Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Brent McGilton was convicted by a jury of three counts of malicious assault against his wife, Angela McGilton. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the circuit court violated his double jeopardy protections by sentencing him for three counts of malicious assault for three wounds caused during the same course of conduct. Petitioner was sentenced to two to ten years on the first count of malicious assault, two to ten years on the second count of malicious assault, and four to ten years on the third count of malicious assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner's double jeopardy rights were not violated for his three separate malicious assault convictions, as a defendant may be convicted of multiple offenses of malicious assault under W. Va. Code 61-2-9(a) against the same victim even when the offenses were a part of the same course of conduct as long as the facts demonstrate separate and distinct violations of the statute.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to the misdemeanor offense of sexual abuse in the second degree. Defendant was sentenced to a term of twelve months in jail and was required to register as a sex offender. When Defendant entered his guilty plea, the Sex Offender Registration Act provided that anyone who was required to register as a sex offender must do so for a period of ten years. Following the completion of Defendant's sentence but during his ten-year registration period, the Legislature amended the Act, requiring a registration period for certain sex offenders increased from ten years to life. The statutory changes applied to Defendant. After Defendant was indicted for offenses relating to the amended Act, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment. The Supreme Court accepted certified questions from the circuit court and answered that constitutional separation of powers provisions were not violated by the Act's authorization of the state police to impose an increase in the registration period for convicted sex offenders.

Petitioner Marcella Dunbar appealed from an order of the circuit court accepting Petitioner's plea to the charge of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and sentencing Petitioner to incarceration for not less than one nor more than fifteen years. Petitioner contended that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress the evidence gathered pursuant to a traffic stop of the vehicle in which he was riding as a passenger. The Supreme Court reversed Petitioner's conviction, holding that the traffic stop initiated in this case was improper, and consequently, the evidence leading to Petitioner's arrest for drug violations was not admissible evidence and should have been suppressed. Remanded.

Petitioner Charles Thompson was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree, sexual abuse by a custodian, and sexual abuse in the third degree. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's direct appeal. Petitioner then filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus, which the circuit court denied after two evidentiary proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State produced sufficient evidence to convict Petitioner; (2) Thompson's argument that certain testimony should have been excluded was not recognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding; and (3) Petitioner failed to prove his claims of ineffective assistance by a preponderance of the evidence.

This case was a consolidation of three separate wrongful death lawsuits. Each lawsuit arose from a nursing home's attempt to compel a plaintiff to participate in arbitration pursuant to a clause in a nursing home admission contract. The Supreme Court (1) ruled that the arbitration clauses were unconscionable and unenforceable in two of the cases, and (2) held that the Nursing Home Act could not be relied upon to bar enforcement of the arbitration clause in the third case. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded to consider whether the arbitration clauses were enforceable under state common law principles that were not specific to arbitration and pre-empted by the FAA. On remand, the Supreme Court (1) held that the doctrine of unconscionability that the Court explicated in Brown I was a general, state, common-law, contract principle that was not specific to arbitration and did not implicate the FAA; (2) reversed the trial courts' prior orders compelling arbitration in two of the cases and permitted the parties to raise arguments regarding unconscionability anew before the trial court; and (3) found the issue of unconscionability in the third case was not considered by the trial court but may be raised on remand.

Petitioners Robert and Rickie Bansbach sought injunctive relief in connection with allegations that their neighbors, Respondents Daniel Harbin and Mary Fanok, were engaging in conduct which constituted both a nuisance and harassment. The trial court ruled that Petitioners had failed to demonstrate that Respondents' conduct constituted a private nuisance or that Respondents' speech, both verbal and written, was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in ruling (1) Respondents' storing of materials on the Fanok property did not create a nuisance that must be abated by the Court; (2) Respondents' posting of signs and shouting profanities at Petitioners did not amount to fighting words for First Amendment purposes; and (3) Respondents' behavior was not so outrageous that it required injunctive relief.

Petitioner David Griffy pleaded guilty to two counts of grand larceny and was sentenced to two indeterminate one-to-ten year terms of imprisonment. Griffy subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence and a motion to withdraw plea. The circuit court denied the motions. Griffy appealed, asserting that the circuit court committed reversible error by failing to comply with W.Va. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(2). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it was evident that Griffy did not understand when he pled guilty that he would not be allowed to later withdraw his plea if his sentence did not meet his expectations, and there was no evidence that Griffy was ever given a Rule 11(2)(e) warning; and (2) the substantial rights of Griffy were affected by the circuit court's failure to give the Rule 11(e)(2) warning. Remanded with instructions that Griffy be given an opportunity to either plead anew or to grant specific performance so that the sentence comported with the reasonable understanding and expectations of Griffy as to the sentence for which he bargained.

After a jury trial, Petitioner Samuel Scarbro was convicted in the circuit court of the felony offense of fraudulent use of a bank conveyance or access device. At issue on appeal was whether the circuit court erred in excluding from the evidence at trial a prior inconsistent statement of the State's key witness. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the witness's pre-trial statement should have been admitted at Petitioner's trial, and the circuit court's refusal to do so constituted error; and (2) the error in excluding the evidence was not harmless, as the improper exclusion of the witness's prior inconsistent statement placed the fairness of Petitioner's trial in doubt. Remanded for a new trial.

Plaintiff Angela Smith filed a complaint against her employer, CSX Transportation, Inc., alleging sexual harassment, hostile work environment, constructive discharge, retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment, and negligent retention of an employee. The jury returned a verdict for Smith and awarded Smith $1,557,600 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. The circuit court denied CSX's motion for post-trial relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by denying CSX's request for post-trial relief, as (1) Smith presented sufficient evidence to prove her hostile work environment claim; (2) the jury was instructed correctly on the law of retaliatory discharge; and (3) the evidence supported the jury's award of punitive damages.

Respondent Christopher Toler's driver's license was revoked by the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles after Respondent's vehicle was stopped at a vehicle equipment checkpoint and Respondent was arrested for driving under the influence. The circuit court reversed, concluding (1) Respondent was driving while under the influence of alcohol; but (2) the vehicle equipment checkpoint at which Respondent was stopped was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the judicially-created exclusionary rule is not applicable in a civil, administrative driver's license revocation or suspension proceeding; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred in applying the exclusionary rule to exclude all evidence in this case. Remanded.