elections.” View "Libertarian Party of Pennsylvania v. Governor of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

A York, Pennsylvania officer reported a shooting and said the suspects fled in a vehicle. Other officers pursued the vehicle, which crashed. Officers pursued the driver and a passenger on foot. An officer found a spent .38 caliber shell casing inside the vehicle. Officers observed Williams and Scott running and ordered them to get on the ground. Scott complied but Williams ran and was eventually apprehended. Williams claims the officers were very rough with her and disregarded her complaints. According to three officers, Williams “was kicking, flailing around, being disorderly, and yelling.” At one point, she tripped on an unidentified officer’s foot. She was transported to City Hall where she continued to refuse to cooperate. Williams claims that an unidentified officer “approached her, twisted her arm, threw her against the wall, and threatened if she did not give him her arm, he would break it.”Williams, found not guilty of disorderly conduct, sued the city and the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied the officers qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed. A plaintiff alleging that one or more officers engaged in unconstitutional conduct must establish the personal involvement of each named defendant to survive summary judgment and district courts must specify those material facts that are and are not subject to genuine dispute and explain their materiality. Reviewing the actions attributable to identified officers, the court concluded that the officers did not violate clearly established law. View "Williams v. City of York" on Justia Law

Seighman pleaded guilty to a counterfeiting conspiracy, a Class D felony carrying a maximum prison term of 60 months. He was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment followed by 36 months of supervised release. After his release, Seighman bought heroin, tested positive for opiates, and failed to comply with drug treatment. The court revoked Seighman’s supervision and sentenced him to another 24 months’ imprisonment plus 12 months of supervised release. After his second release from prison, Seighman transitioned to Renewal, a residential reentry center. The Probation Office petitioned the court to issue a warrant for Seighman because he brought heroin into Renewal. The Probation Office calculated Seighman’s revocation sentencing range as 21–27 months. Seighman objected, arguing that because his counterfeiting conviction permitted a maximum of 60 months' imprisonment, he could be sentenced to no more than six months (having served 54 months). The Third Circuit affirmed his 24-month sentence. In its 2019 decision, “Haymond,” the Supreme Court found subsection (k) of the supervised release statute (18 U.S.C. 3583) unconstitutional in requiring a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of ‘‘not less than 5 years’’ upon a judge’s finding that a defendant ‘‘commit[ted] any’’ listed ‘‘criminal offense,’’ without granting a defendant the rights that accompany a new criminal prosecution. Subsection (g), which Seighman challenged, applies to other offenses and does not limit the judge’s discretion in the same “manner” as subsection (k). View "United States v. Seighman" on Justia Law

Santos, a native of the Dominican Republic, became a lawful permanent U.S. resident in 2006. In 2017, he pleaded guilty to possessing marijuana with intent to deliver. If that crime is the “aggravated felony,” “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance” he is removable, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Santos was taken to the Pike County Correctional Facility, 8 U.S.C. 1226(c). In 2018, an IJ ordered Santos removed. While awaiting the BIA’s decision on remand from the Third Circuit, Santos filed this federal habeas petition, arguing that the Due Process Clause guarantees a bond hearing to an alien detained under section 1226(c) once his detention becomes “unreasonable.” The district court denied relief, finding no evidence that the government had “improperly or unreasonably delayed the regular course of proceedings, or that [it] ha[d] detained him for any purpose other than the resolution of his removal proceedings.” The BIA then held that Santos’s conviction was not an aggravated felony and remanded for a hearing on his application for cancellation of removal. The IJ denied that application, leaving Santos in prison (then more than 30 months). The Third Circuit reversed; his detention has become unreasonable and Santos has a due process right to a bond hearing, at which the government must justify his continued detention by clear and convincing evidence. View "Santos v. Warden Pike County Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

B.L., as an MAHS freshman, was on the junior varsity cheerleading squad. The next year, she was again placed on JV. An incoming freshman made the varsity team. B.L took a photo of herself and her friend with their middle fingers raised and posted it to her Snapchat story that was visible to about 250 “friends.” The caption stated: “Fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.” A teammate took a screenshot and sent it to a cheerleading coach. Another coach stated that: “Several students” had approached her, “visibly upset” about the snaps. The coaches decided B.L.’s snap violated team and school rules, which required cheerleaders to “have respect for [their] school, coaches, . . . [and] other cheerleaders”; avoid “foul language and inappropriate gestures”; and refrain from sharing “negative information regarding cheerleading, cheerleaders, or coaches . . . on the internet.” The coaches removed B.L. from the team. School authorities upheld the decision.B.L. filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in B.L.’s favor. B.L. did not waive her speech rights by agreeing to the team’s rules; her suspension from the team implicated the First Amendment even though extracurricular participation is merely a privilege. B.L.’s snap was off-campus speech and had not caused any actual or foreseeable substantial disruption of the school environment. View "B.L. v. Mahanoy Area School District" on Justia Law

