Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After being separately cited and arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWUI), Ricky Miller and Christopher Gonzalez (Petitioners) petitioned the district court for review of agency inaction by the Wyoming Department of Health (WDOH). Miller and Gonzalez requested that the district court require the WDOH to retroactively decertify the chemical test operators who had performed chemical tests of Petitioners' breath to determine the quantity of alcohol in their respective bodies. The district court dismissed the petition on the grounds that Petitioners lacked standing to bring the action and that the matter was not ripe for review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioners did not satisfy the three elements of standing as set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, and therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing Petitioners' petition for review for lack of standing.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Christina Clark pled guilty to two counts of third degree sexual abuse of a minor. The district court sentenced her to two concurrent terms of six to ten years in prison. Clark appealed from the judgment and sentence, claiming her guilty pleas were not voluntary and she was entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the district court failed to mention probation in the written judgment and sentence in accordance with Wyo. R. Crim. P. 32. The Supreme Court affirmed but remanded for entry of an amended judgment, holding (1) Clark made a voluntary and informed choice to plead guilty; and (2) the district court in this case clearly considered probation before imposing a prison sentence. Remanded to the district court with directions to enter an amended sentence reflecting that the court considered probation in accordance with Rule 32.

Dennis Poitra and two other assailants were involved in the armed robbery of a residence that ended in the killing of a seventy-six-year-old. A jury convicted Poitra of felony murder, aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit burglary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Poitra's right to present the defense of involuntary intoxication and in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of involuntary intoxication; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Poitra's motion to change venue and did not violate his right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury in doing so; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Poitra to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Appellant Hailey Remmick was convicted of six counts of receiving stolen property and one count of conspiracy to commit larceny by a bailee. Remmick appealed, claiming that pre-charging delay deprived her of due process of law and that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because there was no indication that the delay in bringing charges was motivated by an intentional effort to gain tactical advantage over Remmick or evidence that Remmick suffered any actual prejudice, the district court did not err in denying Remmick's motion to dismiss the charges; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support Remmick's convictions on the charges of receiving stolen property and conspiracy to commit larceny by a bailee.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, David Mercer pleaded no contest to three felony counts of sexual abuse of a minor. After he was sentenced, Mercer appealed, asserting that the State breached its plea agreement at sentencing when it misstated facts and argued for a harsh sentence based on Mercer's alleged failure to accept personal responsibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mercer failed to establish that the State breached the plea agreement where (1) a misstatement made by the prosecutor did not prejudice Mercer or violate any clear and unequivocal rule of law; and (2) the prosecutor properly recommended that Mercer should receive the maximum possible sentence based on Mercer's attempt to minimize his behavior.

Victor Jackson pled guilty to one count of third degree sexual assault in exchange for the state's agreement to request probation. The district court placed him on supervised probation for five years. Six months later, the State filed a petition to revoke his probation. A year later, Jackson filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that the victim of the assault had identified someone else as the perpetrator. The district court denied the motion and entered an order revoking probation. The court then imposed a sentence of four to five years. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to withdraw, holding that there was nothing in the record indicating that the district court could not reasonably have concluded as it did or that some facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.

The Town of Jackson applied to the district court for an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) against Operation Save America (OSA), an anti-abortion protest group. The Town sought to restrict OSA's demonstration activities in and around the Jackson town square during the Boy Scouts' 2011 annual Elk Fest. The district court granted the TRO, which enjoined OSA from assembling on the town square without a permit or holding signs of any graphic nature on the square or within a two block radius thereof during the Elk Fest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the case was not moot and the TRO was a final appealable order; (2) the ex parte TRO was issued in violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because under a strict scrutiny analysis, there was no evidence the TRO would serve a compelling government interest of protecting youth from disturbing images or maintaining the peace, and the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to serve the Town's interests; and (3) the district court violated Wyo. R. Civ. P. 65 by issuing the TRO without notice to OSA and an opportunity for OSA to be heard.

Appellant Miachel Maier was convicted of first-degree and attempted first-degree sexual assault. Appellant appealed, arguing (1) he was prejudiced by the admission of hearsay testimony and by prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, and (2) he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel at trial due to his attorney's failure to object to either the hearsay testimony or the prosecutor's closing remarks. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although the district court admitted testimony that included inadmissible hearsay, Appellant was not denied a substantial right and was therefore not materially prejudiced; (2) the prosecutor's statements in his closing argument did not amount to misconduct; and (3) Appellant failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance was so deficient as to require reversal of his conviction.

Appellant Chad Mebane was convicted of possession of methamphetamine and two counts of delivery of methamphetamine. Mebane appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to advise him before he testified that he had a right not to testify and, as a result, his choice to testify was not made intelligently. Mebane appealed, contending that the trial court erred in failing to advise him at the close of the State's case that he did not have to testify. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Mebane was adequately advised by the trial court at arraignment of his right to remain silent; and (2) Mebane voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to remain silent.

Joseph Dax faced state and federal criminal charges arising from a burglary that involved theft of firearms. After the federal court imposed sentence, Dax was transferred to state custody. Thereafter the state imposed sentence. Dax requested credit for time served, which the district court denied. Dax later filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, requesting credit for time served and claiming that he should receive credit against his state sentence for time spent in pre-trial detention on his federal charge. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that res judicata barred review of the issue because Dax did not take advantage of the opportunity to raise it multiple times before.