Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Timothy Hall participated in a protest in Detroit, where he was tackled and injured by a City of Detroit officer. Later, another officer ticketed him for disorderly conduct. Hall filed two lawsuits: one against the City of Detroit and another against the officers, claiming retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. The district court consolidated the suits, denied Hall’s request to extend the discovery period, granted summary judgment to the City, but denied the ticketing officer’s claim of qualified immunity.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Detroit, dismissing Hall’s claims against the City. However, the court denied the ticketing officer’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity, allowing Hall’s First Amendment retaliation claim to proceed. Hall appealed the denial of his motion to extend the discovery period and the summary judgment in favor of the City, while the ticketing officer appealed the denial of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Hall’s motion to extend the discovery period and the grant of summary judgment to the City. However, the appellate court reversed the district court’s decision denying the ticketing officer’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. The court held that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that issuing a ticket under the circumstances violated Hall’s First Amendment rights. The court emphasized that the officer acted on plausible instructions from a superior and had no reason to doubt the legitimacy of the order. View "Hall v. Navarre" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of sexual offenses against two minor girls, Kathy and Denise, who lived with him at the time of the alleged abuse. Kathy testified that the defendant touched her inappropriately on multiple occasions, including an incident where he allegedly penetrated her. Denise testified that the defendant sexually abused her in various ways, including touching and penetrating her. The defendant sought to introduce evidence of Denise's prior allegations of sexual abuse by a third party, arguing that the similarities between those allegations and her allegations against him suggested fabrication.The Superior Court judge excluded evidence of Denise's prior allegations under the rape shield statute, which generally bars evidence of a victim's past sexual conduct. The judge also prohibited cross-examination on this topic, reasoning that the evidence did not fall within any exceptions to the statute and that the policy of protecting victims, especially children, favored exclusion. The jury convicted the defendant on several charges, but acquitted him on others. The Appeals Court affirmed the convictions, and the defendant sought further appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and held that the trial judge erred in excluding evidence of Denise's prior allegations of sexual abuse. The court found that the rape shield statute did apply to the evidence in question but concluded that the exclusion violated the defendant's constitutional rights to confront witnesses and present a complete defense. The court determined that the similarities between Denise's allegations against the defendant and her prior allegations were significant enough to warrant cross-examination. The court reversed the convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, emphasizing that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the centrality of Denise's testimony to the prosecution's case. View "Commonwealth v. Jacques" on Justia Law

In the 1980s, Robert Edward Maury was convicted of multiple crimes, including three counts of first-degree murder and forcible rape. A jury sentenced him to death in 1989. The California Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and death sentence in 2003, and his initial state habeas corpus petition was denied in 2011. In 2021, Maury filed a second state habeas corpus petition, which the Shasta County Superior Court dismissed as procedurally barred. Maury appealed, focusing on a claim under McCoy v. Louisiana, arguing that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when his counsel presented mitigating evidence against his wishes during the penalty phase.The Shasta County Superior Court dismissed Maury’s second habeas petition, finding it untimely and successive. The court did not address the merits of Maury’s McCoy claim, which argued that his counsel violated his Sixth Amendment rights by presenting mitigating evidence over his objection, thus conceding guilt. Maury also claimed that the trial court erred in denying his motions to represent himself during the penalty phase, which he argued forced him to proceed with counsel burdened by an irreconcilable conflict of interest.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and found no McCoy error. The court concluded that Maury’s counsel did not concede guilt over his objection but instead presented mitigating evidence and argued for life without parole while maintaining Maury’s innocence. The court also found that any error in presenting a defense against Maury’s wishes was harmless, as Maury achieved his objective of obtaining a death verdict by personally addressing the jury. The court affirmed the trial court’s order denying Maury’s second habeas corpus petition, concluding that Maury failed to demonstrate prejudice or an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his counsel’s performance. View "In re Maury" on Justia Law

