Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a defendant who was convicted of first degree murder and other crimes in 1996, with the jury finding special circumstances and imposing a death sentence. During jury selection at trial, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike several Black and Latino jurors. The defendant’s counsel objected to these strikes, raising claims of racial discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky and People v. Wheeler. The trial court found a prima facie case of discrimination for most challenges, required race-neutral justifications from the prosecutor, and ultimately denied the motions. On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings.Years later, the defendant sought postconviction discovery under Penal Code section 1054.9, including the prosecution’s jury selection notes. The Superior Court for the County of Riverside denied production of these notes, citing prior case law that required a prima facie showing of a Batson/Wheeler violation for postconviction access to jury selection notes. Shortly after this ruling, Assembly Bill No. 1036 was enacted, amending section 1054.9 to expressly include jury selection notes as discoverable material and shifting the burden to the prosecution to show good cause for withholding or redacting these notes.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that the recent legislative amendments eliminate the requirement for a defendant to make a prima facie case of racial bias to obtain jury selection notes postconviction. Instead, a request for these notes now shifts the burden to the prosecution to demonstrate good cause for shielding or redacting the notes. The appellate court granted the petition for writ of mandate, directing the trial court to adjudicate the defendant’s request in accordance with the current law. View "Montes v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A group of asylum seekers who entered the United States without admission or parole were apprehended, screened for expedited removal, and found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture. As a result, they were transferred from expedited to regular removal proceedings to have their asylum claims adjudicated. However, due to their initial placement in expedited removal, they were subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), which, as interpreted in Jennings v. Rodriguez, does not permit bond hearings or individualized determinations regarding detention. The plaintiffs, forming a certified class, argued that the lack of such hearings violated their rights under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.Initially, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted class certification and issued a preliminary injunction requiring bond hearings. After the Attorney General issued a decision, Matter of M-S-, which aligned with Jennings and eliminated the statutory right to bond hearings, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to challenge the constitutionality of mandatory detention. The district court again granted relief, but the government appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed, but the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam. Upon remand, the district court, after further proceedings, denied the government’s motion to dismiss, holding that it had jurisdiction and that the due process claim was not foreclosed by Thuraissigiam.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the government’s motion to dismiss. The court held that none of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A) or § 1252(e)(3) barred judicial review of the class’s due process claim. The court also held that Thuraissigiam did not eliminate the due process rights of noncitizens apprehended well within the United States, distinguishing the case from those at the “threshold of initial entry.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed that these individuals may pursue constitutional due process claims regarding their detention. View "PADILLA V. UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT" on Justia Law

A town and its select board challenged a state law enacted to address the Massachusetts housing crisis. The law requires municipalities served by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority to have at least one district where multifamily housing is permitted as of right. The town attempted to adopt compliant zoning amendments, but town meeting voters rejected these proposals. The select board subsequently decided not to pursue further compliance steps. After being notified by the state agency responsible that it was noncompliant and at risk of losing state grant funding, the town and board filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.The action was filed in the Superior Court Department. The Commonwealth and the Executive Office of Housing and Livable Communities moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Superior Court judge granted the motion, finding the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the law imposed an unfunded local mandate or unlawfully interfered with the town’s zoning authority. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts allowed direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the dismissal. It held that the complaint did not sufficiently allege that the law imposed an unfunded local mandate because the costs described were either incidental local administration expenses or voluntarily incurred. The Court also held that the town and board lacked standing to assert constitutional voting rights claims on behalf of town meeting voters. Addressing the public importance of the issue, the Court concluded that the law is a valid general law and does not violate the Home Rule Amendment or conflict with the Zoning Act. The judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed. View "Marshfield v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Several plaintiffs, including a federally licensed firearm dealer in Texas and two law-abiding residents of Arizona and New Mexico, challenged federal statutes that prohibit the direct sale and transfer of handguns across state lines. The statutes in question, collectively called the Nonresident Handgun Purchase Ban, make it unlawful for unlicensed persons to buy or sell handguns to residents of other states and restrict licensed dealers from directly selling handguns to nonresidents, subject to limited exceptions. While a workaround exists—requiring transfers through an intermediary licensed dealer in the buyer’s home state—this process is not automatic, incurs additional fees, and results in delays. The plaintiffs argued that, but for the Ban, they would engage in interstate handgun sales and purchases.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas reviewed the case. The government moved to dismiss, and the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. With no disputed facts, the court determined the issue was purely a question of law: whether the Ban violates the Second Amendment. The district court upheld the Ban, granting the government’s motion and dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. Applying the framework from N.Y. State Pistol & Rifle Ass’n v. Bruen, the court found that the Ban implicates conduct covered by the Second Amendment’s plain text and is therefore presumptively unconstitutional. The government failed to identify a sufficient historical tradition to justify the Ban. The Fifth Circuit held that the Ban is inconsistent with the nation’s tradition of firearms regulation under the Second Amendment, reversed the district court’s dismissal, and rendered judgment for the plaintiffs. View "Elite Precision v. ATF" on Justia Law

