Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In early 2013, Pierce County detained the 10 respondents in this case (all patients) under the Involuntary Treatment Act (ITA). In most cases, the respondents were initially held in hospital emergency rooms or in local acute care medical hospitals. None of these sites were certified as evaluation and treatment centers under the ITA. In all cases, the county, through one of its designated mental health providers, filed petitions to hold the respondents for up to 14 more days. Several of the involuntarily detained patients moved to dismiss these 14-day petitions on the grounds that they had not been, and believed they would not be, detained in a certified evaluation and treatment facility. A trial judge found that the patients' placement in uncertified treatment centers, a/k/a "psychiatric boarding," was unlawful. Pierce County appealed, but the Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge and affirmed. View "In Re Det. of D.W." on Justia Law

Russell Homan was convicted of child luring. On appeal, Homan argued that his conviction violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because the evidence was insufficient for conviction and that RCW 9A.40.090 (the Washington luring statute) was unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction due to insufficiency of evidence. The State appealed the reversal, and the Supreme Court granted review on the sufficiency of evidence issue. The Court declined to rule on the overbreadth issue because it would benefit from additional briefing and argument. The Court found sufficient evidence to find that Homan lured a minor and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to decide the overbreadth issue. View "Washington v. Homan" on Justia Law

At his arraignment in August 2012, Petitioner Peter Barton pleaded not guilty to a charge of rape of a child in the first degree. The court set bail at $250,000. The prosecutor asked for a condition requiring 10 percent of the amount to be deposited in cash with the registry of the court. Barton objected to the cash-only bail, and the trial court delayed consideration of the request. At a hearing the next day, the State asked the court to increase Barton's bail to $1,000,000 and direct that if Barton "should post bond that 10 percent of that be in cash." The judge entered an order setting bail at $500,000 and stating that Barton was required to execute a "bond with [sic] depositing 10% cash in the registry of the court." The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on article I, section 20 of the Washington State Constitution and its mandate that criminal defendants "shall be bailable by sufficient sureties." Peter Barton's bail invoked Criminal Rule (CrR) 3.2(b)(4). Barton claims the trial court's order violated his guaranty to bail by sufficient sureties. The Supreme Court held that article I, section 20 meant a defendant must be allowed the option to secure bail via a surety, as distinct from cash or other security. To the extent the trial court's order disallowed this possibility, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Barton" on Justia Law

In this case and its companion, LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC, (No. 88846-9) (Wash. July 31, 2014), the central issues on appeal arose from a joint venture agreement regarding a debt collection business. The debt collection business operated according to the terms of the joint venture agreement, as originally proposed, from approximately winter 2005 through summer 2007. This opinion addressed whether the trial court proceedings complied with due process requirements; whether, as a matter of law, the joint venture proposal was entered by an attorney in violation of one or both of former RPCs 1.7 (1995) and 1.8(a) (2000); and, if so, whether the remedy imposed by the trial court and affirmed on appeal is appropriate. The Supreme Court found: (1) the trial court proceedings satisfied the requirements of procedural due process; (2) though on different reasoning from that used by the Court of Appeals, that the undisputed facts established as a matter of law that the joint venture proposal contemplated a business transaction subject to, agreed to, and entered into in violation of former RPC 1.8(a). The Court affirmed that the former RPC 1.8(a) violation rendered the terms of the business transaction unenforceable under the circumstances presented and the remedy imposed was appropriate. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the business transaction was entered in violation of former RPC 1. 7. The Court declined to determine whether the former RPC 1.7 violation would have also justified the remedy imposed. View "LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

