Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Petitioner Paul Kirby was charged with five counts of possessing child pornography after a search of his computer revealed five different video depictions of sexual conduct by a child or children. Evidence suggested that each video was downloaded independently and stored as a separate file on petitioner's computer. Petitioner pled guilty to three counts of possession in exchange for dismissal of the remaining two counts. Petitioner was sentenced to three concurrent prison terms of four to fifteen years. In 2008, Petitioner acting pro se, filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), and amended the petition with the assistance of counsel in 2009. The petition contained two claims: (1) that petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to research, investigate, and inform him of the possibility of asserting a challenge to the multiple charges of possession that could have resulted in the five charges being reduced to one; and (2) because counsel failed to advise him on this legal theory prior to entering his plea agreement, petitioner's subsequent guilty pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily. Petitioner moved for summary judgment on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The State opposed Petitioner's motion and cross-moved for summary judgment on both claims. The superior court granted the State's motion for summary judgment. Petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that counsel's assessment of the viability of a multiplicity challenge under 13 V.S.A. 2827(a) was not unreasonable, and thus did not create a material misunderstanding upon which Petitioner based his guilty pleas. Petitioner's pleas were entered knowingly and voluntarily and therefore he was not entitled to post-conviction relief.

Guardian appealed an order of the probate division directing that a court-ordered guardianship evaluation performed by Rutland Mental Health Services, Inc. (RMHS) be placed with the court under seal. Guardian argued that the court exceeded its authority, or abused its discretion to the extent that it had any, in directing RMHS to return the evaluation to the court to be sealed. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's conclusion after review of this case that the probate court had authority to restrict access to the original evaluation, it agreed with guardian that the court abused its discretion as a matter of law in ordering the sealing of this particular evaluation, given the circumstances of the case and the court’s reasoning for doing so.

Plaintiff David Shaddy appealed a trial court's dismissal of his complaint against the Brattleboro Retreat and some of its employees. Plaintiff, a former Retreat employee, brought claims of defamation, obstruction of justice, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and intentional interference with a contract, arising from the Retreat’s allegation that he unlawfully diverted regulated drugs from the medication room at its facility. The court dismissed the entire complaint on the ground that, having been resolved in proceeding before the Department of Labor and in plaintiff’s criminal case, the issue of whether plaintiff diverted the drugs was res judicata. The court also stated alternative grounds for dismissing all of the claims against the individual defendants, as well as the IIED, obstruction-of-justice, and intentional-interference-with-a-contract claims against both the individual defendants and the Retreat. Plaintiff argued that the court erred in dismissing his claims on the basis of res judicata and by failing to properly consider his complaint in light of his pro se status. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the court’s dismissal of the defamation claim against the Retreat, but otherwise affirmed its decision.

Fletcher Allen Health Care (FAHC) appealed a decision of the Vermont Employment Security Board finding claimant, Abdullahi Mohamed, eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The Board found that claimant’s discharge for off-duty criminal conduct did not constitute gross misconduct disqualifying him from unemployment compensation benefits. On appeal, FAHC argued that the Legislature’s recent amendments to the Vermont Unemployment Compensation Act required the Board to disqualify claimants from receiving unemployment compensation benefits when an employer can no longer retain them as a result of off-duty criminal conduct. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Defendant Richard Reid appealed his conviction for aggravated sexual assault. In the summer of 2008, when she was six years old, the child "A.V.", made statements to her neighbors indicating that defendant had sexually abused her. A neighbor filed a report with the Vermont Department for Children and Families (DCF). The following day, a DCF investigator and a police officer went to A.V.’s school to question her about the alleged abuse. The investigators found that there was sufficient evidence that defendant had sexually abused A.V., and she was transported to the hospital for further examination. At the hospital, an experienced and trained Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) questioned A.V. and conducted a brief physical examination. Defendant was charged with aggravated sexual assault on August 28. In October 2008, the State provided notice that it intended to offer into evidence hearsay statements made by A.V. through various witnesses pursuant to V.R.E. 804a. Defendant asserted that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting hearsay evidence because the State failed to establish that the time, content, and circumstances of the child-victim’s statements provided substantial indicia of trustworthiness. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed.

