Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a complaint against The Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corporation, Stella-Jones U.S. Holding Corporation, and Stella-Jones, Inc. (collectively, Defendants) alleging that Defendants unlawfully terminated his employment based on his age. Finding that Defendants wrongfully terminated the employment of Plaintiff based on his age, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff in the amount of $2,133,990, which represented compensatory damages for lost back pay and front pay. Denying that age played any role in Plaintiff's termination, Defendants filed a motion for a new trial, which the circuit court denied. Defendants submitted three assignments of error upon which they contended the motion for a new trial should have been granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Rice " on Justia Law

This action arose from modifications resulting from landfill activity made to real property that was adjacent to the property of Respondents. Respondents filed a complaint against the Town of Pratt and others, alleging that the modifications allegedly caused a change in the normal water flow on Respondents' property and resulted in property damage. The Town filed a motion to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment, asserting it was entitled to be dismissed based on sovereign immunity. The circuit court denied the Town's motion as premature, finding that the parties should conduct discovery prior to the court making a determination regarding the Town's immunity arguments. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's order denying the Town's motion and granted the Town's requested writ of prohibition, finding that the Town's immunity was purely a question of law and ripe for summary disposition at the circuit court level through a motion to dismiss. View "State ex rel. Town of Pratt v. Circuit Court (Stucky)" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a circuit court order affirming a magistrate court's ruling that she obstructed a police officer in violation of W. Va. Code 61-5-17(a). Defendant admitted she lied to a police officer during the course of a felony investigation and that the false statement she gave was a violation of section 61-5-17(c). Defendant argued, however, that making a false statement to a police officer is not a violation of section 61-5-17(a) and that her conviction should be overturned because she was charged under the wrong statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order, holding that Defendant's conduct - lying to a law-enforcement officer during the course of an official investigation - was sufficient to support a conviction of obstruction pursuant to section 61-5-17(a). View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

This was a criminal appeal by Defendant from an order of the circuit court sentencing him to life imprisonment without parole for first degree murder, ten to twenty-five years imprisonment on each of nine counts of sexual assault in the second degree, and one to five years imprisonment on each of three counts of sexual abuse in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge did not commit error in rejecting a plea proposal; (2) the evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant of felony murder; and (3) the trial judge properly admitted a statement Defendant made to the police. View "State v. Welch" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of the first degree murder of his wife with a finding that a firearm had been used in the commission of the murder. The circuit court then sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court committed reversible error when it permitted the State to introduce a statement made by him to investigators - a statement in which he confessed to killing his wife. The Supreme Court found no error and affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding that Defendant's statement was voluntarily given and that the trial court did not err in admitting it into evidence. View "State v. Finley" on Justia Law

Petitioner, Feroleto Steel Company, did business in cutting large steel coils into smaller widths as specified by Petitioner's customers. The tax commissioner denied Petitioner an exemption from ad valorem property taxation, finding that the cutting of the steel coils to an individual customer's specifications results in a product of different utility. On appeal, the circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents, the state tax commissioner, county assessor, and county commission. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioner's cutting of steel coils into narrower steel coils, as determined by the specifications of Petitioner's customers, does not result in a product of different utility for the purpose of the ad valorem property tax exemption; and (2) therefore, Petitioner's inventory of steel coils was exempt from ad valorem taxation. View "Feroleto Steel Co. v. Oughton" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a candidate for the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents, including the secretary of state and members of the state election commission, to comply with W. Va. Code 3-12-11(e) and approve the release of matching funds to his campaign. Petitioner, a participant in the Supreme Court Public Campaign Financing Pilot Program, argued that because he complied with the applicable requirements set forth in the Pilot Program, and because one of the privately finances candidates spent a sum sufficient to trigger the matching funds provisions, the election commission was statutorily required to disburse matching funds to his campaign. The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus requested by Petitioner, holding (1) the matching funds provisions set forth in the Pilot Program violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment; and (2) therefore, Petitioner failed to establish a clear legal right to the relief sought.

Appellant was convicted and sentenced on twenty-six charges stemming from an alcohol-related automobile accident in which five people died and seven others were injured. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a driver who fails to comply with the requirements of W. Va. Code 17C-4-3 by leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury or death violates W. Va. Code 17C-4-1 only once regardless of the number of injuries or deaths resulting from the accident; (2) insofar as Appellant was convicted and sentenced on more than one violation of section 17C-4-1, that portion of the circuit court's order was reversed; (3) under W. Va. Code 17C-5-4, any person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to a blood alcohol content test, but if any person under arrest as specified in W. va. Code 17C-5-4 refuses to submit to any secondary chemical test, the tests shall not be given except pursuant to a valid search warrant; and (4) the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant's convictions of DUI causing death and leaving the scene of the accident.

In this appeal, Defendant challenged an order of the circuit court convicting him of felony murder and child neglect resulting in death and sentencing him to life with mercy for the felony-murder conviction and a consecutive sentence of three to fifteen years for child neglect resulting in death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in allowing the State to proceed against Defendant for the separate offenses of felony murder, death of a child by a parent, and child neglect resulting in death; (2) the evidence was sufficient to prove Defendant caused his son's death beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) the circuit court did not err in suppressing Defendant's statement only during the State's case-in-chief; (4) the circuit court did not err in allowing the State to use photographs of the child's autopsy; and (5) the circuit court did not err in permitting the use of certain W. Va. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence at trial.

Petitioner, The Affiliated Construction Trades Foundation (ACT), filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that a public highway construction contract awarded to Respondent, Nicewonder Contracting, Inc., by Respondent, West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (DOH), violated state competitive bidding and prevailing wage laws. The circuit court dismissed ACT's action, finding it lacked standing to challenge the highway construction contract. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that ACT had representative standing to seek the declarations. On remand, the circuit court determined that the Court's opinion in ACT I did not completely decide the issue of ACT's standing and ordered that ACT join the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) as a defendant in the action. The Supreme Court subsequently granted ACT's requested writ of prohibition because the circuit court did not give effect to the mandate of the Court in ACT I, holding (1) ACT, as a matter of law, had standing to prosecute its lawsuit; and (2) FHWA was not an indispensable party to the lawsuit.