Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Walmart, Inc. faced allegations from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for 11,103 violations of immigration-related recordkeeping requirements at 20 locations. These cases were assigned to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in the Department of Justice’s Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO). Before the ALJ could rule on the merits, Walmart filed a lawsuit in federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the "good cause" removal procedure for ALJs under 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Walmart argued that this removal procedure infringed upon the President’s executive power under Article II of the Constitution.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia ruled in favor of Walmart, declaring § 7521(a) unconstitutional and permanently enjoining the Department and its Chief ALJ from adjudicating ICE’s complaints against Walmart. The district court refused to sever § 7521(a) from the rest of the statute.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The Eleventh Circuit held that the APA’s § 7521(a) is constitutional as applied to the Department’s ALJs in OCAHO. The court reasoned that the ALJs perform purely adjudicative functions, have limited duties, and lack policymaking or administrative authority. Additionally, the decisions of the ALJs are subject to plenary review by the Attorney General, who is removable at will by the President, ensuring sufficient executive control.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s permanent injunction and reversed its entry of summary judgment for Walmart. The court also noted that even if § 7521(a) were unconstitutional, the proper remedy would be to sever the "good cause" removal restriction, leaving the rest of the APA intact. View "Walmart, Inc. v. King" on Justia Law

Heriberto Carbajal-Flores, an illegal alien, was arrested in Chicago after firing a pistol at passing cars during a period of civil unrest. He was indicted for possessing a firearm as an illegal alien under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). Carbajal-Flores moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute violated his Second Amendment rights. The district court denied his initial motion but reconsidered after the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, which established a new framework for evaluating Second Amendment challenges.The district court ultimately found § 922(g)(5)(A) facially constitutional but held it unconstitutional as applied to Carbajal-Flores, reasoning that historical traditions only supported disarming untrustworthy or dangerous individuals, and Carbajal-Flores did not fit that description. The government appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Second Amendment's protections do not extend to illegal aliens, as historical evidence shows a consistent tradition of disarming individuals who have not sworn allegiance to the sovereign. The court found that § 922(g)(5)(A) aligns with this tradition, as it only disarms illegal aliens who have not taken an oath of allegiance. The court concluded that the statute is constitutional both on its face and as applied to Carbajal-Flores, reversing the district court's decision and remanding the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Carbajal-Flores" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of murder, carrying a pistol without a permit, and criminal possession of a firearm in connection with the shooting death of the victim. The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense by not instructing the jury on the adequacy of the police investigation. He also claimed that his due process rights were violated by admitting an out-of-court identification by an eyewitness and that his confrontation rights were violated by admitting testimony from a medical examiner who did not perform the autopsy.The trial court denied the defendant's request for an investigative inadequacy instruction, finding no evidence to support the claim that the police failed to investigate other suspects or perform a victimology. The court also denied the motion to preclude the eyewitness identification, concluding that the identification procedure was not suggestive despite the omission of one statutory instruction. The court found that the eyewitness was not pressured to make an identification and that the procedure adhered to best practices.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decisions. The court held that the trial court correctly declined to instruct the jury on investigative inadequacy due to a lack of supporting evidence. The court also found that the identification procedure was not suggestive and that the eyewitness's identification was reliable. Additionally, the court concluded that the medical examiner's testimony did not violate the defendant's confrontation rights, as it was based on autopsy photographs rather than the autopsy report.The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, finding no merit in the defendant's claims and determining that any potential errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Villanueva" on Justia Law

