Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Roy Lee Williams, a death-row inmate with a history of mental illness, was held in solitary confinement for twenty-six years. Williams filed a lawsuit claiming that his prolonged solitary confinement without penological justification violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that the former Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) was entitled to qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment claim and that Williams could not prove deliberate indifference under the ADA.Before the summary judgment, the District Court dismissed Williams' Fourteenth Amendment claim for failure to state a claim. Williams appealed both the summary judgment and the dismissal of his Fourteenth Amendment claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the Secretary had "fair and clear warning" that keeping Williams in solitary confinement without penological justification was unconstitutional, thus rejecting the qualified immunity defense. The court held that it was clearly established that someone with a known preexisting serious mental illness has a constitutional right not to be held in prolonged solitary confinement without penological justification.Regarding the ADA claim, the court found that the District Court erred in concluding that a trier of fact could not find the DOC deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm caused by placing and keeping Williams in solitary confinement despite his mental illness. The court vacated the District Court's grant of summary judgment on both the Eighth Amendment and ADA claims and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Williams' Fourteenth Amendment claim. View "Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the form and procedural requirements of an initiative petition for Amendment 3, which aims to protect reproductive freedom. The Attorney General and the Secretary of State had approved the form of the petition in March 2023. Proponents of the amendment collected the necessary signatures, and the Secretary of State certified the petition for the 2024 general election ballot. Opponents challenged the certification, claiming the petition failed to include all constitutional provisions and statutes that might be affected if the amendment were approved.The Circuit Court of Cole County ruled in favor of the opponents, finding that the petition did not meet the requirements of article III, section 50 of the Missouri Constitution and section 116.050.2(2). The court ordered the amendment removed from the ballot. Proponents appealed, and the case was transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri.The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the circuit court's decision. The court held that article III, section 50 requires a petition proposing a constitutional amendment to identify only those existing sections of the constitution that are in direct conflict with the proposed amendment. The court found that Amendment 3 did not purport to repeal any existing constitutional provision and was not in direct conflict with any existing constitutional article or section. The court also rejected the opponents' claim that Amendment 3 violated the "single subject" requirement, finding that all provisions of the amendment related to the single subject of protecting reproductive freedom.The court concluded that the Secretary of State's certification of Amendment 3 was correct and ordered the amendment to be placed on the 2024 general election ballot. View "Coleman v. Ashcroft" on Justia Law

Michael Mogan, a condominium owner, challenged the City of Chicago's Shared Housing Ordinance, which prevented him from listing his unit on short-term rental platforms like Airbnb. Mogan claimed that the Ordinance constituted an unconstitutional taking and inverse condemnation under Illinois law. He also sought a declaratory judgment against the City and his homeowners association, Roscoe Village Lofts Association, to allow him to lease his unit on a short-term basis.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Mogan's takings and inverse condemnation claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims. Mogan appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Mogan lacked standing to challenge the Ordinance because he failed to demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury. The court also found that Mogan's property rights were subject to the Declaration of Condominium Ownership, which prohibited leases of less than 30 days. Therefore, Mogan could not claim that the Ordinance interfered with any reasonable investment-backed expectations or caused any economic impact. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. View "Mogan v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Transgender residents of Alabama sought to change the sex designation on their driver’s licenses without undergoing sex-change surgery, as required by Alabama’s Policy Order 63. This policy mandates that individuals wishing to change the sex on their driver’s license must submit either an amended birth certificate or a letter from the physician who performed the reassignment surgery. Plaintiffs argued that this policy violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring Policy Order 63 unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. The district court found that the policy classified individuals by sex and applied intermediate scrutiny, concluding that Alabama had not provided an adequate justification for the policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Policy Order 63 does not impose a sex-based classification and therefore does not trigger heightened scrutiny. Instead, the policy was subject to rational basis review, which it survived. The court found that the policy rationally advances Alabama’s legitimate interest in maintaining consistent requirements for amending sex designations on state documents.The appellate court also rejected the plaintiffs’ due process and First Amendment claims. It held that the policy does not violate the right to informational privacy or the right to refuse medical treatment, as it does not force individuals to undergo surgery to obtain a driver’s license. Additionally, the court determined that the policy does not compel speech, as the information on driver’s licenses constitutes government speech, not private speech. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and upheld the constitutionality of Policy Order 63. View "Corbitt v. Secretary of the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency" on Justia Law

In this case, three plaintiffs—Christian Healthcare Centers, Sacred Heart of Jesus Parish, and St. Joseph Parish St. Johns—challenged aspects of Michigan’s antidiscrimination laws, alleging that these laws violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs argued that the laws chilled their speech and conduct, particularly regarding their religious beliefs and practices related to gender identity and sexual orientation.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed each case for lack of standing. The court reasoned that none of the plaintiffs had shown that Michigan’s laws arguably proscribed their speech or conduct, nor had they demonstrated a credible threat of enforcement against them. Consequently, the district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court agreed in part, finding that Michigan’s laws arguably forbade several of the plaintiffs’ pleaded activities. The court concluded that Christian Healthcare and Sacred Heart had plausibly established a credible threat of enforcement against them for some of the challenged provisions of Michigan’s laws. However, the court found that St. Joseph Parish had not plausibly established standing, as it failed to show a credible threat of enforcement.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims related to the Equal Accommodations Act (EAA) but reversed the dismissal of the claims related to the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA) for Christian Healthcare and Sacred Heart. The court remanded the cases to the district court to evaluate the plaintiffs’ requests for injunctive relief. The district court’s decisions were thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Christian Healthcare Centers v. Nessel" on Justia Law

