Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were six custodial parents of children who were owed child support from the noncustodial parent suing on behalf of their respective children. Defendants included the Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR), the Support Enforcement Commission (SEC), and the Bureau for Child Support Enforcement (BCSE). In each case, child support orders were entered requiring the noncustodial parents to pay a certain amount of child support each month, but the orders were not preserved, and significant portions of the child support payments in arrears were barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants failed to reduce their respective support arrearages to judgment and/or to renew such judgments, thus causing their claims to become time-barred. The circuit court concluded that further factual development was necessary to determine whether Plaintiffs had a private cause of action under the statutes governing child support enforcement. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting Defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that Plaintiffs did not have a private cause of action under the statutes governing collection of child support by the BCSE. View "Fucillo v. Kerner" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted on two counts of first degree murder and one count of first degree arson. Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive terms of imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murders and a sentence of twenty years for the arson, to run consecutively. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding, inter alia, that the trial court did not err in (1) permitting the trial to be held in the circuit court of Mercer County; (2) admitting into evidence a statement Defendant made regarding his observation of the two dead victims; (3) admitting into evidence certain of Defendant's telephone conversations from jail; (4) finding the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for first degree murder; and (5) permitting a photographic array in the identification of Defendant. In addition, any error in the admission of certain testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and Defendant's sentence was proportionate to the offenses committed. View "State v. Blevins" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree, death of a child by a guardian or custodian, and child abuse resulting in injury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) granting a change in venue; (2) allowing testimony by a State's witness concerning polygraph test results without ordering a mistrial or providing a curative instruction because the polygraph references were not elicited from or about Defendant; (3) deeming evidence of a child psychologist regarding the character of the accused to be admissible; and (4) permitting the introduction of photographs of the victim taken during the time she was unconscious in the hospital. Lastly, the Court ruled that Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not adequately developed for consideration on direct appeal. View "State v. Meadows" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to life in prison without mercy after he pled guilty in 1992 to murder in the first degree. No appeal of Defendant's 1993 sentencing order was timely filed, but in 2010, Defendant filed a pro se petition with the Supreme Court seeking habeas relief. The Court granted relief by ordering that Defendant be re-sentenced for purposes of presenting his petition for appeal. Resentencing orders enlarging the appeal period were entered by the lower court in 2011, after which Defendant filed his appeal with the Supreme Court asserting procedural and constitutional error. Specifically, Defendant contended that the plea should be vacated and the case remanded for trial because the plea he entered was not knowingly and intelligently made. The Supreme Court affirmed the 2011 sentencing order of the circuit court, holding that no valid basis existed for the procedural or constitutional error asserted. View "State v. Boyce" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of uttering one Federal Reserve note and of possession with intent to utter eight counterfeit Federal Reserve notes. In common language, these notes are referred to as twenty-dollar bills. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding that Defendant's conduct was prohibited by West Virginia law, as (1) a "note" as that term is used in W. Va. Code 61-4-3 includes Federal Reserve notes issued by the Federal Reserve System, and a Federal Reserve note issued by the Federal Reserve System is a note of a "banking institution" as that term is used in section 61-4-3; and (2) a "forged bank note" as that term is used in W. Va. Code 61-4-6 includes Federal Reserve notes issued by the Federal Reserve System. View "State v. Moffit" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of seventeen counts of felony and misdemeanor sexual offenses. Defendant did not file an appeal until he was resentenced. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by (1) allowing the indictment to be amended, (2) allowing the State to call a witness that was not named on the witness list, and (3) allowing the State to recall a witness. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not prejudiced by the amendment to the indictment; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the witness not previously on the witness list to testify, as defense counsel's preparation or presentation was not damaged by the late disclosure; and (3) Defendant failed to preserve and adequately brief the issue of the State recalling a witness during the State's case-in-chief. View "State v. Larry A. H." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of six counts of sexual assault in the first degree, seven counts of sexual abuse by a custodian or parent, and one count of conspiracy. Defendant appealed, arguing primarily that his confrontation and due process rights were violated because he was not permitted to let the jury know that the complaining witness, R.M., had made various statements that sexual misconduct had been perpetrated against her by individuals other than Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) given the age and history of R.M. and the specificity of her statements relating to Defendant, the exclusion of Defendant's evidence regarding R.M.'s reports and statements of sexual misconduct committed against her by others was within the trial court's discretion; and (2) Defendant's remaining assignments of error were without merit. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault in the first degree against a minor. Defendant appealed, contending that the circuit court erred by allowing the victim to testify that Defendant assaulted her more than ten or twelve times. Defendant did not object to this testimony at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the circuit court did not plainly err in permitting the prosecutor to introduce, through the victim's testimony, evidence pertaining to Defendant's other, extraneous bad acts against the victim, as the evidence challenged by Defendant was intrinsic evidence, inextricably intertwined with the acts charged in the indictment. Accordingly, the evidence did not fall under W. Va. R. Evid. 404(b)'s limitations on admissible evidence. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

Defendant was on supervised release from federal custody when he pleaded guilty to second degree robbery in state court. In exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed to recommend that any sentence imposed by the circuit court run concurrent to any federal sentence imposed by the U.S. district court for violation of his supervised release. After the circuit court sentenced Defendant, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his guilty plea was defective because it contained a promise - that his state and federal sentences would run concurrently - which was not fulfilled. The circuit court denied the petition. While Defendant's appeal was pending, Defendant was paroled from the West Virginia Department of Corrections and was no longer in the custody of the State. At the time of this appeal, Defendant was in federal custody. The Court was informed that federal authorities credited Defendant for the time he served in State custody. Thus Defendant's state and federal sentences were effectively served concurrent to each other. The Supreme Court declared the instant appeal moot, as Defendant was no longer in State custody and had obtained the relief he sought. View "Leeper-El v. Hoke" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of simple battery as a lesser included offense of malicious assault. The circuit court resentenced Defendant to one year incarceration. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting his medical records into evidence during his trial. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) it was error for the trial court to allow the prosecutor to introduce evidence of Defendant's medical records, as the prosecutor could not support issuance of a subpoena duces tecum under W. Va. R. Crim. P. 71, and W. Va. Code 57-5-4 could not be relied upon as authority for issuance of the subpoena; but (2) this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. McGill" on Justia Law