Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Department of Ecology erred in determining that no environmental impact statement (EIS) was necessary for a proposed energy cogeneration project, and failed to adequately consider the effects of carbon dioxide emissions and demand for woody biomass from the state's forests. In addition, the issue on appeal centered on whether the project was exempt from the EIS requirement as part of an energy recovery facility that existed before January 1, 1989. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Ecology adequately reviewed the relevant information in determining that the project would not have significant impacts on the environment, and the project was exempt from the EIS requirement. View "PT Air Watchers v. Dep't of Ecology" on Justia Law

Petitioner Phillip Garcia Jr. appealed his convictions for kidnapping in the first degree, burglary in the second degree, and criminal trespass in the first degree. He argued that that the evidence was insufficient to support each of the alternative means of kidnapping presented to the jury, that the trial court violated his confrontation rights by limiting his cross-examination of an adverse witness, that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of a prior crime of dishonesty, and that the prosecutor incorrectly defined "burglary" during closing arguments. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed petitioner's convictions for kidnapping in the first degree because there was insufficient evidence to support that conviction. The Court reversed the conviction for burglary in the second degree because of prejudicial trial error. But the Court affirmed his conviction for criminal trespass in the first degree because the errors petitioner claimed were harmless. View "Washington v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The State prosecuted petitioner David Gower for sex crimes against his 17-year-old stepdaughter S.E.H. In accordance with ER 404(b) and RCW 10.58.090, the State offered evidence that petitioner had committed other similar crimes against two other alleged juvenile victims, C.M. (his biological daughter) and J.K. (another stepdaughter). In a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of that evidence, the trial court ruled it was all inadmissible under ER 404(b). But the trial court acknowledged that admissibility of that evidence under RCW 10.58.090 was a separate question and concluded that although the evidence of other sex offenses was inadmissible under ER 404(b), the evidence of the prior crimes relating to C.M. was admissible under RCW 10.58.090. In 2009, between the statute's enactment arid subsequent invalidation in 2012, the trial court admitted evidence of petitioner's prior sex offenses against him at trial. He was ultimately convicted. Because that evidence was improperly admitted and considered by the trial judge in finding petitioner guilty, the Supreme Court reversed his conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Washington v. Gower" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a secretly recorded conversation between defendant William Kipp and his brother-in-law in violation of Washington's privacy act. Kipp was convicted of two counts of rape of a child and one count of child molestation in the second degree. Before trial, Kipp moved to suppress the recording, relying on the privacy act. The trial court ruled that the recording was not a private conversation and, therefore, not subject to suppression. A jury found Kipp guilty and he appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that for purposes of the privacy act, when facts are undisputed, the question of whether a particular communication is private is a matter of law reviewed de novo. In this case, Kipp's conversation with his brother-in-law was private and therefore should have been suppressed. View "Washington v. Kipp" on Justia Law

The certified questions in this case centered on whether, the exemption of nonprofit religious organizations from the definition of "employer" under Washington's Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), violates article I, section 11 or article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution. Larry Ockletree sued his former employer, Franciscan Health System (PHS), challenging the termination of his employment after he had a stroke. Ockletree, who is African-American, claimed that his termination was the result of illegal discrimination on the basis of race and disability. FHS removed the suit to federal court and moved to dismiss Ockletree's claims. FHS argued that it was exempt from WLAD as a nonprofit religious organization. Ockletree challenged the validity of the religious employer exemption under the state and federal constitutions. The district court certified questions to this court asking whether the religious employer exemption violated Washington's article I, section 11 establishment clause or its article I, section 12 privileges and immunities clause. The Washington Supreme Court answered both questions in the negative. View "Ockletree v. Franciscan Health Sys." on Justia Law

