Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

An individual who operated convenience stores in Massachusetts applied to renew his licenses to act as a sales agent for the state lottery. During the application process, the State Lottery Commission became aware that the applicant had previously been charged with raping his wife, although he was acquitted at trial. The commission held administrative hearings in which it relied on the criminal trial transcripts and the applicant’s testimony, ultimately finding by a preponderance of the evidence that he had committed the act of rape. The commission denied his license renewal, citing regulations that allowed denial based on a finding of deficient moral character.The applicant challenged the denial in the Massachusetts Superior Court, arguing that the regulation permitting denial solely on moral character grounds exceeded the commission’s authority under the statute, that the decision was unsupported by substantial evidence, and that the regulation was unconstitutionally vague. The Superior Court sided with the applicant, reasoning that the statute required both a felony conviction and a finding of deficient moral character for denial, and that reliance on trial transcripts without live testimony was insufficient evidence. The court did not address the constitutional vagueness claim.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. It held that the statute grants the commission broad discretion and does not require both a felony conviction and a deficient moral character finding to deny a license; either basis suffices. The court found the commission’s use of the trial transcript as substantial evidence appropriate and concluded that the regulation was not unconstitutionally vague as applied. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the Superior Court’s decision and ordered judgment for the commission, upholding the denial of the lottery sales agent license. View "Zafar v. State Lottery Commission" on Justia Law

A Virginia college student applied for a state tuition grant program that provides financial assistance to residents attending accredited private, nonprofit colleges in Virginia. The program disqualifies students whose primary major falls under “religious training or theological education,” as classified by certain federal instructional codes. After enrolling at Liberty University as a Music Education major and being notified of her eligibility for the grant, she changed her major first to “Youth Ministries” and later to “Music & Worship”—both considered religious vocational programs under the state’s rules. As a result, she was found ineligible for the grant for two academic years.The student filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging that the grant program’s exclusion of her religious vocational major violated her First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. The defendant, the director of the state higher education council, moved to dismiss, arguing that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Locke v. Davey directly controlled and foreclosed her claim. The district court agreed, finding her situation essentially identical to the plaintiff’s in Locke, and concluded that subsequent Supreme Court decisions—Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, and Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin—had not overruled Locke. The court dismissed her claim with prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that Locke v. Davey remains binding precedent, and that the Supreme Court’s more recent decisions reaffirmed rather than abrogated it. The Fourth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal, upholding the constitutionality of the grant program’s exclusion of religious vocational majors. View "Hall v. Fleming" on Justia Law

A Puerto Rican international banking entity, which operated under an offshore charter and was regulated by Puerto Rico’s Office of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions, maintained a master account with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In 2019, following a federal investigation into potential anti-money laundering violations involving a Venezuelan client, the entity’s offices were raided and its account was temporarily suspended. After the investigation concluded with a fine and compliance improvements, the account was restored under stricter risk-mitigation terms. However, in 2022 and 2023, the Federal Reserve Bank determined the entity had not met required compliance standards and ultimately terminated the master account, citing serious risk concerns related to money laundering and deficiencies in compliance programs.The entity sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking to compel reinstatement of its account and damages. It claimed a statutory entitlement to a master account under the Federal Reserve Act, as amended by the Monetary Control Act, and brought claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, Mandamus Act, Declaratory Judgment Act, the Fifth Amendment, and New York contract law, among others. The district court denied preliminary relief and dismissed all claims, holding that the relevant statutes did not create a nondiscretionary entitlement to a master account and finding failures in both standing and the plausibility of the claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. It held that the Federal Reserve Act does not grant depository institutions a statutory or nondiscretionary right to a master account; instead, regional Reserve Banks retain discretion over account access. The court further found that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, failed to plausibly allege contract or constitutional claims, and that amendment of the complaint would be futile. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in all respects. View "Banco San Juan Internacional, Inc. v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv." on Justia Law

