Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A young man, referred to as Jared, was charged with battery to a law enforcement officer after an incident in which he threatened his family and police, and struck an officer. Following his arrest, concerns about Jared’s mental health led to a competency evaluation. He was diagnosed with schizophrenia and found incompetent to stand trial. While initially taking prescribed medication inconsistently in jail, Jared later refused medication in a mental health institution, resulting in disruptive and aggressive behavior. The State, through a Department of Health Services doctor, sought and obtained a Milwaukee County Circuit Court order for involuntary medication to restore Jared’s competency for trial.On appeal, Jared challenged the involuntary medication order, arguing that neither the statutory requirements under Wisconsin law nor the constitutional standards articulated in Sell v. United States were met. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, finding the circuit court’s findings on both the statutory and Sell factors clearly erroneous and concluding that the State had not sufficiently established any of the four Sell factors necessary for involuntary medication.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case to clarify the standard of appellate review for each of the Sell factors and to determine whether the circuit court’s application of those factors and the statutory requirements was correct. The Supreme Court held that the question of whether an important governmental interest exists (Sell factor one) is reviewed de novo, while the remaining three Sell factors (significant furtherance of the interest, necessity, and medical appropriateness) are findings of fact reviewed for clear error. The Supreme Court found that the State’s interest in prosecuting Jared was important and not sufficiently diminished by special circumstances. It further held that the lower court’s findings on the remaining Sell factors and the statutory requirements were not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstating the circuit court’s order for involuntary medication. View "State v. J. D. B." on Justia Law

A digital service provider scanned a user’s online photo storage account for child sexual abuse material (CSAM) as part of its ongoing content moderation efforts. After the system flagged several files, an employee at the company reviewed and confirmed they were CSAM. The provider then generated a report to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, supplying the files and information linking them to a specific user. Law enforcement traced the report to a residence, viewed the flagged files without a warrant, and subsequently obtained a warrant to search the home, where additional CSAM was found on the user’s device.The Jefferson County Circuit Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the technology company acted on its own initiative and was not functioning as an agent or instrument of the government. The court held there was no Fourth Amendment violation and found that the defendant had not established that the company was acting on behalf of law enforcement. The defendant pleaded guilty and appealed. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals certified the case to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, requesting clarification on whether the provider’s search was private or governmental and whether a search warrant was required for police review of the flagged files.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the provider acted as a private actor when it scanned and reviewed the files, and not as an agent of the government. Therefore, the provider’s actions did not implicate Fourth Amendment protections. The Court further ruled that law enforcement’s review of the files did not constitute a new “search” under the Fourth Amendment, as it merely replicated the provider’s actions and did not exceed their scope. The Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction. View "State v. Sharak" on Justia Law

