Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

When the housing bubble burst in 2008, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) suffered significant losses. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), an independent agency tasked with regulating the companies and, if necessary, stepping in as their conservator, 12 U.S.C. 4501. Congress installed a single Director, removable by the President only “for cause.” The Director placed the companies into conservatorship and negotiated agreements with the Department of Treasury, which committed to providing each company with up to $100 billion in capital and in exchange received senior preferred shares and fixed-rate dividends. A subsequent amendment replaced the fixed-rate dividend with a variable formula, requiring the companies to make quarterly payments consisting of their entire net worth minus a small specified capital reserve. Shareholders challenged that amendment.The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit in part, affirmed in part, and vacated in part.The shareholders’ statutory claim was properly dismissed. The Act's “anti-injunction clause” provides that unless review is specifically authorized by one of its provisions or is requested by the Director, “no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the Agency as a conservator or a receiver.” Where, as here, the FHFA’s challenged actions did not exceed its “powers or functions” “as a conservator,” relief is prohibited.The Court first concluded the shareholders have standing to bring their constitutional claim because they retain an interest in retrospective relief, despite that the FHFA was led by an Acting Director, as opposed to a Senate-confirmed Director, at the time the amendment was adopted. The Act’s for-cause restriction on the President’s removal authority violates the separation of powers. The Court rejected arguments based on the facts that the FHFA’s authority is limited; that when the Agency steps into the shoes of a regulated entity as its conservator or receiver, it takes on the status of a private party and does not wield executive power; and that the entities FHFA regulates are government-sponsored enterprises. The President’s removal power serves important purposes regardless of whether the agency directly regulates ordinary Americans or takes actions that have a profound, indirect effect on their lives. The Constitution prohibits even “modest restrictions” on the President’s power to remove the head of an agency with a single top officer.The Court remanded for determination of a remedy. Although an unconstitutional provision is never really part of the body of governing law, it is still possible for an unconstitutional provision to inflict compensable harm. View "Collins v. Yellen" on Justia Law

Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) conduct adversarial proceedings for challenging the validity of an existing patent before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), 35 U.S.C. 6(a), (c). The Secretary of Commerce appoints PTAB members, including APJs, except the Director, who is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. APJs concluded that Arthrex’s patent was invalid. The Federal Circuit concluded that the APJs were principal officers who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate; their appointment was unconstitutional. To remedy this violation, the court invalidated the APJs’ tenure protections, making them removable at will by the Secretary.The Supreme Court vacated. The unreviewable authority wielded by APJs during patent review is incompatible with their appointment by the Secretary to an inferior office. Inferior officers must be “directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” While the Director has administrative oversight, neither he nor any other superior executive officer can directly review APJ decisions. A decision by the APJs under his charge compels the Director to “issue and publish a certificate” canceling or confirming patent claims he previously allowed. Given the insulation of PTAB decisions from executive review, APJs exercise power that conflicts with the Appointments Clause’s purpose “to preserve political accountability.”Four justices concluded that section 6(c) cannot constitutionally be enforced to prevent the Director from reviewing final APJ decisions. The Director may review final PTAB decisions and may issue decisions on behalf of the Board. Section 6(c) otherwise remains operative. Because the source of the constitutional violation is the restraint on the Director’s review authority not the appointment of APJs, Arthrex is not entitled to a hearing before a new panel. View "United States v. Arthrex, Inc." on Justia Law

The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act required most Americans to obtain minimum essential health insurance coverage and imposed a monetary penalty upon most individuals who failed to do so; 2017 amendments effectively nullified the penalty. Several states and two individuals sued, claiming that without the penalty, the Act’s minimum essential coverage provision, 26 U.S.C. 5000A(a), is unconstitutional and that the rest of the Act is not severable from section 5000A(a).The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge section 5000A(a) because they have not shown a past or future injury fairly traceable to the defendants’ conduct enforcing that statutory provision. The individual plaintiffs cited past and future payments necessary to carry the minimum essential coverage; that injury is not “fairly traceable” to any “allegedly unlawful conduct” of which they complain, Without a penalty for noncompliance, section 5000A(a) is unenforceable. To find standing to attack an unenforceable statutory provision, seeking only declaratory relief, would allow a federal court to issue an impermissible advisory opinion.The states cited the indirect injury of increased costs to run state-operated medical insurance programs but failed to show how that alleged harm is traceable to the government’s actual or possible enforcement of section 5000A(a). Where a standing theory rests on speculation about the decision of an independent third party (an individual’s decision to enroll in a program like Medicaid), the plaintiff must show at the least “that third parties will likely react in predictable ways.” Nothing suggests that an unenforceable mandate will cause state residents to enroll in benefits programs that they would otherwise forgo. An alleged increase in administrative and related expenses is not imposed by section 5000A(a) but by other provisions of the Act. View "California v. Texas" on Justia Law

