Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was involved in a domestic violence incident with a former romantic partner with whom he continued to live as a roommate. On September 18, 2022, after drinking heavily, the defendant assaulted the victim by choking, hitting, and threatening her. The victim, fearing further violence, submitted to sexual acts. After the defendant fell asleep, the victim left, sought medical attention, and reported the incident to police. The defendant was arrested and, while detained pending trial, communicated with the victim numerous times, encouraging her to lie and withhold information from authorities, and discouraging her from testifying.The Hillsborough-northern judicial district Superior Court conducted a jury trial. The jury acquitted the defendant of some charges but convicted him of aggravated felonious sexual assault-domestic violence, stalking-domestic violence, indirect criminal contempt, witness tampering, criminal restraint, second degree assault-domestic violence, and simple assault-domestic violence. The defendant appealed these convictions.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It affirmed the aggravated felonious sexual assault convictions, holding that there was sufficient evidence to find the victim was confined and did not freely consent to the sexual acts due to fear provoked by prior assaults. The court reversed the stalking and indirect criminal contempt convictions, concluding that the bail statute in effect at the time did not authorize no-contact orders for detained defendants, rendering the evidence insufficient for those charges. The court found no double jeopardy violation regarding multiple witness tampering convictions, determining that each attempt to influence the victim constituted a separate offense. Other double jeopardy claims were rejected due to insufficient demonstration of plain error. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the remaining convictions and reversed the stalking and contempt convictions. View "State v. Sales" on Justia Law

Several plaintiffs, including the founder of a religious group called Singularism, used psilocybin as part of their religious ceremonies in Utah, where the drug is classified as a controlled substance. Authorities seized a large quantity of psilocybin from them and notified Singularism’s landlord that the drug use constituted a nuisance. Shortly after, the plaintiffs initiated a state lawsuit, which was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The federal court issued a temporary restraining order requiring the return of seized items and, after state authorities filed criminal charges, enjoined state prosecution against the religious leader to prevent a potential First Amendment violation.On appeal, the state authorities argued that the federal district court should have abstained from interfering with ongoing state criminal proceedings under the Younger abstention doctrine, and that prosecution did not violate the First Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s refusal to abstain de novo and found the requirements for abstention were satisfied. The court concluded that the state authorities had not waived the abstention argument through their litigation conduct. The plaintiffs failed to show that the prosecution was brought in bad faith, was harassing, or created a threat of irreparable injury, as required for exceptions to abstention.On the merits, the Tenth Circuit held the district court erred in finding a likely First Amendment violation. The court found Utah law’s regulatory scheme for secular, supervised medical use of psilocybin was not comparable to the unsupervised religious use, and thus did not treat secular activity more favorably than religious activity. The court vacated the injunction and the denial of the motion to dismiss as to preferential treatment for secular use, remanding the issue of individualized exemptions for further district court proceedings, and dismissed the appeal regarding the Fourth Amendment claim for lack of jurisdiction. View "Jensen v. Utah County" on Justia Law

A non-verbal adult male with Down syndrome and autism, residing in Philadelphia with his mother and sister, receives care funded under Pennsylvania’s Consolidated Waiver program for home and community-based services. After the Department of Human Services imposed a “40/60 Rule” limiting compensation for care provided by relatives to 40 hours per week for one caretaker or 60 hours for multiple caretakers, his mother sought a permanent exception, citing religious grounds. She argued that Islamic law prohibits unrelated males from providing personal care and restricts her own interactions with unrelated male aides. Without an exception, she and her daughter would continue to provide care beyond the capped hours without compensation.The Department initially denied the exception, and an Administrative Law Judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. After a remand and settlement for reassessment, the Department again denied the request. The Bureau of Hearings and Appeals upheld the denial, and the mother appealed to the Commonwealth Court. During the COVID-19 pandemic, temporary exceptions permitted full compensation, but after resumption, the request for a permanent religious exemption was again denied. The Commonwealth Court affirmed, finding no substantial burden on religious exercise under the Free Exercise Clause or Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act (RFPA), and concluded that the mother failed to meet her burden of proof.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether a Free Exercise Clause claim requires evidence of a “substantial burden” on religious exercise. The Court held that only a “burden” is required, not a substantial burden, and that the Commonwealth Court erred by conflating RFPA’s statutory standard with the constitutional standard. The Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "Alsyrawan v. DHS" on Justia Law

