Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners asked the Supreme Court to take jurisdiction of an original action challenging rules adopted by the Government Accountability Board (GAB). Before the Court accepted the original action, four justices voted to enjoin the GAB from enforcing the rules Petitioners were challenging. The Court then accepted the original action, leaving the injunction in place. The participating justices then unanimously agreed that the order enjoining Respondents from enforcing the rules should be vacated. However, the court was equally divided on the rationale: half of the justices would conclude that the GAB had the authority to promulgate the amendments, and half of the justices would dismiss the action on the ground that an original action was improvidently granted. The action was subsequently dismissed, and the order enjoining Respondents from enforcing the rules was vacated.

The circuit court found William Dinkins guilty of knowingly failing to comply with the sex offender registration statute, which required Dinkins to provide the address at which he would be residing ten days prior to his release from prison. The court found that Dinkins attempted to comply with the statute but was unable to find housing for himself prior to his release. The court of appeals reversed. The State appealed, contending that homelessness was not a defense to failing to comply with the registration requirements and that Dinkins could have complied with the statute by listing a park bench or other on-the-street location as the place he would be residing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a registrant cannot be convicted of violating the statute for failing to report the address at which he will be residing when he is unable to provide this information.

Defendant was convicted at a bench trial of misdemeanor retail theft in the circuit court. On appeal, the court of appeals (1) affirmed the conviction; (2) denied Defendant's request to remand the cause to determine whether Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial; and (3) concluded that Defendant could raise the issue of postconviction counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel in a Wis. Stat. 974.06 motion. The court did not remand the matter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in ruling that Defendant had an avenue of relief through section 974.06, and the court's error deprived Defendant of any opportunity for review of an on-its-face deficient jury trial waiver colloquy or the clear error by postconviction counsel in filing a defective postconviction motion. Remanded to reinstate Defendant's direct appeal rights and to remand the matter to the circuit court to allow counsel to file a new or amended motion for postconviction relief.

After a jury trial, Defendant Carl Dowdy was found guilty of second degree sexual assault. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to fifteen years imprisonment and then stayed the sentence in favor of a ten-year period of probation. Seven years later, Defendant petitioned the circuit court to reduce the length of his probation from ten years to seven years. The court granted the petition and thereby discharged Defendant from probation, finding (1) Wis. Stat. 973.09(3)(a) authorized the court to reduce the length of probation, and (2) there was cause for reducing the length of Defendant's probation. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court lacked authority to reduce the length of Defendant's probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Wis. Stat. 973.09(3)(a) does not grant a circuit court authority to reduce the length of probation; and (2) accordingly, the circuit court in this case erred as a matter of law when it relied upon section 973.09(3)(a) to reduce the length of Defendant's probation.

Plaintiffs, several residents of the Town of Cooks Valley, brought a declaratory judgment action against the Town to declare the Town's nonmetallic mining ordinance invalid because the ordinance did not have county board approval. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. At issue on appeal was whether the mining ordinance was a zoning ordinance. If the ordinance was not a zoning ordinance, county board approval was not required. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, holding that, even though the ordinance at issue had some similarities to traditional zoning ordinances, it was not to be classified as a zoning ordinance. Rather, it was a non-zoning ordinance adopted under the Town's police power.

Defendant was convicted of battery to a law enforcement officer and disorderly conduct. Although the circuit court judge's daughter-in-law was not a member of the jury, she was in the pool of potential jurors, and Defendant used a peremptory challenge to remove the judge's daughter-in-law from the jury. The circuit court denied defendant's motion for a new trial, noting that neither party moved to strike the daughter-in-law for cause and neither the State nor Defendant suggested that the daughter-in-law was not a suitable juror. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction and the order denying post-conviction relief, holding that presiding judges must sua sponte remove their immediate family members from the panel of potential jurors. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant exercised a peremptory strike to remove the judge's daughter-in-law from the jury, and because Defendant did not claim the jury was unfair or partial, a new trial was not required under the circumstances.

After a jury trial, Daniel Hanson was found guilty of fleeing a traffic officer, a felony under Wis. Stat. 346.04(3). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly instructed the jury on the requirements of section 346.04(3); (2) there does not exist a subjective, good-faith exception to the fleeing law, and Hanson's opportunity to demonstrate any justification for his behavior was through his self-defense claim, which the jury considered and rejected; (3) the circuit court was correct to exclude testimony about the traffic officer's alleged confrontational character because the officer was not a "victim" for purposes of admitting character evidence under Wis. Stat. 904.04(1)(b); and (4) neither the Constitution nor the interests of justice warranted a new trial, as no constitutional infirmities were raised on appeal and the real controversy was tried.

A jury convicted David Domke of repeatedly sexually assaulting his ten-year-old stepdaughter. Domke moved for postconviction relief and a new trial based on the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. The circuit court denied the motion after concluding that while Domke had shown that counsel had performed deficiently, Domke had failed to show that the deficient performance had prejudiced him. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that Domke had established cumulative prejudice from three instances of deficient performance. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the circuit court's judgment of conviction, holding (1) Domke was not entitled to a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel because, although counsel performed deficiently in three aspects during trial, those errors did not prejudice Domke; and (2) under the totality of the circumstances, Domke received a fair trial.

A state trooper pulled defendant Deandre Buchanan's vehicle over when it was traveling in excess of the posted speed limit. The trooper saw Buchanan make a movement indicating he was putting an item out of sight beneath the driver's seat and observed that Buchanan was visibly nervous. The trooper also discovered Buchanan had an arrest record for violent crimes and drug trafficking. The officer then did a protective search of Buchanan and his vehicle and discovered plant material in the car. The officer seized the item, which was marijuana. Buchanan was convicted for possessing marijuana with intent to deliver. The court of appeals affirmed. Buchanan appealed, arguing the evidence he sought to suppress in the trial court was seized in violation of the federal and state constitutional provisions barring unreasonable search and seizure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the initial protective search of Buchanan and his vehicle was valid; and (2) the piece of marijuana plant that the state trooper discovered on the car floor during the protective search was in plain view and there was probable cause to justify seizing it. Therefore there was no basis for suppressing the evidence.

While she was present in defendant's apartment, police obtained consent from defendant Brian St. Martin's girlfriend to search the attic in defendant's apartment. Defendant, who was in police custody in a police van parked nearby, refused to consent to the search. The police proceeded to search the attic and found cocaine and currency. A warrant was subsequently obtained and after a second search police seized cell phones, currency, a scale, and documents. Defendant was later charged based on the evidence seized in the searches. Defendant pleaded guilty and was convicted. Defendant then appealed the court's order denying his motion to suppress the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the rule regarding consent to search a shared dwelling in Georgia v. Randolph, which states that a warrantless search cannot be justified when a physically present resident expressly refuses consent, does not apply where the resident remains in close physical proximity to the residence but was not physically present at the residence. Instead, the applicable rule is the one stated in United States v. Matlock, which holds that a co-tenant's consent to search is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting co-tenant.