Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant, Justin Gregory Jubert, was charged with cyberstalking under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B) and transmitting a threatening communication in interstate commerce. The charges arose from a prolonged online campaign where Jubert used multiple Facebook accounts to threaten, harass, and intimidate the victim, M.R., his wife, and their two minor daughters. The harassment included posting threats, insults, and personal information, escalating to threats of violence and tracking the daughters' activities. The family took significant security measures in response, including installing cameras and contacting law enforcement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied Jubert's motion to dismiss the charges, rejecting his facial challenge to the statute but deferring the as-applied challenge. Jubert then pleaded guilty to the cyberstalking charge, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The district court sentenced him to 27 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. Jubert appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and addressed two main questions: whether the statute is facially overbroad and whether Jubert's conduct qualifies as a true threat. The court concluded that the statute is not overbroad and that Jubert's conduct constituted true threats, which are not protected by the First Amendment. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B) is constitutional as applied to Jubert and does not violate his right to freedom of speech. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Jubert" on Justia Law

Michael Hogan, a death row inmate in Nevada, appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition. Hogan challenged the district court's denial of relief on two certified issues and sought to expand the certificate of appealability (COA) on five additional issues. The case predates the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.Hogan's first certified claim alleged ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) for failing to investigate his 1971 Iowa manslaughter conviction, which was used as an aggravating factor in his Nevada penalty proceeding. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that Hogan's trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to challenge the Iowa conviction in Nevada rather than in Iowa. The court also found that Hogan could not demonstrate prejudice from his counsel's failure to challenge the Iowa conviction as a crime of violence under Nevada law.Hogan's second certified claim argued that the procedural default of his trial-court IAC claims should be excused under Martinez v. Ryan. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's reasons for concluding that Hogan failed to establish "cause" under Martinez. The court held that Martinez applies to procedural defaults based on state timeliness rules and that Hogan's failure to raise the trial IAC claims in his second petition did not preclude Martinez relief. The court remanded Claims 2(A)-(G) and (I)-(O) to the district court for further proceedings.The Ninth Circuit granted Hogan's motion to expand the COA to include whether the district court erred in dismissing his challenges to the aggravating circumstances (Claims 5(A) and (B)) as procedurally defaulted. The court held that these claims were properly exhausted and that Nevada's procedural rules were not consistently applied as of 1990, allowing federal review of the merits. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on the merits of these claims.The Ninth Circuit declined to expand the COA to cover four other issues, including Hogan's Confrontation Clause claim, jury instructional errors, lethal injection claim, and cumulative errors claim. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on these issues. View "Hogan v. Bean" on Justia Law

The U.S. Department of Education announced a reduction in force (RIF) on March 13, 2025, affecting about half of its employees. Subsequently, twenty-one states and several labor organizations and school districts filed lawsuits against the Secretary of Education, the Department, and the President, claiming that the RIF violated the U.S. Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). They also sought an injunction against the transfer of certain functions out of the Department, announced by the President on March 21, 2025.The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts consolidated the cases and granted the plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, determining that the RIF and the transfer of functions were likely ultra vires and violated the APA. The court concluded that the actions were arbitrary and capricious, lacking a reasoned explanation and failing to consider the substantial harms to stakeholders.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied the appellants' motion for a stay pending appeal. The court found that the appellants did not make a strong showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits, particularly regarding the APA claims. The court also determined that the plaintiffs would suffer substantial injury without the injunction, as the RIF made it effectively impossible for the Department to carry out its statutory functions. The court concluded that the public interest favored maintaining the injunction to ensure the Department could fulfill its legal obligations. View "New York v. McMahon" on Justia Law

