Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Vermont Human Rights Commission appealed a trial court decision interpreting 9 V.S.A. section 4554 as requiring all lawsuits brought by the Commission against the State of Vermont to be filed within a six-month conciliation period. The trial court held that because the Commission failed to file within this six-month period, its suit against the State was time-barred. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision and dismissed the Commission's claim. View "Vermont Human Rights Commission v. Vermont Agency of Transportation." on Justia Law

In July 2010, Defendant Donald Shepherd pled guilty to charges of aggravated sexual assault, lewd and lascivious conduct with a child, and sexual exploitation of a child in exchange for dismissal of several other pending charges. His victim was a ten-year-old child. Defendant was serving a sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison. At issue on this appeal was the court-ordered restitution for relocation expenses of the victim and his family. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the relocation in this case was a direct result of defendant’s criminal acts. Restitution was therefore appropriate, and the Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Shepherd" on Justia Law

Appellant Charles Crannell appealed the decision of the Rutland Civil Division that he was no longer entitled to an appointed attorney to handle his post-conviction relief (PCR) proceedings.  Appellant’s previously assigned counsel filed a notice of withdrawal based on lack of legal merit in the PCR. Appellant argued that, having filed his PCR petition before the Legislature enacted the amended version of the applicable statutory authority, he had a vested right to counsel under the pre-amendment version. Alternatively, Appellant argued that the Defender General’s Office waived its right to withdraw because it represented him in his PCR proceedings for nine years before seeking to do so. In addition, Appellant asserted that because counsel is necessary for effective advocacy in PCR proceedings at the trial court level, the Supreme Court should read the applicable statute to provide a right to assigned representation in such proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that Appellant was correct that the old version of the statute still governed his right to assigned PCR counsel and granted him a statutory right to representation at his own, rather than the Defender General’s, discretion. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Crannell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sally J. Taylor sued Fletcher Allen Health Care (FAHC) for medical negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress in connection with her medical care following a surgery performed on her lumbar spine. After plaintiff failed to disclose any expert witness in response to discovery requests, FAHC moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff’s claims failed as a matter of law without an expert witness. The trial court granted FAHC’s motion. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that this case was sufficiently complex that plaintiff could not prove her claims without expert testimony. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Taylor v. Fletcher Allen Health Care" on Justia Law

Petitioner Timothy Wiley appealed the Windham Civil Division's denial of his request for DNA testing pursuant to Vermont's Innocence Protection Act. Following an unsuccessful appeal of convictions for aggravated sexual assault and lewd and lascivious conduct stemming from charges that he raped his girlfriend's daughter, and for obstruction of justice in connection with threatening and encouraging the mother to commit perjury, petitioner claimed innocence and filed for relief under the Innocence Protection Act. Petitioner claimed the trial court erred in reaching its conclusion that his anticipated test results would not have created a reasonable probability of a different result had they been available at trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of petitioner's request on the ground that the testing he sought was not of any evidence "obtained during the investigation or prosecution of the crime" for which innocence is claimed, as required by the Act, rendering his request outside of the Act's relief. View "In re Wiley" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal, defendants Paul Edmonds and Francis Cobb appeared their conditional pleas to driving with a suspended license, claiming that the Windsor Criminal Division erred in denying their motions to suppress evidence. Defendants argued that they were subject to investigative stops unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. They alternatively argued that Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution affords greater protection against such detentions than does the Fourth Amendment, and that, even if lawful under the Fourth Amendment, the investigative stops in each case violated Article 11. The trial court, treating the reasonable suspicion standard as the same under the Fourth Amendment and Article 11, held that defendants' detentions were supported by reasonable suspicion that they were driving with suspended drivers licenses. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Edmonds" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder following a jury trial.  He appeals that conviction on three grounds: (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion for a new trial based on a newly discovered witness corroborating defendant’s self-defense claim; (2) the trial court erred by failing to dismiss two jurors for cause; and (3) the jury instructions on diminished capacity failed to inform the jury it must acquit defendant of second-degree murder if defendant could not form the specific intent for that offense due to diminished capacity. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Defendant's contentions on appeal to be without merit and affirmed his conviction. View "Vermont v. Bruno" on Justia Law

Petitioner Charlotte Rumsey appealed a decision by the Vermont Human Services Board which denied her Choices for Care (CFC) Services on a tie vote of the Board. The issue before the Board was whether petitioner met the eligibility requirements for either highest need or high need services. Petitioner was seventy-four years of age at the time of the Board's evidentiary hearing and lived alone. She suffers from chronic seizure disorder, osteoarthritis of the knees and ankles, cerebral vascular disease, depression, anxiety, and obesity. She applied for CFC benefits to obtain home-delivered services to allow her to remain safely in her home. To avoid being placed on a waiting list, she must meet eligibility requirements for highest need or high need services. The hearing officer issued her proposed findings of fact, a recommended decision to affirm the DAIL denial, and a statement of reasons. The Board met to consider this and other cases with six of seven members present. After hearing argument, the six members tied on whether to accept the hearing officer's recommendation. The Board did unanimously accept the hearing officer's findings of fact. It decided that in the case of a tie vote, the "Department's original decision stands." Following the Board decision, petitioner moved to reopen the case, seeking a Board decision based on the vote of all seven members. Petitioner also argued that the decision did not contain findings on the elements of the CFC eligibility standards. DAIL opposed the motion. The Board denied the motion. It concluded that the findings were complete. In response to petitioner's request for a vote by all seven members, the Board stated that, if the case were reopened, there would be no guarantee "that all seven members would be present." The Board noted that it was following the rule of courts for instances where there is a tie vote and that reopening would only delay an authoritative decision from the Supreme Court on the meaning of the CFC regulations. On appeal, both parties argued that the Supreme Court should reach the merits of the case; in the alternative, petitioner sought a remand for proper findings and to have all seven of the Board members decide the case. DAIL opposed the alternative and suggested that the Court instead declare the meaning of the regulations and remand for the Board to find the relevant facts and render a decision. The Board denied petitioner's motion to reopen in part because it did not want to delay the case reaching the Supreme Court for an authoritative interpretation of the CFC regulations. The Court did not agree with this reasoning. In its view, the quality of the Court's decision improved when it had "the informed analysis and decision of the Board. The decision before us has no reasoning or conclusions, and we do not know why either of the sides voted as it did." Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant Jeffrey Brandt was convicted by a jury of two counts of second-degree aggravated domestic assault and one count of driving with a license suspended (DLS). On appeal to the Supreme Court, he raised three arguments: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the charges and grant him separate trials; (2) the jury instruction on excited utterances improperly bolstered the credibility of the complainant's out-of-court statement; and (3) the prosecutor's opening and closing arguments were inappropriate and denied him a fair trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed.

Defendant Paul Bourn was convicted in superior court of two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon following an incident where he pointed an unloaded muzzleloader toward two police officers who were attempting to remove him from a home. He appealed his convictions, arguing first that the court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury that the charge of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires proof of specific intent to threaten, and second, that such intent may be negated by the defendant's diminished capacity. Holding that Vermont's aggravated assault statute requires specific intent, the Supreme Court reversed.