Philadelphia contracts with private agencies, which certify prospective foster families under state criteria. Based on its religious beliefs, Catholic Social Services (CSS) will not certify unmarried couples or same-sex married couples. Other Philadelphia agencies will certify same-sex couples. No same-sex couple sought certification from CSS. Philadelphia informed CSS that unless it agreed to certify same-sex couples it would no longer refer children to the agency, citing a non-discrimination provision in the agency’s contract and its Fair Practices Ordinance. CSS filed suit. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of preliminary relief.The Supreme Court reversed. The refusal of Philadelphia to contract with CSS unless CSS agrees to certify same-sex couples violates the Free Exercise Clause by requiring CSS either to curtail its mission or to certify same-sex couples in violation of its religious beliefs. Philadelphia's policies are neither neutral nor generally applicable so they are subject to strict scrutiny. The contract's non-discrimination requirement is not generally applicable; it permits exceptions at the “sole discretion” of the Commissioner. The Ordinance forbids interfering with the public accommodations opportunities of an individual based on sexual orientation, defining a public accommodation to include a provider “whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public.” Certification as a foster parent is not readily accessible to the public; the process involves a customized assessment that bears little resemblance to staying in a hotel or riding a bus.A government policy can survive strict scrutiny only if it advances compelling interests and is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests. Philadelphia has no compelling interest in denying CSS an exception to allow it to continue serving Philadelphia's children consistent with its religious beliefs; it does not seek to impose those beliefs on anyone. View "Fulton v. Philadelphia" on Justia Law

In its 2019 “Rehaif” decision, the Supreme Court clarified that for 18 U.S.C. 922(g) firearms-possession offenses, the prosecution must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm. Before Rehaif, the petitioners were convicted under section 922(g)(1). The Eleventh Circuit rejected Greer's request for a new trial based on the court’s failure to instruct the jury that Greer had to know he was a felon to be found guilty. The Fourth Circuit agreed that Gary's guilty plea must be vacated because the court failed to advise him that, if he went to trial, a jury would have to find that he knew he was a felon.The Supreme Court affirmed Greer's conviction and reversed as to Gary. A Rehaif error is not a basis for plain-error relief unless the defendant makes a sufficient argument that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not know he was a felon. A defendant who has “an opportunity to object” to an alleged error and fails to do so forfeits the claim of error. If a defendant later raises the forfeited claim, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)’s plain-error standard applies. Rehaif errors occurred during the underlying proceedings and the errors were plain but Greer must show that, if the court had correctly instructed the jury, there is a “reasonable probability” that he would have been acquitted; Gary must show that, if the court had correctly advised him, there is a “reasonable probability” that he would not have pled guilty. They have not carried that burden. Both had multiple prior felony convictions. The Court rejected arguments that Rehaif errors are “structural” and require automatic vacatur. View "Greer v. United States" on Justia Law

During an argument with his wife, Caniglia placed a handgun on a table and asked his wife to “shoot [him] and get it over with.” His wife left and spent the night at a hotel. The next morning, unable to reach her husband by phone, she called the police to request a welfare check. Officers encountered Caniglia on the porch of his home and called an ambulance, believing that Caniglia posed a risk to himself or others. Caniglia agreed to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation if the officers would not confiscate his firearms. After Caniglia left, the officers located and seized his weapons. Caniglia sued, claiming that the officers had violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The First Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers, extrapolating from the Supreme Court’s “Cady” decision a theory that the officers’ removal of Caniglia and his firearms from his home was justified by a “community caretaking exception” to the warrant requirement.A unanimous Supreme Court vacated. Cady held that a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not violate the Fourth Amendment in light of the officers’ “community caretaking functions.” Searches of vehicles and homes are constitutionally different; the core of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee is the right of a person to retreat into his home and “free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” View "Caniglia v. Strom" on Justia Law

An Alaska jury convicted Wright of 13 counts of sexual abuse of a minor. Wright finished serving his sentence and moved to Tennessee. Once there, he failed to register as a sex offender as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 34 U.S.C. 20913. Wright pleaded guilty to failure to register and received a sentence of time served plus supervised release. During those federal proceedings, Wright filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Alaska under 28 U.S.C. 2241 and 2254, arguing that the Alaska Supreme Court had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when it denied his Sixth Amendment claims and affirmed his 2009 state conviction and sentence. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that Wright was not in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. The Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Wright’s state conviction was “ ‘a necessary predicate’ ” to his federal conviction. The Supreme Court vacated. Section 2254(a) permits a federal court to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” A habeas petitioner does not remain “in custody” under a conviction “after the sentence imposed for it has fully expired, merely because of the possibility that the prior conviction will be used to enhance the sentences imposed for any subsequent crimes.” That Wright’s state conviction served as a predicate for his federal conviction did not render him “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” If Wright’s second conviction had been for a state crime, he independently could have satisfied section 2254(a)’s “in custody” requirement, though his ability to attack the first conviction would have been limited. View "Alaska v. Wright" on Justia Law

