Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Patricia LaCava was convicted in the circuit court of two counts of embezzlement. LaCava commenced her appeal pro se. LaCava filed a timely notice of appeal and asked the court reporter to order transcripts of the trial proceedings. LaCava subsequently secured representation by appellate counsel, who discovered that the transcripts had not been filed within the sixty-day period required by Va. R. Crim. App. 5A:8(a). After filing the transcripts by hand, counsel filed a motion to extend the deadline for filing transcripts. The court of appeals denied the motion and thereafter denied LaCava's petition for appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) the court of appeals abused its discretion in denying LaCava's motion to extend the deadline for filing her transcript, as LaCava showed good cause to extend the period for filing transcripts; and (2) the court of appeals erred in denying LaCava's petition for appeal because the order was predicated solely on the absence of a transcript or statement of facts.

Defendant Jean Enriquez was found in a drunken condition in a parked motor vehicle with the keys in the ignition switch. Defendant was subsequently convicted of driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Defendant appealed, contending that the evidence was insufficient to convict him as a matter of law of the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when an intoxicated person is seated behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle on a public highway and the key is in the ignition switch, he is in actual physical control of the vehicle and, therefore, is guilty of operating the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol within the meaning of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-266; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle and to support his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

When he was fifteen years old, E.C. pled guilty to breaking and entering and rape. After E.C. was released from custody and placed under parole supervision, a team of attorneys filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on E.C.'s behalf alleging that E.C.'s guilty plea was neither knowing nor voluntary and was unconstitutionally invalid because of ineffective assistance of counsel. Six days after his petition was filed, E.C. was released from parole supervision. The circuit court dismissed the petition, concluding that it had no jurisdiction to consider the petition and that the habeas corpus proceeding was moot. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court had active jurisdiction over the proceeding because E.C. was detained for purposes of habeas corpus when the petition was filed; and (2) E.C.'s release from probation during the pendency of the habeas corpus proceeding did not automatically render the proceeding moot, as the collateral consequences imposed on E.C. by the convictions he challenged were sufficient to sustain a continued controversy.

James Blaxton was convicted in 1989 of rape, forcible sodomy and attempted sodomy. In 2008, the Commonwealth filed a petition seeking Blaxton's civil commitment as a sexually violent predator. The trial court found that Blaxton was a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA). The circuit court subsequently entered an order granting Blaxton conditional release and transferred supervision of Blaxton to the state of Illinois after finding that the SVPA does not prohibit interstate transfers of sexually violent predators. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court's judgment was error pursuant to Commonwealth v. Amerson, in which the Court held that the SVPA does not authorize the conditional release of a sexually violent predator outside the Commonwealth. Remanded.

Defendant pled guilty to attempted rape, a felony. Defendant's sentencing order contained a provision stating that the sentencing court would reduce the conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor following Defendant's incarceration and successful completion of probation. After Defendant violated his probation, he filed a motion to vacate the sentencing order as void ab initio and to dismiss his charge of the probation violation, arguing that the circuit court did not have the power to reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor under the circumstances. The circuit court denied Defendant's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in this case, the circuit court did not have the power to render a judgment reducing Defendant's conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor more than five years after its entry of the sentencing order; and (2) the ultra vires provision in the sentencing order resulted in the entire sentencing order being void ab initio.

After Jennifer Bing was arrested on suspicion of drug possession and distribution, a lieutenant conducted a full cavity search on Bing. Almost two years later, Bing filed a complaint against several law enforcement officers, alleging assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that the search was illegal. The trial court found that the statute of limitations barred Bing's claim and dismissed with prejudice the cause of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err when it granted Defendants' plea of the statute of limitations because Bing was "confined" within the meaning of Va. Code Ann. 8.01-243.2, and the body cavity search related to the conditions of her confinement. Therefore, a one-year statute of limitations applied.

Defendant Roger Stevens was found guilty of, among other crimes, two counts of murder, two counts of use of a firearm in the commission of murder, conspiracy to commit robbery, and malicious bodily injury. The court of appeals affirmed Stevens' conviction. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress his statement to police during a custodial interrogation because, in light of the circumstances, Defendant's request for a lawyer was ambiguous and, therefore, the officers were entitled to ask further clarifying questions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, the officers could have reasonably viewed Stevens' statement as ambiguous, and thus they were permitted to ask Stevens clarifying questions.

Albemarle County enacted a zoning ordinance governing construction on slopes within the county. Under the waiver provision of the county code, the planning commission was authorized to grant a waiver from the restrictions otherwise imposed by the ordinance. Kent Sinclair, who owned property in the county, filed a complaint seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the county exceeded the power delegated to it by the General Assembly in violation of the Dillon Rule because its procedure for considering waiver applications was not authorized by state law. The circuit court granted summary judgment against Sinclair. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment that the decision to grant or deny waiver applications may be delegated to the planning commission, as the delegation was legislative in nature and not authorized by state law. Accordingly, in enacting the waiver provision, the county exceeded its authority from the General Assembly in violation of the Dillon Rule and the waiver provision was void. Remanded.

The Supreme Court upheld two capital murder convictions against Alfredo Rolando Prieto as well as convictions for rape, grand larceny, and two counts of felonious use of a firearm. The Court remanded for resentencing based on a finding of error in the penalty phase of the trial. Following a new penalty phase, the circuit court entered a final order imposing the death penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed after addressing Prieto's several assignments of error, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment and that there was no reason to commute or set aside the sentences of death.

Judy Maretta, as the named beneficiary of a Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) policy, received FEGLI benefits upon the death of her ex-husband. Jacqueline Hillman, the widow of the deceased, filed an action against Maretta, claiming that pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 20-111.1(D), Maretta was liable to her for the death benefits received. Maretta claimed that the state law was preempted by 5 U.S.C. 8705 and 8705 because the state statutes granted FEGLI benefits to someone other than the named beneficiary in violation of FEGLIA's terms. The circuit court concluded that section 20-111.1(D) was not preempted by FEGLIA and entered judgment against Maretta. The Supreme Court reversed and entered judgment for Maretta, holding that because Congress intended for FEGLI benefits to be paid and to belong to a designated beneficiary, FEGLIA preempts section 20-111.1(D).