Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

David Nutter was indicted in August 2021 for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits individuals with convictions for misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence from possessing firearms or ammunition. Nutter had three prior convictions in Ohio for domestic violence and child endangerment. He acknowledged possessing firearms and did not dispute his prior convictions but moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(9) violated the Second Amendment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied Nutter's motion, applying the means-end analysis from District of Columbia v. Heller. Nutter entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion. After the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, which rejected the means-end analysis, Nutter filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that § 922(g)(9) was unconstitutional under the new framework. The district court again denied the motion, concluding that § 922(g)(9) was consistent with the Nation's history and tradition of disarming individuals deemed a threat to public safety.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that § 922(g)(9) is facially constitutional, finding that it fits within the historical tradition of disarming individuals who pose a credible threat to the physical safety of others. The court noted that the statute's purpose and method align with historical analogues, such as surety and going armed laws, which were designed to mitigate demonstrated threats of physical violence. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Nutter's motion to dismiss the indictment and upheld his conviction. View "United States v. Nutter" on Justia Law

Speech First, Incorporated, challenged Texas State University's harassment policy, arguing it violated the First Amendment. The policy prohibited "unwelcome verbal" or "written conduct" without defining these terms, potentially stifling speech on sensitive topics like abortion, immigration, and gender identity. Speech First claimed the policy targeted politically disfavored speech, causing students to self-censor.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas acknowledged the policy's First Amendment issues but refused to issue a preliminary injunction. Instead, it pressured the University to amend the policy. The University reluctantly complied, and the district court dismissed Speech First's motion as moot, believing the policy change resolved the issue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It disagreed with the lower court's ruling that the policy change rendered the request for a preliminary injunction moot. The appellate court noted that voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case unless it is absolutely clear the behavior will not recur. The court found that Texas State's policy change, made under judicial pressure, did not meet this stringent standard. The University continued to defend the original policy, and there was no controlling statement ensuring the policy would not revert.The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further consideration of the motion for preliminary injunctive relief. View "Speech First v. McCall" on Justia Law

Planned Parenthood South Atlantic and other appellants challenged the constitutionality of the 2023 South Carolina Fetal Heartbeat and Protection from Abortion Act. The Act prohibits most abortions once a fetal heartbeat is detected, which the appellants argued occurs only after approximately nine weeks of pregnancy. The State contended that a fetal heartbeat is detectable at approximately six weeks of pregnancy.The federal district court initially enjoined the 2021 version of the Act, but the injunction was lifted following the Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. The South Carolina Supreme Court later declared the 2021 Act unconstitutional under the state constitution. In response, the General Assembly revised the Act in 2023, maintaining the same definition of "fetal heartbeat." The circuit court ruled in favor of the State, and Planned Parenthood appealed.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision, holding that the term "fetal heartbeat" refers to the detection of cardiac activity, which can be identified by medical professionals using diagnostic technology such as a transvaginal ultrasound. The Court determined that this cardiac activity typically occurs at approximately six weeks of pregnancy. The Court's interpretation was based on legislative history, medical evidence, and statutory construction principles, concluding that the General Assembly intended to ban most abortions at this early stage of pregnancy. View "Planned Parenthood v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Grant Gambaiani was sentenced to 34 years in prison after being found guilty by an Illinois jury of multiple crimes, including the repeated sexual assault of his minor cousin, D.G. During the trial, the courtroom was partially closed during D.G.'s testimony, which Gambaiani argued violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed his conviction, and the Supreme Court of Illinois denied review. Gambaiani then sought postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations, but the state courts denied relief.Gambaiani filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, claiming violations of his constitutional rights to a public trial and effective assistance of counsel. The district court denied his petition. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Illinois Appellate Court's conclusion that Gambaiani waived his right to a public trial by failing to object to the partial closure was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The court also found that the partial closure of the courtroom during D.G.'s testimony did not violate Gambaiani's Sixth Amendment right. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit upheld the state court's determination that Gambaiani's attorneys provided effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations, as the state court's credibility determinations were reasonable and supported by the record. View "Gambaiani v Greene" on Justia Law

Theresa Brooke, a woman with disabilities who uses a wheelchair, visited the Ramada by Wyndham Burbank Airport hotel in August 2023. She alleged that architectural barriers at the hotel deterred her from entering. Brooke sued the hotel's owner, Tsay JBR, LLC, for violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act. She sought injunctive relief under the ADA and statutory damages under the Unruh Act.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted partial summary judgment in favor of Brooke, finding that Tsay JBR had violated the ADA due to the lack of an access aisle in the hotel's passenger loading zone. This ADA violation also constituted a violation of the Unruh Act. However, the court found that there was a factual issue regarding whether Brooke personally encountered the violation or was deterred by it, which is necessary for statutory damages under the Unruh Act. The district court scheduled a bench trial, concluding that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial did not apply to claims for statutory damages under the Unruh Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and granted Tsay JBR's petition for a writ of mandamus. The Ninth Circuit held that the Seventh Amendment entitles parties in federal court to a jury trial on claims for statutory damages under section 52(a) of the Unruh Act. The court determined that Brooke's claim was legal in nature, both in terms of its historical analog to 18th-century English public accommodations law and the punitive and deterrent nature of the statutory damages sought. The court directed the district court to set the matter for a jury trial. View "TSAY JBR LLC V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA" on Justia Law