In October 2018, the petitioner and several friends planned to rob alleged drug dealers at gunpoint. During one of these planned robberies, the petitioner and his group approached a victim, K.H., and during the confrontation, the petitioner and another individual fired their weapons, resulting in K.H.'s death. The petitioner was subsequently arrested and charged with multiple offenses, including first-degree felony murder and aggravated robbery.The case proceeded to trial in the El Paso County District Court, where a jury convicted the petitioner on most counts, including felony murder. The trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the felony murder conviction, plus additional years for other charges. The petitioner appealed, arguing that his LWOP sentence for felony murder was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence, concluding that the LWOP sentence was not categorically unconstitutional and was proportionate to the offense.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that an LWOP sentence for felony murder for an adult offender is not categorically unconstitutional. The court reasoned that there was no national consensus against such sentences and that the sentence served legitimate penological goals such as retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation. The court also conducted an abbreviated proportionality review and concluded that the petitioner's offense was grave and serious, and thus, the LWOP sentence was not grossly disproportionate. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals. View "Wayne Tc Sellers IV v. People" on Justia Law

In 1990, the petitioner was convicted of murder, largely based on two cross-racial eyewitness identifications. Both witnesses initially identified another person as the shooter but later identified the petitioner, who was the only Black man at the defense table during a probable cause hearing. The petitioner challenged the identification procedures and jury instructions on appeal, but the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld his conviction.The petitioner filed a habeas petition in 2016, claiming that the admission of unduly suggestive and unreliable eyewitness identification evidence violated his due process rights. He also argued that advances in the science of eyewitness identification since his conviction called into question the validity of his conviction. The habeas court dismissed these claims, concluding they were barred by res judicata and that the decisions in State v. Guilbert and State v. Dickson did not apply retroactively. The court also dismissed and denied other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the principles set forth in Dickson, which addressed the suggestiveness of first-time, in-court identifications, must apply retroactively on collateral review. The court reasoned that the rule in Dickson was a result of scientific developments that significantly improve the accuracy of convictions and that the petitioner had raised similar claims in his direct appeal. The court reversed the Appellate Court's decision and remanded the case for a trial on the petitioner's due process and actual innocence claims, directing the lower court to apply the holding of Dickson retroactively. View "Tatum v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, including Free Speech Coalition, Inc. and others, sought to prevent Utah officials from enforcing a law requiring age verification for online pornography. They argued that the law violated the First Amendment and other constitutional rights. The law allows private parties to sue commercial entities that fail to verify users' ages. Plaintiffs claimed this law imposed unconstitutional restrictions on free speech and sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Attorney General of Utah and the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety.The United States District Court for the District of Utah dismissed the case, ruling that the defendants were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court found that the defendants did not enforce or give effect to the law, thus the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity did not apply. The district court also noted that the Commissioner’s oversight of a mobile driver's license program did not constitute enforcement of the law, as the program did not yet provide for online age verification.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court agreed that neither the Attorney General nor the Commissioner enforced or gave effect to the law. The court held that the Ex parte Young exception did not apply because the law placed enforcement authority with private individuals, not state officials. The court also found that the Commissioner’s management of the mobile driver's license program was too attenuated to constitute enforcement of the law. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. View "Free Speech Coalition v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The case involves Bradley Rodriguez, who applied for disability benefits and supplemental security income, claiming a disability due to a traumatic brain injury, bipolar disorder, and depression. His application was denied by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) with the Social Security Administration (SSA). The Appeals Council also denied his request for review. Rodriguez then filed a federal lawsuit challenging the denial of benefits, raising several constitutional issues regarding the appointment of SSA ALJs, Appeals Council members, and the Commissioner of the SSA. He also argued that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of the SSA. The court found that the ALJ was properly appointed, the Appeals Council members were not principal officers requiring presidential appointment and Senate confirmation, and the for-cause removal provision for the Commissioner was unconstitutional but severable. The court also held that Rodriguez was not entitled to a new hearing because he did not show that the unconstitutional removal provision caused him any harm. Additionally, the court determined that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the Commissioner had the statutory authority to appoint SSA ALJs and properly exercised that authority through ratification in July 2018. The Appeals Council members were deemed inferior officers, not principal officers, and thus did not require presidential appointment and Senate confirmation. The court also agreed that the for-cause removal provision for the Commissioner was unconstitutional but severable, and Rodriguez did not demonstrate entitlement to retrospective relief. Finally, the court found that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, including medical records and vocational expert testimony. View "Rodriguez v. Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