Two individuals campaigned for judicial positions in Kentucky’s 2022 elections. During their campaigns, they publicly described themselves using terms such as “conservative,” “Republican,” or “the Conservative Republican,” and one used a generic elephant image. They also received, but did not solicit, endorsements from Republican committees and pro-life organizations, which were referenced or visually displayed in campaign materials. Their conduct prompted complaints to the Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission, which sent warning letters suggesting that their actions might violate specific provisions of the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct related to party nominations, endorsements, and making commitments on issues.After receiving the warning letters and being asked to respond, both candidates objected to the vagueness of the allegations. Fearing imminent enforcement, they filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on First Amendment grounds. The district court initially denied a preliminary injunction for lack of standing, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted an emergency injunction pending appeal, finding a credible threat of enforcement. After further proceedings, the district court granted summary judgment for the candidates on most claims, holding that certain rules were unconstitutional as applied to their speech and that one rule was unconstitutionally vague, and it issued a permanent injunction. The Commission appealed, and the candidates cross-appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the candidates had standing and that their as-applied challenges to the “Nominee,” “Endorsement,” and “Commitment” rules succeeded. The court determined the candidates’ campaign speech was protected by the First Amendment and affirmed an injunction preventing the Commission from enforcing those rules as applied to their speech, but declined to extend relief to facial challenges. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part, tailoring relief to the candidates’ specific conduct. View "Fischer v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The defendant, a convicted felon, was living at a multi-unit residence with his girlfriend and her family in New Hampshire. After an altercation involving a damaged car mirror and escalating tensions with a family friend, the defendant brought a loaded pistol outside, intending to confront the friend. During a heated exchange, the defendant fired two shots, killing the family friend and seriously injuring his girlfriend’s uncle. He was arrested later that day and subsequently charged in federal court with possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).Prior to trial in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, the defendant sought to present affirmative justification defenses, including duress, necessity, and self-defense. He also moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that the application of § 922(g)(1) violated his Second Amendment rights as applied to his circumstances. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and ultimately ruled that the defendant had failed to make a sufficient threshold showing to present a justification defense to the jury. It also denied his motion to dismiss. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal these rulings and later challenged his above-Guidelines sentence as substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings and affirmed. The court held that the defendant failed to meet the threshold requirements for a justification defense under established circuit precedent and common law standards. The court further concluded that the defendant’s Second Amendment as-applied challenge lacked merit given the facts, and upheld the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. Finally, the First Circuit found the above-Guidelines sentence was justified and not substantively unreasonable. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "US v. Fort" on Justia Law

In September 2025, the Missouri General Assembly enacted HB 1, which redrew congressional districts despite no new census certification. Two Missouri voters, affected by the redistricting, signed and helped submit a referendum petition to challenge HB 1 before it took effect in December 2025. They argued that upon filing the petition with the secretary of state on December 9, 2025, HB 1 was automatically suspended under the Missouri Constitution until voters could decide on it. They also contended that any statutes allowing the secretary to delay suspension until official verification conflicted with constitutional provisions.The Circuit Court of Cole County held a bench trial on stipulated facts. It dismissed the voters’ petition on several grounds—lack of standing, lack of ripeness, the political question doctrine, and the existence of an adequate statutory remedy. On the merits, it also declared that filing the referendum petition did not automatically suspend HB 1. The voters appealed, and the Supreme Court of Missouri accepted transfer to review the important legal question presented.The Supreme Court of Missouri held that simply filing a referendum petition does not automatically suspend a legislative act under article III, sections 49, 52(a), or 52(b) of the Missouri Constitution. The Court reasoned that such suspension only occurs if the referendum petition is ultimately determined to be legal, sufficient, and timely, as required by constitutional and statutory provisions. The ongoing statutory process for verifying signatures and certification by the secretary of state must be completed to determine sufficiency. The Court also rejected the argument that the relevant statutes were unconstitutional as applied. The judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. View "Maggard vs. State" on Justia Law

Tire Town Auto LLC, a towing service based in Marshfield, Wisconsin, operated for years on a list maintained by Wood County for dispatching towing companies to remove disabled vehicles from public roads. Wood County required businesses on the list to comply with a set of minimum standards, including 24/7 availability, liability insurance, and rules such as the use of reflective vests. After complaints about noncompliance with these standards—including failure to wear vests and alleged overcharging—Wood County removed Tire Town from the rotation list. Tire Town filed suit three years later, alleging that its removal violated its procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin dismissed Tire Town’s amended complaint, finding that Tire Town had not plausibly alleged deprivation of a property interest protected by due process. The court determined that neither Wisconsin law nor any contract, statute, or ordinance guaranteed Tire Town a spot on the towing rotation list. The Minimum Standards policy explicitly stated it was not a contract and gave the county broad discretion to remove companies from the list.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Tire Town had not plausibly alleged a protected property interest in remaining on the towing rotation list. The court concluded that the Minimum Standards policy did not restrict the county’s discretion sufficiently to create a legitimate claim of entitlement, and Tire Town could not reasonably rely on the policy as a source of property rights. The court rejected arguments based on unwritten “mutually explicit understandings,” finding no basis in law or contract for a protected property interest. View "Tire Town Auto LLC v Wood County" on Justia Law