Two students alleged that an Arkansas law violates their First Amendment rights by prohibiting their teachers from providing classroom materials and instruction about Critical Race Theory (CRT). The district court concluded that the law likely violated the students' right to receive information and entered a preliminary injunction. Arkansas officials appealed, arguing that the Free Speech Clause does not allow students to compel the government to provide certain classroom materials or instruction in public schools.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted a preliminary injunction to the students but denied one to the teachers. The court determined that the teachers' speech was government speech, not their own, and thus any chill on their speech did not harm their rights. The court concluded that the students demonstrated that the law blocked their receipt of information previously provided before its enactment and that the Arkansas officials did not show a legitimate pedagogical reason for withholding teaching about CRT.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the Arkansas officials. The court held that the students conceded the classroom materials and instruction they sought to receive constituted government speech. Since the government's own speech is not restricted by the Free Speech Clause, the government is free to choose what to say and what not to say. The court concluded that the students could not show a likelihood of success on their claim and vacated the preliminary injunction. The court also declined to uphold the preliminary injunction based on the teachers' vagueness claim, as the teachers did not file a cross-appeal. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Walls v. Oliva" on Justia Law

Meredith Logan Whitehurst was cited for violating the Town of Sullivan's Island's Disorderly Conduct Ordinance after loudly berating her Uber driver with profanity and racial and xenophobic epithets at nearly 2:00 a.m. The driver, an Egyptian-born immigrant, testified that Whitehurst's loud phone conversation disturbed his driving, and when he asked her to be quiet, she began mocking and cursing him. After stopping the car and asking Whitehurst and her friend to exit, Whitehurst continued to yell offensive remarks at the driver. The police were called, and Whitehurst was cited for public disorderly conduct.Whitehurst was tried by a jury in the Town's Municipal Court, which found her guilty and fined her $1,040. She moved for a new trial, which was denied, and then appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the conviction. Whitehurst then appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, arguing that the Ordinance violated her First Amendment rights, was unconstitutionally vague, and that the trial court erred in various procedural rulings, including denying her motion to suppress the Uber video.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court held that the Ordinance was content-neutral and served the Town's significant interest in controlling noise levels, thus not infringing on Whitehurst's First Amendment rights. The Court also found that the Ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague, as it provided fair notice of the prohibited conduct and included a scienter requirement. Additionally, the Court deemed Whitehurst's arguments regarding the multiple subsections of the Ordinance and the motion to suppress the Uber video as conclusory and abandoned due to lack of supporting authority. View "Whitehurst v. Town of Sullivan's Island" on Justia Law

A group of hospitals in New Jersey, which serve a high number of low-income patients, challenged the state's charity care program. This program mandates that hospitals cannot refuse patients based on their inability to pay and prohibits billing qualified patients. The hospitals argued that this program constitutes an unlawful taking of private property without just compensation, violating both federal and state constitutional protections.The trial court dismissed some of the hospitals' claims for not exhausting administrative remedies and granted summary judgment to the state on the remaining claims, finding no per se or regulatory takings. The Appellate Division affirmed the summary judgment, agreeing that the charity care program does not effect a taking.The New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the charity care program does not constitute an unconstitutional per se physical taking. The program does not grant an affirmative right of access to hospital property, does not physically set aside hospital property for the government or third parties, and does not deprive hospitals of all economically beneficial use of their property. Additionally, the court found that the program does not amount to a regulatory taking due to the highly regulated nature of the hospital industry and the significant public interest served by the charity care program.The court affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment, as modified, and noted that hospitals can challenge their subsidy allocations through administrative channels and lobby the Legislature for policy changes. The court emphasized that the charity care program does not violate the Takings Clause. View "Englewood Hospital & Medical Center v. State" on Justia Law

GenBioPro, Inc., a manufacturer of generic mifepristone, filed a complaint against West Virginia officials, arguing that the state's law prohibiting most abortions was preempted by federal law. The company claimed that the FDA Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), which regulates the distribution of high-risk drugs like mifepristone, preempted the state law. GenBioPro contended that the FDAAA established a comprehensive scheme for regulating REMS drugs with safe-use elements, leaving no room for state regulation.The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia dismissed GenBioPro's complaint, finding no preemption. The court held that abortion regulation is a matter of health and safety traditionally occupied by the states. It determined that Congress had not expressed an intent to occupy the field of drugs subject to a REMS in a manner that would preempt West Virginia's abortion restrictions. The court also found that the FDAAA's requirement to consider patient access was a limitation on the FDA's own restrictions, not a command to ensure access for all patients.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the FDAAA did not preempt West Virginia's abortion law. The court emphasized the presumption against preemption in areas of traditional state regulation, such as health and safety. It found that the FDAAA did not demonstrate a clear intention to displace the state's historic and sovereign right to regulate abortion. The court concluded that the FDAAA's focus on drug safety did not create a right to access specific high-risk drugs, and the statute did not preempt state laws regulating the incidence of abortion. View "GenBioPro, Inc. v. Raynes" on Justia Law

