Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Republican voters alleged that Maryland’s Sixth Congressional District was gerrymandered in 2011 in retaliation for their political views. Six years after the General Assembly redrew the District, plaintiffs sought to enjoin election officials from holding congressional elections under the 2011 map. The district court denied the motion and stayed further proceedings pending the Supreme Court’s disposition of partisan gerrymandering claims in Gill v. Whitford. The Supreme Court affirmed. In granting a preliminary injunction a court must consider whether the movant has shown “that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Plaintiffs made no such showing. They did not move for a preliminary injunction until six years, and three general elections, after the 2011 map was adopted, and three years after their first complaint was filed. The delay largely arose from a circumstance within plaintiffs’ control. In considering the balance of equities, that unnecessary, years-long delay weighed against their request. The public interest in orderly elections also supported the decision. Plaintiffs represented to the court that any injunctive relief would have to be granted by August 18, 2017, to ensure the timely completion of a new districting scheme in advance of the 2018 election season. Despite the court’s undisputedly diligent efforts, that date had passed by the time the court ruled. There was also legal uncertainty surrounding any potential remedy for the asserted injury; the court reasonably could have concluded that a preliminary injunction would have been against the public interest and might have had a needlessly disruptive effect on the electoral process. View "Besinek v. Lamone" on Justia Law

After Lozman towed his floating home into a marina owned by the City, he became an outspoken critic of the City’s plan to condemn waterfront homes for private development. He filed suit, alleging that the City’s approval of a development agreement violated Florida’s open-meetings laws. The Council held a closed-door session and discussed Lozman’s lawsuit. He alleges that the meeting’s transcript shows that councilmembers devised an official plan to intimidate him. Months later, the Council held a public meeting. Lozman spoke about the arrests of officials from other jurisdictions. When he refused a councilmember’s request to stop making his remarks, a police officer was told to “carry him out.” The officer handcuffed Lozman and ushered him out, allegedly for violating the Council’s rules of procedure by discussing issues unrelated to the City and refusing to leave the podium. The State’s attorney determined that there was probable cause for his arrest, but dismissed the charges. Lozman filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court instructed the jury that, for Lozman to prevail on his retaliatory arrest claim, he had to prove that the officer was motivated by impermissible animus against Lozman’s protected speech and lacked probable cause to make the arrest. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a judgment for the City. The Supreme Court vacated. The existence of probable cause does not bar Lozman’s First Amendment retaliation claim because his case, is “far afield from the typical retaliatory arrest claim.” Lozman must prove the existence and enforcement of an official policy motivated by retaliation which is unlike an on-the-spot decision by an individual officer. The Court noted that Lozman alleges that the City deprived him of the right to petition, “one of the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights." View "Lozman v. Riviera Beach" on Justia Law

Members of the Wisconsin Legislature are elected from single-member legislative districts. The legislature redraws district boundaries following each census. After the 2010 census, the legislature passed Act 43. Democratic voters alleged that Act 43 harms the Democratic Party’s ability to convert Democratic votes into Democratic legislative seats by “cracking” certain Democratic voters among different districts in which those voters fail to achieve electoral majorities and “packing” other Democratic voters in a few districts in which Democratic candidates win by large margins. They cited an “efficiency gap” that compares each party’s respective “wasted” votes, i.e., votes cast for a losing candidate or for a winning candidate in excess of what that candidate needs to win. The district court enjoined application of Act 43 and required redistricting. The Supreme Court vacated for lack of standing. A plaintiff may not invoke federal-court jurisdiction unless he can show “a personal stake in the outcome,” by proof that he has suffered the “invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized.” If the plaintiffs’ alleged harm is the dilution of their votes, that injury is district-specific, not statewide. A plaintiff who complains of gerrymandering, but who does not live in a gerrymandered district, “assert[s] only a generalized grievance.” Claims that their votes have been diluted require revising only such districts as are necessary to reshape the voter’s district. Statewide injury to Wisconsin Democrats is a collective political interest, not an individual legal interest. Injury-in-fact is not based on intent but requires proof of a burden on the plaintiffs’ votes that is “actual or imminent," not ‘hypothetical. Studies showing that Act 43 skewed Wisconsin’s statewide map in favor of Republicans do not address the effect that a gerrymander has on the votes of particular citizens. The Court remanded to give the plaintiffs an opportunity to prove concrete and particularized injuries to their individual votes. View "Gill v. Whitford" on Justia Law