T.M. has a medical condition that causes psychosis when she ingests gluten. After an episode in 2023, she was involuntarily committed to Baltimore Washington Medical Center. Despite her and her father's request for voluntary admission, an administrative hearing led to her involuntary commitment. A clinical review panel approved forcibly injecting T.M. with antipsychotic medication, a decision affirmed by a Maryland administrative law judge. T.M. and the medical center later reached an oral agreement for her release, which was formalized in a consent order by a state court. The consent order required T.M. to follow certain conditions, including taking prescribed medications and dismissing other lawsuits.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed T.M.'s claims, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents federal courts from reviewing state court judgments. The court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over T.M.'s claims and dismissed the parents' claims for failure to state a claim. T.M.'s claims were dismissed with prejudice, while the parents' claims were dismissed without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of T.M.'s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court held that T.M. was a state court loser seeking to overturn a state court judgment, which is barred by the doctrine. The court vacated the dismissal with prejudice and remanded with instructions to modify the judgment to dismiss T.M.'s claims without prejudice. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the parents' claims for failure to state a claim, noting that the complaint did not allege a violation of their First Amendment rights. View "T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation" on Justia Law

In 2018, Marcus Delars Branson was convicted of bank robbery in Texas and sentenced to thirty-seven months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. A condition of his release was that he not possess a firearm. In March 2023, a probation officer found two firearms in Branson's apartment, leading to his indictment for possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Branson moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The district court denied his motion, and Branson pled guilty, receiving a forty-one-month prison sentence, consecutive to a twenty-four-month revocation sentence, followed by three years of supervised release.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied Branson's motion to dismiss the indictment. Branson then pled guilty and was sentenced to a total of sixty-five months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. Branson appealed, presenting both preserved and unpreserved constitutional challenges.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Branson's appeal. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Branson's facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges were foreclosed by precedent, specifically United States v. Diaz and United States v. Schnur. The court also rejected Branson's Commerce Clause and Fifth Amendment challenges, citing previous rulings that had addressed similar arguments. Finally, the court found that Branson's void-for-vagueness challenge lacked merit, as § 922(g)(1) clearly defined the prohibited conduct, and Branson had fair notice that his actions were unlawful. The court reviewed the unpreserved challenges for plain error and found none. Thus, the district court's sentence was affirmed. View "USA v. Branson" on Justia Law

Joseph Lee Betancourt was convicted for firearms possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the felon-in-possession statute. The case arose when Harris County Sheriff’s deputies responded to a 911 call reporting that Betancourt had brandished a firearm during an argument. Upon searching his home, deputies found firearms, ammunition, and body armor. Betancourt had prior felony convictions for aggravated assault, which served as the predicate for his prosecution under § 922(g)(1).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Betancourt’s motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment. Betancourt entered a plea agreement, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to time served and three years of supervised release. Betancourt then appealed the district court’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court applied the framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, which requires determining if the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the regulated conduct and if the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court also referenced United States v. Rahimi, which upheld prohibitions on firearm possession by individuals posing a credible threat to safety.The Fifth Circuit held that Betancourt’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge failed. The court found that Betancourt’s aggravated assault convictions, which involved reckless driving and causing serious injuries, demonstrated that he posed a threat to public safety. The court concluded that disarming Betancourt was consistent with historical traditions of firearm regulation. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Betancourt" on Justia Law

