Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Several current and former employees of the City of Chicago, including police officers and an emergency management officer, challenged the City’s COVID-19 vaccination policy. The policy, issued in October 2021, required city employees to either be vaccinated against COVID-19 or undergo regular testing and report their status through an employee portal. Religious exemptions from vaccination were available and granted to these plaintiffs, but the plaintiffs objected to having to submit their vaccination status and test results in the portal, arguing that this reporting requirement violated their constitutional and statutory rights.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, raising claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the First and Fourteenth Amendments via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act (IRFRA). The district court dismissed the Third Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. It found the Title VII claims factually implausible and concluded that the plaintiffs did not allege a religious practice conflicting with the reporting requirements. The court also held that, since the plaintiffs were granted their requested exemptions from vaccination, they could not succeed on claims based on their refusal to comply with reporting requirements.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Seventh Circuit held that the policy’s reporting requirements were neutral and generally applicable, subject only to rational-basis review, which the policy satisfied. The court determined that the reporting and disciplinary provisions were rationally related to the City’s legitimate interest in public health and workplace safety. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all constitutional, statutory, and state-law claims, finding the plaintiffs’ arguments insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. View "Kondilis v City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The case centers on Jessie Glass, whose estranged wife, April, reported to law enforcement that she witnessed a significant quantity of child sexual abuse material on Glass’s phone. April provided specific details about the alleged material, the devices Glass owned, and information for accessing his online accounts. Detective Jason Lowrance investigated April’s claims, which included reviewing her prior allegations against Glass as well as Glass’s history of previous investigations for similar offenses. Some of these earlier investigations had been closed without charges or with findings labeled “[u]nfounded.” Lowrance then prepared affidavits for search warrants to search Glass’s home and electronics, securing evidence of child sexual abuse material.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied Glass’s motion to suppress, which argued that Lowrance recklessly omitted information in his warrant affidavits that would have undermined April’s credibility and thus probable cause. The district court found that any omissions were not made with intent to mislead or recklessness, and that the omitted facts would not have altered the probable cause determination. A jury later found Glass guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment and imposed financial penalties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the appeal. It held that Lowrance’s affidavits contained sufficient detail to support probable cause, and that the omitted information about April’s credibility would not have defeated probable cause. The appellate court also rejected Glass’s double jeopardy argument, finding the convictions and sentences were based on distinct conduct. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s imposition of a $5,000 special assessment, concluding the required statutory considerations were adequately addressed. The judgment was affirmed in all respects. View "US v. Glass" on Justia Law

An Indian professor employed at a public university in North Carolina applied for tenure after a probationary period, but his initial application was denied following negative evaluations from colleagues concerning his teaching, mentorship, and administrative performance. Several years later, the same professor reapplied and was granted tenure. After receiving tenure, he sued various university officials, alleging that the original denial was the result of racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as retaliation for his non-traditional teaching methods in violation of the First Amendment. His complaint focused on negative statements and actions by two specific colleagues, while also asserting that other officials enabled or failed to remedy alleged bias.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court found that the plaintiff’s allegations of racial discrimination were unsupported by facts connecting any defendant’s actions to race, and that his First Amendment retaliation claim failed to identify protected speech or a causal link between such speech and the tenure decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s allegations did not plausibly suggest he was treated differently than similarly situated colleagues because of his race, as required for Equal Protection and § 1981 claims. The court also concluded that the complaint failed to plausibly allege protected speech or retaliation under the First Amendment. The Fourth Circuit emphasized the limited judicial role in reviewing academic tenure decisions and declined to address qualified immunity, as no plausible claim was stated. Thus, the district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Katti v. Arden" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a community advocate, posted a lengthy video—obtained from internal office security footage of a local police department—on his Facebook page. Only a few department employees had access to this footage. In response, a special agent from the Virginia State Police investigated how the plaintiff obtained the video, suspecting possible computer trespass under Virginia law. The agent sought and obtained warrants to search the plaintiff’s Facebook and Gmail accounts, believing these accounts might contain evidence relevant to the investigation. Although the plaintiff moved to quash both warrants