Axalta Coating Systems LLC ("Axalta") provided a can of flammable paint to FedEx for air shipment. The paint spilled during transit due to a loose lid. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) filed an administrative complaint alleging Axalta failed to package the paint according to the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Axalta in violation and imposed a $1,900 penalty, which the FAA Administrator affirmed. Axalta petitioned for review, arguing the administrative adjudication violated the Seventh Amendment's jury trial guarantee, referencing the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. Jarkesy.The ALJ denied Axalta's motion to dismiss the complaint and a motion to disqualify the ALJ. After a hearing, the ALJ concluded Axalta violated 49 C.F.R. § 171.2(e) and 49 C.F.R. § 173.24(b)(1), assessing a $1,900 penalty. Axalta appealed, and the FAA cross-appealed for a higher penalty. The Administrator affirmed the ALJ's decision. Axalta then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for review.The Third Circuit held that the administrative adjudication did not violate the Seventh Amendment. The court distinguished the case from Jarkesy, noting that the HMR's technical standards were not derived from common law, unlike the securities fraud provisions in Jarkesy. The court concluded that the FAA's enforcement action was a public right that could be adjudicated administratively without a jury. The court also rejected Axalta's additional arguments, including claims of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, improper ALJ appointment, statute of limitations issues, and due process violations. The petition for review was denied. View "Axalta Coating Systems LLC v. Federal Aviation Administration" on Justia Law

Tobias Jones, a self-described citizen journalist, was filming a Secret Service building in Washington, D.C. when two officers ordered him to stop. When he refused, they detained, handcuffed, and searched him. A third officer later informed Jones that he had the right to film, and he was released. Jones sued the officers for damages, claiming violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights, and sought prospective relief against the Secret Service.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Jones' case. The court held that Jones did not have a valid cause of action for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics and lacked standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Jones' Fourth Amendment claims presented a new context under Bivens, as the Secret Service officers were performing protective duties, which differ from the law enforcement activities in Bivens. The court found that extending Bivens to this new context was inappropriate due to the potential for judicial intrusion into executive functions and the availability of alternative remedies through the Department of Homeland Security. The court also declined to extend Bivens to Jones' First Amendment claim, noting that the Supreme Court has never done so and has foreclosed Bivens remedies for First Amendment retaliation claims.Regarding prospective relief, the court held that Jones lacked standing because he did not plausibly allege a substantial risk of future harm. The court noted that Jones' allegations of potential future encounters with Secret Service officers were speculative and insufficient to establish standing.The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Jones' case. View "Jones v. Secret Service" on Justia Law

Joseph Terrell Goody, a documented gang member with a lengthy criminal history, was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon. His criminal record includes convictions for cocaine possession, robbery, assault, deadly conduct, evading arrest, and burglary. On September 26, 2020, Goody was pulled over for traffic violations, and officers found cocaine, methamphetamine, and a suspicious guitar case in his car. The case contained a loaded rifle. Goody was arrested and later pleaded guilty to violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas sentenced Goody to 57 months of imprisonment and two years of supervised release, with a special condition prohibiting him from associating with gang members. Goody appealed his conviction and the supervised-release condition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Goody raised three arguments on appeal: the facial unconstitutionality of the felon-in-possession ban under the Second Amendment, a violation of the equal protection principle under the Fifth Amendment, and the vagueness of the supervised-release condition. The court rejected all three arguments. It upheld the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession ban, found no merit in the equal protection claim, and determined that the supervised-release condition was not plainly erroneous. The court noted that similar conditions have been routinely imposed and upheld by other courts. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Goody" on Justia Law