Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Conner Schierman was convicted of four counts of aggravated first degree murder and sentenced to death. He appealed his convictions and sentences on multiple grounds. Schierman was convicted for the 2006 stabbing deaths of members of the Milkin family; he was also charged with the first-degree arson of their house. The Washington Supreme Court reviewed all of Schierman’s challenges to trial and his death sentence. The Court affirmed all convictions; a majority of the Court rejected Schierman's challenges to his death sentence. View "Washington v. Schierman" on Justia Law

This case required the Washington Supreme Court to consider the "independent source doctrine," a recognized exception to the exclusionary rule under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. The superior court admitted into evidence Ray Betancourth's cell phone records, which were initially obtained under a jurisdictionally invalid district court warrant. In 2012, Betancourth assembled a group of friends to look for Terrance Frank, whom Betancourth suspected of breaking his car windows a few days earlier. Betancourth drove the group around in his pickup truck until they located Frank walking down the sidewalk with two other men, Jordan Lemus and Jose Rodriguez. Betancourth's group exited the truck and chased after Frank, Lemus, and Rodriguez. Betancourth turned back after realizing he had left his truck running, while his friends chased Lemus and Rodriguez into an alley. Betancourth's friend, Marco Cardenas, pulled out a pistol and fired twice, killing Rodriguez. Almost a year after Betancourth's arrest, a superior court judge ruled in a separate case that RCW 10.96.060 authorized only superior courts to issue warrants for the records of out-of-state companies. Based on this ruling, police obtained a new warrant for Betancourth’s Verizon phone records. Though a valid superior court warrant was subsequently issued, police did not physically return and reseize the evidence. In upholding admission of the cell phone records, the Court of Appeals fashioned what it deemed an "invalidity correction corollary" to the independent source doctrine Betancourth argued this corollary improperly interjected reasonableness or good faith considerations that were incompatible with Washington constitutional privacy rights. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: “[w]hile we do not embrace the notion of an ‘invalidity correction corollary,’ we agree with the lower courts that the exclusionary rule does not apply in this case. We hold that Betancourth's cell phone records were admissible under our existing independent source doctrine.” View "Washington v. Betancourth" on Justia Law

This case required the Washington Supreme Court to consider the "independent source doctrine," a recognized exception to the exclusionary rule under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. The superior court admitted into evidence Ray Betancourth's cell phone records, which were initially obtained under a jurisdictionally invalid district court warrant. In 2012, Betancourth assembled a group of friends to look for Terrance Frank, whom Betancourth suspected of breaking his car windows a few days earlier. Betancourth drove the group around in his pickup truck until they located Frank walking down the sidewalk with two other men, Jordan Lemus and Jose Rodriguez. Betancourth's group exited the truck and chased after Frank, Lemus, and Rodriguez. Betancourth turned back after realizing he had left his truck running, while his friends chased Lemus and Rodriguez into an alley. Betancourth's friend, Marco Cardenas, pulled out a pistol and fired twice, killing Rodriguez. Almost a year after Betancourth's arrest, a superior court judge ruled in a separate case that RCW 10.96.060 authorized only superior courts to issue warrants for the records of out-of-state companies. Based on this ruling, police obtained a new warrant for Betancourth’s Verizon phone records. Though a valid superior court warrant was subsequently issued, police did not physically return and reseize the evidence. In upholding admission of the cell phone records, the Court of Appeals fashioned what it deemed an "invalidity correction corollary" to the independent source doctrine Betancourth argued this corollary improperly interjected reasonableness or good faith considerations that were incompatible with Washington constitutional privacy rights. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: “[w]hile we do not embrace the notion of an ‘invalidity correction corollary,’ we agree with the lower courts that the exclusionary rule does not apply in this case. We hold that Betancourth's cell phone records were admissible under our existing independent source doctrine.” View "Washington v. Betancourth" on Justia Law

Justin Vanhollebeke drove his truck the wrong way down a one-way street. An officer stopped him. Vanhollebeke ignored the officer's command to stay in the vehicle, got out and locked the vehicle behind him, left a punched out ignition and apparent drug paraphernalia behind in plain view of the police, and had no key. The police asked Vanhollebeke for consent to search the vehicle. Vanhollebeke refused. A police officer then contacted the truck's owner, received the absent owner's consent and a key to search, and then returned to search the vehicle. Vanhollebeke was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm found in the truck, and he challenged the legality of the vehicle search. Vanhollebeke moved to suppress evidence found in the vehicle, citing his refusal at the scene and the officer’s subsequent search of the vehicle as a violation of his Constitutional rights. The officer lacked a warrant; the State relied instead on the consent of the owner as an exception to the warrant requirement. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held the present driver's refusal to consent to the search of his or her vehicle generally had to be respected. But where, as here, circumstances like a punched out ignition and a driver with no key raises a significant question about whether the driver had any legitimate claim to the vehicle at all, the police could contact the absent owner and get that owner's consent to search instead. View "Washington v. Vanhollebeke" on Justia Law