Two yoga teachers, Steven Hubbard and Amy Baack, challenged the City of San Diego's ordinance prohibiting teaching yoga to four or more persons at the City’s shoreline parks or beaches. They argued that this prohibition violated their First Amendment rights. The ordinance defined teaching yoga as a non-expressive activity and prohibited it without the City’s permission, even if offered for free. Hubbard and Baack, who offered free yoga classes in these parks, were stopped by City park rangers and issued infraction tickets for violating the ordinance.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California denied their motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that teaching yoga was not protected speech under the First Amendment and that the City’s prohibition was a valid time, place, and manner restriction. The court also concluded that issuing an injunction was not in the public interest, as the City had not banned yoga entirely but had restricted it to non-shoreline parks.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that teaching yoga is protected speech under the First Amendment because it involves communicating and disseminating information about yoga’s philosophy and practice. The court found that the City’s ordinance was content-based, as it specifically targeted yoga, and thus failed strict scrutiny. The City did not demonstrate a compelling interest or narrow tailoring to justify the prohibition. The court concluded that Hubbard and Baack were likely to succeed on the merits of their as-applied First Amendment claim, would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored granting the injunction. The case was remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction in favor of Hubbard and Baack. View "HUBBARD V. CITY OF SAN DIEGO" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant met a sixteen-year-old runaway in the Bronx and, along with two associates, lured her to their apartment. There, they gave her drug-laced alcohol, sexually assaulted her, and began prostituting her over a period of three weeks. The group took explicit photos, posted online advertisements, arranged clients, and used violence and threats to control the victim. Although the victim initially claimed to be eighteen, the defendant and his associates became suspicious of her age and eventually learned she was sixteen, but continued the operation. The defendant left the group after being injured in a shooting, but remained in contact with his co-conspirators. The victim was eventually rescued by law enforcement, and the defendant was arrested after several months as a fugitive.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the trial. The government charged the defendant with sex trafficking conspiracy, sex trafficking a minor, and conspiracy to use interstate commerce to promote unlawful activity. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted on all counts. The defendant moved for acquittal on the sex trafficking count, arguing that the government failed to prove he knew the victim was underage, and objected to the jury instructions, claiming the relevant statutory language was unconstitutionally vague.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c), which allows conviction for sex trafficking a minor if the defendant had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim, is not unconstitutionally vague. The court also found no error in the district court’s use of a general verdict form rather than a special verdict form. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Concepcion" on Justia Law

The appellant was charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) and sought habeas relief to avoid prosecution, arguing she had already been prosecuted and punished for contempt for the same DWI. The contempt order was void for lack of notice and was withdrawn by the trial court. However, her claim of multiple punishments was found to be meritorious.The trial court initially charged the appellant with misdemeanor DWI in November 2021, with bond conditions including not committing any crimes. In 2022, while the first DWI was pending, she was charged with additional offenses, including a second DWI. The trial court ordered her to show cause for contempt for violating bond conditions, specifically for the second DWI. Despite objections to the notice, the appellant was found guilty of contempt and sentenced to three days in jail, probated for nine months. The contempt judgment was later withdrawn due to lack of notice. The trial court denied her habeas corpus application, and she appealed.The First Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the contempt judgment was void and that the appellant had not been placed in jeopardy since the contempt order was vacated.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and held that the appellant's successive prosecution claim was without merit due to the void contempt order. However, the court found that her multiple punishments claim was valid. The court determined that the appellant was punished for the second DWI through the contempt judgment, and any further punishment for the same offense would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for dismissal of the DWI charge. View "EX PARTE ESTEVEZ" on Justia Law

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Texas electronic communications harassment statute, arguing that his prosecution was based on the content of his messages, which he claimed were protected under the First Amendment. The State contended that the prosecution was not content-based and, even if it was, it served a compelling interest in protecting individuals from abuse.The appellant was convicted in a trial court for sending approximately three dozen electronic messages to his former therapist over a 15-week period. The messages were sent to her professional accounts and contained content that the therapist found disturbing and harassing. The trial court admitted the messages into evidence and overruled the appellant's objections based on First Amendment protections. The jury found the appellant guilty of two counts of harassment, and he was sentenced to 180 days in jail and a $500 fine.The Seventh Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, reasoning that the statute regulated conduct rather than speech and that the appellant's messages were integral to criminal conduct, thus not protected by the First Amendment. The court of appeals concluded that the statute was not unconstitutional as applied to the appellant.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and determined that the appellant was indeed prosecuted for the content of his messages, which violated his First Amendment rights. The court held that the statute, as applied to the appellant, was a content-based restriction on speech and did not meet the strict scrutiny standard required to justify such restrictions. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for dismissal of the indictment. View "OWENS v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law