Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A former Fire Chief of the Cincinnati Fire Department, who had worked for the department since 1993 and was promoted to Fire Chief in 2021, was terminated by the City Manager in 2023 without being given a pre-termination hearing. The City Charter provided that, after serving six months as Fire Chief, the individual could only be removed for cause. When promoted, the Fire Chief signed a memorandum stating the position was “unclassified” and subject to dismissal without cause, but the Charter’s language provided for-cause protection after the first six months. The City Manager provided the Fire Chief with a termination letter listing reasons for the firing and publicized the termination, including to the media, citing the reasons as “for cause.” The Fire Chief did not receive a pre-termination or post-termination hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied summary judgment to the City Manager and the City, holding that the City Manager was not entitled to qualified immunity regarding pre-termination due process violations. The court found that, under the Charter, the Fire Chief had a property interest in continued employment after six months and that there were unresolved factual disputes regarding waiver of those rights. The district court also denied statutory immunity to the City Manager on the Fire Chief’s state law defamation claim, finding triable issues regarding whether her statements were knowingly false or made with malice.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Sixth Circuit held that the City Charter unambiguously gave the Fire Chief for-cause removal protection after six months, creating a property interest protected by procedural due process. It found that no “clear and unmistakable” waiver of those rights was effected by the memorandum. The court also held that sufficient evidence existed for a jury to decide whether the City Manager acted with malice or bad faith in making allegedly defamatory statements. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. City of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

A group of former employees of a public university in Washington State were terminated after failing to comply with a COVID-19 vaccine mandate issued by the state’s governor. These employees had requested, and in some cases received, religious or medical exemptions from the vaccine requirement. However, the university determined that accommodating these exemptions would impose undue hardship and, as a result, denied many accommodation requests. None of the employees received the vaccine or could be accommodated, so they lost their jobs.The former employees filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington against the university and certain human resources officers, alleging that their terminations violated their constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Both parties moved for summary judgment on these claims. The district court ruled in favor of the university, finding that it is an “arm of the state” under the test articulated in Kohn v. State Bar of California and thus is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. The employees appealed this ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp., clarifying the “arm of the state” analysis. The Ninth Circuit held that its prior three-factor test remains valid but must be applied in accordance with the Supreme Court’s guidance, giving the greatest weight to whether the state intended to create a legally independent entity, less weight to formal liability for debts, and the least weight to state control. Applying the refined test, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the university is an arm of the state under the Eleventh Amendment and not a “person” under § 1983, affirming summary judgment for the university and dismissing the § 1983 claims. View "NILSEN V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON" on Justia Law

LUMA Energy, LLC and LUMA Energy ServCo, LLC entered into a long-term contract to operate and maintain Puerto Rico’s electric power transmission and distribution system, previously managed by the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA), a Title III debtor under PROMESA. The agreement included a liability waiver provision, which was subsequently approved with modifications by the Puerto Rico Energy Bureau (PREB). After LUMA invoked the waiver to deny numerous consumer claims, the Puerto Rico Department of Consumer Affairs (DACO) brought suit in Puerto Rico’s courts against LUMA, PREPA, and PREB, challenging the constitutionality of the waiver. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico accepted the case for review.While the DACO action was pending, LUMA, without participation from PREPA or the Financial Oversight and Management Board (the Board), sought an order from the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico (acting as the Title III court) to enforce the automatic bankruptcy stay and halt the DACO litigation. The Title III court denied LUMA’s motion, finding the police and regulatory power exception to the automatic stay applicable because DACO’s action was an exercise of governmental authority to protect consumers. LUMA appealed this order.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The main holding was that LUMA lacked statutory standing to appeal the Title III court’s denial of its motion to enforce the automatic stay. The First Circuit clarified that LUMA was not a “person aggrieved” for purposes of appellate standing under the Bankruptcy Code as incorporated by PROMESA, because LUMA did not show it suffered a direct and adverse pecuniary injury of the type the automatic stay is meant to prevent. Accordingly, the First Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "LUMA Energy LLC v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs" on Justia Law

