Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Linda Stone sued the Town of Irasburg alleging that the selectboard had acted unlawfully in ordering her, as town treasurer, to raise her bond to $1,000,000. She sought monetary damages based on common law defamation, tortious interference with office, violation of the Vermont Constitution, and deprivation of due process. She also asserted that the Town was obligated to pay her attorney’s fees pursuant to statute. In several different orders, the trial court granted the Town summary judgment on all counts. Plaintiff appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. The Court concluded plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a question of fact as to whether a July 12 hearing adequately protected her due process rights. "To remedy a stigma-plus violation through a post-deprivation name-clearing hearing, due process requires more than a chance to speak. It requires an opportunity to clear one’s name before a body which is sufficiently neutral that a person has some realistic chance of success. [. . .] It was error to make a contrary factual determination in favor of the Town in the context of summary judgment." The Court affirmed the trial court with regard to plaintiff's civil rights, tortious interference and defamation claims, and affirmed in all other respects. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Stone v. Town of Irasburg" on Justia Law

Defendant Kyle Bolaski appealed his conviction for second-degree murder after a jury trial. He argued the trial court erred in: (1) not instructing the jury that the jury had to find an absence of passion or provocation; (2) excluding evidence of the victim’s mental health history in the months before the incident; and (3) dismissing a juror during the trial because she reported having followed the case during the time of the grand jury. On appeal, defendant argued that even though his case was presented as a self-defense case, there were sufficient facts in evidence to merit an instruction on passion or provocation for the second-degree murder charge. He also argued that the exclusion of the victim’s mental health evidence was error because it was admissible under Rule 404(b). And lastly, he argued that the dismissal of a juror partway through the trial because she admitted to having followed the story of the case during the grand jury phase was improper. The Supreme Court could not conclude that the instructions in this case were full, fair and correct on the elements of second-degree murder, assuming that the trial court’s decision to charge voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense was proper; nor could the Court conclude that the jury was not misled, despite the more accurate statement of the law in the voluntary manslaughter instruction. Some of the confusion in this case resulted from labeling defendant’s theory as trying to establish the victim’s motives for his actions. The Court concluded that the word was misused in this context. "If the medical records, for example, contained evidence that defendant had engaged in misconduct with respect to the victim’s girlfriend, we might describe that evidence as establishing a motive for the victim pursuing defendant with a splitting maul. Nothing like that is in the medical evidence. Instead, it relates generally to the victim’s mental health condition at the time of the killing, a circumstance that we would not describe in this case as motive." Based on its review of the excluded evidence, the Supreme Court concluded that in general it was relevant to defendant’s self-defense theory for the reason that defendant argued. The Court did not reach defendant's juror dismissal issue, and reversed and remanded this case for a new trial. View "Vermont v. Bolaski" on Justia Law

Petitioner Alvin Stocks appealed the superior court’s order granting summary judgment to the State on his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). He argued that the trial court did not comply with Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in accepting his guilty pleas to various crimes. In June 2009, petitioner, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled guilty to: operation without consent of owner; driving under the influence, second offense; possession of marijuana; and domestic assault. In July 2011, petitioner filed a pro se PCR petition. Counsel was appointed and petitioner moved for summary judgment. Petitioner argued that the undisputed facts showed that the plea colloquy failed to comply with Rule 11(f) because the court did not sufficiently establish a factual basis for the pleas. "What is principally required - and what was missing in this case - is evidence of a specific inquiry by the judge into the factual basis for the plea." The Supreme Court reversed, finding that although the trial court asked petitioner if he understood the charges against him and, in connection with some charges, whether he understood the alleged factual basis for the charge, the trial court never asked him if he admitted the truth of the allegations, nor whether the State could prove the underlying facts. "The court never asked him to describe the facts giving rise to the charges in his own words, and never sought any other admissions from him to support the conclusion that the guilty pleas had a factual basis. The court did not elicit from petitioner any information to support the finding of a factual basis. Petitioner confirmed his understanding of the charges but, apart from the actual guilty pleas themselves, admitted nothing." View "In re Stocks" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the Superior Court, Environmental Division’s affirmance of the zoning board’s grant of a conditional use zoning permit to applicant Group Five Investments, LLC, to build and operate a Dollar General store in Ferrisburgh. Opponents claimed: (1) the trial court erroneously shifted the burden of proof by requiring opponents to show both that the proposed project would have an adverse impact on the area and that existing commercial development in the area already had an adverse impact; (2) the trial court erred in using the "Quechee" definition of undue adverse impact as guidance in interpreting the zoning ordinance; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to rule that the proposed use is prohibited under the applicable zoning ordinance, and that the trial court violated Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) by failing to make requested findings on the proposed use of the Dollar General store. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "In re Group Five Investments CU Permit" on Justia Law

The father of L.M. appealed the trial court's finding L.M. to be a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). He raised numerous arguments. The Supreme Court found that while father's unstable living situation, standing alone, might not be sufficient to support a CHINS determination, there were multiple elements of risk under the facts of this case leading to the trial court's conclusion that father and L.M. could end up in an unsafe living situation. Furthermore, father's inability to follow through on recommendations designed to promote L.M.'s safety enhanced the potential risk of harm to L.M.'s well-being. Given these factors, including mother's concession, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court record supported the decision that there was a risk of prospective harm to the child sufficient to justify the State’s temporary intervention to ensure that L.M. was safe. View "In re L.M." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of sexual assault. He appealed that conviction, arguing that his case should have been dismissed on speedy trial grounds and that he was entitled to a new trial based on statements made in closing argument by the prosecution. While defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial at the appropriate time, the Supreme Court concluded that that right must be balanced with the facts that he was out on bail for the entire period of delay and has identified few specific claims of prejudice. Under these circumstances, the Court concluded that defendant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial. Moreover, the prosecutor’s statements did not rise to the level of fundamental misconduct required by the "plain error" standard. View "Vermont v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

The State of Vermont appealed the superior court’s reversal of the Vermont Parole Board’s decision to revoke Edwin Rodriguez’s parole. On appeal, the State argued: (1) the court erred in weighing the evidence and assessing witness credibility when reviewing the parole board’s decision, and (2) erred in concluding that the parole violation was not established by a preponderance of the evidence. After review of the Parole Board record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the decision. View "Rodriguez v. Vermont Parole Board" on Justia Law

Defendant Brian Aubuchon appealed the superior court’s denial of his request under Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 for additional credit toward his aggregated minimum sentence. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Vermont v. Aubuchon" on Justia Law

The State appealed the grant of defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law on his civil driver's license suspension. The trial court held that the State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's blood alcohol concentration was 0.08 or above at the time he operated a motor vehicle. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Vermont v. Nugent" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the issue before the Supreme Court presented centered on whether the same prior conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) could serve both to criminalize a refusal to submit to an evidentiary blood-alcohol test under 23 V.S.A. 1201(b) and to enhance the penalty for that offense under 23 V.S.A. 1210. The trial court held that the statute prohibited such dual use, and the State appealed that decision.  After careful consideration of the two cases, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the plain language of the statute allowed the same prior DUI conviction to be used both as an element of criminal refusal and to enhance the penalty for the refusal. View "Vermont v. Wainwright" on Justia Law