for lack of probable cause, a state court denied the motions, and the Supreme Court of Virginia refused his appeal. Ultimately, the local prosecutor determined there was insufficient evidence to charge anyone with computer trespass.Following these events, the plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, alleging that the searches violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights and were conducted in retaliation for his criticism of local government. After amending his complaint once, the plaintiff sought to amend it a second time. The district court dismissed his claims, concluding that his failure to plead the absence of probable cause was fatal, and denied leave to amend as futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Fourth Circuit held that, in order to state a First Amendment retaliatory search claim, the plaintiff was required to plead the absence of probable cause or show he qualified for a narrow exception, and he had done neither. The court further held that the same requirement applied to his Fourth Amendment claim. The court also agreed that denying leave to amend was proper, as the proposed amendment would not have stated a valid claim. View "Stanley v. Bocock" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, a Nevada prisoner sentenced to death, challenged his conviction and sentence based on the claim that the prosecutor impermissibly used peremptory strikes to exclude three Black prospective jurors during jury selection. The underlying facts involve the murder of Ebony Mason in 1994, for which the petitioner was charged after being linked to the crime through witness statements and physical evidence. He was ultimately convicted of murder and related charges after a trial in which three of four Black prospective jurors were excluded by the prosecution.The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the petitioner’s Batson v. Kentucky claims on direct appeal. It found the prosecutor’s reasons for striking two jurors—Emma Jean Samuels and Angela Smith—were race-neutral, as both had close family members with criminal convictions. The court concluded that, once these two strikes were deemed nondiscriminatory, they did not factor into whether there was a pattern of discrimination, and thus, the exclusion of the first Black juror, Gwendolyn Velasquez, was viewed in isolation, with no prima facie case found. The Nevada Supreme Court therefore did not require the prosecution to provide a race-neutral reason for striking Velasquez.On federal habeas review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief on the Batson claims regarding Samuels and Smith, finding no unreasonable application of federal law. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the Nevada Supreme Court unreasonably applied Batson by excluding from consideration the strikes of Samuels and Smith when assessing whether a prima facie case was established as to Velasquez. The appellate court vacated the denial of relief as to Velasquez and remanded for an evidentiary hearing requiring the State to explain its strike. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of equitable tolling for additional untimely claims and declined to expand the certificate of appealability. View "DOYLE V. ROYAL" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, all residents, property owners, and taxpayers in Johnson County, Wyoming, brought a declaratory action against the county’s Board of Commissioners and the Wyoming Department of Audit (including its Director). Their complaint alleged that the Board mismanaged county finances and violated state fiscal statutes, and that the Department failed to enforce compliance. The plaintiffs claimed that these actions caused them tangible harm as taxpayers through increased taxes and fees. Their suit included ten counts, all seeking declarations of statutory or constitutional violations and requesting judicial oversight, including a forensic audit.The District Court of Johnson County reviewed the case after the Board and the Department moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. The district court agreed, finding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a sufficient personal or particularized injury, and dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. The plaintiffs appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish prudential standing under Wyoming’s Brimmer test, which requires a tangible personal stake in the outcome, not just a generalized grievance. The court also declined to recognize taxpayer standing, since the plaintiffs’ claims of increased tax burdens were speculative and unsupported by specific factual allegations. Even though the plaintiffs argued the case was of great public importance, the court held that public interest alone is insufficient to relax standing requirements without a concrete, particularized harm. As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the action for lack of standing. View "Williams v. Board of County Commissioners of Johnson County" on Justia Law

A police officer responded to a complaint of littering at a McDonald’s parking lot in DeFuniak Springs, Florida, where he encountered John Thomas in a gray Acura matching the reported description. Thomas admitted to littering, exited his vehicle to pick up the trash, and then returned to the driver’s seat. When asked for identification, Thomas produced a Louisiana driver’s license that appeared false, given the age discrepancy. After confirming with the dispatcher that the license information did not match, the officer attempted to arrest Thomas, who resisted, pepper-sprayed the officer, and fled. Thomas abandoned his car nearby and was later apprehended. Police obtained a search warrant for the car, discovering methamphetamine, counterfeit bills, and numerous fraudulent identification documents.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida denied Thomas’s motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his car. Thomas argued the warrant was based on information obtained during an illegal stop, asserting that Florida law does not permit officers to detain someone for a noncriminal violation such as littering. The district court found the initial stop lawful, reasoning that the officer had authority to detain Thomas based on the littering complaint and to request identification. It further held that the subsequent arrest for providing false identification was supported by probable cause, validating the search warrant and denying suppression.