Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the defendant was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against his two stepdaughters, L.C. and M.C., when they were under ten years old. The jury found him guilty of thirteen counts, including nine counts of lewd acts. The court sentenced him to 145 years to life under California’s “One Strike” law, which mandates severe penalties for certain sexual offenses involving multiple victims.The Superior Court of San Diego County admitted evidence of both charged and uncharged sexual offenses committed by the defendant. The court conducted a pretrial analysis under Evidence Code section 352 to determine the admissibility of this evidence. The jury was instructed that it could consider this evidence as indicative of the defendant’s propensity to commit sexual offenses. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not conducting a separate section 352 analysis before instructing the jury and that his sentence violated constitutional guarantees of equal protection and prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not err in its handling of the section 352 analysis, as it had implicitly conducted this analysis pretrial. The appellate court also found that the defendant’s equal protection claim was foreclosed by the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Williams, which upheld the constitutionality of excluding One Strike offenders from youthful offender parole consideration. Additionally, the court concluded that the defendant forfeited his claim regarding cruel and unusual punishment by not raising it at trial and that the claim lacked merit regardless.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, upholding the defendant’s conviction and sentence. View "P. v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. and Nicole Shanahan submitted nomination papers to the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) to run as independent candidates for President and Vice President in the November 2024 election. On August 23, 2024, Kennedy requested to withdraw his candidacy, but WEC denied his request based on Wisconsin law, which states that a candidate who has filed nomination papers cannot decline the nomination unless they die. Consequently, WEC included Kennedy's name on the certified list of candidates.Kennedy sought judicial review of WEC's decision in the Dane County Circuit Court and filed a motion for a temporary injunction to remove his name from the ballot. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Kennedy had not demonstrated irreparable harm, that the injunction would alter the status quo, and that he had no reasonable probability of success on the merits. The court also found that Kennedy's constitutional claims lacked legal merit.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the circuit court's decision to deny the temporary injunction. The Supreme Court's task was to determine whether the circuit court had properly exercised its discretion. The Supreme Court concluded that Kennedy failed to demonstrate that the circuit court had erred in its decision. Specifically, Kennedy did not adequately argue that the circuit court misinterpreted the relevant statute or that his constitutional claims had merit. As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order denying the temporary injunction. View "Kennedy v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

Steve Winder became suicidal after discovering Facebook messages between his wife and her ex-husband. His wife, Latrisha, who was out of state, called her mother, Lou Anne, and the Young County Sheriff’s Department for a welfare check after Steve sent pictures of himself holding a gun to his head. Deputy Joshua Gallardo arrived at the scene, and after hearing Steve shout from within, opened the front door. Lou Anne indicated that Steve was armed. Deputy Gallardo then fatally shot Steve after ordering him to put the gun down.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the case at the 12(b)(6) stage. The court found that Steve’s suicidality and possession of a gun created exigent circumstances excusing the need for a warrant. It also ruled that an objectively reasonable officer in Deputy Gallardo’s position would not need to wait for Steve to point the gun at him before using deadly force, thus defeating the excessive force claim. Additionally, the court found no underlying constitutional violation to support claims for supervisory or Monell liability and ruled that Title II of the ADA does not support claims where police officers face exigent circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry and that Deputy Gallardo’s use of deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances. The court also found no basis for supervisory or Monell liability due to the absence of an underlying constitutional violation. Lastly, the court ruled that the ADA claims were foreclosed by the exigent circumstances and that there was no evidence that Steve was discriminated against by reason of his disability. View "Winder v. Gallardo" on Justia Law