While imprisoned at Moshannon Valley Correctional Center ()MVCC), Davis, a Jamaican national, requested permission to marry a non-inmate U.S. citizen. MVCC apparently imposed requirements on those wishing to get married, beyond the requirements specified in the Federal Bureau of Prison regulations. Davis alleges that, despite having complied with all requirements, including MVCC’s additional requirements, Warden Wigen denied the request. MVCC almost exclusively houses foreign nationals who have been ordered to be deported or are facing immigration proceedings. Davis claims that federal defendants and officials of GEO, a company that operates private prisons on behalf of the government, conspired to ensure that no MVCC inmate can get married; marriage could complicate, and perhaps stop, removal and other immigration proceedings.The Third Circuit vacated the dismissal of section 1983 claims, reasoning that the complaint did not allege a purely private conspiracy, so a basic premise of the district court’s decision on the availability of relief was erroneous. The court affirmed the dismissal of the Bivens claim as asking for an unsupportable extension of Bivens liability; the Supreme Court has never recognized or been asked to recognize, a Bivens remedy for infringement of the right to marry. The court affirmed the dismissal of other 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, and 2000d claims. View "Davis v. Samuels" on Justia Law

Scripps was convicted of wire fraud for transferring millions of dollars from the bank accounts of his mother and autistic uncle—heirs to the family’s publishing fortune—into his own account. During sentencing arguments, the court repeatedly indicated that Scripps could address the court without personally asking Scripps if he wished to speak. The court asked defense counsel (Dezsi) whether Scripps wished to address the court. Dezsi stated that Scripps did not. The judge later concluded that “[t]here’s nothing in this record from which I could fairly conclude there’s any remorse” and sentenced Scripps to 108 months’ imprisonment, the maximum period of incarceration within the Guidelines range. On appeal, with Scripps represented by Dezsi, the Third Circuit affirmed. Scripps filed an unsuccessful 28 U.S.C 2255 motion, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, including by failing to argue that the judge erred by not personally inviting Scripps to speak during sentencing. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) requires a sentencing judge to “address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence.”The Third Circuit reversed. The district court abused its discretion in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing. It is possible that appellate counsel’s failure to raise Rule 32 error “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” The Supreme Court has held that a Rule 32 query, directed towards counsel, does not satisfy the requirement that the court personally address the defendant. View "United States v. Scripps" on Justia Law

New Jersey and New York agreed more than 50 years ago to enter into the Waterfront Commission Compact. Congress consented to the formation of the Waterfront Commission Compact, under the Compacts Clause in Article I, section 10, of the U.S. Constitution, 67 Stat. 541. In 2018, New Jersey enacted legislation to withdraw from the Compact. To prevent this unilateral termination, the Waterfront Commission sued the Governor of New Jersey in federal court. The district court ruled in favor of the Commission.The Third Circuit vacated. The district court had federal-question jurisdiction over this dispute because the Complaint invoked the Supremacy Clause and the Compact (28 U.S.C. 1331) but that jurisdiction does not extend to any claim barred by state sovereign immunity. Because New Jersey is the real, substantial party in interest, its immunity should have barred the exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor v. Governor of New Jersey" on Justia Law

Pennsylvania Trooper Ramirez stopped a car for speeding after running the license plate and learning the car was owned by Enterprise. It lacked typical rental stickers. Each vent had an air freshener clipped to it. The driver, Fruit, gave Ramirez his license and rental car agreement, identifying his passenger, Garner. The rental agreement listed Fruit as the authorized driver but limited to New York and appeared to have expired 20 days earlier. Ramirez questioned Garner; 12 minutes into the stop, Ramirez put their information into his computer and learned that neither man had outstanding warrants, although Fruit was on supervised release. Both had extensive criminal records, including drug and weapons crimes. Enterprise confirmed that Fruit had extended the rental beyond the listed expiration date. Ramirez resolved to ask permission to search the vehicle but waited for backup, which arrived 37 minutes into the stop. Fruit declined permission to search. Ramirez stated that he was calling for a K-9 and Fruit was not free to leave. "Zigi" arrived 56 minutes into the stop, alerted at the car, then entered the vehicle and alerted in the back seat and trunk. A search revealed 300 grams of cocaine and 261 grams of heroin.Both men were indicted for conspiracy to possess (and possession) with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine. The district court denied their motion to suppress, ruling that Ramirez had “an escalating degree of reasonable suspicion” that justified extending the stop. In a consolidated appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. Ramirez had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop based on information he obtained during the first few minutes of the traffic stop before he engaged in an unrelated investigation; no unlawful extension of the stop occurred. View "United States v. Fruit" on Justia Law

Section 1513 of the Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act prevents the plaintiffs from making political contributions because they hold interests in businesses that have gaming licenses. They sued, claiming First Amendment and Equal Protection violations. The district court concluded that Section 1513 furthers a substantially important state interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption but ruled that the restriction is unconstitutional because the Commonwealth did not draw it closely enough. The court permanently enjoined the enforcement of Section 1513.The Third Circuit affirmed. Limitations on campaign expenditures are subject to strict scrutiny. The government must prove that the regulations promote a “compelling interest” and are the “least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.” Even applying an intermediate threshold, examining whether the statute is “closely drawn,” the Commonwealth does not meet its burden. The overwhelming majority of states with commercial, non-tribal casino gambling like Pennsylvania do not have any political contribution restrictions that apply specifically to gaming industry-related parties. The Commonwealth’s implicit appeal to “common sense” as a surrogate for evidence in support of its far-reaching regulatory scheme is noteworthy in light of the approach taken by most other similarly situated states. View "Deon v. Barasch" on Justia Law