Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Kevin Vericker published an internet blog questioning the credentials, character, and competency of Norman Christopher Powell, who was appointed as the attorney for North Bay Village. Powell filed a defamation lawsuit against Vericker, claiming the blog posts were defamatory per se. Vericker responded with a motion for summary judgment and an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that Powell, as a public official, needed to prove actual malice, which he could not. The trial court denied Vericker's motion.Vericker then sought a writ of certiorari from the Third District Court of Appeal to review the denial of his anti-SLAPP motion. The Third District held that certiorari was not appropriate for reviewing such orders, aligning with the Fourth District's position that public policy favors interlocutory review through rule amendments rather than expanding certiorari jurisdiction. The Third District certified conflict with the Second District's decisions in Gundel, Baird, and Davis, which had allowed certiorari review for anti-SLAPP motions.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and held that denials of anti-SLAPP motions do not constitute irreparable harm sufficient to support certiorari relief. The court emphasized that the Anti-SLAPP statute does not provide immunity from suit but rather aims for the expeditious resolution of meritless, speech-targeted lawsuits. To align with legislative intent, the court amended Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3) to allow interlocutory review of nonfinal orders denying anti-SLAPP motions. The court approved the Third District's decision and disapproved the Second District's conflicting decisions. View "Vericker v. Powell" on Justia Law

Praxis Packaging Solutions, operating a manufacturing facility, applied for a tax exemption for its manufacturing equipment under Michigan law. The Township of Byron's assessor denied the application, stating the equipment did not meet the statutory definition of eligible manufacturing personal property (EMPP). The denial notice informed Praxis of its right to appeal to the March Board of Review but did not provide specific deadlines or meeting dates. Praxis's agents contacted the assessor for appeal details but were not informed of the deadlines. Praxis submitted an appeal letter after the Board had adjourned, and the Board did not consider the appeal.The Michigan Tax Tribunal dismissed Praxis's petition for lack of jurisdiction, as Praxis had not first appealed to the Board. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Township's notice did not meet statutory requirements and deprived Praxis of due process, thus vesting the Tribunal with jurisdiction.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Township's notice did not violate due process. The Court found that the notice, combined with the separate notice of assessment, provided sufficient information about the appeal process. The Court emphasized that due process requires notice reasonably calculated to inform the taxpayer and provide an opportunity to be heard. Since Praxis received actual notice of the Board's meeting dates and the appeal process, the Court concluded that there was no due process violation.The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment and reinstated the Tax Tribunal's dismissal of Praxis's petition for lack of jurisdiction, as Praxis failed to timely protest the exemption denial before the Board. View "Sixarp LLC v. Township Of Byron" on Justia Law

Jeremy Jason Schnur, previously convicted of multiple felonies including aggravated battery, burglary, and robbery, was indicted for unlawfully possessing a firearm as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Schnur was apprehended by law enforcement at the Hard Rock Casino in Biloxi, Mississippi, where he was found in possession of a loaded Canik 9mm semiautomatic pistol. Schnur moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) violated his Second Amendment rights as applied to him. The district court denied his motion, and after a bench trial, found him guilty.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied Schnur's motion to dismiss the indictment. Schnur waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to a bench trial based on stipulations regarding his possession of the firearm and his felony convictions. The district court found Schnur guilty and sentenced him to seventy-eight months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $3,000 fine. Schnur appealed the decision, maintaining his as-applied Second Amendment challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) de novo. The court held that the Second Amendment's plain text covers Schnur's conduct, but the government demonstrated that disarming Schnur is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court cited precedents indicating that individuals with violent criminal histories, like Schnur's aggravated battery conviction, can be constitutionally disarmed. The court also referenced Schnur's robbery and burglary convictions, which further supported the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to him. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) in Schnur's case. View "United States v. Schnur" on Justia Law