Homer Gibson applied to Kittitas County for a conditional use permit (CUP) that would allow him to conduct rock crushing and other gravel and cement production related activities on his agricultural-zoned property. Kittitas gave notice that it would hold a public hearing on the CUP. Ellensburg Cement Products, Inc. objected to the CUP application and appealed Kittitas's SEPA Determination of Non-Significance (DNS) under the county's administrative appeal procedures. Kittitas first considered the SEPA appeal in a "closed record" hearing, and upheld the DNS. It then held an "open record" public hearing on the CUP, and granted Gibson's application over Ellensburg Cement's objections. Ellensburg Cement appealed both decisions to the superior court, which affirmed, and then to the Court of Appeals, which reversed. The Court of Appeals held that Kittitas was statutorily required to hold an "open record hearing" on the appeal of the SEP A DNS and that rock crushing was not a permissible conditional use under Kittitas's relevant zoning regulations. After its review, the Supreme Court found no error with the appellate court's decision and affirmed. View "Ellensburg Cement Prods., Inc. v. Kittitas County" on Justia Law

In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a conviction must be vacated even if it were shown that eavesdropping (an "odious practice" when done between an attorney and her client), did not result in any prejudice to the defendant. In this case, the police detective eavesdropped on attorney-client conversations after the trial was complete and the jury had found the defendant guilty. Thus, while the conduct was "unconscionable," there was no way for the eavesdropping to have any effect on the trial itself. Further, the prosecutor submitted a declaration stating that the detective on the case never communicated any information about the attorney-client conversations to the prosecution. Upon review of this case, the Supreme Court held that eavesdropping is presumed to cause prejudice to the defendant unless the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the eavesdropping did not result in any such prejudice. In this case, the record did not provide enough information to make this determination, and the Court remanded the case for additional discovery. View "Washington v. Fuentes" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on "Loudon v. Mhyre," (756 P.2d 138 (1988)), and whether it applied to a plaintiff's nonparty, treating physician when such physician is employed by a defendant. Specifically, the Court was asked whether Loudon barred ex parte communications between a physician and his or her employer's attorney where the employer is a corporation and named defendant whose corporate attorney-client privilege likely extends to the physician. To protect the values underlying both the physician-patient and the attorney-client privileges, the Supreme Court adopted a modified version of the "Upjohn" test: an attorney hired by a defendant health care provider to investigate or litigate an alleged negligent event may conduct privileged ex parte communications with a plaintiff's nonparty treating physician only where the communication meets the general prerequisites to application of the attorney-client privilege, the communication is with a physician who has direct knowledge of the event or events triggering the litigation, and the communications concern the facts of the alleged negligent incident. The attorney-client privilege protects the privileged communications only - not the facts transmitted in those communications. Facts are proper subjects of investigation and discovery, even if they are also the subject of privileged communications. View "Youngs v. PeaceHealth" on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Stockwell sought to withdraw his guilty plea to a 1986 charge of first-degree statutory rape. Petitioner's plea statement and judgment and sentence misstated the statutory maximum sentence. The Supreme Court held that in a personal restraint petition, a petitioner must show actual and substantial prejudice in a challenge to a guilty plea based on such a misstatement. Because petitioner failed to make this showing, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Stockwell" on Justia Law

Jonathan Lee Gentry was convicted for the 1991 aggravated first degree murder of 12-year-old Cassie Holden and sentenced to death by a jury. One of the issues he raised on appeal was a claim that the decision to pursue a capital case against him, and the trial that ensued, was unfairly tainted by the specter of racial bias on the part of the prosecution. The Supreme Court rejected that contention, concluding in part that Gentry had not shown prejudice resulting from any misconduct. The Court's recent decision in "Washington v. Monday," (257 P.3d 551 (2011)), held that when a party shows prosecutorial misconduct based on racial bias, it is the State's burden to show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. Gentry brought a personal restraint petition in light of the Court's holding in "Monday." "While we believe the rule in Monday is critically important to our justice system, we conclude it does not qualify as a 'watershed' rule that can be applied retroactively." View "In re Pers. Restraint of Gentry" on Justia Law