FutureSelect invested nearly $200 million in the Rye Funds, which pooled and fed money into Bernard Madoff's fraudulent securities investment scheme. The investments were lost when Madoff's fraud collapsed. FutureSelect sued Tremont Group Holdings (proponent of the Rye Funds), Oppenheimer Acquisition Corporation and Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (Tremont's parent companies) and Ernst & Young, LLP (Tremont's auditor) for their failure to conduct due diligence on Madoff's investments. The trial court dismissed on the pleadings, finding Washington's security law did not apply, and that Washington courts lacked jurisdiction over Oppenheimer. The Court of Appeals reversed, and the defendants sought to reinstate the trial court's findings. Finding no error with the Court of Appeals' decision, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. View "Futureselect Portfolio Mgmt., Inc. v. Tremont Grp. Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Alvin Witherspoon appealed his conviction and life sentence for second degree robbery. Because the robbery conviction was his third "most serious offense," he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA). On appeal to the Supreme Court, Witherspoon: challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial to convict him; argued he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and that his persistent offender sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Witherspoon" on Justia Law

"TC" took a loaded gun from the home where his mother lived with her boyfriend, Douglas Bauer. The gun belonged to Bauer. TC brought that loaded gun to school in his backpack a few days after he stole it. The gun discharged as TC was rummaging in his pack at the end of the day. The bullet struck one of TC's classmates, and it seriously injured her. The State charged Bauer with assault in the third degree, alleging that he, "[w]ith criminal negligence, cause[d] bodily harm to another person by means of a weapon or other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm." Before trial, Bauer moved to dismiss, arguing that the facts did not support a third degree assault charge as a matter of law. The State argued that the statutory phrase "causes bodily harm" reached Bauer's conduct as a primary "cause" of the harm to TC's classmate. The trial court agreed with the State and denied the motion to dismiss but then certified the matter to the Court of Appeals. In a split decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling. The Supreme Court agreed with Bauer, however: "Although causation in fact is the same in criminal and civil cases, legal causation is not. Our case law suggests that legal causation does not extend as far in criminal cases as it does in tort cases, and even our civil cases do not extend liability as far as the State seeks to do in this case. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals." View "Washington v. Bauer" on Justia Law

Miguel Angel Villanueva-Gonzalez was convicted of second degree assault and fourth degree assault for attacking his girl friend. On appeal, he contended that his actions constituted one assault, and therefore two convictions violated double jeopardy. Finding that the legislature has not provided a definition of assault and the common law definition was ambiguous, the Washington Supreme Court was "guided by the many other jurisdictions that have treated assault as a course of conduct crime," and was "mindful of the 'rule of lenity,'" which required the Court to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the defendant. It therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that Villanueva-Gonzalez's two assault convictions violated double jeopardy because the underlying acts occurred during the same course of conduct. View "Washington v. Villanueva-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the permissible scope of these protective frisks. An officer stopped Tanner Russell for violating several minor traffic laws. The officer recognized Russell from a previous encounter where Russell had told officers he was not armed, when in fact he had a small gun in his pocket. Fearing for his safety, the officer frisked Russell for weapons and felt a small box in Russell's pants pocket. The officer removed the box, opened it, and found a syringe filled with methamphetamine. The State charged Russell with possession of a controlled substance; the syringe was the only evidence against him. Russell moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search was unlawful, and the trial court granted his motion and dismissed the case. The trial court found that although the initial stop was justified, the frisk was not because the stop occurred in a well-lit area and Russell did not verbally threaten the officer, nor did he make any threatening gestures or movements. The court also found that even if the frisk was justified, the search of the container was not because it posed no threat once it was in the control of the officer. The Supreme Court held that the initial protective frisk was justified to protect officer safety, but the warrantless search of the container was not because it exceeded the permissible scope of a protective frisk. View "Washington v. Russell" on Justia Law

William France was convicted of five counts of felony harassment and one count of witness intimidation for making multiple harassing calls to his former attorneys. The jury was instructed consistent with the pattern jury instructions on witness intimidation. There was no evidence presented that France, who was in jail when he made the calls, intended immediately to use force against any person present at the time of the charged conduct. France contended under the law of the case doctrine, his felony harassment convictions should have been dismissed. The State argued that the instructions, taken as a whole, accurately informed the jury of the elements of felony harassment and that it presented sufficient evidence to sustain France's convictions. The Supreme Court agreed with the State, and affirmed the trial court. View "Washington v. France" on Justia Law