The case involves the interpretation of the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) in relation to weapon parts kits and unfinished frames or receivers. The GCA mandates that those involved in the import, manufacture, or sale of firearms must obtain federal licenses, keep sales records, conduct background checks, and mark their products with serial numbers. The Act defines a "firearm" to include any weapon that can expel a projectile by explosive action and the frame or receiver of such a weapon. With the rise of weapon parts kits that can be assembled into functional firearms, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) adopted a rule in 2022 to include these kits under the GCA's regulations.The District Court vacated the ATF's rule, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the GCA does not cover weapon parts kits or unfinished frames or receivers. The Fifth Circuit affirmed this decision, holding that the GCA's definition of "firearm" does not extend to weapon parts kits or unfinished frames and receivers, regardless of their completeness or ease of assembly.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision. The Court held that the ATF's rule is not facially inconsistent with the GCA. The Court found that some weapon parts kits, like Polymer80's "Buy Build Shoot" kit, qualify as "weapons" under the GCA because they can be readily converted into functional firearms. Additionally, the Court held that the GCA's definition of "frame or receiver" includes some partially complete frames or receivers that can be easily finished using common tools. The Court concluded that the ATF has the authority to regulate these items under the GCA. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Bondi v. Vanderstok" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an at-will employee, was terminated by her employer, a private organization, after she sent emails to members of the Tennessee General Assembly expressing grievances about the employer's COVID-19 vaccination mandate. The employer claimed the emails violated its policies. The plaintiff sued for retaliatory discharge, asserting her termination violated her right to petition under Article I, Section 23 of the Tennessee Constitution.The Chancery Court for Hamilton County dismissed the complaint, holding that the right to petition did not apply to private employers. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the right to petition could serve as a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, thus allowing the plaintiff's claim to proceed.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that the right to petition in the Tennessee Constitution is enforceable only against governmental entities, not private parties. The court emphasized that the historical context of the right to petition, dating back to early England, was intended to protect against government oppression, not to constrain private parties. The court noted that no state has held that the right to petition limits the ability of private employers to terminate at-will employees. Consequently, the court concluded that private employers do not violate a clear public policy by terminating employees for exercising the right to petition.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, holding that at-will employees cannot base claims of retaliatory discharge against private employers on the right to petition in the Tennessee Constitution. View "Smith v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee" on Justia Law

A Cambridge police officer observed a black Mazda sedan with an unilluminated rear license plate and initiated a traffic stop. The driver, Natnael Zemene, and two passengers were removed from the vehicle for an inventory search, which revealed a bottle of tequila and a box of ammunition. During a subsequent pat frisk, a firearm was found under Zemene's foot. Zemene admitted ownership of the firearm and was arrested.Zemene was charged with possession of ammunition without a license, carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a loaded firearm without a license, unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, and two civil motor vehicle infractions. He was found guilty of carrying a firearm without a license but not guilty of the other charges. The trial judge denied his motion for a required finding of not guilty and sentenced him to eighteen months in a house of correction. Zemene's post-trial motions were denied, and his sentence was stayed pending appeal.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. Zemene argued that retrial on the charge of carrying a firearm without a license would violate the double jeopardy clause. The court held that the relevant legal change occurred with its decision in Commonwealth v. Guardado, not the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen. Therefore, the double jeopardy clause did not bar retrial. The court affirmed the single justice's denial of Zemene's petition for relief. View "Zemene v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Bradley Hillious was charged with deliberate homicide for the death of his wife, Amanda, who was found unresponsive at the bottom of a staircase and later died from strangulation and blunt-force injuries. Prior to trial, Hillious sought to exclude certain statements Amanda made before her death, including a petition for a temporary order of protection (TOP) and text messages to a coworker. The District Court denied the motion to exclude the TOP petition and deferred ruling on the text messages until trial.The Eleventh Judicial District Court in Flathead County convicted Hillious of deliberate homicide. Hillious filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the jury panel was improperly assembled because the clerk did not certify non-responding jurors to the sheriff for personal service, as required by Montana law. The District Court denied the motion, finding that the clerk's method of jury selection did not undermine the randomness or objectivity of the process.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's judgment. The Court held that the clerk's failure to certify non-responding jurors for personal service was a technical violation that did not affect the randomness or objectivity of the jury selection process. The Court also found that Hillious's motion for a new trial was untimely and that he failed to show good cause for the delay. Additionally, the Court held that the admission of the TOP petition violated Hillious's Confrontation Clause rights but concluded that the error was harmless given the other evidence presented at trial. View "State v. Hillious" on Justia Law

