Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with first degree sexual assault of a child. Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress statements he made during an undisputedly non-custodial interrogation, claiming they were involuntary. The circuit court found Defendant's statements were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances and allowed admission of the statements at trial. Defendant then testified at trial and was convicted. Defendant appealed on the grounds that the statements were involuntary and were thus improperly admitted. The court of appeals assumed the statements were involuntary but held that, in light of the other evidence produced at trial, the admission of the statements was harmless error. The Supreme Court affirmed but under a different analysis, holding that the admission of Defendant's statements at trial was not error because, under the totality of the circumstances, the statements were voluntary. View "State v. Lemoine" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from litigation against Juneau County relating to an employee of the county sheriff's department. The County's defense was conducted by a law firm, which was retained to represent the County by the County's insurance company. The law firm prepared and sent to the insurance company invoices for its legal services rendered. Relying on the Public Records Law, the Juneau County Star-Times sought access to these invoices. The circuit court denied the Star-Times' claims, concluding that the invoices generated by the law firm did not fall within Wis. Stat. 19.36(3) of the Public Records Law, the "contractors' records" provision, because the County had not contracted with the insurance company for the purposes of collecting the information the Star-Times was seeking. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the matter to the circuit court to order the County to provide unredacted copies of the invoices to the Star-Times, holding that section 19.36(3) applied to the invoices. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 19.36(3) governed the accessibility of the invoices in this case. View "Juneau County Star-Times v. Juneau County" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to three felonies on the morning of a scheduled trial in which he was facing six felony charges. As part of the plea bargain, the State agreed to dismiss three felony charges, but there was no agreement that the dismissed charges would be "read-in" under Wis. Stat. 973.20(1g)(b). At sentencing, the circuit court explicitly considered the dismissed charges in explaining and imposing Defendant's sentence. Defendant subsequently challenged the validity of the sentence. The circuit court denied Defendant's motion for resentencing, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a circuit court may consider dismissed charges in imposing sentence; (2) the circuit court here did not use the dismissed charges for an improper purpose; and (3) Defendant had adequate opportunity to refute the purported inaccuracies of the facts underlying the dismissed charges.

The circuit court suppressed an incriminating statement that Defendant made to police during custodial interrogation. The court of appeals reversed, holding that even though Defendant invoked his right to counsel during questioning, he later initiated conversation with his police interrogator and thereafter knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights before making the incriminating statement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendants' Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his equivalent right under the Wisconsin Constitution were not violated, as Defendant withdrew his request for an attorney by voluntarily initiating a request to resume the questioning; and (2) the court of appeals was not required to disregard State v. Middleton, but Middleton was factually distinguishable from this case and was now overruled in its entirety.

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of one count of possession of a firearm by a felon and one count of carrying a concealed weapon. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant made incriminating statements while in police custody and while being subjected to interrogation by police officers, he had a Fifth Amendment right to receive Miranda warnings; (2) accordingly, it was error to admit the incriminating statements at trial; and (3) because the State did not meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found Defendant guilty absent the error, the error was not harmless.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against St. Patrick Congregation, alleging that her employment was terminated for an improper reason. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint, concluding that because St. Patrick was a religious institution and Plaintiff was a ministerial employee, Plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a court may not review whether St. Patrick improperly terminated its ministerial employee because St. Patrick's choice of who shall serve as its ministerial employee is a matter of church governance protected from state interference by the First Amendment and by Wis. Const. art. I, 18; and (2) accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim upon which a court may grant relief.

Defendant was convicted of first-degree sexual assault of a child under the age of thirteen without great bodily harm. Following Defendant's conviction, all the principals in this case learned that Defendant was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years in prison. Defendant moved for a new trial on the basis that he was denied his due process rights when he was not adequately informed of the penalty of the crime prior to going to a jury trial. The circuit court granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Defendant's lack of knowledge regarding a mandatory minimum sentence could not have interfered with Defendant's right to plea bargain because he did not have such a right. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the case must be remanded to the circuit court for a hearing to determine whether Defendant was prejudiced by the violations of Wis. Stat. 970.02(1)(a), which requires the judge who presides at an initial appearance to inform the defendant of the possible penalties for the offenses in the complaint.

Defendant pled guilty to second-degree recklessly endangering safety with a deadly weapon. Defendant moved for postconviction relief wherein he sought to withdraw his guilty plea and to vacate the judgment, asserting that the proceeding at which he pled guilty via videoconferencing violated due process as well as his statutory right to be present under Wis. Stat. 971.04(1)(g). Defendant argued that he could not have effectively waived his right to challenge the use of videoconferencing because he was not aware that such a right existed. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 971.04(1)(g) provides a criminal defendant the statutory right to be in the same courtroom as the presiding judge when a plea hearing is held, if the court accepts the plea and pronounces judgment; but (2) this statutory right may be waived, and Defendant waived it prior to pleading and the court's pronouncement of judgment.

Defendant was charged with being a party to the crime of possession with intent to deliver more than 10,000 grams of THC. Smith stipulated to the fact that the packages seized by the police contained more than 10,000 grams of THC. Prior to the jury's deliberations, the circuit court answered a verdict question for the jury concerning the weight of the drugs. The jury then found Defendant guilty as charged. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the cause, holding that Defendant did not waive his right to a jury determination of the drug quantity. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the guilty verdict and judgment of conviction, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction; and (2) although the circuit court erred in determining the drug quantity without submitting the question to the jury, the error was harmless because it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed, rational jury would have found Defendant guilty of the charged offense absent the error.

In 1992, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree sexual assault of a person under the age of sixteen years. Nearly eighteen years after his conviction, Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, basing his motion on Wis. Stat. 971.08, which allows a defendant to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea where a plea-accepting court fails to personally advise the defendant of the potential immigration consequences of the plea. The circuit court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The court of appeals affirmed. The court assumed that Defendant had not been personally advised as required under the statute, but, as Defendant was aware of the potential immigration consequences of his plea, the court concluded that any failure to personally advise him was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was properly denied, as Defendant's affidavit did not allege sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle him to withdraw his guilty plea.