Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Anthony Unocic, while incarcerated in a Nebraska detention center, told two fellow inmates that he wanted to kill a federal agent named Tubbs who had investigated him. Unocic's threats were taken seriously by the inmates because he bragged about a previous violent standoff with police, demonstrated stabbing techniques, and mentioned using explosives. The inmates reported the threats to federal agents, leading to Unocic being charged with one count of threatening to assault a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) and (c)(1).Unocic pleaded not guilty, and the case went to trial in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska. The district court instructed the jury on the elements required to convict Unocic, including that he either knew or intended that others would regard his communication as threatening violence, or recklessly disregarded a substantial risk that others could regard his communication as threatening violence. The jury found Unocic guilty, and he was sentenced to thirty-three months' imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Unocic argued that the district court erred by including the term "carelessly" in the definition of "recklessly disregards" in the jury instructions. He claimed this allowed the jury to convict him for speech protected by the First Amendment. The Eighth Circuit reviewed for plain error and concluded that, taken as a whole, the jury instructions did not mislead the jury to convict Unocic based on an incorrect standard. The court found no obvious error and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Unocic" on Justia Law

Lathfield Investments, LLC, Lathfield Holdings, LLC, and Lathfield Partners, LLC (collectively, "Lathfield") own three commercial buildings in Lathrup Village, Michigan, rented to various commercial tenants. The City of Lathrup Village and its Downtown Development Authority (collectively, the "City") require landlords to obtain a rental license and list each tenant's name and principal business. Lathfield applied for a landlord rental license in July 2020 but did not list the required tenant information, leading to the denial of their application and their tenants' business license applications. Lathfield sued the City, alleging unlawful compulsion to apply for unnecessary licenses and make unnecessary property improvements, bringing eleven claims, nine against the City.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to the City on all nine claims. Lathfield appealed, arguing that the City improperly required site plan approval, violated due process and equal protection rights, and engaged in inverse condemnation, among other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Lathfield's request for declaratory relief regarding site plan approval was moot since the site plan process was already completed. The court also found that Lathfield was required to obtain a general business license under the City Code and that the City Code's tenant registration requirement applied to Lathfield. The court rejected Lathfield's due process claims, noting that the City’s adoption of the Michigan Building Code was a legislative act not subject to procedural due process requirements. The court also dismissed Lathfield's equal protection claim due to a lack of evidence of differential treatment and found no basis for the Contracts Clause claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lastly, the court concluded that Lathfield failed to establish an inverse condemnation claim or a civil conspiracy. View "Lathfield Investments, LLC v. City of Lathrup Village, Mich." on Justia Law

Two detectives from the Lowell police department, while investigating a home invasion in Lowell, Massachusetts, crossed into Nashua, New Hampshire, to speak with the defendant. During the conversation, one detective suspected the defendant was deleting data from his cell phone and seized it without a warrant. The detectives then brought the phone back to Massachusetts and obtained a warrant to search it.In the Superior Court, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the cell phone, arguing that the seizure was unlawful. The motion judge allowed the motion, finding that the Lowell detectives had no authority to seize the phone in New Hampshire. The Commonwealth sought an interlocutory appeal, which was allowed by a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. The case was then transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and concluded that the Lowell detective did not have extraterritorial authority to seize the cell phone in New Hampshire. The court found that no statutory or common law authority permitted the warrantless seizure in these circumstances. The court also rejected the Commonwealth's argument that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered, as this theory was not sufficiently supported by the record. The court held that suppression of the evidence was the appropriate remedy to deter police misconduct and preserve judicial integrity. The order allowing the motion to suppress was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