A man convicted of murder in Texas and sentenced to death sought to halt his execution, scheduled for October 7, 2026. He argued that newly developed clinical standards for diagnosing intellectual disability, which became available after his first federal habeas petition, would now classify him as intellectually disabled and therefore constitutionally ineligible for execution. He maintained that these new clinical guidelines constituted either a new rule of constitutional law or a new factual predicate, justifying a second federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. As an alternative, he requested a stay of execution pending a potential relevant decision by the United States Supreme Court.After his 2001 conviction, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected his Eighth Amendment claim that his mental illness barred execution. His first state and federal habeas petitions were denied, with the federal courts determining in 2017 that he was not intellectually disabled. He later abandoned his initial Atkins v. Virginia claim after the Supreme Court faulted Texas’s standards for such claims in Moore v. Texas. In 2019, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas denied his remaining federal habeas claims, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a Certificate of Appealability in 2020.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the petitioner’s second federal habeas application was barred by the one-year statute of limitations and that he was not entitled to equitable tolling. The court further found that his renewed claim of intellectual disability had already been presented in his prior habeas petition, barring reconsideration under § 2244(b)(1). The court also denied his request for a stay of execution, finding no likelihood of success on the merits and no justification for equitable relief. Both motions were denied. View "In re Howard" on Justia Law

A group of individuals required to register as sex offenders under Missouri’s Sex Offender Registration Act (Mo. SORA), along with their spouses and children, filed suit against Missouri State Highway Patrol officials responsible for enforcing the law. The plaintiffs challenged various aspects of Mo. SORA, including its registration requirements, the lack of individualized risk assessments, the tiered system of registration durations, and reporting obligations for online identifiers. They asserted that these provisions violated their constitutional rights and also caused harm to their family members, who experienced social stigma and other indirect consequences.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri dismissed the claims of the family members, finding they were not directly subject to Mo. SORA and that incidental effects on them were irrelevant to the constitutional analysis. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment and Ex Post Facto Clause challenges, concluding that Mo. SORA was not punitive. It found the statute’s requirements regarding online identifiers were not unconstitutionally vague because the registration form specified the information to be provided. The court dismissed the due process and equal protection claims, finding no fundamental rights or suspect classifications were implicated and that the statute was rationally related to legitimate state interests. Regarding the First Amendment, the court held that the prior restraint on use of online identifiers was unconstitutional, and the parties agreed to modify the registration form to remove that requirement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that (1) Mo. SORA is not punitive for Eighth Amendment or Ex Post Facto purposes, (2) the statute is not unconstitutionally vague regarding online identifiers, (3) no cognizable due process or equal protection claims were stated, (4) the family members lacked standing, and (5) the First Amendment claim was properly resolved by modifying the reporting requirement. View "Does v. Flannigan" on Justia Law

A registered nurse working in a hospital’s Mother Baby Unit requested a religious exemption from her employer’s mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy. Her request, which cited Christian beliefs regarding the sanctity of life and objections to the use of abortion-derived cell lines in vaccine development and testing, was denied. The hospital had followed an executive order issued by the Oregon governor, requiring all healthcare workers to be vaccinated unless granted a medical or religious exemption. The nurse was subsequently terminated for failure to comply with the vaccination mandate.The nurse filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. She alleged a Free Exercise claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against individual members of the hospital’s Board of Directors and Vaccine Exception Review Committee, and a Title VII claim against the hospital for failure to accommodate her religious beliefs. The district court granted the individual defendants’ motion to dismiss the Free Exercise claim on qualified immunity grounds, finding that the right to refuse a state-mandated vaccine on religious grounds was not clearly established in 2021. The court denied the hospital’s motion to dismiss the Title VII claim but later granted summary judgment for the hospital, holding that accommodating the nurse’s request would have imposed undue hardship due to health, safety, operational, and financial risks.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Free Exercise claim, holding that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law in 2021 recognized a healthcare worker’s religious right to a vaccine exemption under those circumstances. The court also affirmed summary judgment for the hospital on the Title VII claim, concluding that the hospital demonstrated undue hardship in accommodating the nurse without substantial risk to patients and operations. View "MACDONALD V. OREGON HEALTH AND SCIENCE UNIVERSITY" on Justia Law

The case involves William Castillo, who was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Isabelle Berndt in Las Vegas, Nevada. Castillo used a key he found while working as a roofer at Berndt’s home to later enter her residence with an accomplice, steal items, and fatally attack Berndt with a tire iron. Subsequently, he returned to the home to set it on fire. Evidence recovered from Castillo’s apartment linked him to the crime. He confessed to the robbery, murder, and arson during police interrogation and was convicted by a jury on multiple counts, including first-degree murder. The penalty phase included testimony regarding his abusive childhood and mental health, but the jury imposed a death sentence.After his conviction, Castillo appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, which affirmed both the conviction and sentence. His state post-conviction relief (PCR) petition was denied by the trial court and affirmed by the Nevada Supreme Court. Castillo then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. He voluntarily dismissed the petition, but later moved to reopen it. His subsequent amended petitions were dismissed by the district court as untimely or procedurally defaulted. The district court granted a certificate of appealability for four claims and denied it for two others.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that Castillo’s first and second amended habeas petitions were untimely and equitable tolling was not warranted. The court affirmed denial of relief on most claims, including ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the as-applied Eighth Amendment challenge to Nevada’s lethal injection protocol. However, the court reversed the district court’s ruling on two claims, finding that attorney error in state PCR proceedings could excuse procedural default under Martinez v. Ryan and Hogan v. Bean. Those claims were remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed denial of certificates of appealability for the remaining claims. View "CASTILLO V. BEAN" on Justia Law