In 2020, East Fork Funding LLC filed a quiet title action against U.S. Bank, N.A., regarding a mortgage recorded against East Fork’s property. The mortgage had been subject to three foreclosure actions, two of which were voluntarily discontinued by the mortgagee. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of East Fork, holding that under the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA), enacted in December 2022, the voluntary discontinuances did not reset the six-year statute of limitations for bringing a foreclosure action. Consequently, the statute of limitations continued to run from the commencement of the first foreclosure action in 2010 and expired six years later, entitling East Fork to quiet title.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of East Fork. The court held that FAPA applied retroactively to the voluntary discontinuances, meaning they did not reset the statute of limitations. Therefore, the statute of limitations began running with the filing of the 2010 action and expired before East Fork commenced the quiet title action. The court also found that retroactive application of FAPA did not violate the U.S. Constitution and that even under pre-FAPA law, the statute of limitations had expired.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is currently reviewing the case. The main issue on appeal is whether FAPA applies retroactively to voluntary discontinuances that occurred before its enactment. The court has certified this question to the New York Court of Appeals, as it is a novel question of state law necessary to resolve the appeal. The Second Circuit seeks clarification on whether Sections 4 and/or 8 of FAPA apply to a unilateral voluntary discontinuance taken prior to the Act’s enactment. The court retains jurisdiction pending the New York Court of Appeals' response. View "E. Fork Funding LLC v. U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

In 2018, Merrick Redding was convicted of felony murder and aggravated assault in connection with the death of Joseph Davis. The incident occurred during a barbecue where Redding, uninvited, approached Davis and struck him in the head, causing fatal injuries. Redding claimed self-defense, stating Davis provoked him, but witnesses testified that Davis did not physically provoke Redding before the fatal blow.Redding's case has been reviewed multiple times by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Initially, the trial court denied Redding's motion to dismiss based on a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the trial court's judgment three times, each time remanding the case for proper factual findings and legal analysis regarding the speedy-trial claim. The trial court repeatedly denied the motion, leading to the current appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the trial court's denial of Redding's speedy-trial motion and found no abuse of discretion. The court applied the Barker-Doggett framework, considering the length of delay, reasons for delay, Redding's assertion of his right, and prejudice to Redding. The court concluded that the trial court correctly weighed these factors and did not err in its decision.Additionally, Redding challenged the trial court's admission of prior convictions for impeachment under Rule 609 and other-acts evidence under Rule 404(b). The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the trial court did not err in admitting the 2015 and 2009 convictions but assumed any error in admitting the 2007 conviction was harmless. The court also found that any error in admitting the other-acts evidence was harmless given the strong evidence against Redding. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "REDDING v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Crusader Gun Group, L.L.C. applied for a Federal Firearms License (FFL) in November 2020, with Alan Aronstein identified as the president and responsible person. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) denied the application, citing Aronstein's history of willfully violating federal firearms laws through his previous roles in other firearms businesses. These violations included over 6,000 recordkeeping errors, failure to report the theft or loss of firearms, and possession of unlawful machine guns. Crusader requested a hearing, but the ATF upheld its decision, leading Crusader to seek judicial review.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the ATF. The court found that the ATF was authorized to deny the application based on Aronstein's willful violations of federal firearms laws. Crusader's cross-motion for summary judgment was denied, prompting an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the ATF was authorized to deny Crusader's FFL application under 18 U.S.C. § 923(d)(1)(C) because Aronstein, as the responsible person, had willfully violated federal firearms laws. The court also rejected Crusader's due process claims, noting that adequate procedural safeguards were in place, including notice, a hearing, and the opportunity for judicial review. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to stay discovery, as the administrative record was sufficient for summary judgment. The court concluded that the ATF's denial of the FFL application was lawful and supported by substantial evidence. View "Crusader Gun Group v. James" on Justia Law