A couple owning a lot in Homer, Alaska, added a second dwelling made from a shipping container and obtained a permit from the city. A neighboring property owner challenged the permit, arguing that the container dwelling required a conditional use permit and was a nuisance under the city’s zoning code. The city’s zoning board determined that the container dwelling was an accessory building to the existing mobile home and did not require a conditional use permit. The board also found that the container dwelling was not a nuisance because it had been modified and no longer functioned as a shipping container.The neighboring property owner appealed to the Homer Board of Adjustment, which upheld the zoning board’s decision. The Board of Adjustment concluded that the container dwelling was an accessory building and did not require a conditional use permit. It also agreed that the container dwelling was not a nuisance. The neighboring property owner then appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Board of Adjustment’s decision and awarded attorney’s fees to the city.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the Board of Adjustment’s interpretation of the zoning code was reasonable and that the container dwelling qualified as an accessory building. The court also found that the Board’s conclusion that the container dwelling was not a nuisance had a reasonable basis. However, the court vacated the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees and remanded for further proceedings, noting that fees cannot be awarded for defending against nonfrivolous constitutional claims, and some of the challenger’s constitutional claims were not frivolous. View "Griswold v. City of Homer" on Justia Law

The case involves the National Infusion Center Association (NICA) and other plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of the Drug Price Negotiation Program established by the Inflation Reduction Act. This program requires the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to negotiate drug prices with manufacturers, setting a "maximum fair price" between 40% and 75% of the market price. Manufacturers who do not comply face significant fines or must withdraw from Medicare coverage entirely.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed NICA's lawsuit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court reasoned that NICA's claims had to be "channeled" through HHS as required by 42 U.S.C. § 405, which mandates that claims arising under the Medicare Act be decided by the relevant agency before being brought to federal court. The district court also dismissed the remaining plaintiffs due to improper venue without NICA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that NICA had standing based on both economic and procedural injuries. The court determined that NICA's claims did not arise under the Medicare Act but rather under the Inflation Reduction Act, and thus did not require channeling through HHS. The court held that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over NICA's claims and reversed the lower court's dismissal, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Natl Infusion Center v. Becerra" on Justia Law

The case involves hundreds of plaintiffs who allege that they were injured by the drug Fosamax, manufactured by Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. (Merck), due to inadequate warnings about the risk of atypical femoral fractures. The plaintiffs claim that they would not have taken the drug if they had been properly warned. Merck contends that it proposed a label change to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to address this risk, but the FDA rejected the proposed change due to insufficient scientific support.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted summary judgment in favor of Merck, concluding that the plaintiffs' state law claims were preempted by federal law. The court found that Merck had fully informed the FDA of the justifications for the proposed warning and that the FDA had rejected the proposed label change, thus preempting the state law claims. The court relied on the FDA's Complete Response Letter and other communications to determine that the FDA's rejection was based on a lack of sufficient scientific evidence linking Fosamax to atypical femoral fractures.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the District Court's judgment. The Third Circuit concluded that the District Court erred in its preemption analysis by giving too little weight to the presumption against preemption. The appellate court found that the FDA's Complete Response Letter was ambiguous and that the District Court placed too much reliance on informal FDA communications and an amicus brief to interpret the letter. The Third Circuit emphasized that the presumption against preemption is strong and that Merck did not meet the demanding standard of showing that federal law prohibited it from adding any and all warnings that would satisfy state law. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re: Fosamax" on Justia Law

Three nonprofit organizations challenged two Arizona election law amendments: one allowing the cancellation of a voter’s registration if they move to another county (the “Cancellation Provision”) and another making it a felony to provide a voting mechanism to someone registered in another state (the “Felony Provision”). The plaintiffs argued these laws would jeopardize voting rights in Arizona.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of both provisions, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the laws could harm voters and were likely unconstitutional. The defendants, including the Arizona Attorney General and the Yuma County Republican Committee, appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to challenge the Cancellation Provision because they only alleged a frustrated mission and diverted resources, failing to show direct harm to their core activities. The court emphasized that organizational standing requires more than just a diversion of resources; it requires a direct impact on the organization’s core activities.Regarding the Felony Provision, the court found that the plaintiffs had standing because they faced a realistic possibility of prosecution, which could chill their voter outreach activities. However, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their vagueness challenge. The court interpreted the phrase “mechanism for voting” narrowly, determining it referred only to unlawful acts of voting, not voter outreach or registration.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "ARIZONA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS V. MAYES" on Justia Law

Scott Lowe was convicted of drug trafficking and unlawful possession of a firearm. He argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Denver Police Department officers searched a storage unit in his apartment building without a warrant. The search revealed evidence linking him to drug trafficking. Lowe moved to suppress the evidence, claiming a possessory interest in the unit that required a warrant. The district court denied the motion.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the case. Lowe had previously pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon and was on supervised release. His probation officer received tips from a confidential informant about Lowe using a storage unit for hiding narcotics and firearms. Despite Lowe's denials and the property manager's confirmation that he did not rent a storage unit, officers found incriminating evidence in a storage unit on the eighth floor of his apartment building. Lowe was arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute MDMA, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm as a felon. The district court denied Lowe's motion to suppress the evidence, ruling that he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the storage unit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Lowe failed to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the storage unit. The court found sufficient evidence to support his conviction and found no legal error in his sentencing. The court also addressed Lowe's challenges regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and the reasonableness of his sentence, ultimately affirming the lower court's rulings. View "United States v. Lowe" on Justia Law