Davion Rivers was convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon and sentenced to 188 months in prison. Rivers appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence and in sentencing him under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) without a jury determining whether his prior offenses occurred on different occasions.The district court denied Rivers's motions to suppress the firearm found on his person and a spent shotgun shell from his residence. The court found that the officers' approach to Rivers's residence was lawful under the knock-and-talk exception and that the search warrant for the residence was supported by probable cause. Rivers was convicted by a jury, and the district court applied the ACCA enhancement based on Rivers's prior drug offenses, finding that they occurred on different occasions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Rivers's conviction, finding no error in the denial of the suppression motions. The court held that the officers' approach to the residence was lawful and that the search warrant was supported by probable cause.However, the court vacated Rivers's sentence under the ACCA, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Erlinger v. United States, which requires that a jury, not a judge, must determine whether prior offenses occurred on different occasions. The court found that the district court's judicial fact-finding violated Rivers's constitutional rights and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The case was remanded for resentencing consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in Erlinger. View "United States v. Rivers" on Justia Law

Jeffrey G. Hutchinson was convicted of murdering his girlfriend Renee Flaherty and her three children in 1998. After an argument with Renee, Hutchinson drank heavily, returned to her home with a shotgun, and killed Renee and two of her children with single shots to the head. He then shot the third child, Geoffrey, twice, killing him. Hutchinson called 911, admitting to the shootings, and was found by police with gunshot residue on his hands and body tissue from Geoffrey on his leg. He was charged with four counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the murders of the three children.Hutchinson's convictions and death sentences were affirmed on direct appeal by the Florida Supreme Court. He filed multiple postconviction motions, all of which were denied. His initial state postconviction motion and successive motions were also denied, as were his federal habeas petitions. His fourth successive postconviction motion, filed after the Governor signed a death warrant, was denied by the circuit court without an evidentiary hearing.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed Hutchinson's appeal of the denial of his fourth successive postconviction motion and his habeas corpus petition. The court affirmed the circuit court's denial, rejecting Hutchinson's claims that the warrant period violated his constitutional rights, that the warrant selection process was arbitrary, and that his execution would be cruel and unusual punishment. The court also denied his habeas claims, including his argument that Atkins v. Virginia should extend to individuals with neurocognitive disorders and his challenge to the heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) aggravator. The court denied Hutchinson's requests for a stay and oral argument, and ordered the mandate to issue immediately. View "Hutchinson v. State" on Justia Law

An informant informed law enforcement that a person named "Tom Collins" was dealing heroin from a residence in Albany, Oregon. Detectives planned to use the informant in a controlled buy at the residence. Instead of waiting for the results of the controlled buy to apply for a warrant, the detectives applied for and obtained a search warrant that anticipated the controlled buy. The state argued that the warrant was an "anticipatory warrant" as approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Grubbs. The defendant argued that such warrants are incompatible with Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.The Linn County Circuit Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search, ruling that anticipatory warrants were valid under both the Oregon and U.S. Constitutions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that anticipatory warrants were permissible under Article I, section 9, and that the affidavit established probable cause.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and declined to address the constitutional question. Instead, the court focused on Oregon's statutory warrant requirements, specifically ORS 133.555(2) and ORS 133.545(6). The court concluded that the affidavit in support of the warrant failed to comply with ORS 133.545(6), which requires that the facts and circumstances show that the objects of the search are in the places to be searched at the time of the warrant's issuance. As a result, the warrant did not comply with ORS 133.555(2), and the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court, remanding the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "State v. Lee" on Justia Law

A firearms dealer in Madison County filed a lawsuit against the Illinois Attorney General, challenging the constitutionality of a state statute known as the Firearms Industry Responsibility Act. The plaintiff argued that the statute was preempted by federal law, void for vagueness, violated the Second Amendment, and violated the Illinois Constitution's three-readings rule. Additionally, the plaintiff contended that the venue provision, which limited venue to Sangamon and Cook Counties for actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief from a constitutional challenge to a state statute, was unconstitutional as it violated federal due process rights.The circuit court of Madison County denied the Attorney General's motion to transfer the case to Sangamon County and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the venue issue. The court found that transferring the case to Sangamon County would be inconvenient for the plaintiff and would deprive it of its ability to effectively challenge the statute. The court concluded that the venue provision was unconstitutional as applied to individuals residing or injured outside of Cook or Sangamon Counties.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the venue provision did not violate the plaintiff's due process rights. The court emphasized that the inconvenience of traveling to Sangamon County did not rise to the level of a due process violation, especially considering the availability of remote court proceedings. The court also noted that the legislature has the authority to determine venue and that the state's interest in consolidating actions in certain counties was reasonable. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Piasa Armory, LLC v. Raoul" on Justia Law