After divorcing in 2022, Eric and Tiare experienced escalating harassment and abuse beginning in late 2023. Tiare repeatedly sent manipulative and threatening messages, made suicide threats, and harassed Eric’s new girlfriend. The harassment intensified, culminating in Tiare entering Eric’s property, physically attacking him, and being arrested for battery and unauthorized entry. Various protective orders were issued, including a temporary restraining order (TRO), an emergency protective order, and a criminal protective order. Despite these, Tiare violated the orders and continued contacting Eric.The Marin County Superior Court initially granted Tiare three continuances for the hearing on Eric’s petition for a domestic violence restraining order, citing reasons such as giving Tiare time to respond, her attorney’s absence, and her participation in residential treatment. At the fourth hearing, Tiare requested another continuance, arguing her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent due to pending criminal charges. The trial court denied this request, found that Eric had proven acts of abuse, and issued a three-year restraining order protecting both Eric and his girlfriend.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the trial court’s denial of the fourth continuance. The appellate court held that respondents in Domestic Violence Prevention Act proceedings who intend to assert their Fifth Amendment right are not automatically entitled to a continuance. The trial court must balance the respondent’s Fifth Amendment interests against other interests, including those of the petitioner, judicial efficiency, nonparties, and the legislative purpose of prompt resolution. The appellate court found the trial court had properly weighed these competing interests and did not abuse its discretion in denying the request. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Irvine v. Irvine" on Justia Law

A Puerto Rico limited liability company, Berkey International, LLC, manufactures water filters known as Black Berkey Filters, which contain silver—a substance recognized as a pesticide. Berkey distributed these filters without EPA registration, claiming the silver was intended only to protect the filters themselves, not for pesticidal purposes. Inspections by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) revealed that Berkey and associated distributors made claims on product labels and websites indicating the filters could remove viruses, bacteria, and other pathogens, suggesting pesticidal intent. As a result, the EPA issued a Stop Sale, Use, or Removal Order prohibiting Berkey and other distributors from selling or distributing these filters.Reviewing the matter, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico considered Berkey’s request for a preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the EPA’s order. The district court evaluated the administrative record, held hearings, and reviewed extensive briefing. The court found that Berkey had not substantiated its claims that the silver was not intended for pesticidal use and denied Berkey’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief. Berkey’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied, prompting Berkey to file an interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief for abuse of discretion. Applying a highly deferential standard to the EPA’s technical determinations, the appellate court concluded that Berkey had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, including its assertions of arbitrary and capricious agency action and violations of notice-and-comment and due process requirements. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, holding that the EPA had reason to believe Berkey’s filters were unregistered and misbranded pesticidal products under federal law. View "Berkey International, LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Two individuals filed an initiative petition with Wilmington city officials, proposing a new ordinance to regulate data centers and their campuses. The ordinance would set standards for noise, lighting, emissions, generator-testing, water use, and heat generation, among other things. A key feature of the proposed ordinance was the creation of a “private right of action,” allowing residents within certain distances of a data center to sue its owner or operator for alleged violations of these standards, with the possibility of injunctive relief, penalties, and attorney’s fees.After the petition was filed and signatures validated, the Wilmington city auditor certified its sufficiency and validity, but did not opine on whether it was within the city’s initiative power. The Clinton County Board of Elections declined to certify the petition for the ballot, determining that the ordinance was not within the municipality’s power because it sought to create a new private cause of action. The board reaffirmed this decision after a hearing requested by one petitioner.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the mandamus action seeking to compel the board to certify the petition. The court held that the proposed ordinance was outside the municipal initiative power because it would create a new cause of action, which municipalities are not authorized to do. The court relied on its prior decisions, including State ex rel. Bolzenius v. Preisse and State ex rel. Flak v. Betras, and rejected arguments that the ordinance merely restated existing statutory remedies. The court also rejected a First Amendment challenge, finding no unconstitutional prior restraint. The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the writ of mandamus, upholding the board’s decision not to certify the initiative for the ballot. View "State ex rel. Kidd v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who entered the United States without inspection and was placed in removal proceedings after being detained by immigration authorities. While in custody, he was properly served with a Notice to Appear and provided the detention center address as his location. Shortly before his release, his relatives posted a bond and filled out a bond form with his residential address and telephone number, but not his mailing address. The relatives were unaware that the individual received mail via a P.O. Box and not at his residential address. After release, the government sent a hearing notice to the residential address listed on the bond form, but the notice was returned as undeliverable since mail could not be received at that address.An Immigration Judge ordered the individual removed in absentia after he failed to appear at the hearing, relying on the assumption that he had received written notice. The individual, who did not know about the hearing, promptly moved to reopen the proceedings, providing his correct mailing address and explaining, via sworn statements, that he had notified the court of his address for receiving notices and had lived at the same location since release. The Immigration Judge denied the motion to reopen, applying a presumption of delivery based on regular mail. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, concluding that the government had complied with statutory notice requirements by sending notice to the last known address and rejecting the argument that he was entitled to actual notice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the government violated the petitioner’s due process rights by relying solely on a residential address provided by third parties on a bond form, which was not reasonably calculated to provide notice. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the removal order, and remanded for further proceedings. The court dismissed a later petition for review as moot. View "MEDINA V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

