Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

C Davis sought to recall Washington Governor Jay Inslee. Davis filed five recall charges alleging that Governor Inslee violated the separation of powers, infringed on a number of constitutional rights, and improperly exercised emergency powers when issuing proclamations in response to the COVID -19 pandemic. In order to be placed on the ballot, a recall charge must be legally and factually sufficient to demonstrate an elected official’s malfeasance, misfeasance, or violation of the oath of office. The Washington Supreme Court held that the charges put forth by Davis were not legally or factually sufficient. View "In re Recall of Inslee" on Justia Law

The question this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the prosecution was required, under Brady v. Maryland, to turn over to the defense the jail and mental health records of the victims’ mother, who was a codefendant and a State’s witness. Additionally, this case involved whether a Petrich jury unanimity instruction was required for charges of assault of a child. At trial, a jury found Reuben Mulamba guilty of first degree assault of a child, second degree assault of a child, first degree criminal mistreatment of a child, and third degree criminal mistreatment of a child. Mulamba filed a timely personal restraint petition (PRP) arguing multiple grounds for relief, based in part on the newly obtained jail records of a trial witness. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished, split decision, granted Mulamba’s petition with respect to his claims of a Brady violation and a Petrich jury unanimity violation. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on both the Brady violation and the jury unanimity claims, and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration of any unresolved issues. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Mulamba" on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a city ordinance requiring guns be safely kept and out of unauthorized hands, was preempted by state law. After robust debate following a mass shooting at the nearby Marysville Pilchuck High School, the Edmonds City Council adopted an ordinance requiring residents to safely store their firearms when not in use. At around the same time, Washington voters enacted Initiative 1639, which, among many other things, criminalized unsafe storage of firearms but in more limited circumstances than Edmonds’ ordinance. The initiative specifically did not “mandate[] how or where a firearm must be stored.” The Supreme Court determined the local ordinance was indeed preempted by the state law. View "Bass v. City of Edmonds" on Justia Law

Respondent Douglas Arbogast was charged with two counts of attempted child rape as a result of a Washington State Patrol sting operation. Police officers posted an advertisement online and posed as a mother seeking a person to teach her two children about sex. Arbogast answered the ad, exchanged messages with undercover officers, and was later arrested. At trial, Arbogast sought to present the affirmative defense of entrapment and his lack of criminal convictions as evidence that he was not predisposed to commit the charged crimes of attempted child rape. The trial court declined to allow evidence of his lack of criminal record or instruct the jury on entrapment. Arbogast was convicted. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The Washington Supreme Court held that to obtain an entrapment instruction, defendants must make a prima facie showing: (1) the crime originated in the mind of the police or an informant; and (2) the defendant was induced to commit a crime that he or she was not predisposed to commit. "The measure of a prima facie showing is whether the evidence offered, considered in a light most favorable to the defendant, is sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence. Here, Arbogast offered sufficient evidence to justify an instruction. Whether he can establish the defense is ultimately a decision for the jury." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Arbogast" on Justia Law

RCW 49.60.227 permitted a court to strike a racially restrictive, legally unenforceable covenant from the public records and eliminate the covenant from the title. This case concerned what under the statute, striking from the public records and eliminating from the title meant, and whether a court order declaring the covenant struck and void was all that was required or allowed. Alex May sought a declaratory action under former RCW 49.60.227 (2006) to have a racially restrictive covenant voided and physically removed from the title to his property and from the public records. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded that the statute at issue did not allow the physical removal of the covenant from the title but, instead, allowed only for an order voiding the covenant to be filed with the title. In the interim, the legislature amended RCW 49.60.227, clarifying the procedure under which these covenants were struck and eliminated. The Washington Supreme Court held that the interim amendments in Laws of 2021, chapter 256, section 4 applied, and therefore the Supreme Court did not address the statute under which May initially sought to have the covenants removed. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the trial court for relief under Laws of 2021, chapter 256, section 4. View "In re That Portion of Lots 1 & 2" on Justia Law

At trial, a jury found Daviel Canela guilty of attempted first degree murder and of second degree unlawful possession of a firearm. Canela appealed his conviction on multiple grounds. The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction for attempted first degree murder, finding that premeditation was an essential element in a charge of attempted first degree murder. This was the only issue before the Washington Supreme Court: Canela challenged the sufficiency of the information charging him of first degree murder, and whether premeditation had to be alleged in the charging document. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, finding premeditation was not an essential element that had to be included in the charging document for attempted first degree murder. View "Washington v. Canela" on Justia Law

