Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of making a false written statement to obtain property and was sentenced to a two to five year period of incarceration. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Appellant later filed a motion entitled "Motion to Execute Sentence." The district court denied the motion. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court's sentence should be ordered to be executed to give effect to subsequent sentences in other jurisdictions and to avoid an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that the district court was without jurisdiction to consider Appellant's motion, as it was not a motion to correct an illegal sentence, and it was not a motion otherwise expressly provided for by rule or statute. Consequently, the Court was without jurisdiction to consider this appeal. View "Kurtenbach v. State" on Justia Law

Appellants both had their driver's licenses suspended, and both requested a contested case hearing with the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) to challenge the suspension. Appellants made several arguments regarding the validity of Laramie Enrolled Ordinance 1592, which makes it a misdemeanor to refuse to submit to a chemical test and enhances the penalties for driving under the influence if a chemical test reveals a certain elevated blood alcohol level. In each case, the OAH determined it did not have the authority to consider the validity of the ordinance and upheld the suspension of Appellants' driver's licenses. The district court upheld the OAH's decision and dismissed Appellants' request for a declaration that the ordinance was unenforceable and unconstitutional on the basis that Appellants failed to raise a justiciable controversy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the OAH appropriately found that the ordinance did not change the nature of the advisements law enforcement officers were required to provide an individual pursuant to the state's implied consent statutes; (2) the OAH also properly upheld Appellants' driver's license suspensions; and (3) the district court did not err when it dismissed Appellants' petition for declaratory relief. View "Sandoval v. State" on Justia Law

In 1982, Appellant pled guilty to aggravated robbery, among other crimes, in both Sweetwater and Uinta Counties. In subsequently federal court proceedings, the convictions in both counties were set aside. In the following state court proceedings, Appellant once again pled guilty to the charges. Upon resentencing in 1989, Appellant was sentenced to forty-five to fifty years for the Uinta County aggravated robbery charge. After serving thirty years in prison, Appellant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Appellant argued that the aggravated robbery statute, amended in 1983, applied retroactively, and thus, his forty-five to fifty year sentence was illegal because it exceeded the new statutory maximum. The district court granted the motion and reduced Appellant's sentence in the Uinta County aggravated robbery charge. On appeal, Appellant challenged various aspects of the district court's rulings on his motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) ruling that Appellant did not have the constitutional right to be present at the hearing in which the district court considered his motion and reduced his sentence; and (2) modifying Appellant's sentence without allowing him to withdraw the guilty plea. View "Osborn v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of one count of sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree. Appellant appealed, contending (1) the victim was incompetent to testify, and (2) the district court improperly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was no evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant had sexual contact with the victim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the victim satisfied the five-part test for witness competency, and the district court was not clearly erroneous in determining that she was competent to testify; and (2) the State presented sufficient evidence to show that Defendant engaged in sexual contract with the victim, and thus, the district court properly denied Appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal. View "Hutchinson v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to three counts of illegal drug possession, two counts being felonies, at arraignment. The district court found that a factual basis existed for all three counts but ordered a presentence investigation without accepting any of the pleas or adjudicating guilt. After the sentencing hearing, the district court deferred further proceedings without adjudicating guilt on both of the felonies pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 35-7-1037. The State filed a motion to reconsider. The district court then withdrew one of the deferrals, accepted Appellant's guilty plea on one count, and proceeded to sentencing. A judgment and sentence was subsequently filed, providing (1) section 35-7-1037 does not authorize a court to order deferral of multiple counts of an information or indictment, and (2) the court erred in deferring entry of conviction and sentence in both felony counts. Appellant challenged the order on the State's motion to reconsider. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State's motion to reconsider was filed and heard before judgment was entered and was not, therefore, a nullity; and (2) the motion to consider was not deemed denied under Wyo. R. Crim. P. 6(c)(2). View "McWilliams v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court. Based on the same incident, Appellant was later convicted on a criminal charge. Appellant appealed, asserting that the criminal prosecution violated his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's criminal conviction of sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree, holding (1) Appellant satisfied all of the requirements necessary to establish plain error, as the trial court clearly and obviously transgressed the rule of law prohibiting subsequent criminal prosecution and punishment, and (2) the prohibited criminal conviction and punishment adversely affected Appellant's substantial rights and resulted in material prejudice to him. View "Haynes v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a complaint in district court after making an unsuccessful construction bid to the Town of Thayne City Council, claiming (1) a civil rights violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, (2) that the Town failed to provide an independent observation of the bid evaluation and selection process, and (3) a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court granted the Town's motion for summary judgment on the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim and dismissed the remaining claims for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed given the deficient brief filed by Appellant and Appellant's failure to comply with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. View "Call v. Town of Thayne" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted on six felony charges involving sexual assault. The district court subsequently sentenced him to consecutive prison sentences totaling thirty to fifty years. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed motions for sentence reduction, one through counsel and one pro se. In the first motion, Defendant asserted sentence reduction was appropriate based upon his rehabilitation efforts. In his second motion, he asserted reduction was also appropriate because he was going blind in both eyes and his condition could be reversed only if he was able to seek outside medical attention. The district court denied both motions. Defendant appealed, claiming the district court erred when it denied motions without considering his change of circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motions for sentence reduction. View "Boucher v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant entered an Alford plea to three counts of first degree sexual abuse of a minor and one count of third degree sexual abuse of a minor. The Alford plea allowed Defendant to enter a guilty plea without allocuting or otherwise admitting his participation in the crimes. During Defendant's sentencing hearing, the district court cited to a number of factors that influenced the court's sentencing decision and then commented on Defendant's flippancy and lack of remorse before announcing its decision. Defendant challenged the sentence, contending that the district court violated his constitutional right against self incrimination by using his silence as evidence of a lack of remorse. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not establish that the district court inferred a lack of remorse based on his silence, and therefore, the question of whether such an inference would infringe on a Defendant's right against self incrimination did not need to be addressed. View "Joreski v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Appellant was convicted for unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Appellant appealed, contending (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel, and (2) the trial court improperly admitted lay opinion testimony concerning his level of intoxication. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not denied effective assistance of trial counsel; and (2) the testimony of two bartenders regarding Appellant's level of intoxication was properly admitted and considered by the trial court, as the testimony was based on the bartenders' observations of Appellant and was helpful to the fact-finder's determination of whether Appellant had the requisite intent. View "Mickelson v. State" on Justia Law