AAC, a company that finances motorcycle purchases and holds security interests in the vehicles, acquired installment contracts for two motorcycles owned by individuals involved in a criminal case. After one owner, Brock, was killed during a gang shootout, and the other, Andrzejewski, was arrested and charged in connection with the incident, the Lexington County Sheriff’s Department seized both motorcycles as evidence. AAC was not notified of the seizures or the motorcycles’ location and learned about the events through news reports. AAC contacted the Sheriff’s Department seeking information and access to the motorcycles but was told that the vehicles would not be returned until the criminal proceedings concluded.AAC initially filed claim and delivery actions in the Lexington County Circuit Court, but the court dismissed these actions for improper service, noting it would not order release of evidence during a pending murder case. AAC then brought suit in the Lexington County Court of Common Pleas under state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging procedural due process violations. The Sheriff’s Department removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, which dismissed AAC’s federal claim, holding that the seizure was lawful and that AAC’s property interests must yield to the state’s duty to preserve evidence for criminal proceedings. The district court remanded the state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that when property is seized in connection with a criminal investigation, the Fourth Amendment defines the process that is due, and compliance with its requirements satisfies procedural due process. The court found the seizures lawful and determined that no additional process was required for AAC as a lienholder. The court affirmed the district court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss. View "American Acceptance Corporation of SC v. Gietz" on Justia Law

A defendant, who co-founded an animal rights organization, participated in “open rescues” at two poultry farms in Sonoma County, California. These actions involved entering private property without permission to document suspected animal cruelty and, in some cases, removing animals believed to be suffering. The defendant relied on legal and veterinary opinions suggesting his actions were justified to prevent harm to the animals. He was charged with felony conspiracy to commit trespass, misdemeanor trespass, and related offenses, arising from two incidents at Sunrise Farms and Reichardt Duck Farm.The case was tried in the Superior Court of Sonoma County. The defendant represented himself and sought to present a necessity defense, arguing he believed his conduct was lawful based on legal advice. The trial court ruled the necessity defense legally unavailable, finding no emergency or imminent threat justifying trespass. It also restricted the mistake of law defense, limiting it to a statutory provision that allowed trespass only to provide food or water to animals deprived for over 12 hours. The jury convicted the defendant on most counts, except one which was dismissed after a hung verdict. The defendant appealed, raising issues about the exclusion of his necessity defense, the limited mistake of law instruction, and constitutional challenges to the statutes involved.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred by excluding evidence and jury instructions on the defendant’s good faith mistake of law based on necessity, which was relevant to the specific intent crimes charged. The appellate court reversed the convictions for conspiracy to commit trespass and trespass with intent to interfere with a business, remanding for further proceedings. The conviction for trespass by refusing to leave property was affirmed. The court rejected constitutional challenges to the relevant statutes. View "P. v. Hsiung" on Justia Law

Two consolidated cases involved fathers incarcerated in Idaho whose parental rights were terminated in private proceedings initiated by the mothers of their children. In each case, a county public defender was initially appointed to represent the indigent father at the trial level. After the 2025 enactment of Senate Bill 1181, which altered the state’s indigent defense system, the counties argued they were no longer responsible for providing counsel in private termination cases, and the new State Public Defender (SPD) asserted it was not statutorily required to represent parents in such cases. The trial courts ultimately appointed counsel at county expense. After judgments terminating parental rights were entered and appeals were filed, questions arose as to whether the fathers were entitled to counsel and appellate costs at public expense, and if so, who was responsible for providing and funding these services.Previously, Idaho law categorically provided indigent parents in termination proceedings the right to appointed counsel, with counties typically responsible for payment. Senate Bill 1181, effective July 1, 2025, limited the right to counsel to cases where it is “constitutionally required” and made clear that the SPD’s obligation to provide indigent defense did not extend to private termination cases. It also barred counties from being required to fund indigent defense in such cases. With these statutory changes, the Idaho Supreme Court confronted the resulting gap in representation.The Idaho Supreme Court held that, under the Due Process Clauses of the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions, indigent parents in private termination cases may be constitutionally entitled to counsel at public expense, including on appeal, but this right is not automatic and must be determined case by case. The Court further held that, after the legislative changes, no state agency or county can be required to provide such representation, though they may do so voluntarily. However, all indigent parents appealing termination orders are constitutionally entitled to records and transcripts at public expense, and if not otherwise provided, those costs must be paid from the county district court fund. View "Doe v. Doe" on Justia Law