Justin Vanhollebeke drove his truck the wrong way down a one-way street. An officer stopped him. Vanhollebeke ignored the officer's command to stay in the vehicle, got out and locked the vehicle behind him, left a punched out ignition and apparent drug paraphernalia behind in plain view of the police, and had no key. The police asked Vanhollebeke for consent to search the vehicle. Vanhollebeke refused. A police officer then contacted the truck's owner, received the absent owner's consent and a key to search, and then returned to search the vehicle. Vanhollebeke was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm found in the truck, and he challenged the legality of the vehicle search. Vanhollebeke moved to suppress evidence found in the vehicle, citing his refusal at the scene and the officer’s subsequent search of the vehicle as a violation of his Constitutional rights. The officer lacked a warrant; the State relied instead on the consent of the owner as an exception to the warrant requirement. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held the present driver's refusal to consent to the search of his or her vehicle generally had to be respected. But where, as here, circumstances like a punched out ignition and a driver with no key raises a significant question about whether the driver had any legitimate claim to the vehicle at all, the police could contact the absent owner and get that owner's consent to search instead. View "Washington v. Vanhollebeke" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether there were any limitations on the scope of a community corrections officer’s search. “It is well established that an individual on probation has a reduced expectation of privacy, and a community corrections officer (CCO) may conduct a warrantless search if he or she suspects the individual has violated a probation condition.” The Washington Supreme Court held article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution required a nexus between the property searched and the suspected probation violation. There was no nexus in the search at issue here. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and petitioner Curtis Cornwell’s convictions. View "Washington v. Cornwell" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether there were any limitations on the scope of a community corrections officer’s search. “It is well established that an individual on probation has a reduced expectation of privacy, and a community corrections officer (CCO) may conduct a warrantless search if he or she suspects the individual has violated a probation condition.” The Washington Supreme Court held article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution required a nexus between the property searched and the suspected probation violation. There was no nexus in the search at issue here. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and petitioner Curtis Cornwell’s convictions. View "Washington v. Cornwell" on Justia Law

Charles Fletcher was found not guilty by reason of insanity of assault and related crimes in 2013. The judge ordered him committed. Fletcher initiated the process for obtaining release in 2015 by mailing a motion for release directly to the superior court judge. The court directed Fletcher to file with Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) instead, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s consideration centered on the self-petition process. If a criminal defendant was acquitted due to insanity, the judge must then decide what to do with him or her. An acquitted person who constitutes a substantial danger to others, or who presents a substantial likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security unless kept under further control of the court, other persons, or institutions, "shall" be committed under Washington’s involuntary commitment statute, RCW 10.77.110(1). If those safety concerns disappear, the insanity acquittee must be released. Either DSHS or the insanity acquittee may initiate the process for obtaining such release. The Court held that the insanity acquittee may petition the court directly for conditional release. Furthermore, he or she is entitled to legal counsel once a petition for conditional release is filed with the court or an application for release is submitted to DSHS. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the superior court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

Charles Fletcher was found not guilty by reason of insanity of assault and related crimes in 2013. The judge ordered him committed. Fletcher initiated the process for obtaining release in 2015 by mailing a motion for release directly to the superior court judge. The court directed Fletcher to file with Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) instead, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s consideration centered on the self-petition process. If a criminal defendant was acquitted due to insanity, the judge must then decide what to do with him or her. An acquitted person who constitutes a substantial danger to others, or who presents a substantial likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security unless kept under further control of the court, other persons, or institutions, "shall" be committed under Washington’s involuntary commitment statute, RCW 10.77.110(1). If those safety concerns disappear, the insanity acquittee must be released. Either DSHS or the insanity acquittee may initiate the process for obtaining such release. The Court held that the insanity acquittee may petition the court directly for conditional release. Furthermore, he or she is entitled to legal counsel once a petition for conditional release is filed with the court or an application for release is submitted to DSHS. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the superior court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

Petitioner Donald Herrick was an alleged sexually violent predator (SVP) awaiting trial after stipulating to probable cause and agreeing to be evaluated by the State's expert. At the request of the State's expert and pursuant to ROW 71.09.050(1), the trial court ordered Herrick to submit to penile plethysmograph (PPG) and polygraph tests. Herrick refused to comply with the court order, which resulted in a finding of contempt. Herrick brought a facial and as-applied challenge to the statute, and he also challenged the lawfulness of the contempt order. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Washington Supreme Court found that compelled PPG testing pursuant to court order in accordance with RCW 71.09.050(l)(c) complied with substantive due process, including in Herrick's case. Therefore, finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Det. of Herrick" on Justia Law