Minnesota law prohibits wearing a “political badge, political button, or other political insignia” inside a polling place on Election Day, Minn. Stat. 211B.11(1), including clothing and accessories with political insignia. Election judges are authorized to decide whether a particular item is banned. Days before the 2010 election, plaintiffs challenged the ban. In response, the state distributed guidance with specific examples of prohibited apparel: items displaying the name of a political party or the name of a candidate, items supporting or opposing a ballot question, “[i]ssue oriented material designed to influence or impact voting,” and “[m]aterial promoting a group with recognizable political views.” Cilek allegedly was turned away from the polls for wearing a “Please I.D. Me” button, a “Don’t Tread on Me” T-shirt, and a Tea Party Patriots logo. The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s rejection of the constitutional challenges. Minnesota’s political apparel ban violates the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. Because the ban applies only in a “nonpublic forum,” its content-based restrictions would be constitutional if “reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view,” The statute makes no distinction based on the speaker’s political persuasion and serves a permissible objective: to set aside polling places as “an island of calm.” The state may reasonably decide that the interior of the polling place should reflect the distinction between voting and campaigning. However, the “unmoored use of the term “political” in the Minnesota law, combined with haphazard interpretations" render the law unconstitutional for lack of narrow tailoring to serve that objective. Its indeterminate prohibitions present “[t]he opportunity for abuse, especially where [it] has received a virtually open-ended interpretation.” An election judge’s own politics may shape his views on what is “political.” View "Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky" on Justia Law

The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 52 U.S.C. 20507(d), provides that a state may not remove a name from voter rolls on change-of-residence grounds unless the registrant either confirms in writing that he has moved or fails to return a pre-addressed, postage prepaid “return card” containing statutorily prescribed content and then fails to vote in any election during the period covering the next two general federal elections. The “Failure-to-Vote Clause,” section 20507(b)(2), provides that a state removal program “shall not result in the removal of the name . . . by reason of the person’s failure to vote,” and, as added by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), specifies that “nothing in [this prohibition] may be construed to prohibit a State from using the [pre-addressed return card] procedures.” Section 21083(a)(4)(A) states that “no registrant may be removed solely by reason of a failure to vote.” Ohio uses the failure to vote for two years to identify voters who may have moved, then sends these non-voters a pre-addressed, postage prepaid return card. Voters who do not return the card and fail to vote in any election for four more years are removed from the rolls. The Supreme Court held that the Ohio process does not violate the NVRA. The process follows subsection (d): It does not remove a registrant on change-of-residence grounds unless the registrant is sent and fails to mail back a return card and then fails to vote for an additional four years. The Failure-to-Vote Clause simply forbids the use of nonvoting as the sole criterion for removing a registrant; Ohio does not use it that way. An argument that so many registered voters discard return cards upon receipt that the failure to send cards back is worthless as evidence that an addressee has moved “is based on a dubious empirical conclusion that conflicts with the congressional judgment.” View "Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute" on Justia Law

Minnesota law provides that “the dissolution or annulment of a marriage revokes any revocable . . . beneficiary designation . . . made by an individual to the individual’s former spouse,” Minn. Stat. 524.2–804. If an insurance policyholder does not want that result, he may rename the ex-spouse as beneficiary. Sveen and Melin were married in 1997. Sveen purchased a life insurance policy, naming Melin as the primary beneficiary and designating his children from a prior marriage as contingent beneficiaries. The marriage ended in 2007. The divorce decree did not mention the insurance policy. Sveen did not revise his beneficiary designations. After Sveen died in 2011, Melin and the Sveen children claimed the insurance proceeds. Melin argued that because the law did not exist when the policy was purchased, applying the later-enacted law violated the Contracts Clause. The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, holding that the retroactive application of Minnesota’s law does not violate the Contracts Clause. The test for determining when a law crosses the constitutional line first asks whether the state law has “operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship,” considering the extent to which the law undermines the contractual bargain, interferes with a party’s reasonable expectations, and prevents the party from safeguarding or reinstating his rights. If such factors show a substantial impairment, the inquiry turns to whether the state law is drawn in a “reasonable” way to advance “a significant and legitimate public purpose.” Three aspects of Minnesota’s law, taken together, show that the law does not substantially impair pre-existing contractual arrangements. The law is designed to reflect a policyholder’s intent and to support, rather than impair, the contractual scheme. The law is unlikely to disturb any policyholder’s expectations at the time of contracting, because an insured cannot reasonably rely on a beneficiary designation staying in place after a divorce. Divorce courts have wide discretion to divide property upon dissolution of a marriage. The law supplies a mere default rule, which the policyholder can easily undo. View "Sveen v. Melin" on Justia Law