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the initial encounter was consensual and did not implicate the Fourth Amendment, and that the officer had probable cause to arrest Thomas for possession of a fraudulent driver’s license under Florida law. Therefore, the evidence obtained from the car search was admissible, and Thomas’s conviction was affirmed. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer applied for a search warrant based on information provided by a confidential informant, who had a record of reliability and admitted past drug use. The informant reported seeing a quantity of methamphetamine consistent with trafficking at the defendant’s residence within the previous seventy-two hours and stated the defendant kept a continuous supply of narcotics at her home and on her person. The affidavit described the informant’s familiarity with methamphetamine and recounted the informant’s prior accurate tips and participation in controlled drug buys. Based on this affidavit, a magistrate judge issued a search warrant. Officers executing the warrant found methamphetamine and paraphernalia, leading to the defendant's arrest and indictment for possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.The defendant moved to suppress the evidence in the Twelfth Judicial District Court, alleging that the affidavit failed to show an adequate basis for the informant’s knowledge because it lacked details on quantity, packaging, or observed sales. The district court agreed, referencing a nonprecedential Court of Appeals memorandum opinion, State v. Belknap, and found the affidavit insufficient. The State appealed. The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the informant’s first-hand observation and demonstrated knowledge of methamphetamine established a sufficient basis for probable cause.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico reviewed the case to clarify the standard for establishing probable cause based on an informant’s tip under Article II, Section 10 of the state constitution and Rule 5-211(E) NMRA. The Court held that the affidavit provided a sufficient factual basis for probable cause because the confidential informant’s first-hand observations, combined with demonstrated credibility and knowledge, met the “basis of knowledge” prong. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision to reverse the district court’s grant of the motion to suppress. View "State v. Perea" on Justia Law

Detectives sought to arrest an individual based on an outstanding warrant and observed him near a corner store. When approached, he fled and discarded a loaded firearm into a bush. Upon apprehension, officers recovered the firearm and found five rocks of crack cocaine and $94 on his person. The individual had multiple prior felony convictions under Louisiana law, including attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, aggravated flight from an officer, possession of heroin, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and aggravated battery. He pled guilty to knowingly possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana sentenced him to 70 months of incarceration and three years of supervised release. The court applied a four-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), finding that he possessed the firearm in connection with another felony offense, specifically drug trafficking, based on the quantity of crack cocaine and circumstances of his arrest. The defendant objected, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the enhancement, but the district court overruled the objection and adopted the Presentence Investigation Report.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed his facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), as well as the application of the sentencing enhancement. The court held that existing precedent foreclosed his Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1). Additionally, the Fifth Circuit concluded the district court did not clearly err in applying the four-level enhancement, determining that the record plausibly supported a finding that he possessed the firearm in connection with drug trafficking. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed both the conviction and the sentence. View "USA v. McCree" on Justia Law

Late on January 10, 2022, Kansas City police officers stopped a pickup truck with a broken headlight and expired license plate. The driver, Alonzo Miller, was not the vehicle’s owner and could not provide proof of insurance. The officers recognized the area Miller had driven from as one known for criminal activity. During the stop, Miller exhibited nervous behavior. A computer check revealed Miller was on probation and parole for a violent felony involving a firearm. The officers, noting a significant age difference between Miller and his passenger and the late hour, suspected possible illicit activity. After Miller mentioned “something under there” when asked about illegal items and consented to a vehicle search, the officers asked him to step out. Miller behaved unusually, triggering further suspicion. As an officer attempted a frisk, Miller resisted, and a firearm discharged from his coat pocket. Miller was arrested and later indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied Miller’s motion to suppress evidence from the stop and search. The magistrate judge found the stop lawful, that Miller’s consent to search was voluntary, and that the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop and frisk Miller based on the totality of the circumstances—including Miller’s criminal history, behavior, and responses during the encounter. The district court adopted these findings. Miller then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the denial of Miller’s suppression motion, applying de novo review to legal conclusions and clear error review to factual findings. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop, request consent to search the vehicle, and frisk Miller. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law