A Mississippi jury convicted Jones of murder for killing his grandfather when Jones was 15 years old. Under Mississippi law, murder carried a mandatory sentence of life without parole. That sentence was affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court subsequently held, in Miller v. Alabama, that the Eighth Amendment permits a life-without-parole sentence for a defendant who committed homicide when he was under 18 only if the sentence is not mandatory and the sentencer has the discretion to impose a lesser punishment. The Mississippi Supreme Court ordered that Jones be resentenced. The judge at resentencing acknowledged that he had discretion under Miller to impose a sentence less than life without parole but determined that life without parole remained the appropriate sentence. The Supreme Court had recently held (Montgomery v. Louisiana) that Miller applied retroactively on collateral review. The Mississippi Court of Appeals rejected Jones’s argument that, under Miller and Montgomery, a sentencer must make a separate factual finding that a murderer under 18 is permanently incorrigible before sentencing the offender to life without parole.The Supreme Court affirmed. In the case of a defendant who committed homicide when he was under 18, Miller and Montgomery do not require the sentencer to make a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility before sentencing the defendant to life without parole; a discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient. The cases require consideration of an offender’s youth but not any particular factual finding nor an on-the-record sentencing explanation with an “implicit finding” of permanent incorrigibility before sentencing a murderer under 18 to life without parole. Jones's resentencing complied with Miller and Montgomery because the sentencer had discretion to impose a sentence less than life without parole in light of Jones’s youth. View "Jones v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In March 1985, Hines, carrying a concealed hunting knife, checked into a motel. The manager had put Jenkins in charge of the motel, providing her with a bag of money. Another visitor, Jones, later found Jenkins’ body in a guest's room, with several knife wounds. Her money, keys, and vehicle were missing. A group of travelers later picked Hines up from beside Jenkins' broken-down car. Hines had dried blood on his shirt and “ke[pt] contradicting himself.” Hines admitted to his sister that he had stabbed somebody at the motel; he had a lot of money and the keys to Jenkins’ car. Hines changed his story when he surrendered to the police but offered to confess if guaranteed the death penalty. A search of Hines' motel room revealed stab marks. Jones testified he knew the motel's owners and had stopped by, taken a key from the office, and entered Hines’ room to use the bathroom. Hines’ counsel stressed to the jury this odd sequence of events. The jury heard discrepancies between his account and the first responders' timeline. When Hines unsuccessfully sought post-conviction review, Jones admitted that he was at the motel with a woman other than his wife and had helped himself to a room key. His story was confirmed by his companion who watched through the room’s window. Hines’ attorney was aware of Jones’ affair but had decided to spare him some embarrassment.The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's 2020 grant of habeas relief. A federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief unless the state decision took an “unreasonable” view of the facts or law. Substantial evidence linked Hines to the crime. The theory that a more aggressive attorney could have changed the result by casting doubt on Jones’ credibility or portraying him as a viable suspect ignores that Jones’ testimony about discovering the body did not indicate that Hines was the culprit. Ample other evidence did that. If Jones’ credibility mattered, the jury had good reasons to be skeptical. Had the Sixth Circuit properly considered the entire record, it would have had little trouble deferring to the Tennessee court’s conclusion that Hines suffered no prejudice. View "Mays v. Hines" on Justia Law

New Mexico State Police officers arrived at an apartment complex to execute an arrest warrant and approached Torres, then standing near a car, and attempted to speak with her as she got into the driver’s seat. Believing the officers to be carjackers, Torres hit the gas to escape. The officers fired their service pistols 13 times to stop Torres, striking her twice. Torres escaped and drove to a hospital 75 miles away. Torres was airlifted back to an Albuquerque hospital, where she was arrested. Her suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 was rejected on summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit held that “a suspect’s continued flight after being shot by police negates a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim.”.The Supreme Court vacated. The application of physical force to the body of a person with the intent to restrain is a seizure even if the person does not submit and is not subdued. The required corporal seizing or touching can be as readily accomplished by a bullet as by a finger. The focus of the Fourth Amendment is “the privacy and security of individuals,” not the particular form of governmental intrusion. A seizure requires the use of force with intent to restrain, as opposed to force applied by accident or for some other purpose. The inquiry is whether the challenged conduct objectively manifests an intent to restrain. The officers seized Torres by shooting her with the intent to restrain her movement. The Court did not address the reasonableness of the seizure, damages, or the officers’ entitlement to qualified immunity. View "Torres v. Madrid" on Justia Law