Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants James Vlha and Travis Schlotterbeck were convicted for conspiring to manufacture firearms for sale without a federal license and for selling a firearm to a felon, respectively. They engaged in manufacturing and selling semiautomatic AR-15 firearms without a license in Bellflower, California, and sold these firearms to undercover agents and a confidential informant believed to be a felon. They were charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) and § 922(d)(1). Defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the statutes violated the Second Amendment, but the district court denied their motion. They entered conditional pleas and appealed the decision.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the indictment. The defendants then entered conditional pleas, preserving their right to appeal the district court's decision. They timely appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court held that the Second Amendment does not protect the conduct regulated by 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) because requiring commercial firearm manufacturers to obtain licenses does not meaningfully constrain would-be purchasers from obtaining firearms. The court also held that Schlotterbeck’s facial and as-applied challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) fail because the prohibition on selling firearms to felons does not meaningfully constrain the possessory rights of felons, who do not have possessory rights under the Second Amendment. The court concluded that the text of the Second Amendment does not cover the conduct regulated by these statutes, and thus, the defendants' constitutional challenges fail. The convictions were affirmed. View "USA V. VLHA" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers suspected Bandak Wiyual Deng of involvement in a shooting at a park on February 10, 2022. Surveillance video showed an individual matching his characteristics exiting a car with what appeared to be a gun. The car, a black Ford Taurus, lacked a license plate or paper registration tag. A confidential informant recorded a conversation with Deng, where Deng mentioned needing a gun for a funeral and a previous shooting. On the day of the funeral, officers stopped Deng, found marijuana and a gun in his car, and Deng admitted to using drugs and touching the gun.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa upheld the government's peremptory strikes of two prospective jurors and refused to admit parts of Deng's interview with law enforcement. Deng's motion for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) violated the Second Amendment, was denied. The jury convicted Deng.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in overruling Deng’s objections to the peremptory strikes, as the government provided race-neutral explanations. The court also found that any potential error in the district court's evidentiary rulings was harmless, given the ample evidence supporting Deng’s conviction. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of Deng’s motion for a judgment of acquittal, rejecting his facial challenge to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Deng" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who responded to an online advertisement posted by an undercover law enforcement officer posing as a woman offering sexual services, including access to two fictitious underage girls, one purportedly 12 years old. The defendant agreed to meet at a hotel to engage in sexual conduct with the supposed minors and was arrested upon arrival. He was charged with two counts of Sexual Abuse of Children under Montana law, with enhanced penalties based on the alleged ages of the victims.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, denied the defendant’s motion to strike the mandatory sentencing enhancements, which imposed a 25-year parole restriction for offenses involving victims 12 years old or younger. The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of Attempted Sexual Abuse of Children, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion regarding the sentencing enhancement. The court imposed the State’s recommended sentence, including the mandatory enhancement, and dismissed the second count.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the mandatory minimum sentence enhancement for sexual child abuse applies when the “victim” is a fictitious child created by law enforcement in a sting operation. The court held that the statutory language requiring enhanced penalties based on the age of “the victim” refers to actual, specified child victims, not to fictional or simulated victims. The court concluded that the Legislature’s use of different language in the statute—distinguishing between “a child” in defining the offense and “the victim” in penalty enhancements—demonstrates an intent to limit enhanced penalties to cases involving real children. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s imposition of the mandatory enhancement and remanded for resentencing under the general penalty provision. View "State v. Schultz" on Justia Law

The case involves Pacific Bell Telephone Company and other utilities suing the County of Napa and the state Board of Equalization for a refund of property taxes and declaratory relief. The utilities argue that from 2018 to 2023, the tax rates used to compute the debt-service component of their property taxes were higher than those applied to other properties, violating the California Constitution's requirement that public utility property be taxed in the same manner as other property.In the lower court, the trial court sustained the respondents' demurrer to the utilities' complaint without leave to amend, based on the precedent set by the Sixth District Court of Appeal in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, which held that the California Constitution does not mandate that public utility property be taxed at the same rate as other property. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the respondents.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing with the reasoning in Santa Clara and another case, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Merced. The court concluded that the constitutional provision does not require the same or comparable debt-service tax rates for public utility and nonutility property. The court also rejected the utilities' claim that the tax rates violated the principle of taxation uniformity embodied in the California Constitution. The judgment in favor of the respondents was affirmed. View "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Napa" on Justia Law

Darian McKinney, a health and physical education teacher, was employed by the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) for four years. During his tenure, he was investigated for sexual harassment, leading to a grievance he filed against DCPS. Both disputes were resolved through a Settlement Agreement, under which McKinney resigned but was allowed to reapply for teaching positions. However, when he reapplied, DCPS blocked his return, citing a failed background check.McKinney sued the District of Columbia, alleging that DCPS breached the Settlement Agreement by not fairly considering his employment applications and deprived him of property and liberty without due process. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Settlement Agreement did not obligate DCPS to fairly consider McKinney’s applications, only to allow him to apply. The court found no basis in the contract’s language or law for McKinney’s demand for fair consideration. Additionally, the court ruled that McKinney did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in his original job, the contingent job offers, or his eligibility for DCPS positions. The court also found that McKinney’s claim of deprivation of liberty without due process was forfeited as it was not raised in the lower court.The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of McKinney’s complaint. View "Darian McKinney v. DC" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of certain Wisconsin statutes that grant the Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules (JCRAR) the power to pause, object to, or suspend administrative rules. The Governor and other petitioners argue that these statutes amount to unconstitutional legislative vetoes, as they allow JCRAR to halt the implementation of rules without passing legislation. The Legislature contends that these statutes are permissible extensions of legislative power, maintaining that rulemaking must remain subordinate to the legislature.The lower courts had previously upheld the constitutionality of similar provisions. In Martinez v. DILHR, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a three-month rule suspension by JCRAR did not violate the Wisconsin Constitution's bicameralism and presentment requirements. This reasoning was later extended in SEIU, where the court upheld the multiple suspension provision, allowing JCRAR to suspend rules repeatedly.The Wisconsin Supreme Court, currently reviewing the case, adopted the reasoning from Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, which requires bicameralism and presentment when legislative action alters the legal rights and duties of others outside the legislative branch. Applying this standard, the court found that the challenged statutes empower JCRAR to take actions that alter the legal rights and duties of the executive branch and the people of Wisconsin without requiring bicameralism and presentment. Consequently, the court held that the statutes WIS. STAT. §§ 227.19(5)(c), (d), (dm), and 227.26(2)(d), (im) facially violate the Wisconsin Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements and are therefore unconstitutional. View "Evers v. Marklein" on Justia Law