Reginald Chapman was convicted by an Illinois state court jury of murdering Angela Butler and her son, C.B., in 1998. After his conviction, Chapman sought post-conviction DNA testing on evidence collected during the investigation that had not been tested or could be tested with new technology. He filed a motion under 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/116-3, the Illinois statute governing post-conviction DNA testing. Although the county prosecutor’s office initially agreed to DNA testing, the state court rejected the agreement and dismissed Chapman’s motion, finding the evidence at trial was overwhelming and that further testing would not have altered the verdict. Chapman appealed, but the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied his request for review.Following the denial in state court, Chapman filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the Cook County State’s Attorney, Eileen O’Neill Burke. He challenged the constitutionality of the Illinois post-conviction DNA testing statute on its face under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars lower federal courts from reviewing state court judgments.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that Chapman had standing to sue, as his injury was fairly traceable to Burke’s refusal to allow DNA testing. The court also held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar Chapman’s federal claim because he was challenging the constitutionality of the statute itself, not seeking to overturn the state court judgment. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Chapman v Burke" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted of felony murder, first-degree robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery following an incident in Hartford where the victim was robbed of jewelry and fatally shot. The State’s case included testimony from two eyewitnesses and a police sergeant who presented cell site location information (CSLI) derived from the petitioner’s cell phone records. This data was used to create a time-lapse video that depicted a human silhouette purportedly tracing the movements of the petitioner’s phone between the crime scene, a pawn shop, and other relevant locations. The video and supporting testimony were admitted without objection, and the prosecution relied heavily on them during closing arguments.On direct appeal, the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that trial counsel’s failure to object to the CSLI evidence or request a Porter hearing was a strategic decision, and the petitioner’s unpreserved evidentiary claims were unreviewable. The Connecticut Supreme Court later affirmed that decision. While the appeal was pending, the petitioner filed for habeas relief in the Superior Court, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically that his trial attorney failed to challenge the admissibility or accuracy of the CSLI evidence and the time-lapse video.The Connecticut Supreme Court, reviewing the habeas court’s judgment, held that trial counsel performed deficiently by not challenging the misleading GeoTime video, which misrepresented the capabilities of CSLI technology by depicting precise movements unsupported by the underlying data. The Court found that this failure prejudiced the petitioner, as the State’s case was not strong absent the contested evidence, and the misleading video was the prosecution’s most persuasive link to the crime. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the habeas court’s decision vacating the conviction and ordering a new trial. View "Turner v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

The petitioner challenged the renewal of an annual permit granted to a hotel operator for the use of state-owned, ceded lands fronting the Kahala Hotel. The permit, which allowed the hotel to use the land for recreational and maintenance purposes, was extended several times by the Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR). The petitioner requested a contested case hearing (CCH) during a public meeting about the most recent renewal, arguing that the practice of pre-setting lounge chairs on the land discouraged public use. The BLNR denied the request for a hearing and approved the permit renewal. The petitioner appealed this denial.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit affirmed the BLNR’s actions, rejecting the petitioner’s arguments. The petitioner then appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), which found that the petitioner had a constitutionally protected property interest in a clean and healthful environment under the Hawai‘i Constitution. The ICA concluded that the petitioner was entitled to a CCH and that the denial of such a hearing violated procedural due process. However, since the permit had expired, the ICA remanded the case to the circuit court to determine what relief could be granted, and denied the petitioner’s request for attorney fees under the private attorney general (PAG) doctrine, finding that the requirements for the doctrine had not yet been satisfied.Upon certiorari, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the PAG doctrine does not require a party to obtain further relief before recovering attorney fees, and that all requirements for the doctrine were met. The court ruled that the hotel operator is liable for all reasonable attorney fees incurred by the petitioner during the certiorari proceedings, including fees for seeking fees, and remanded to the ICA to determine the amount of reasonable fees for the appellate stage. View "Ralston v. Board of Land and Natural Resources." on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was found asleep with a firearm in his possession at a restaurant in Indiana. He was charged with and pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the calculation of his advisory sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines turned on whether his prior Indiana conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery qualified as a “crime of violence.” The parties agreed that Indiana law allows for conviction of conspiracy even if the only other participant is an undercover officer, a so-called “unilateral” conspiracy.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana determined that the relevant definition of “conspiracy” under the Guidelines, as amended in 2023, included both bilateral (where more than one genuine participant agrees to commit a crime) and unilateral conspiracies. As a result, it found that the Indiana conviction was a “crime of violence,” applied a higher offense level, and sentenced the defendant to 96 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It applied the categorical approach, which looks to the elements of the generic offense as understood when the relevant Guideline provision was enacted. The court held that in 1989, when the Guideline first included conspiracies as “crimes of violence,” the prevailing view required bilateral conspiracies; most states and federal law at that time defined conspiracy as requiring two or more genuine participants. Because Indiana’s statute is broader, the prior conviction could not categorically qualify as a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "USA v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

