Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A group of individuals, businesses, and an advocacy organization challenged the constitutionality of two provisions of the Federal Switchblade Act (FSA), which restricts the introduction, manufacture, transportation, distribution, sale, and possession of switchblade knives. The plaintiffs argued that these restrictions violate their rights under the Second Amendment. Some plaintiffs are individuals who wish to purchase, carry, or sell switchblade knives, while others are businesses that would sell such knives but refrain from doing so due to the FSA’s provisions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the plaintiffs’ challenge to the provision regulating possession, sale, and manufacture of switchblades in certain federal jurisdictions (15 U.S.C. § 1243) for lack of standing, finding no substantial threat of enforcement. It allowed standing for the challenge to the provision targeting interstate commerce in switchblades (15 U.S.C. § 1242) but ruled that this section did not violate the Second Amendment, reasoning that it was not a de facto ban on possession since switchblades remained available through intrastate commerce. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that plaintiffs had standing to challenge both provisions. Applying the framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, the Fifth Circuit determined that switchblades are “arms” under the Second Amendment and that § 1242 burdens constitutionally protected conduct. The court found the government failed to show that the regulation was consistent with the historical tradition of arms regulation, particularly regarding the manner in which it restricted switchblade knives. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the § 1242 claim. However, it affirmed dismissal of the § 1243 claim, concluding that the plaintiffs had not met the demanding standard required for a facial challenge to that provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Knife Rights v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A noncitizen from Iran, who was granted asylum in the United States as a child, faced removal proceedings after a drug conviction. In 2002, an immigration judge deferred his removal under the Convention Against Torture, and he was released on supervision, consistently complying with all terms for over 20 years. After relocating from California to Kansas with approval from immigration authorities, he was unexpectedly detained by ICE officers in June 2025, despite no alleged violations of his release terms. He was subsequently notified that his release was revoked due to a supposed new possibility of removal to a third country, yet was not given the required informal interview to contest this revocation.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied his initial habeas petition challenging the legality of his detention, as well as his request for a preliminary injunction to stop his transfer out of Kansas. The court suggested he could file a new habeas petition if detained for more than six months. After over eight months in detention, the petitioner filed a second habeas petition, which the district court granted, leading to his release. The government then moved to dismiss his appeal as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined the appeal was not moot, applying the exception for wrongs capable of repetition yet evading review. On the merits, the court held that the district court misapplied the applicable legal standards. It concluded that the government violated its own regulations by failing to promptly provide the petitioner with an informal interview upon revocation of his release, a due process violation that was per se prejudicial. The court also found error in the district court's application of the six-month presumptive reasonableness standard for detention under Zadvydas v. Davis, ruling it did not reset with each re-detention. The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Abedi v. Carter" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped a car after it ran a red light and found three occupants, all under the age of twenty-one. There was marijuana in the car, and none of the occupants was wearing a seat belt. When asked if anyone had a weapon, the defendant, seated in the front passenger seat, did not respond. The officer asked him to exit the car, at which point the defendant pushed the officer and fled, discarding a loaded handgun during the pursuit. The defendant was charged with assault and battery on a police officer and unlawful possession of a firearm without a license.The charges were brought in the Dorchester Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department. A jury found the defendant guilty on both counts. The defendant appealed his convictions, raising no challenge to the assault and battery conviction. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred the appeal from the Appeals Court on its own initiative to address the defendant's challenge to his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm without a license. Specifically, the defendant argued that the statutory minimum age requirement of twenty-one for obtaining a license to carry a firearm violated his Second Amendment rights, both facially and as applied to him, even though he had never applied for a license and was only twenty years old at the time of the offense.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that while the defendant lacked standing to bring an as-applied challenge because he had not applied for a license, he did have standing to bring a facial challenge. The court found that the Commonwealth’s licensing age restriction—requiring individuals to be at least twenty-one years old to obtain a license to carry a firearm—was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation and did not violate the Second Amendment. The court affirmed the defendant’s convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Thomson" on Justia Law