In 2015, Brennan R. Trass was charged with first-degree felony murder and criminal possession of a firearm after killing Jose Morales during a drug deal. Trass admitted to the shooting, claiming self-defense. Before trial, the district court appointed multiple attorneys for Trass due to conflicts, causing significant delays. Two weeks before the trial in 2019, the court allowed Trass' attorneys to withdraw due to a conflict and ordered Trass to represent himself with standby counsel. During the trial, Trass was removed from the courtroom for refusing to participate, and his standby counsel took over. The jury convicted Trass.The Reno District Court initially handled the case, where Trass faced multiple attorney changes and delays. Trass filed a direct appeal, and the Kansas Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court to determine the feasibility of a retrospective competency hearing. The district court found Trass competent before and during his 2019 trial. Trass raised several issues on appeal, including violations of his right to counsel, speedy trial rights, and sufficiency of evidence.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court violated Trass' Sixth Amendment right to counsel by forcing him to represent himself without proper advisories or warnings about the dangers of self-representation. The court concluded that Trass did not waive his right to counsel knowingly and intelligently, nor did he forfeit it through egregious misconduct. The violation of Trass' right to counsel constituted structural error, requiring automatic reversal of his convictions. The court also found no violation of Trass' statutory right to a speedy trial and sufficient evidence to support his felony-murder conviction. The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial before a different judge. View "State v. Trass" on Justia Law

The Tuscaloosa City Council passed an ordinance limiting the maximum occupancy of certain restaurants, affecting a sports bar owned by CMB Holdings Group. The ordinance required establishments with restaurant liquor licenses to maintain occupancy limits based on their configuration as restaurants, not as bars or entertainment venues. This change reduced the sports bar's maximum occupancy from 519 to 287, negatively impacting its revenue. CMB Holdings Group sued the City of Tuscaloosa, the mayor, city council members, and the fire marshal, alleging racial discrimination and other claims.The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court dismissed most of CMB's claims, including those for money damages against the City and personal-capacity claims against the mayor and councilors due to legislative immunity. The court also dismissed claims for procedural and substantive due process, equal protection, and others, leaving only claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Alabama Constitution's Contracts Clause. CMB requested the court to alter or amend its judgment or certify it as final for appeal purposes. The court denied the request to alter or amend but granted the Rule 54(b) certification, allowing CMB to appeal the dismissed claims.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the Rule 54(b) certification was improper. The court found that the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims were closely intertwined, particularly regarding whether the ordinance affected vested rights or mere privileges and whether it served a legitimate public interest. The court concluded that separate adjudication could lead to inconsistent results and dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. View "CMB Holdings Groupv. City of Tuscaloosa" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with obstructing the administration of law in violation of a municipal ordinance. The incident occurred when law enforcement officers attempted to arrest the defendant's son, who had a felony warrant. The defendant, holding a large dog, approached the officers, yelled at them, and did not comply with their commands to step back. This behavior continued until the officers threatened to shoot the dog. The defendant also picked up his son's backpack despite orders to leave it, further interfering with the officers' duties.The County Court for Douglas County found the defendant guilty, concluding that his actions constituted willful and defiant refusals to comply with lawful commands, thereby obstructing the officers. The court relied on the language of the ordinance and referenced a similar case, State v. Ferrin, to support its findings. The defendant was fined $250 and ordered to pay court costs.On appeal, the District Court for Douglas County affirmed the conviction. The defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove intent, that the trial court improperly applied a different statute, and that his conviction violated due process and his First Amendment rights. The district court found that the evidence supported the conviction and that the trial court had not erred in its application of the law.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, as the defendant's actions interfered with the officers' duties and demonstrated intent to obstruct. The court also found no merit in the defendant's arguments regarding the application of a different statute and constitutional violations, noting that these issues were not properly raised in the lower courts. View "State v. Yah" on Justia Law

