Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Tony Myers was convicted of three counts of first degree robbery and was sentenced to three concurrent terms of incarceration of sixty years each. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) allowing the admission of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless arrest, search, and seizure; (2) permitting witnesses called by the State to identify Petitioner despite being subjected to a prior identification procedure; (3) charging, trying, and convicting Petitioner of three counts of robbery; and (3) denying Defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal or a new trial based upon the insufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions.

In the underlying action in this case, Respondent Michael Brown was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment. Respondent filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and the circuit court set aside the convictions and granted Respondent a new trial. The basis of the circuit court's ruling was that a juror in the criminal trial failed to answer certain questions during voir dire. The court concluded that in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Dellinger, the juror's lack of candor deprived the circuit court and the parties of the ability to determine the juror's fitness to serve, which foreclosed Respondent's constitutional right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the relevant statutory and case law and the material from the habeas corpus proceedings and the criminal trial, the circuit court committed reversible error in granting Respondent a new trial. Remanded.

Karen Tanner appealed an order the circuit court that granted her parole with the condition that she not be in the presence or accompaniment of anyone convicted of a felony, including her husband. Tanner contended (1) the circuit court was without authority to grant parole insofar as parole is an executive function, and (2) the condition that she not associate with her husband was an unreasonable burden on her right of marriage. After discussing the reasons for imposing parole conditions, including the aim of reducing recidivism, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the West Virginia Home Incarceration Act imparts authority to circuit courts to grant parole under the conditions specified therein; and (2) the circuit court properly exercised its discretion and did not act in an unreasonable, capricious, or arbitrary manner when it imposed upon Tanner's parole the condition that she not associate with her husband.

Tyrone Crouch was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced by the circuit court to ten years imprisonment. Crouch appealed, contending that the circuit court improperly instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because of the clearly inconsistent and confusing definition of involuntary manslaughter given by the trial court, it was not certain that the jury understood how they could reach a verdict on that lesser included offense; and (2) the Court was unable to determine independently from the record that the inconsistent instructions were harmless. Remanded for a new trial.

The West Virginia Office of Tax Appeals rejected the challenge of ConAgra Brands, Inc. to assessments for unpaid corporation net income tax and business franchise tax. The assessments were imposed on apportioned royalties ConAgra received from the licensing of its intangible trademarks and trade names for use through the United States, including West Virginia. In setting aside the decision of the Office of Tax Appeals, the circuit court held that ConAgra's licensing transactions did not constitute doing business in West Virginia and that the assessments failed to meet the requirements of the due process and commerce clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The State Tax Commissioner sought reinstatement of the assessments for corporation net income tax and business franchise tax. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding that the order setting aside the decision of the Office of Tax Appeals and invalidating the assessments should not be disturbed.

Michael Chenoweth was arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Thereafter, Commissioner Joe Miller of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles issued an order revoking Chenoweth's privilege to drive a motor vehicle. The circuit court reversed and vacated the revocation of Chenoweth's driver's license based on its finding that the trooper improperly stopped Chenoweth's vehicle without an articulable reasonable suspicion. In so doing, the circuit court applied the exclusionary rule to an administrative driver's license revocation proceeding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no illegal stop, and thus it was not necessary to reach the issue of whether the circuit court properly applied the exclusionary rule in this case.

This case involved a decision by the West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (DOH) to provide a wage increase for current and newly hired employees in three counties that were part of its District 5 operations. Appellants, who worked in DOH's District 1 counties, filed administrative grievances contending that they were victims of unlawful discrimination because of DOH's failure to provide them with a wage increase. The West Virginia public employees grievance board and the circuit court found no merit to Appellants' contention. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants did not provide the Court with a basis on which to find that the board's findings were arbitrary or capricious so as to represent an abuse of discretion.

Petitioner Donna Boley filed a petition asking for a writ of mandamus directed to Respondents, the Secretary of State of West Virginia and Frank Deem. Petitioner was an incumbent state senator seeking re-election for the Third Senatorial District (District 3). Deem sought to challenge Petitioner for the Republican Party's 2012 nomination and was certified as eligible by the Secretary to have his name placed on the ballot. Petitioner filed the petition challenging Deem's eligibility to be a candidate for state senator against her, asserting that Deem did not met the residency requirements contained in the state Constitution and the Senate Redistricting Act of 2011. Deem conceded that a plain reading of the residency requirements made him ineligible to be a candidate for state senator in District 3 but argued that the residency requirements should be declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court found that the residency requirements were constitutional and granted the requested writ, ordering the Secretary to withdraw her certification of Deem's candidacy for state senator in District 3 and commanding that Deem's name be removed from ballots to be used in the May 2012 Republican party primary election.

In 1974, Amos and Lois Harper purchased property in a subdivision. In 2001, the property was sold at a foreclosure sale to the Bank of New York. Because the property taxes were not paid, the sheriff sold the tax lien on the property in 2007 to Marquis Development. Marquis sold the property to Gavin Smith, who subsequently served an eviction notice on Lois Harper's son, Mike Harper. The Harpers filed this declaratory judgment action against Marquis and Smith, claiming that they were the owners of the subject property. Ultimately, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and declared that Smith was the owner of the subject real estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred to the extent it concluded that Smith was a bona fide purchaser given the fact that he was on notice of a potential defect in the tax deed received by Marquis; but (2) because the Harpers lost title to the property as a result of the foreclosure sale in 2001, the Harpers had no standing to challenge Smith's status as a bona fide purchaser.

Michelle Falquero was employed by the state Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) when she filed a grievance alleging (1) that she had been constructively discharged due to a hostile work environment which spurred her to tender a letter of resignation, and (2) that when her working conditions improved she was wrongly denied the opportunity to rescind the voluntary resignation even though DEP had not formally accepted it. The state Public Employee's Grievance Board found merit in Falquero's contention that her job at DEP should not have been terminated because she could and did rescind her voluntary resignation before DEP had accepted it and ordered DEP to reinstate Falquero with back pay. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding (1) acceptance of a tender of resignation of public employment may occur when the employer (i) clearly indicates acceptance through communication with the employee, or (ii) acts in good faith reliance on the tender; and (2) because the evidence showed that acceptance of the resignation did not occur, the circuit court did not err in upholding the ruling of the Grievance Board.