In 2000, Reginald Bertram Johnson abducted and raped 14-year-old C.A. at gunpoint. Following the assault, C.A. was examined by Dr. Scott Silla at a rape treatment center, where biological specimens were collected. Eight years later, a DNA match linked Johnson to the specimens. At trial, the prosecution introduced Dr. Silla’s report to support the chain of custody for the specimens, despite Johnson’s objection that the report’s admission violated the Confrontation Clause since Dr. Silla did not testify. Johnson was convicted and later filed a habeas corpus petition, which was denied.The Florida District Court of Appeal upheld Johnson’s convictions, ruling that the report was properly authenticated as a business record and that the Confrontation Clause was not violated because Johnson had the opportunity to cross-examine other witnesses involved in the collection and testing of the specimens. The Supreme Court of Florida and the U.S. Supreme Court denied further review. Johnson then exhausted his state post-conviction remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether the admission of Dr. Silla’s report without his testimony violated Johnson’s confrontation rights. The court assumed, without deciding, that there was a Confrontation Clause violation but found that any error was harmless. The court concluded that other evidence, including the DNA match and testimonies from C.A., Nurse Carter, Detective Signori, and forensic analyst Sharon Hinz, provided significant corroboration. Thus, the court affirmed the denial of Johnson’s habeas petition, holding that Johnson could not prove actual prejudice from the report’s admission. View "Johnson v. Florida Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Governor of Kentucky issued orders prohibiting mass gatherings, including religious services, and closing non-life-sustaining organizations, which included religious organizations. Maryville Baptist Church held an Easter service in defiance of these orders, leading to a lawsuit against the Governor, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky initially declined to issue a preliminary injunction. However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a partial stay, allowing outdoor worship. Subsequently, the district court granted a preliminary injunction, permitting both indoor and outdoor worship. The Governor later allowed places of worship to reopen, and the Kentucky General Assembly limited the Governor's authority to issue similar orders in the future. The underlying action was dismissed as moot, and the Church sought attorney’s fees, which the district court denied, ruling that the Church did not prevail.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court referenced the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lackey v. Stinnie, which held that a party who receives a preliminary injunction but whose case becomes moot before a final judgment does not qualify as a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Applying this precedent, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of attorney’s fees, concluding that the Church's preliminary injunction did not constitute enduring judicial relief that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties. View "Maryville Baptist Church v. Beshear" on Justia Law

Lateef Jabrall McGann was convicted by a jury for the felony offense of fleeing from a law enforcement officer with reckless indifference. The State of West Virginia then filed a recidivist information, asserting that McGann should be sentenced to life with mercy under West Virginia Code § 61-11-18(d). The recidivist jury found McGann had prior felony convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and wanton endangerment. The Circuit Court of Berkeley County, however, concluded that imposing a recidivist life sentence would violate the proportionality clause of the West Virginia Constitution and was arbitrary and capricious.The State sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia to prevent the circuit court from imposing any sentence other than a recidivist life sentence. The State argued that the circuit court exceeded its legitimate powers by not imposing the mandatory life sentence as required by the recidivist statute.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that the circuit court erred in its decision. The court held that the recidivist life sentence was not constitutionally disproportionate, as the crime of fleeing with reckless indifference is considered a violent felony. The court also found no evidence of selective prosecution or violation of equal protection rights. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Appeals granted the writ of prohibition, directing the circuit court to impose the recidivist life sentence on McGann. View "State ex rel. State v. Cohee" on Justia Law