Law enforcement charged the defendant with multiple counts of possession of child sexual abuse material and child exploitation after content was discovered on his cell phone. The investigation began when Snapchat’s automated hash-based scanning program flagged a 16-second video uploaded from the defendant’s account as known child sexual abuse material (CSAM). Snapchat forwarded this video to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), which confirmed the file’s hash matched previously identified CSAM but did not view the video itself. NCMEC then sent the report and video to the Wisconsin Department of Justice (DOJ), where a DOJ analyst first viewed the video without a warrant. Subsequently, local law enforcement also viewed the video without a warrant, obtained account information via subpoena, and secured a search warrant for the defendant’s home and devices, leading to the recovery of additional CSAM.In Waukesha County Circuit Court, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that viewing the video without a warrant constituted an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. The circuit court granted the motion, finding a legitimate privacy interest in the cell phone and concluding that the private search doctrine was inapplicable because no human at Snapchat had seen the video and the hash algorithm used was allegedly unreliable.The State appealed, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, determining that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the video due to Snapchat’s policies and the nature of the conduct, and found no Fourth Amendment search occurred.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case and held that Snapchat’s automated scan constituted a private search, and that the government’s subsequent viewing of the flagged video did not exceed the scope of that private search. Because any expectation of privacy was frustrated by the private scan and there was virtual certainty regarding the video’s contents, the Fourth Amendment was not implicated. The court affirmed the court of appeals’ reversal of suppression and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Gasper" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of certain Wisconsin statutes that grant the Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules (JCRAR) the power to pause, object to, or suspend administrative rules. The Governor and other petitioners argue that these statutes amount to unconstitutional legislative vetoes, as they allow JCRAR to halt the implementation of rules without passing legislation. The Legislature contends that these statutes are permissible extensions of legislative power, maintaining that rulemaking must remain subordinate to the legislature.The lower courts had previously upheld the constitutionality of similar provisions. In Martinez v. DILHR, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a three-month rule suspension by JCRAR did not violate the Wisconsin Constitution's bicameralism and presentment requirements. This reasoning was later extended in SEIU, where the court upheld the multiple suspension provision, allowing JCRAR to suspend rules repeatedly.The Wisconsin Supreme Court, currently reviewing the case, adopted the reasoning from Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, which requires bicameralism and presentment when legislative action alters the legal rights and duties of others outside the legislative branch. Applying this standard, the court found that the challenged statutes empower JCRAR to take actions that alter the legal rights and duties of the executive branch and the people of Wisconsin without requiring bicameralism and presentment. Consequently, the court held that the statutes WIS. STAT. §§ 227.19(5)(c), (d), (dm), and 227.26(2)(d), (im) facially violate the Wisconsin Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements and are therefore unconstitutional. View "Evers v. Marklein" on Justia Law

In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which held that the U.S. Constitution does not protect the right to abortion, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that Wisconsin Statute § 940.04(1), which criminalizes the intentional destruction of an unborn child, does not ban abortion. The plaintiffs included the Attorney General, the Department of Safety and Professional Services, the Medical Examining Board, and three physicians. They argued that the statute either does not apply to abortion or has been impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation.The Dane County Circuit Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs stated a claim upon which relief could be granted because § 940.04 does not prohibit consensual medical abortions. The court later issued a declaratory judgment that the statute does not prohibit abortions.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The central question was whether § 940.04(1) bans abortion. The court concluded that comprehensive legislation enacted over the last 50 years, which regulates various aspects of abortion, impliedly repealed the 19th-century near-total ban on abortion. The court held that the legislature's detailed regulation of abortion was meant as a substitute for the earlier statute, and therefore, § 940.04(1) does not ban abortion in Wisconsin.The court affirmed the circuit court's judgment and order, holding that the comprehensive legislative framework governing abortion impliedly repealed the near-total ban on abortion in § 940.04(1). View "Kaul v. Urmanski" on Justia Law

Luis A. Ramirez, an inmate serving a lengthy sentence for felony convictions, attacked a corrections officer with a sharpened pencil. He was charged with battery by a prisoner and disorderly conduct. Due to multiple continuances and rescheduled trial dates, Ramirez was tried and convicted by a jury 46 months after the charges were filed.Ramirez moved for postconviction relief, claiming the delay violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The postconviction court denied his motion, and Ramirez appealed. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the decision, concluding that Ramirez's right to a speedy trial was violated and ordered the charges dismissed. The State sought review by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and applied the four-factor balancing test from Barker v. Wingo: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant. The court found that while the 46-month delay was presumptively prejudicial, it was not long enough to declare prejudice as a matter of law. The reasons for the delay were attributed to neutral factors, such as the orderly administration of justice and the State's negligence, but not deliberate or bad-faith conduct. Ramirez's significant delay in asserting his right to a speedy trial and his failure to demonstrate particularized prejudice weighed against him.The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that Ramirez's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the Wisconsin State Legislature and the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (DPI) regarding the governor's partial veto power and the allocation of funds for literacy programs. The legislature argued that the governor exceeded his constitutional authority by partially vetoing a bill that was not an appropriation bill. DPI and the governor contended that the legislature's Joint Committee on Finance (JCF) improperly withheld funds appropriated for DPI's literacy programs.The Dane County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in part for each party. The court concluded that the governor did not exceed his constitutional boundaries in partially vetoing the bill and that JCF did not improperly withhold funds from DPI. The court reasoned that the bill in question was an appropriation bill and that the governor's partial veto was valid. However, the court also held that DPI was not entitled to the funds appropriated to JCF.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the governor breached his constitutional boundaries because the bill he partially vetoed was not an appropriation bill. The court reaffirmed the "four corners rule," which requires that an appropriation bill must set aside public funds for a public purpose within its text. The court concluded that the bill in question did not meet this requirement and, therefore, was not subject to the governor's partial veto authority. The court also held that JCF did not improperly withhold funds from DPI, as the funds were lawfully appropriated to JCF. Consequently, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court's summary judgment order. View "Wisconsin State Legislature v. Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction" on Justia Law

