Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a New Mexico resident, was arrested in Utah and indicted on federal charges of coercion and enticement of a fifteen-year-old. Defendant was returned to New Mexico to await trial and remained there for more than two years, returning to Utah on a few occasions to attend proceedings in federal court. The federal charges were subsequently dismissed. Thereafter, the State of Utah charged Defendant with enticement of a minor. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge as untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. The district court denied Defendant's motion. At issue on appeal was the applicability of the criminal tolling statute, which tolls the limitations period while a defendant is out of the state. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the criminal tolling statute applied to Defendant even though he was present in Utah during the course of the federal court proceedings, as (1) Defendant was only loosely subject to the authority of the State during the federal proceedings against him; and (2) applying the statute to Defendant did not violate the Uniform Operation of Laws provision of the Utah Constitution. View "State v. Canton" on Justia Law

Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) initiated an unlawful detainer action against Appellant, claiming ownership of Appellant's home pursuant to a trustee's deed it obtained from ReconTrust, a national bank that conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure sale in its capacity as trustee of the trust deed that Appellant had executed to secure her mortgage. After an immediate occupancy hearing, the district court entered an order of restitution requiring that Appellant vacate her home. At issue on appeal was whether ReconTrust had authority to conduct the foreclosure sale and convey Appellant's home to the FNMA where Utah Code 57-1-21 and 57-1-23 limits the power of sale to trustees who are either members of the Utah State Bar or title insurance companies with an office in Utah. The district court concluded that ReconTrust, as a national bank, was authorized to conduct the sale under federal law and that federal law preempted Utah law. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order of restitution, holding that the relevant Utah statutes were not preempted by federal law, and therefore, a national bank seeking to foreclose real property in Utah must comply with Utah law. Remanded. View "Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Sundquist" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were camping with their young son, Sam, when a bear pulled Sam from out of his tent and killed him. The bear was the same bear that had attacked another camper in the same campsite earlier that day. Plaintiffs sued the State, alleging that the State negligently failed to warn them of the dangerous condition created by the bear. The district court initially dismissed Plaintiffs' claims under the permit exception to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The Supreme Court reversed. On remand, the State filed a motion for summary judgment, raising two alternative arguments that the Supreme Court declined to address in Francis I. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment for the State on both duty and immunity grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State was entitled to present its alternative arguments on remand; (2) the State owed Plaintiffs a duty because it undertook no specific action to protect them as the next group to use the campsite; and (3) the natural condition exception to the Immunity Act did not immunize the State from liability because a bear is not a "natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands." View "Francis v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder. Fourteen years later, Defendant filed a petition for a post-conviction determination of factual innocence pursuant to Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA). After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court vacated Defendant's murder conviction, determining (1) the PCRA allows a determination of factual innocence to be based on a combination of newly discovered evidence and previously available evidence; and (2) Defendant established her factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a post-conviction determination of factual innocence can be based on both newly discovered evidence and previously available evidence; and (2) the State did not properly challenge the post-conviction court's factual findings, and therefore, the post-conviction court's ultimate determination that Defendant was factually innocent was affirmed. View "Brown v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant confessed to helping Glenn Griffin commit murder. The State charged both Griffin and Defendant with the crime. The State prosecuted Griffin first and, concerned that Defendant would invoke his privilege against self incrimination and refuse to testify, offered Defendant use immunity. The district judge subsequently issued an order compelling Defendant to testify, but Defendant refused. Thereafter, the State charged Defendant with three counts of obstruction of justice. After a hearing, the magistrate judge refused to bind Defendant over for trial and dismissed the obstruction of justice charges. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that State had failed to present sufficient evidence of intent to obstruct. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to bind Defendant over for trial for obstruction of justice. Remanded. View "State v. Maughan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant, who was temporarily staying in the spare bedroom of the victim's father's house, was convicted of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. Defendant's conviction was based on the holding that he occupied a "position of special trust" in relation to the victim under Utah Code 76-5-404.1(4)(h). The district court and court of appeals both held Defendant was an "adult cohabitant" of a parent of the child, which was one of several positions specifically referenced in section 76-5-404.1(4)(h). The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction and remanded, holding (1) the fact that a defendant occupies one of the positions listed in section 76-5-404.1(4)(h) is insufficient, standing alone, to establish the crime of aggravated sexual abuse of a child; (2) for the State to establish aggravated sexual abuse of a child under subsection 4(h), it must prove both that the defendant occupied a "position of authority" over the victim and that the position gave the defendant the ability to "exercise undue influence" over the victim; and (3) because the lower courts did not require the State to establish both elements, Defendant's conviction must be vacated. View "State v. Watkins" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault and sentenced to life without parole on the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to show that the prosecution's decision to charge him with aggravated murder and the district court's denial of his motion to amend the charge to murder violated his constitutional rights; (2) the aggravated murder statute is constitutional; and (3) the admission of victim impact testimony at Defendant's sentencing hearing did not violate constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishments, and therefore, defense counsel's failure to object to the testimony did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Mateos-Martinez" on Justia Law

The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) owned a piece of property on land adjacent to property owned by Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a condemnation action, asserting a right to condemn a portion of UDOT's parcel to construct an access road to the development Plaintiff planned to build on its property. The district court granted summary judgment for UDOT, finding that the two parties' uses were incompatible because the detention pond on UDOT's property left no room for Schroeder's proposed road. Plaintiff appealed, challenging the district court's invocation of the more necessary public use doctrine and its refusal to allow an exception under the doctrine of compatible uses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, absent any basis for a compatible use exception in this case, UDOT was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Schroeder Invs., L.C. v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Wolf Mountain and ASC Utah (ASCU) had been litigating their rights and responsibilities regarding development in a resort of several years. In 2011, the jury awarded ASCU $54,437,000 in damages. Wolf Mountain appealed. Meanwhile, in an effort to collect on the judgment, ASCU filed an application for writ of execution, listing Wolf Mountain's real and personal property. The court ordered Wolf Mountain's property to be sold, and after a public sale, ASCU purchased Wolf Mountain's interests in the claim asserted in this litigation. Wolf Mountain did not appeal from the writ of execution or any of the related orders or proceedings. ASCU then moved to dismiss Wolf Mountain's appeal as moot, arguing that because ASCU now owned Wolf Mountain's appellate rights, there was no longer a controversy. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) ASCU did not acquire Wolf Mountain's appellate rights, and therefore, an actual controversy existed; and (2) Wolf Mountain failed to demonstrate that the district court erred or abused its discretion in any way. View "ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault for stabbing the victim. At trial, the district court instructed the jury on self-defense. However, the court refused to instruct the jury on defense of a third person because it determined that Defendant's theory that he stabbed the victim in defense of a third person was not supported by the evidence. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that a jury could not reasonably have concluded that the third person was in imminent danger at the time of the assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no basis in the evidence to support Defendant's theory that he acted in defense of the third person when he stabbed the victim. View "State v. Berriel" on Justia Law