Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with aggravated murder and aggravated burglary. After being tried and convicted on both charges, he was sentenced to death. On appeal, Defendant raised numerous arguments concerning his convictions, the imposition of the death penalty, and Utah's death penalty scheme. Defendant's arguments included (1) jury issues, (2) evidence and arguments in the guilt phase of the trial, (3) challenges regarding the death penalty exemption hearing, (4) evidence and arguments in the penalty phase, (5) constitutional challenges to Utah's death penalty scheme, and (6) claims of cumulative error. The Supreme Court rejected each of Defendant's arguments and affirmed Defendants' convictions and sentence.

Stephen Maxfield challenged the results of the 2010 gubernatorial election under Utah's election-contest statute, asking the district court to declare him and his running mate the lieutenant governor and governor of Utah, respectively. The court dismissed the petition, concluding that the statutory grounds for an election contest did not encompass Maxfield's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in disposing of the case by deciding Herbert's timely-filed Rule 12(b)(6) motion; (2) the nature of the hearing held in district court was appropriate, and Maxwell's right to a timely hearing was waived; and (3) the district court did not err in refusing to allow Maxfield to bring an election contest based on allegations of campaign finance violations.

A jury convicted Defendant of aggravated robbery. The jury found that Defendant was subject to a one-year enhancement of his sentence because a dangerous weapon was used in the course of the robbery. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, contending that the State failed to prove he had knowledge of the principal's possession of a dangerous weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of aggravated robbery with a one-year penalty enhancement after clarifying the mental state required for the dangerous weapon aggravator in Utah Code 76-6-302(1)(a), holding (1) because the legislature has made no indication that it is a strict liability offense, the statutory aggravator requires the culpable mental state of recklessness; but (2) Defendant's claims on appeal did not require reversal because he did not demonstrate that the errors caused him prejudice.

Plaintiffs brought suit against a law firm and its attorneys for their role in executing civil discovery orders. The orders authorized entry into Plaintiffs' home to seize electronic files from Plaintiffs' computer and other electronic devices. Plaintiffs raised several causes of action based largely on the theory that the execution of the civil discovery orders constituted an illegal warrantless search. The district court granted Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed on alternate grounds, holding (1) the judicial proceedings privilege extends to attorneys' conduct in representing their clients; and (2) as applied in this case, the privilege barred all of Plaintiffs' claims.

Roger Hooban sued Unicity International for breach of a distribution agreement. The district court entered summary judgment for Unicity, holding that Hooban was not a party to the agreement and lacked standing to sue for its enforcement. Unicity then filed a motion for attorney fees under Utah's reciprocal attorney fees statute, Utah Code 78B-5-826. The district court denied the motion on the ground that section 826 was inapplicable given that Hooban was not a party to the underlying contract. The court of appeals reversed, interpreting the Supreme Court's decision in Bilanzich v. Lonetti to dictate a fee award in litigation that is based on a written contract where the contract allows at least one party to the litigation to recover fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 826 applied in this case; and (2) the statute thus authorized the court to award fees to Unicity.

Defendant Eric Butt was convicted of distributing harmful materials to a minor when he mailed rudimentary nude drawings of himself to his five-year-old daughter. On appeal, Butt argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State presented nothing more than the drawings themselves. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Defendant "distributed" the material to a minor under Utah Code 76-10-1206(1); (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that the material was "harmful" as defined by Utah Code 76-10-1201(5)(a); and (3) Defendant's argument that the jury used the incorrect community standard was not preserved for appeal.

Eighteen-month-old Wonzie Barrientos's mother, Jessica Nelson, was killed in a car accident, the result of a high-speed chase in which an Ogden City police officer pursued a speeding car that ultimately crashed into Nelson's car. Plaintiff sued the police officer and Ogden City for negligence. Ogden City defended the case on the ground that it had governmental immunity and, if it did not, that it was not negligent. Ogden City won at trial and Plaintiff moved for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to grant Plaintiff a new trial, because Ogden City's lawyer violated orders in limine by asking inflammatory questions that served no purpose other than to create prejudice; and (2) it was likely the jury's verdict was impacted by the inappropriate questioning. Remanded for a new trial.

Petitioner David Gregg was convicted of rape, a first-degree felony. The trial court sentenced Gregg to an indeterminate term of five years to life. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Gregg subsequently filed an amended petition for post-confiction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The district court dismissed all of Gregg's claims as procedurally barred under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) because of a procedural error on behalf of the court clerk. The Supreme Court vacated Gregg's conviction, holding (1) Gregg qualified for an exception to the procedural bar because the Court would not hold Gregg accountable for the clerk of court's procedural error; and (2) Gregg received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Remanded for a new trial.

This case arose from a lawsuit in federal district court over the death of fifteen-year-old Tucker Thayer. In that suit, Tucker's parents alleged that Washington County School District officials were negligent when they allowed a gun loaded with blank cartridges to be used in a school musical production, resulting in their son's death. The school district asserted governmental immunity from the claims. The Utah Supreme Court accepted certification to address a novel issue of state law and held that the Licensing Exception of the Governmental Immunity Act did not apply to the conduct of the school district officials and those acting on the district's behalf, as any authorization of the presence of the firearm on campus was not a formal, official authorization by a governmental body or employee endowed with regulatory power to issue such an authorization. In addition, a governmental entity such as the school district may not insulate itself from suit by routinely authorizing and approving the negligent conduct of its employees.

Wolfgango Ruiz pled guilty to one count of attempted sexual abuse of a child, a third degree felony. Prior to his sentencing, Ruiz made a request to withdraw his plea on the ground that his original defense counsel had not informed him of the immigration consequences of a felony conviction. District Court Judge Fuchs initially granted Ruiz's motion, but upon a motion to reconsider, Judge Skanchy reversed the order that permitted Ruiz to withdraw his plea. The court of appeals reversed Judge Skanchy's ruling and reinstated Judge Fuch's order based on Judge Skanchy's failure to state the basis for his ruling on the record and the principal that motions to withdraw guilty pleas should be liberally granted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals err in vacating Judge Skanchy's ruling because the basis for the ruling was apparent on the record; and (2) recent amendments to the Plea Withdrawal Statute superseded prior case law stating that presentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas should be liberally granted. Remanded.