Federal agents suspected that an individual was using his auto garage as a front for narcotics distribution. After two controlled purchases of cocaine and ongoing surveillance, agents obtained a warrant to search his house and the surrounding grounds for evidence of drug crimes. The warrant did not specifically list vehicles among the items to be seized. Upon executing the warrant, agents found a blue minivan and a red truck parked in the driveway. Although a search of the vehicles initially revealed no contraband, the agents seized them for civil asset forfeiture, believing the minivan was used to facilitate drug sales and the truck was purchased with drug proceeds. Later, after receiving a tip, agents obtained a separate warrant to search the minivan and discovered cocaine and a firearm hidden in a secret compartment.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence found in the minivan. The court reasoned that, under Florida v. White, law enforcement does not need a warrant to seize forfeitable vehicles from places where officers are lawfully present, even private driveways. The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty while preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The Court held that the warrantless seizure of the minivan from the private driveway was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment since the agents had a warrant authorizing them to be present on the property and search its grounds. The Court explained that such a seizure did not constitute an invasion of privacy. The Court distinguished this case from United States v. Lasanta, finding Lasanta inapposite because the agents here had a search warrant for the property, unlike in Lasanta. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Acevedo" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The defendant was part of a group that planned to purchase marijuana but instead decided to rob the victim, resulting in the victim’s death. At trial, the prosecution’s key witness testified that the defendant was the shooter. Another witness identified the perpetrators as three black males, while the defendant is white. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment and 25 to 30 years for the respective convictions. His direct appeal, handled by the same attorney as at trial, was unsuccessful.Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief in the District Court for Douglas County, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel relating to a juror who allegedly exhibited bias during voir dire and was not removed by peremptory challenge or on appeal. He also claimed that the State failed to disclose implied plea agreements with two witnesses, violating his constitutional rights. The district court denied all claims without an evidentiary hearing, finding the juror claims were refuted by the record and the plea agreement claims were either procedurally barred, unsupported by facts, or harmless error.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing regarding all claims about the juror and the claim concerning an implied plea agreement with one witness, finding the record did not support allegations of juror bias, ineffective assistance, or an undisclosed agreement. However, the court reversed in part, holding that the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the claim that the State failed to disclose an implied plea agreement with another witness. The court directed that the case be remanded for this limited evidentiary hearing. Thus, the judgment was affirmed in part and in part reversed and remanded with directions. View "State v. Elseman" on Justia Law

A politically active resident of East Cleveland, Ohio, who had long used a sound truck to broadcast political messages, supported a challenger in a mayoral primary. After this involvement, city officials began enforcing rarely used parking and noise ordinances against him. The plaintiff was warned, cited, had his truck impounded, and was prosecuted for a noise violation. He alleged that these actions were motivated by his support for the challenger and criticism of the administration. The plaintiff, along with his company, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the city, the mayor, the mayor’s chief of staff, and the police chief, asserting First Amendment retaliation and prior-restraint violations, as well as Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio resolved all claims in favor of the defendants. Some claims—including First Amendment retaliation claims against the mayor and chief of staff—were dismissed at the pleading stage, while others were resolved at summary judgment. The court found that the ordinances were facially valid and that the plaintiff had either failed to establish the required elements for his claims or had forfeited certain arguments on appeal.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit revived certain First Amendment retaliation claims. It held that the district court erred in applying the probable cause requirement to the retaliation claims against the mayor and chief of staff, reversing their dismissal. The court affirmed summary judgment for the police chief on qualified immunity grounds, finding no clearly established law that would make him liable as a conduit for another’s retaliatory motive. As to the city, the court vacated summary judgment on retaliation, remanding for further proceedings on whether municipal policy directly caused a constitutional violation. The court affirmed the district court on all other claims, including the prior-restraint and Fourth Amendment seizure claims, and noted that the plaintiff had forfeited his selective enforcement arguments on appeal. View "Fambrough v. City of E. Cleveland" on Justia Law