The case involves a constitutional challenge to a Wisconsin law that prohibits the Department of Justice (DOJ) from settling most civil cases without the approval of the Joint Finance Committee (JFC). The Attorney General, DOJ, and the Governor argue that this law is unconstitutional as applied to two specific categories of cases: civil enforcement actions and cases brought by DOJ at the request of executive branch agencies. They contend that litigation in these categories constitutes core executive power, and thus, the Legislature cannot interfere.The Dane County Circuit Court agreed with the plaintiffs and granted summary judgment in their favor. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, concluding that the power to settle these types of cases is a shared power between the executive and legislative branches, and legislative approval does not unduly burden executive powers.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that settling these two categories of cases falls within the core powers of the executive branch. The court found that the Legislature has not identified any constitutional role for itself in these categories of cases. Therefore, the statutory requirement for JFC approval prior to settling these cases violates the Wisconsin Constitution’s separation of powers. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the circuit court’s decision granting summary judgment to the DOJ. View "Kaul v. Wisconsin State Legislature" on Justia Law

Following a high-speed chase, Kordell L. Grady was charged with multiple criminal offenses. He accepted a plea deal, pleading no contest to three charges. The dispute arose over whether Grady's due process rights were violated during a restitution hearing, where he was ordered to pay for damages caused to a law enforcement vehicle during the chase. Grady's counsel argued he lacked the ability to pay, and Grady, attending via Zoom, interrupted the proceedings. The court allowed him to speak with his attorney but warned that the conversation could be heard by everyone in the courtroom. Grady's statements undermined his counsel's argument, and the court ordered him to pay the full restitution amount.Grady filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that his due process rights were violated because he could not consult confidentially with his counsel, and that the Assistant District Attorney improperly used his statements. The circuit court rejected these arguments, finding that Grady did not intend for his conversation to be confidential. The court of appeals summarily affirmed the circuit court's decision.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and deferred to the circuit court's factual finding that Grady did not intend for his conversation with his counsel to be confidential. The Supreme Court held that Grady's due process rights were not violated, as he did not seek a confidential conversation. Consequently, his conversation was not privileged under Wisconsin Statute § 905.03(2). The decision of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "State v. Grady" on Justia Law

H.C. appealed an order terminating her parental rights, arguing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and public policy require the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence, or at least a preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in the best interests of the child. H.C.'s son, John, has significant medical and developmental needs, which H.C. failed to address. John was taken into custody at age two after numerous incidents of abuse and neglect. H.C. struggled with addiction, mental health issues, and was often absent from her group home. The State filed a petition to terminate H.C.'s parental rights, citing continuing CHIPS and failure to assume parental responsibility.The Milwaukee County Circuit Court found H.C. unfit and determined that terminating her parental rights was in John's best interests. The court of appeals affirmed, stating that the circuit court did not err in its discretion. However, the court of appeals also asserted that due process requires the child's best interests to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, with the burden of proof shared by all parties.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the best interests of the child during the dispositional phase of a TPR proceeding constitute a discretionary determination by the circuit court, with no burden of proof placed on any party. The court concluded that neither the Due Process Clause nor applicable statutory law imposes a burden of proof during the dispositional phase. The court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, agreeing that the circuit court committed no error in terminating H.C.'s parental rights but rejected the court of appeals' due process analysis. View "State v. H. C." on Justia Law