Dr. Ronald S. Hines, a retired and physically disabled veterinarian licensed in Texas, provided online pet-care advice without physically examining the animals. Texas law requires veterinarians to establish a veterinarian-client-patient relationship (VCPR) through an in-person examination or a visit to the premises where the animal is kept before offering veterinary advice. Dr. Hines was penalized for violating this requirement, receiving probation, a fine, and being forced to retake a licensing exam. He challenged the law on First Amendment grounds, arguing that it unconstitutionally restricted his speech.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas initially dismissed Dr. Hines's First Amendment claim, but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for further consideration in light of new Supreme Court precedent. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that the law regulated Dr. Hines's speech in a content-neutral way and survived intermediate scrutiny. Dr. Hines appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the physical-examination requirement primarily regulated Dr. Hines's speech rather than his conduct. The court found that the State failed to demonstrate that the harms it sought to address with the law were real and that the law alleviated these harms in a direct and material way. The court also concluded that the law was not narrowly tailored to serve the State's interests, as it burdened substantially more speech than necessary. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment for Dr. Hines, upholding his First Amendment rights. View "Hines v. Pardue" on Justia Law

In August 2021, Michael Yard’s infant son died from blunt-force trauma to the head while Yard was the sole caregiver. The child had also suffered broken ribs weeks earlier. Yard was charged with first-degree murder and other offenses in April 2022 and was denied bail by a Magisterial District Judge. At a preliminary hearing, evidence including an autopsy report and a 911 call was presented, and all charges were bound over to the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas.Yard petitioned for bail, citing a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, Commonwealth v. Talley, which established a unique standard of proof for denying bail under the state Constitution. The bail court initially set bail at $200,000 with conditions but later vacated this decision, interpreting Talley to require live testimony rather than a "cold record." The Superior Court vacated the bail order and remanded for further proceedings. Yard then filed for nominal bail under Rule 600, which was granted by the bail court, setting bail at $1.00 with conditions.The Commonwealth appealed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction. The Court held that the proof/presumption limitation in Article I, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution does not apply to the life-offense exception to the right to bail. Therefore, when a defendant is charged with an offense carrying a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, the Constitution categorically precludes release on bail. The Court vacated the bail court’s order granting nominal bail and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Commonwealth v. Yard" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of felony vehicle burglary, being a felon in possession of tear gas, and misdemeanor receiving stolen property. During jury selection, the defendant, who was in jail, did not appear in court. The bailiff reported that the defendant refused transport, leading the court to find his absence voluntary and proceed with jury selection. The defendant missed another day but was present for the rest of the trial. He was sentenced to two years and eight months in county jail, with part of the sentence suspended for mandatory supervision.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco handled the initial trial. The defendant argued that his constitutional right to be present was violated due to insufficient evidence of voluntary absence and the denial of a continuance. The court found substantial evidence of voluntary absence based on the bailiff's testimony and denied the continuance. The defendant was convicted on most counts, and the court later modified his sentence.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that the defendant was voluntarily absent, including the bailiff's report and jail procedures. The court also ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, considering the potential manipulation by the defendant and the inconvenience to jurors and court resources. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decisions but accepted the Attorney General's concession that the defendant was entitled to four additional days of presentence custody credits. View "People v. Hersom" on Justia Law

On December 5, 2020, Covington Police Officer Kevin Igo received a letter alleging that Scott Bitter, a convicted felon, was involved in drug trafficking and had assaulted someone. Officer Igo and other officers went to Bitter's residence to investigate. They conducted a "knock and talk" without announcing themselves as police officers. When Bitter's companion, Susan Hornsby, opened the door, Officer Igo observed drug paraphernalia in plain view, including a scale, baggies, and pills. The officers then conducted a protective sweep of the apartment and later obtained a search warrant, which led to the discovery of drugs and a firearm.The Kenton Circuit Court denied Bitter's motion to suppress the evidence, which argued that the initial entry and subsequent search were unconstitutional. The court found that the officers' actions were lawful, as the drug paraphernalia was in plain view and the protective sweep was justified for officer safety. Bitter was convicted by a jury of two counts of trafficking in controlled substances and being a persistent felony offender, and he was sentenced to twenty years in prison.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the trial court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous. The court concluded that Officer Igo's observation of the drug paraphernalia from the doorway was lawful and that the protective sweep was reasonable under the circumstances. The search warrant obtained based on these observations was valid, and the evidence collected was admissible. The court affirmed Bitter's conviction and sentence. View "BITTER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law