Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of fleeing or attempting to elude a traffic officer. Defendant appealed, contending that the jury instructions given in this case required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant violated Wis. Stat. 346.04(3) "by increasing the speed of the vehicle to flee" and that there was no evidence that Defendant increased the speed of his vehicle after law enforcement officers began to pursue him. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the disputed jury instruction was erroneous because it added a requirement to the statutory definition of the crime; but (2) it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found Defendant guilty of the crime of fleeing or attempting to elude an officer, and therefore, there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendant. View "State v. Beamon" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to first-degree sexual assault with a child. Defendant was convicted to a violation of Wis. Stat. 948.02(1)(d). The court of appeals ordered the judgment of conviction to be amended in accordance with the plea agreement and ordered the circuit court to list the correct crime, a violation of Wis. Stat. 948.02(1)(e). The court then remanded for resentencing because a structural error occurred when the circuit court imposed the sentence relying on the penalty provision for a violation of section 948.02(d) instead of the penalty provision for a violation of section 948.02(e). The State appealed. At issue on appeal was whether a circuit court's imposition of a sentence using inaccurate information that Defendant was subject to a mandatory minimum five-year period of confinement is structural error or subject to the application of harmless error analysis. The Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds, holding (1) the error in this case was subject to a harmless error analysis and was not a structural error; and (2) the error was not harmless. View "State v. Travis" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to charges of uttering a forgery as a repeater. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to a six-year term of imprisonment for the conviction. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief moving to withdraw his contest plea, arguing that it was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The circuit court denied Defendant's motion without requiring the State to prove that Defendant entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The court stated that since Defendant was informed that he faced a six-year term of imprisonment and he received a six-year term of imprisonment, any error was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, as Defendant knew the maximum penalty that could be imposed and was verbally informed at the plea hearing of the penalty that he received; and (2) withdrawal of Defendant's plea was not necessary to correct a manifest injustice. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty and was convicted of child abuse-recklessly causing great bodily harm and neglecting a child resulting in the child's death. Defendant's appealed the denial of his motion to suppress statements he made after he stated that he wanted an attorney on the grounds that an Edwards v. Arizona violation had occurred. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly denied the motion to suppress because Defendant was not in custody when he asked for an attorney, and therefore, Miranda's rule requiring that the interrogation cease upon a request for an attorney did not apply, and there was no constitutional violation and no bar to using Defendant's subsequent statements. View "State v. Lonkoski" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of stalking, bail jumping, and violating a harassment injunction. Defendant appealed, contending (1) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to use certain fingerprint evidence and related testimony in rebuttal, which the court had previously excluded from the State's case-in-chief due to a discovery violation; and (2) he was deprived of his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury because, he claimed, one of the jurors was sleeping during a portion of defense counsel's closing argument. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) properly exercised its discretion in permitting the rebuttal use of the fingerprint evidence and related testimony; and (2) did not clearly err in finding that the juror was not sleeping and in therefore concluding that Defendant failed to establish a finding necessary to his contention. View "State v. Novy" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers installed a GPS device on Defendant's vehicle and monitored the vehicle pursuant to a warrant. The warrant was based on witness reports that a car matching the description of Defendant's vehicle had been seen at the locations of recent burglaries in the area. The device was installed after officers lawfully stopped Defendant and his co-defendant in the suspect vehicle. The officers then moved the vehicle to another location where the GPS device could be installed. Only days later, Defendant was arrested and charged with fourteen criminal counts. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence obtained through the use of the GPS device on the ground that the evidence was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Defendant then pled guilty to some counts. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Defendant's suppression motion, holding (1) the three-hour seizure of Defendant's vehicle was supported by probable cause and was thus constitutionally permissible; and (2) the technology used in conducing the GPS search did not exceed the scope of the warrant allowing GPS tracking of Defendant's vehicle. View "State v. Brereton" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol content, fourth offense. Defendant appealed, challenging the circuit court's denial of his suppression motion and collaterally attacking a prior conviction as the result of an invalid waiver to the right to counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress, as the law enforcement officers' warrantless search of Defendant's bedroom was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) despite a technically deficient plea colloquy, Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel before he pleaded not contest to his second operating a motor vehicle under the influence offense in 1998, and thus the circuit court properly denied the collateral attack of his earlier conviction and thus properly considered the 1998 conviction in determining that Defendant had three prior relevant convictions. View "City of Menasha v. Gracia" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of two counts of robbery, party to a crime. Twelve years later, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence and in the interest of justice. Defendant's arguments stemmed from new expert analysis of a video of one of the robberies. By applying new technology - digital photogrammetry - one expert concluded that Defendant was too tall to be the robber in the video. The circuit court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Defendant was entitled to a new trial based on the photogrammetry evidence and in the interest of justice because the jury was precluded from hearing photogrammetry evidence, and therefore, the real controversy was not fully tried. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there was not a reasonable probability that a jury, looking at both the evidence presented at trial and the new digital photogrammetry evidence, would have a reasonable doubt as to Defendant's guilt; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice because the controversy was fully tried even though the jury did not hear the photogrammetry evidence. View "State v. Avery" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first degree sexual assault of a child. Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress statements he made during an undisputedly non-custodial interrogation, claiming they were involuntary. The circuit court found Defendant's statements were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances and allowed admission of the statements at trial. Defendant then testified at trial and was convicted. Defendant appealed on the grounds that the statements were involuntary and were thus improperly admitted. The court of appeals assumed the statements were involuntary but held that, in light of the other evidence produced at trial, the admission of the statements was harmless error. The Supreme Court affirmed but under a different analysis, holding that the admission of Defendant's statements at trial was not error because, under the totality of the circumstances, the statements were voluntary. View "State v. Lemoine" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from litigation against Juneau County relating to an employee of the county sheriff's department. The County's defense was conducted by a law firm, which was retained to represent the County by the County's insurance company. The law firm prepared and sent to the insurance company invoices for its legal services rendered. Relying on the Public Records Law, the Juneau County Star-Times sought access to these invoices. The circuit court denied the Star-Times' claims, concluding that the invoices generated by the law firm did not fall within Wis. Stat. 19.36(3) of the Public Records Law, the "contractors' records" provision, because the County had not contracted with the insurance company for the purposes of collecting the information the Star-Times was seeking. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the matter to the circuit court to order the County to provide unredacted copies of the invoices to the Star-Times, holding that section 19.36(3) applied to the invoices. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 19.36(3) governed the accessibility of the invoices in this case. View "Juneau County Star-Times v. Juneau County" on Justia Law