Frank William Bonan II served as chairman of the board and loan committee member at Grand Rivers Community Bank in Illinois while simultaneously holding positions at another local bank. In 2015, Bonan orchestrated a complex loan transaction involving the purchase and leaseback of a warehouse by 618 Holdings, LLC, whose principals were financially unstable and closely connected to Bonan. The transaction was structured so that Grand Rivers’s loan funded both the purchase of the warehouse and initial lease payments, with the bank ultimately suffering significant losses when the loan defaulted. Additionally, Bonan was involved in an incident where the bank mistakenly released its security interest in valuable collateral, resulting in further losses.Following these events, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) initiated an administrative enforcement action against Bonan in 2021, alleging unsafe or unsound banking practices and breaches of fiduciary duty. After a hearing before an FDIC administrative law judge, the judge found misconduct and recommended sanctions. The FDIC Board of Directors subsequently issued an order barring Bonan from working at any FDIC-insured institution under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e) and imposed a $105,000 civil money penalty under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(B).Bonan petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for review, presenting constitutional and evidentiary challenges, including an argument that the FDIC’s administrative adjudication deprived him of his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The Seventh Circuit found that, under current Supreme Court precedent, the FDIC’s enforcement action implicated “public rights” and was not subject to the jury trial requirement. The court rejected Bonan’s additional constitutional and evidentiary arguments, found substantial evidence supporting the FDIC’s findings, and denied the petition for review, thereby upholding the FDIC’s orders. View "Bonan v. FDIC" on Justia Law

Law enforcement began investigating after a mother reported that an adult man had offered her sixteen-year-old daughter vape pens in exchange for sex. Officers identified the man as the appellant and corroborated the report through interviews, social media messages, and vehicle information. During an interview at the appellant’s home, officers observed behavior indicating he was deleting information from his phone when asked about his contact with the minor. Concluding that evidence was at risk of imminent destruction, officers seized his phone without a warrant. The appellant subsequently signed a consent form for the search but only after officers inaccurately stated they already had a warrant. Later, a warrant was obtained based on an affidavit summarizing the investigation. The search revealed child sexual abuse material involving a different minor.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota reviewed the appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from his phone, arguing the seizure was unconstitutional and the search warrant was invalid due to factual omissions and misrepresentations in the supporting affidavit. The magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, and the district court adopted that recommendation. The appellant then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the warrantless seizure of the phone was justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances because officers reasonably believed evidence was about to be destroyed. The court also found that, even after correcting for alleged errors and omissions in the warrant affidavit, there remained probable cause to support the warrant. The court rejected the appellant’s arguments for suppression and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. View "United States v. Mulamba" on Justia Law

A residential contractor in Iowa received warning notices from the Iowa Insurance Division, alleging that its business activities and advertising involved unlicensed public adjusting, which is regulated by two Iowa statutes. These statutes require public adjusters to be licensed and prohibit residential contractors from representing or negotiating insurance claims on behalf of property owners for the same project on which they perform work. Violations can lead to significant penalties. After the contractor was notified of alleged violations related to its advertising and communications with consumers, it challenged the constitutionality of the statutes, claiming they are void for vagueness and infringe upon First Amendment rights, both facially and as applied.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa dismissed the contractor’s suit. The court found that the State of Iowa and its Insurance Division were immune under the Eleventh Amendment. It further held that the contractor failed to state a cognizable claim under the First or Fourteenth Amendments, concluding the statutes regulated conduct, not speech, and were not unconstitutionally vague.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appellate court held that the statutes are not facially unconstitutional and are not void for vagueness. However, the court found that the district court erred by not adequately analyzing the contractor’s as-applied First Amendment challenge. Specifically, when the statutes were applied to restrict the contractor from telling insureds that it would assist or advise them in navigating the insurance claims process, the law regulated speech. The court reversed the dismissal of the as-applied First Amendment claim and remanded for further proceedings, while affirming the rejection of the facial and vagueness challenges. View "Shamrock Hills, LLC v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law