Stephen Simmons pled guilty to violating the National Firearms Act by possessing an unregistered auto sear, a device that converts semi-automatic firearms to fire like machineguns. On the day of his offense, Simmons tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana. Although he was not prosecuted for any drug-related crime, the district court applied multiple sentencing enhancements, penalizing him for possessing the unregistered auto sear, additional auto sears, silencers, and firearms as an unlawful user of controlled substances. Simmons argued that these enhancements violated his Second Amendment rights and that the term "unlawful user of any controlled substance" was unconstitutionally vague.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia applied sentencing enhancements that increased Simmons's offense level due to his status as an unlawful user of controlled substances and his possession of multiple and stolen firearms. The court calculated his total offense level as 25, resulting in an advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 57 to 71 months' imprisonment. After applying a downward variance, the district court sentenced Simmons to 36 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Simmons's Second Amendment challenge, noting that he conceded he had no constitutional right to possess auto sears or silencers, which are not protected by the Second Amendment. The court also dismissed his vagueness claim, as Simmons's conduct clearly fell within the definition of an "unlawful user" of controlled substances. However, the court found that the district court erred in applying sentencing enhancements for possessing ordinary firearms not covered by the National Firearms Act, as these firearms were not relevant to the offense for which Simmons was convicted. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit vacated Simmons's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "US v. Simmons" on Justia Law

Ronell Moses was driving through his Pittsburgh suburb when Officer Dustin Hess, in a marked police SUV, smelled burnt marijuana and saw that Moses's car windows were tinted very dark, both of which are illegal. The officer followed Moses to his home, where Moses parked in his driveway. The officer walked up the driveway, searched Moses's car, and found a loaded, stolen pistol. Moses, a felon on probation, was arrested and charged with possessing a gun and ammunition as a felon.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied Moses's motion to dismiss the indictment, which challenged the constitutionality of the law under the Second Amendment. The court also denied his motion to suppress the gun, rejecting his claim that the officer had invaded his home's curtilage without a warrant. Moses then pleaded guilty conditionally, preserving his right to appeal the curtilage issue and the constitutionality of the law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the officer did not invade Moses's curtilage by walking halfway up the driveway, as the driveway was not an extension of Moses's home. The court applied a de novo standard of review to curtilage decisions, aligning with other circuits. The court also held that the officer's actions were constitutional and that Moses, as a felon on parole, could be prosecuted for possessing a gun. The court affirmed Moses's conviction. View "United States v. Moses" on Justia Law

John Labriola, a media aide for the Miami-Dade Board of County Commissioners, wrote an inflammatory opinion piece criticizing the Equality Act, using derogatory language towards the LGBT community. Following public backlash and internal complaints, the County suspended him without pay, mandated anti-discrimination training, and eventually terminated him for not completing the training.Labriola sued Miami-Dade County in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights, compelled speech, and that the County's anti-discrimination policy was unconstitutionally overbroad. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the County on all counts, applying the Pickering-Connick test to Labriola's free speech and free exercise claims, and ruling that his free-press claim was invalid because he was not a journalist.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Labriola's free speech and free exercise claims failed the Pickering-Connick balancing test, as his speech impeded the County's ability to perform its duties efficiently and disrupted workplace harmony. The court also rejected Labriola's free-press claim, noting that even though the district court erred in stating he couldn't bring the claim as a non-journalist, his claim failed on the merits. Additionally, the court found no evidence to support Labriola's compelled speech claim, as the required training did not compel him to express views he disagreed with. Lastly, the court dismissed Labriola's overbreadth challenge to the County's anti-discrimination policy, as he failed to demonstrate that the policy was substantially overbroad.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Miami-Dade County on all counts. View "Labriola v. Miami-Dade County" on Justia Law

A group of nine plaintiffs, led by Alexander Carter, filed a class action lawsuit against the Cook County Sheriff, challenging a policy at the Cook County Jail that destroys inmates' government-issued identification cards if left unclaimed after the inmate is transferred to the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). The plaintiffs argued that this policy violated the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. The district court dismissed the case, finding that precedent foreclosed each of the plaintiffs' claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted the Sheriff’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim was foreclosed by the precedent set in Lee v. City of Chicago. The court also found that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims were indistinguishable from those rejected in Conyers v. City of Chicago and Kelley-Lomax v. City of Chicago. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims but did not appeal the procedural due process claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Fourth Amendment claim was foreclosed by Lee, which rejected the notion of a "continuing seizure" of lawfully seized property. The court also found that the Fifth Amendment takings claim failed because the plaintiffs had abandoned their property by not following the jail's property retrieval procedures. Finally, the court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim failed because the plaintiffs did not show the inadequacy of state law remedies or an independent constitutional violation. View "Carter v. Cook County Sheriff" on Justia Law