Two victims were robbed at gunpoint and had their personal items and vehicle stolen by two suspects, one of whom drove away in the victims’ car while the other fled in a different vehicle. Police responded shortly after, locating the victim’s vehicle and monitoring the suspect’s vehicle at an address associated with one of the suspects, Marcos Andres Andrade. During the investigation, officers obtained cell site location information (CSLI) from Andrade’s phone carrier without a warrant by submitting an emergency disclosure request. This data assisted in acquiring search and arrest warrants, leading to Andrade’s arrest and recovery of some stolen items.The Santa Clara County Superior Court reviewed Andrade’s motion to suppress evidence derived from the warrantless CSLI request. The trial court denied the motion, finding exigent circumstances justified the search because the suspects were outstanding, armed, and there was potential for destruction of evidence or public danger. Andrade subsequently entered a no contest plea to second degree robbery and admitted a prior strike, receiving a four-year sentence. He appealed, arguing the exigent circumstances exception did not apply.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, considered whether the warrantless acquisition of both historical and real-time CSLI was a Fourth Amendment search, and if exigent circumstances justified the search. The court held that law enforcement’s request for historical and real-time CSLI constituted a Fourth Amendment search, requiring a warrant unless a valid exception applied. The court found that no exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search in this case and directed suppression of the CSLI data. The judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings, with instructions for the trial court to permit Andrade to withdraw his plea and to determine whether other evidence should be suppressed as fruits of the illegally obtained CSLI. View "People v. Andrade" on Justia Law

A man was killed in a motor vehicle accident while working for Rent-A-Center. His widow and the mother of his minor child sued the driver responsible for the accident and other related parties in the District Court of Bryan County, Oklahoma. The employer and its insurance carrier, having paid statutory workers' compensation death benefits to the widow and child, were allowed to intervene, seeking reimbursement for the death benefits from any recovery against the tortfeasor, as authorized by 85A O.S.2014, § 43.Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, arguing that Section 43 was unconstitutional under Article 23, section 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, finding the statute unconstitutional as applied to death benefits. The employer and insurer appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals, Division I, reversed the trial court’s order, holding Section 43 constitutional based on precedent and persuasive authority from other jurisdictions. Plaintiffs then petitioned for certiorari review by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which was granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma conducted a de novo review and held that 85A O.S.2014, § 43 is constitutional and does not violate Article 23, section 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution. The court clarified that Section 43 does not abrogate the right of action for wrongful death but rather apportions recovery between dependents and the employer or insurer who paid benefits. The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and the trial court’s order were both vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision. View "ALEXANDER v. DUONG" on Justia Law

James Seabrook was arrested in May 2016 and spent more than seven and a half years in pre-trial detention. In April 2019, he was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon, but juries hung on more serious charges during subsequent retrials, and Seabrook was ultimately acquitted of those charges in December 2023. On January 31, 2024, Seabrook was sentenced to an indeterminate term of three and a half to seven years for the 2019 conviction. All parties recognized at sentencing that he had already served more time than the maximum sentence, yet he was remanded to Rikers Island, where he remained for seventeen days pending transfer from the New York City Department of Correction to the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, before his release.Seabrook filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming the City of New York and various DOC officials. The district court dismissed his claims, holding that the complaint did not adequately allege deliberate indifference by any individual defendant, nor the existence of a City policy or practice causing his over-detention. The court also found no deprivation of a cognizable liberty interest or lack of procedural protections sufficient to sustain the due process claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that Seabrook had plausibly alleged both an unconstitutional City policy or practice causing his excessive detention and deliberate indifference by DOC Captain Monastero. The Court further determined that Seabrook's procedural due process claim was sufficiently pleaded, given the absence of adequate processes to prevent over-detention. The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Seabrook v. City of New York" on Justia Law

A coalition of twenty-seven Judeo-Christian organizations challenged a change in federal immigration enforcement policy that removed longstanding protections for houses of worship. For over thirty years, the government had a "Sensitive Locations Policy" that limited immigration enforcement at places like churches, synagogues, and mosques, except in exigent circumstances or with high-level approval. In January 2025, the Department of Homeland Security rescinded this policy, instructing immigration officers to use their discretion when conducting enforcement at these locations. Subsequent agency memoranda implemented this change, allowing supervisory agents to approve enforcement operations at or near houses of worship on a case-by-case basis, with no bright-line rules. Plaintiffs, representing congregations that serve undocumented immigrants, alleged that the new policy created a credible threat of enforcement, causing declines in attendance, financial burdens, and moral dilemmas.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to have Article III standing, finding their asserted injuries were not sufficiently imminent, not traceable to the policy change, or not redressable by reverting to the prior policy. Specifically, the district court relied on a legal standard requiring plaintiffs to show they were uniquely targeted for enforcement, which it found was not satisfied.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs likely have associational standing based on the imminent threat of enforcement actions at houses of worship, which burdens expressive and religious rights. The court determined that the harm was imminent, traceable to the government’s policy change, and redressable by the requested relief. The main holding was that plaintiffs likely have standing, and the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mennonite Church USA v. DHS" on Justia Law