Doe, a minor was eight weeks pregnant when she unlawfully crossed the border into the U.S. She was detained by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), in a federally-funded Texas shelter. Doe requested an abortion. Absent “emergency medical situations,” ORR policy prohibits shelter personnel from “taking any action that facilitates an abortion without direction and approval from the Director.” A minor may leave government custody by seeking voluntary departure, or by working with the government to identify a suitable sponsor” in the U.S., 8 U.S.C. 1229c. Garza, Doe’s guardian ad litem, filed a putative class action on behalf of Doe and “all other pregnant unaccompanied minors in ORR custody.” The district court ruled in Doe’s favor, Doe attended preabortion counseling, required by Texas law to occur at least 24 hours in advance with the same doctor who performs the abortion. The clinic she visited typically rotated physicians weekly. The next day, the District of Columbia Circuit vacated portions of the order. Four days later, that court, en banc, vacated the panel order and remanded. Garza obtained an amended order, requiring the government to make Doe available to obtain the counseling and abortion. Believing the abortion would not take place until after Doe repeated the counseling with a new doctor, the government informed opposing counsel and the Supreme Court that it would file a stay application on October 25. The doctor who had performed Doe’s earlier counseling became available at 4:15 a.m. At 10 a.m., Garza’s lawyers informed the government that Doe “had the abortion this morning.” The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for dismissal. Doe’s individual claim for injunctive relief—the only claim addressed by the D. C. Circuit—became moot after the abortion but the unique circumstances and the balance of equities weigh in favor of vacatur. The Court considered but did not decide the government’s allegations that opposing counsel made misrepresentations to thwart review. View "Azar v. Garza" on Justia Law

Phillips, the owner of a Colorado bakery, told a same-sex couple that he would not create a cake for their wedding because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriages (which Colorado did not then recognize) but that he would sell them other baked goods. The couple filed a charge under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, which prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in a “place of business engaged in any sales to the public.” An ALJ ruled in the couple’s favor. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. While Colorado law can protect gay persons in acquiring products and services on the same terms as are offered to other members of the public, the law must be applied in a manner that is neutral toward religion. “To Phillips, his claim that using his artistic skills to make an expressive statement, a wedding endorsement in his own voice and of his own creation, has a significant First Amendment speech component and implicates his deep and sincere religious beliefs.” Before Colorado recognized the validity of gay marriages and before the Supreme Court addressed that issue, Phillips was not unreasonable in thinking his decision lawful. State law afforded storekeepers some latitude to decline to create specific messages they considered offensive. Phillips was entitled to a neutral and respectful consideration of his claims but the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, acting inconsistently with its consideration of similar cases, showed impermissible hostility toward his sincere religious beliefs. A commissioner compared his religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Holocaust, without objection. The government cannot pass judgment upon or presuppose the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices. The state’s interest could have been weighed against Phillips’ sincere religious objections in a way consistent with the requisite religious neutrality. View "Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission" on Justia Law

While investigating traffic incidents involving an orange and black motorcycle with an extended frame, Officer Rhodes learned that the motorcycle likely was stolen and in Collins’ possession. On Collins’ Facebook profile, Rhodes discovered photographs of an orange and black motorcycle parked in the driveway of a house. From the street, Rhodes could see what appeared to be the motorcycle under a tarp, in the location shown in the photograph. Without a search warrant, Rhodes walked up the driveway, removed the tarp, confirmed that the motorcycle was stolen by running the license plate and vehicle identification numbers, replaced the tarp, and returned to his car to wait. When Collins returned, Rhodes arrested him. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress, citing the Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception. The Supreme Court reversed. The automobile exception does not permit the warrantless entry of a home or its curtilage to search a vehicle therein. Curtilage, the area immediately surrounding and associated with the home, is part of the home for Fourth Amendment purposes. When an officer physically intrudes on the curtilage to gather evidence, a Fourth Amendment search has occurred and is presumptively unreasonable absent a warrant. The part of the driveway where the motorcycle was parked is curtilage. The scope of the automobile exception extends no further than the automobile itself; its proposed expansion would undervalue the core Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home and its curtilage and untether the exception from its justifications. View "Collins v. Virginia" on Justia Law

While investigating traffic incidents involving an orange and black motorcycle with an extended frame, Officer Rhodes learned that the motorcycle likely was stolen and in Collins’ possession. On Collins’ Facebook profile, Rhodes discovered photographs of an orange and black motorcycle parked in the driveway of a house. From the street, Rhodes could see what appeared to be the motorcycle under a tarp, in the location shown in the photograph. Without a search warrant, Rhodes walked up the driveway, removed the tarp, confirmed that the motorcycle was stolen by running the license plate and vehicle identification numbers, replaced the tarp, and returned to his car to wait. When Collins returned, Rhodes arrested him. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress, citing the Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception. The Supreme Court reversed. The automobile exception does not permit the warrantless entry of a home or its curtilage to search a vehicle therein. Curtilage, the area immediately surrounding and associated with the home, is part of the home for Fourth Amendment purposes. When an officer physically intrudes on the curtilage to gather evidence, a Fourth Amendment search has occurred and is presumptively unreasonable absent a warrant. The part of the driveway where the motorcycle was parked is curtilage. The scope of the automobile exception extends no further than the automobile itself; its proposed expansion would undervalue the core Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home and its curtilage and untether the exception from its justifications. View "Collins v. Virginia" on Justia Law