Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Michael Patterson challenged the sentence he was serving on his conviction as an accessory to second degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to a mandatory twenty-year term for his crime. Less than a month later, the State filed a “Motion for Correction of Sentence” in the case. The motion cited Wyo. Stat. Ann. 7-13-201, which requires that the minimum sentence be no greater than 90% of the maximum. The State asked to change the original sentence of 20-22 years to a sentence of 240-267 months, adding three months to the maximum sentence. The district court granted the motion the day after it was filed, and imposed a new sentence of 240-267 months. A year and a half later, Defendant filed a pro se Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. He contended that a sentence of 20-22 years was illegal because it violated the requirement of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 7-13-201 that the minimum be no more than 90% of the maximum. He asserted that his sentence could not be legally increased after he had begun serving it, and proposed a new sentence of 19-22 years. Four months later, Defendant filed an Amended Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. All of the previous post-sentencing pleadings filed by or on behalf of Defendant had recited that his sentence was 20-22 years. This amended motion was the first to recognize that his sentence had been increased to 240-267 months. Defendant argued that the increase in his sentence violated his rights against double jeopardy, and further, violated his rights to due process because the sentence was increased without notice to him and without an opportunity for a hearing. The Public Defender’s Office was appointed to represent Defendant, and it filed a supplemental motion and brief on his behalf. After a hearing, the district court set aside the previous order increasing Defendant's sentence from 20-22 years to 240-267 months, and reinstated the original sentence of 20-22 years. The district court acknowledged that this original sentence was technically illegal because the minimum exceeded 90% of the maximum. It noted, however, that the minimum sentence was only "90.09 percent rather than 90 or less" of the maximum sentence. The district court characterized this as a "small deviation," and concluded that "the original sentence was not illegal because it substantially complied" with the statute. Defendant appealed the district court's order. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant's original sentence was illegal and must be set aside. The Court concluded that the reinstituted sentence of 20-22 years was also illegal, and set that sentence aside too. The case was remanded for resentencing.

A jury convicted Vincent Scott of first degree sexual assault, aggravated assault, and child abuse. Scott appealed, claiming the district court denied his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself at trial and imposed an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court in this case had the discretion to deny Scott's untimely request to proceed without counsel, and although it erred in denying the request on the grounds that Scott's decision was not knowing and intelligent, the request was properly denied as untimely; and (2) the sentence imposed was not impossible or illegal because the district court awarded credit for time served, which made the sentencing scheme possible.

A Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper stopped Bryan Phelps and Justin Fitch for a traffic violation, detained them, conducted a drug dog sniff of their vehicle and, after the dog alerted to the presence of controlled substances, searched the vehicle and found marijuana. Phelps and Fitch were each charged with three felonies. They moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, and the district court denied the motion. Phelps and Fitch subsequently entered pleas of guilty to one of the counts while reserving their right to appeal the denial of their suppression motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the suppression motion, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that probable cause existed for the search.

After a jury trial, Appellant Charles Jones was convicted of aggravated robbery and first-degree murder. Jones appealed, arguing that the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury, that there was insufficient evidence to convict him, and that the prosecutor committed cumulative error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge's failure to give an intent instruction was harmless, as there was no prejudice to Jones; (2) the jury had sufficient evidence to convict Jones of robbery; and (3) Jones was not denied his right to a fair trial due to the cumulative effect of any alleged prosecutorial misconduct that may have occurred.

Black Diamond Energy Partners (BDE Partners) were Nevada limited partnerships which owned interests in coal bed methane wells located in Wyoming. Black Diamond Energy, Inc. (BDE Inc.) was a Wyoming corporation and the managing general partner of several of the BDE Partners. Black Diamond Energy, Inc. of Delaware (BDE Del) was a Delaware corporation and the managing general partner of two of the BDE Partners. BDE Inc. and BDE Del were wholly owned subsidiaries of Koval Resources, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company. Koval entered in a loan agreement in Pennsylvania with S&T Bank, a regional state bank with offices only in Pennsylvania. Koval ultimately defaulted on the loan. BDE Partners filed a complaint in Wyoming against S&T alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and other claims. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that BDE Partners presented sufficient undisputed evidence that S&T's activities in Wyoming were such that, as a matter of law, Wyoming courts had personal jurisdiction to decide their claims.

After entering a conditional plea to one count of felony child abuse, Roman Vance reserved his right to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss, which was premised on grounds of constitutional speedy trial. On appeal, Vance claimed that a six and one-half year delay between charging and arrest raised a presumption of prejudice that the State did not persuasively rebut. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that the district court erred in denying Vance's motion to dismiss based upon a violation of his constitutional speedy trial right, as the court overlooked the question of presumptive prejudice and because no evidence was offered by the prosecution to rebut the presumption of prejudice afforded to Vance.

After a jury trial, Appellant Francis Guerrero was convicted of felony larceny. The district court sentenced Appellant to three to five years of imprisonment. Appellant appealed, claiming the district court erroneously instructed the jury on the elements of larceny and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. The Supreme Court agreed with Appellant's second claim and reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to show that Appellant's activities constituted a taking, one of the elements of larceny, as opposed to a conversion. Consequently, the Court found that Appellant was entitled to an acquittal on the charge of felony larceny.

Following a jury trial, Timothy Kramer was convicted of attempted first-degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not plainly err in instructing the jury on the elements of first-degree murder; (2) Kramer's trial attorneys were not ineffective by not objecting to the jury instructions, and counsel's investigation into the timeline of events was sufficient; and (3) the trial court did not err or violate Kramer's confrontation right when it allowed one of the main witnesses in the trial to testify via video conference, as, under the circumstances, presentation of this testimony in that manner was necessary to further an important public policy, and the reliability of the testimony was otherwise assured.

Defendant Christopher Counts was convicted of aggravated burglary and kidnapping. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error by the district court in admitting redacted documents and recordings into evidence was harmless; (2) the district court erred by limiting Defendant's cross-examination of the victim, but the error was harmless; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for a bill of particulars; (4) the district court properly instructed the jury; (5) the verdict was consistent; and (6) there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict on the charges of kidnapping and aggravated burglary.

Alfred Baldes, a certified nursing assistant, was convicted of two counts of third-degree sexual assault after giving a young man who suffered from muscular dystrophy a sponge bath. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain Baldes' conviction, and specifically, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that Baldes was in a position of authority and that sexual contact occurred, respectively; and (2) the trial court did not err when, following a Gleason analysis, it allowed the introduction of Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence, specifically the testimony of another client of Baldes'.