In August 2016, R.G.M. disclosed to her mother that her father, Patrick Crossguns Sr., had sexually abused her. R.G.M. said he had been abusing her for over a year, beginning when she was 12 years old. Crossguns was charged with one count of second degree rape of a child and one count of second degree child molestation. Before trial, the State sought to admit evidence of uncharged sexual abuse of R.G.M. by Crossguns from July 2015 to August 2016. Crossguns opposed admission of the evidence, arguing that it was improper propensity evidence. The trial court concluded the probative value outweighed any risk of unfair prejudice and ruled the evidence was admissible. The court also concluded the evidence was admissible to prove the aggravators but stated “the main factor” for admitting the evidence was to prove Crossguns’s “lustful disposition toward[] [R.G.M.]” At issue before the Washington Supreme Court in this case was the term "lustful disposition," and whether the prosecutor’s statements in closing, asking the jury to decide if the witnesses were telling the truth, constituted misconduct that absent an objection, was so prejudicial that reversal was warranted. The Supreme Court concluded “lustful disposition” was archaic, reinforced outdated rape myths and misconceptions of sexual violence, and was not a proper purpose for admitting evidence. Rejection of the label “lustful disposition” did not modify the established doctrine of allowing “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts” to be admitted as “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident” pursuant to ER 404(b). In this case, the Supreme Court concluded evidence of Crossguns’s uncharged acts of sexual assault was properly admitted for permissible ER 404(b) purposes. Therefore, the trial court’s reference to lustful disposition in its decision admitting the evidence was harmless. Further, the Court concluded the prosecutor’s statements constituted misconduct, but the prejudice could have been corrected by an instruction. The Court of Appeals was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Crossguns" on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Elwell was charged with one count of residential burglary. He disagreed with his assigned trial counsel about a number of issues, including the probable merit of a motion to suppress based on an alleged unlawful search. Elwell ultimately filed a written motion to suppress the stolen item, although counsel assisted by eliciting testimony and presenting oral argument before the court. The trial court denied Elwell’s motion to suppress, and he was convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Elwell’s motion to suppress was properly denied on the basis of the open view doctrine and that Elwell’s right to counsel had not been violated. The Washington Supreme Court found the open view doctrine did not justify the police officer’s actions in this case. Instead, the Court held that the officer engaged in an unlawful, warrantless search in violation of article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. Therefore, it was error to deny Elwell’s motion to suppress. However, the Court found the error was harmless. Further, the Court held Elwell was not deprived of the right to counsel. View "Washington v. Elwell" on Justia Law

Julie Fairbanks began dating Charmarke Abdi-Issa shortly after she moved to Seattle with her dog, Mona. Mona was a small Chihuahua and Dachshund mix. Fairbanks testified she was close to Mona. Abdi-Issa, however, had a history of disliking Mona. Abdi-Issa was abusive toward Fairbanks and Mona, even threatening to kill them both. Abdi-Issa insisted on taking the dog for a walk. Witnesses saw Abdi-Issa kick Mona so hard it went airborne and into some nearby bushes. A witness called police; police discovered the dog still alive, under a bush. When it was transported to a nearby veterinary clinic, the dog had died. A necropsy found that Mona had died from multiple instances of blunt force trauma. The State charged Abdi-Issa with first degree animal cruelty under RCW 16.52.205 and sought a domestic violence designation under RCW 10.99.020 and RCW 9A.36.041(4). The State also charged two sentencing aggravators: (1) that the crime had a destructive and foreseeable impact on persons other than the victim under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(r) and (2) that Abdi-Issa’s conduct during the crime of domestic violence manifested deliberate cruelty or intimidation of the victim, RCW 9.94A.635(3)(h)(iii). Abdi-Issa unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the domestic violence designation and aggravators multiple times. The Court of Appeals vacated the domestic violence designation, the no- contact order, and the impact on others sentencing aggravator. The Washington Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the trial court correctly concluded that animal cruelty could be a crime of domestic violence. The Court was also asked whether the trial court properly instructed the jury that it could find this crime had a destructive and foreseeable impact on persons other than the victim. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court on both issues. View "Washington v. Abdi-Issa" on Justia Law

Justin Jennings was convicted of felony murder and unlawful possession of a firearm for the killing of Chris Burton. At trial, the court held that a toxicology report showing Burton had methamphetamine in his system at the time of death was inadmissible because it was irrelevant and speculative. Jennings appealed, arguing the exclusion of the report violated his constitutional right to present a defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Jennings sought review of that decision and also challenged his sentence in light of the Washington Supreme Court’s recent decision in Washington v. Blake, 481 P.3d 521 (2021). The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ holding that the trial court’s exclusion of the toxicology report did not violate Jennings’ right to present a defense. However, the Court clarified the test that applied to a claimed constitutional violation of the right to present a defense. In addition, the Court vacated Jennings’ sentence and remanded to the trial court for resentencing in light of Blake. View "Washington v. Jennings" on Justia Law