David Samuel Crawford and A.L. ended their four-year relationship in 2018. Despite A.L.'s firm decision to end the relationship, Crawford persistently contacted, surveilled, and approached her for over four years. His actions included calling, emailing, texting, messaging on social media, contacting her friends and family, sending letters and gifts to her workplace, and showing up uninvited at her home. A.L. reported serious emotional distress due to Crawford's conduct, but law enforcement determined there was no imminent threat of harm as Crawford's actions did not include true threats.The Jefferson County District Court charged Crawford with two counts of stalking under section 18-3-602(1)(c), C.R.S. (2024). The prosecution sought to introduce evidence of Crawford's repeated contacts with A.L. Crawford challenged the charges, arguing they violated the First Amendment based on the precedent set in Counterman v. Colorado. The district court concluded that the prosecution needed to prove Crawford had recklessly disregarded that his repeated contacts would cause A.L. serious emotional distress.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that stalking charges based on repeated actions, including contacts but not their contents, do not require proof of a reckless state of mind. The court reversed the district court's order expanding Counterman's holding and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court clarified that Counterman's recklessness mens rea requirement applies only to true-threats cases based on the content of speech, not to cases involving repeated, unwelcome, and content-neutral conduct. View "People v. Crawford" on Justia Law

A Florida restaurant, Hamburger Mary’s, regularly hosted drag performances, including family-friendly shows that invited children. Following the enactment of Florida’s Senate Bill 1438, which prohibits children from attending "adult live performances" deemed obscene for minors, Hamburger Mary’s canceled its family-friendly shows and barred children from all performances, fearing penalties under the new law.Hamburger Mary’s filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida against the Governor of Florida and the Secretary of the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation (FDBPR), alleging that the Act was unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and a content-based speech regulation that failed strict scrutiny. The district court issued a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Act and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Act was likely unconstitutional on its face due to its vague and overbroad nature. The Act’s prohibition on "lewd conduct" was found to be insufficiently specific under the Miller test for obscenity, which requires clear definitions to avoid arbitrary enforcement and to protect free speech. Additionally, the Act’s age-variable obscenity standard, which adjusts the criteria for what is considered obscene based on the age of the child present, was deemed unconstitutionally vague and likely to chill a substantial amount of protected speech.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction, preventing the enforcement of the Act against Hamburger Mary’s and others, citing the need for clarity in speech regulations to avoid arbitrary enforcement and protect First Amendment rights. View "HM Florida-ORL, LLC v. Secretary of the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation" on Justia Law

Yolanda Welch Atkins, a court clerk for Macon, Mississippi, since 2003, was placed on leave in October 2020 after $3,200 in municipal court fines and fees went missing, leading to her arrest and indictment for embezzlement. Despite this, she was reinstated by the board of aldermen. In January 2021, after running unsuccessfully for mayor against Patrick Hopkins's preferred candidate, Atkins was not reappointed as court clerk when Hopkins and other aldermen did not second the motion for her reappointment.Atkins sued Hopkins and others, claiming First Amendment retaliation. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi granted summary judgment to all defendants except Hopkins, finding a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Hopkins's refusal to second the motion was due to Atkins's protected speech. Hopkins appealed the denial of summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials are protected from liability unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. The court found that existing precedent, including Sims v. City of Madisonville, did not clearly establish that Hopkins's specific conduct—refusing to second a motion—violated the First Amendment. Consequently, the court held that Hopkins was entitled to qualified immunity.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment for Hopkins and remanded the case for further proceedings, without indicating what those proceedings should entail. View "Atkins v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

Michael Poffenbarger, a First Lieutenant in the Air Force Reserve, filed a lawsuit challenging the Air Force’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate, claiming it violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First Amendment. He sought a religious exemption, which was denied, and subsequently refused the vaccine. As a result, he received a letter of reprimand and was placed on inactive status, losing pay and retirement points. Poffenbarger sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including restoration of lost pay and points.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio initially granted a preliminary injunction preventing the Air Force from taking further punitive action against Poffenbarger. In a related case, Doster v. Kendall, the same court certified a class of affected service members and issued similar injunctions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed these injunctions, but the Supreme Court later vacated the decision on mootness grounds after Congress directed the rescission of the vaccine mandate. The district court then dismissed Poffenbarger's case as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The court held that Poffenbarger’s claim for lost drill pay and retirement points was barred by federal sovereign immunity. The court explained that RFRA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not unequivocally include claims for money damages against the federal government. Since Poffenbarger’s claim sought retrospective compensation for a previous legal wrong, it constituted money damages, which are not covered by RFRA’s waiver. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case. View "Poffenbarger v. Kendall" on Justia Law

John Doe, a convicted sex offender, challenged the enforcement of Tennessee's sex-offender statutes against him, arguing that the requirements imposed by these statutes constituted retroactive punishment in violation of the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause. Tennessee's sex-offender statutes require offenders to register with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, update their personal information quarterly, limit where they can live and work, and allow the state to publish information about registrants. Doe committed his offenses before the passage of the 2004 statutes and sought to prevent Tennessee officials from enforcing these laws against him.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee issued a preliminary injunction barring Tennessee officials from enforcing any of the state’s sex-offender statutes against Doe. This decision was influenced by a related case, Does #1–9 v. Lee, where the district court had issued a similar injunction for nine other convicted sex offenders. After the Sixth Circuit reviewed Does #1–9, it held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the governor and directed the trial court to modify its injunction against the director, stating that the district court had misinterpreted precedent and that only specific provisions of the sex-offender statutes could be enjoined.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's refusal to dissolve or modify the preliminary injunction following the Does #1–9 decision. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by not dissolving or modifying the injunction, as the Does #1–9 decision clarified that the injunction was overly broad. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s order administratively closing the case and remanded for proceedings consistent with the Does #1–9 opinion, instructing the district court to determine which specific provisions of Tennessee’s sex-offender statutes could be enjoined. View "Doe v. Lee" on Justia Law