A woman was stopped by police in Idaho for driving with an expired vehicle registration. During the traffic stop, a drug detection dog named Edo was deployed to conduct a “free-air sniff” around her vehicle. While sniffing, Edo briefly touched the vehicle’s door handle with the tip of his nose and alerted to the presence of drugs. Based on this alert, officers searched the vehicle and discovered methamphetamine, marijuana, alprazolam, and drug paraphernalia, leading to her arrest and subsequent charges for possession.After an earlier appeal concerning discovery issues related to Edo’s performance records, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence from the stop, arguing that the dog’s contact with her vehicle transformed the sniff into a trespassory search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in Ada County heard testimony and reviewed video evidence, ultimately granting the motion to suppress. The court concluded that the brief nose contact constituted trespassing and an unlawful search under Idaho precedent, specifically State v. Dorff, 171 Idaho 818, 526 P.3d 988 (2023).The State appealed, and the Idaho Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s suppression order, finding that the contact was not trespassory and that Edo’s alert provided probable cause for the search. The defendant then petitioned for review, which was granted by the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho. The Supreme Court held that the drug dog’s fleeting, momentary nose contact did not amount to “intermeddling” or trespassory conduct under the property-based Fourth Amendment analysis established in Dorff. Therefore, the contact did not transform the free-air sniff into a search, and the district court erred in granting the motion to suppress. The suppression order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Pendleton " on Justia Law

A group of parents, authors, a free speech organization, and a book publisher brought a lawsuit against a county school board, challenging the removal of certain library books from public school libraries. The school board had adopted policies, as required by Florida law, mandating the removal of materials deemed pornographic or describing sexual conduct, and established procedures for reviewing objections to specific books. After objections were raised to various titles, review committees and the superintendent made recommendations, and the school board ultimately voted to remove several groups of books based on its existing policies and a directive aligned with state guidelines.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida considered whether members of the school board could claim legislative privilege to avoid being deposed about their reasons for voting to remove the books. The district court ruled that legislative privilege did not apply in this context, finding that the board members’ votes to remove specific books constituted administrative acts—applying established policy to particular facts—rather than legislative acts involving the creation or amendment of policy. The district court denied the board members’ motion for a protective order and subsequent motions to quash deposition subpoenas.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether legislative privilege shielded the school board members from testifying about their decisions to remove the books. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that the board members’ votes to remove specific books, as applications of existing policy to individual cases, were administrative rather than legislative acts. Therefore, legislative privilege did not bar their depositions regarding those specific removal decisions. The court emphasized its holding was limited to the particular facts of this case and did not address whether other privileges or rules might limit such discovery. View "Pen American Center, Inc. v. Adams" on Justia Law

A Ukrainian Catholic parish near Pittsburgh owns two plots of land, one containing its church and the other, a cemetery and mausoleum. The parish sought to build a large shrine dedicated to Mary and the sanctity of life on its second plot in Collier Township, but the township’s zoning code did not allow such a use. The parish applied to amend the code and rezone its land to facilitate the project, submitting plans and a traffic study. After a public hearing, the township’s Board of Commissioners denied the application, citing traffic concerns, fundraising issues, and objections to the shrine’s pro-life message. The parish then proposed a smaller chapel, which was approved but with restrictive conditions. Initially, the parish appealed in state court, but it abandoned that appeal to file a federal lawsuit, alleging violations of the First Amendment and RLUIPA.The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania reviewed the parish’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the parish was not substantially likely to succeed on the merits, the requested relief was unclear, and granting an injunction would disrupt the status quo rather than preserve it. The court also found that no injunction was necessary to keep the case viable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. Applying a deferential standard, the Third Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that although the parish had a strong likelihood of success on its RLUIPA substantial-burden claim, it failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or the necessity of preliminary relief. The court emphasized that preliminary injunctions are meant to preserve the status quo pending trial, not to grant final relief. The denial was affirmed. View "Holy Trinity Ukrainian Catholic Church v. Township of Collier" on Justia Law