The Windsor County State's Attorney filed an interlocutory collateral final order appeal seeking review on the question of whether 13 V.S.A. 4815(g)(1) violated the Vermont Constitution's separation-of-powers provision by divesting the trial court of the authority to order an inpatient mental health evaluation of a potentially incompetent defendant. The Attorney General intervened on behalf of the State, arguing that the appeal was improvidently granted, and that the statute is constitutional. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no justiciable claim because the necessity of an inpatient evaluation and the constitutionality of the statute were not decided below. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal.

Hartford police officers responded to a report of a possible burglary in progress, and used considerable force in restraining the suspect. The alleged burglar turned out to be the homeowner, who was disoriented due to a medical condition. Journalist Anne Galloway requested records relating to the police contact with the homeowner from the chief of police. The chief denied Galloway's request, as did the town manager when Galloway appealed the chief's decision. After Galloway filed an action to compel production of the records, the superior court ruled that under the Public Records Act's (PRA) exemption for police investigations, the police did not need to provide Galloway with any records produced or acquired before the point at which the officers decided against charging the homeowner with a criminal offense. Galloway then appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that because the homeowner's detention amounted to an arrest, the records in question must be disclosed under the PRA's proviso that "records reflecting the initial arrest of a person . . . shall be public."

Kayla Eaton's lawsuit against her former employer and supervisor for sexual assault was dismissed for failure to prosecute. She claimed that her ability to prosecute the case was thwarted by a licensed polygraph examiner, Leroy Prior, who determined that she did not tell the truth in responding to questions about the alleged assault. Ms. Eaton and her father Robert Eaton filed this action against Prior, claiming negligent administration of the polygraph examination, and against the Vermont State Police and Lt. Matthew Belmay, alleging that they improperly disclosed the examination results and conspired to cover up Prior's misconduct. The trial court entered judgment for defendants on the ground that the suit was barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to actions for "injuries to the person," under 12 V.S.A. 512(4), and the Eatons appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly concluded the statute of limitations applied to this case, however, the court mistakenly failed to consider the applicability of 12 V.S.A. 511's general six-year limitation period to the claims for economic harm resulting from dismissal of the underlying lawsuit and other alleged economic costs.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned whether a truck idling in the middle of the night in the parking lot of an auto repair shop that had previously been burglarized was sufficient to give police reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Defendant Nicole Paro did not challenge the facts as found by the trial court; she challenged only the trial court's legal conclusion that, given the particular facts of this case, the police had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop her vehicle. Police passed by Northeast Foreign Cars and noticed a Chevrolet pickup truck idling in the parking lot. The police officer thought this was suspicious, as the shop was not open for business, and he knew that this area had experienced previous break-ins, with the most recent being about nine months earlier. In fact, the police officer had personally investigated thefts from vehicles at Northeast Foreign Cars a year earlier in August 2009. As he started to turn around, the Chevy truck pulled out of the parking lot and headed east towards the police officer.The officer made a motor vehicle stop based solely on his suspicion of criminal activity at Northeast Foreign Cars. Defendant was charged with driving under the influence and moved to suppress all evidence obtained through the traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed: "We recognize that police officers are trained to be suspicious and it is their job to investigate suspicious situations. But we must also be mindful of our right to wander where we please, when we please, without fear of a police seizure."

Defendant Chase Tetrault and friends broke into a remote camp owned by A.C. (camp owner), damaging appliances and personal items. Defendant pled guilty to one count of unlawful trespass and the State requested restitution. At the restitution hearing, Defendant argued that the camp owner should be able to recover only the actual value of the damaged items at the time of the trespass, not their replacement cost. He also argued restitution could not be had for items that were not damaged, but "merely used." The trial judge disagreed, and awarded the camp owner the full amount of claimed damages. On appeal, Defendant raised the same two arguments, along with a new argument that restitution was not appropriate at all in this case, because the crime of unlawful trespass did not include an element of destruction of property. "While the value of a used microwave or toaster would be lower than the value of the identical appliances in new condition, Defendant’s suggestion that the replacement cost can be estimated by what the items might fetch at a yard sale is pettifoggery. . . .[a] victim of a home invasion should not have to visit local thrift stores or pore through the classifieds to determine the value of a used blender." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court was well within its discretion in awarding the camp owner restitution in the amount sought.