After the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) confirmed thousands of federal stockwater rights on federal land, Idaho enacted a series of statutes known as the “stockwater amendments.” These amendments altered water rights rules, including procedures for forfeiture and appurtenance, and imposed new requirements specifically affecting federal stockwater rights. The United States challenged several provisions, arguing that they were intended to divest it of SRBA-decreed stockwater rights and unlawfully discriminated against the federal government. Two groups—the Idaho Legislature and ranching interests—intervened as defendants.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho rejected jurisdictional challenges based on Rooker-Feldman, prior exclusive jurisdiction, Burford abstention, and claim preclusion, holding it could hear the case. On the merits, the district court found Idaho Code § 42-224 constitutional as applied to the United States, but held Idaho Code §§ 42-113(2)(b), 42-502, and 42-504 were facially unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. The United States appealed the ruling on § 42-224, while the State Defendants and Ranchers cross-appealed the jurisdictional holdings and the ruling on § 42-113(2)(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s jurisdictional holdings, concluding that neither the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction nor Burford abstention applied. The panel reversed the district court’s finding that § 42-224 was constitutional as applied, holding that it is part of a statutory scheme that unlawfully discriminates against the United States and jeopardizes its SRBA-decreed rights. The panel affirmed the district court’s holding that § 42-113(2)(b) is facially unconstitutional because it singles out the United States for unfavorable treatment by changing appurtenance rules only for rights associated with federal land. Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, awarding costs to the United States. View "USA V. STATE OF IDAHO" on Justia Law

A university professor in Oxford, Mississippi sought to host a nighttime art exhibition on the grounds of the local courthouse, which is frequently used by the public for varied activities, including political protests and social gatherings. The county had implemented a Facility Use Policy requiring permits for use of courthouse grounds, including a ban on nighttime events, advance notice, security fees, insurance, and granting discretionary authority to deny permits based on the nature of the event. The professor’s permit request was denied due to the curfew provision, prompting him to file suit alleging violations of the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi held a bench trial and permanently enjoined enforcement of the curfew provision against the professor, finding it an unreasonable restriction on speech. However, the court dismissed the professor’s other claims for lack of standing, concluding he had not suffered sufficient injury to challenge the remaining policy provisions or to bring a vagueness challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the injunction against the curfew provision, holding that the ban was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and burdened more speech than necessary. The court rejected the county’s argument that subsequent policy amendments mooted the case, finding the amended curfew provision still posed the same fundamental issues. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the professor’s facial challenges to the other policy provisions, holding he had standing to challenge them under the First Amendment, though not on vagueness grounds. The case was remanded for further proceedings, requiring the professor to demonstrate that unconstitutional applications of the policy substantially outweigh constitutional ones. View "Rash v. Lafayette County" on Justia Law