The appellant, Samuel Cocking, was skateboarding in Carson City with a concealed firearm that lacked a serial number. After tripping, he was ridiculed by a group of minors, leading to a verbal altercation. The minors' father, Philip Eubanks, approached, and Cocking shot and killed him. Cocking was charged with open murder, carrying a concealed firearm without a permit, and possession of a firearm not imprinted with a serial number. He pleaded no contest to involuntary manslaughter, carrying a concealed firearm without a permit, and possession of a firearm not imprinted with a serial number, reserving the right to appeal the constitutionality of the gun charges.The First Judicial District Court in Carson City denied Cocking's motion to dismiss the gun charges, ruling that the statutes did not violate his Second Amendment rights. Cocking was sentenced to consecutive prison terms totaling 43-108 months.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. Cocking argued that the statutes regulating concealed carry and unserialized firearms were unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, as clarified by the U.S. Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen. The court held that the concealed carry statute did not violate the Second Amendment because it only regulated the manner of carrying firearms, not the right to carry them openly. The court also held that the statute requiring firearms to have serial numbers did not infringe on the Second Amendment, as unserialized firearms are not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.Additionally, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion at sentencing by relying on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "COCKING VS. STATE" on Justia Law

The appellants, Robin and Louie Joseph Aquilino, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in April 2020 and retained the law firm Spector Gadon Rosen & Vinci P.C. (Spector Gadon) as their counsel. They agreed to pay a flat fee of $3,500 and a $335 filing fee, which Spector Gadon disclosed to the Bankruptcy Court. However, due to the complexity of the case, Spector Gadon billed the Aquilinos for additional post-petition services, resulting in a fee agreement of $113,000, which was not disclosed to the Bankruptcy Court as required by 11 U.S.C. § 329(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 2016(b).The Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey found that Spector Gadon violated the disclosure requirements and sanctioned the firm by ordering the disgorgement of collected fees and cancellation of the remaining fee agreement. Spector Gadon appealed, and the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey reversed the Bankruptcy Court's decision, concluding that Spector Gadon was entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the Bankruptcy Court had "core" jurisdiction over the fee disclosure issue under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). The Third Circuit held that the Seventh Amendment did not entitle Spector Gadon to a jury trial in the § 329(a) proceeding because the sanctions imposed were equitable in nature, designed to restore the status quo, and did not involve legal claims. The Third Circuit also found that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions, as it considered all relevant factors, including the Debtors' misconduct.The Third Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment and reinstated the Bankruptcy Court's sanctions order. View "In re Aquilino" on Justia Law

Police stopped Prince Irell Seuell in Van Buren County, Michigan, in November 2023, discovering drugs, a semiautomatic pistol, and an outstanding warrant. Seuell pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, and the government dropped the drug distribution charge. The presentence report calculated a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months, and the district court sentenced Seuell to 70 months.Seuell challenged his conviction and sentence. He argued that the felon-in-possession statute violated the Second Amendment as applied to him, but he waived this argument at sentencing. The district court offered to appoint new counsel to file a motion challenging the statute, but Seuell chose to proceed with sentencing without raising the motion. The court found this waiver binding.Seuell also contested the base offense level set by the presentence report, arguing that he did not know his pistol could carry a large capacity magazine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the relevant Guideline does not contain a state-of-mind requirement and applies whenever the firearm qualifies. The court noted that the Sentencing Commission knew how to add a state-of-mind requirement when it wished to do so and rejected Seuell's argument.Additionally, Seuell challenged the district court’s enhancement for using a firearm in connection with another offense. The Sixth Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s finding that Seuell committed another felony offense and connected his pistol to drug trafficking. The court noted that the drugs and drug paraphernalia were found in close proximity to the loaded pistol, supporting the enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed Seuell’s conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Seuell" on Justia Law