Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries
McNabb v. Harrison
Robin M. McNabb, a former Municipal Court Judge for Lenoir City, filed an election contest against Gregory H. Harrison, who won the election for the same position in 2022. McNabb argued that Harrison was ineligible to serve because he had not resided within the Lenoir City corporate limits for the year preceding the election, as required by Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution.The Chancery Court for Loudon County found that the term "district" in Article VI, Section 4 referred to the modern-day judicial district. Since Harrison resided in the Ninth Judicial District, the court ruled him eligible to serve. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision but modified the judgment, stating that "district" referred to Loudon County, not the Ninth Judicial District, because the Lenoir City Municipal Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Loudon County General Sessions Court.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower courts. It held that Article VI, Section 4 requires a candidate for a municipal judgeship to be a resident of the same municipality to which they will be assigned. Therefore, Harrison needed to reside in Lenoir City for one year prior to the election. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the Chancery Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "McNabb v. Harrison" on Justia Law
P. v. Copeland
Samuel Scott Copeland was convicted by a jury of attempting to prevent or dissuade a witness from giving testimony, in violation of Penal Code section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2). The conviction was based on allegations that Copeland withheld rent to pressure his friend and landlord, Madelyn Wagner, from testifying in a civil dispute involving their mutual friend, Trina West. The trial court sentenced Copeland to two years of formal probation and imposed but stayed a sentence of 365 days in custody, pending successful completion of probation.The Superior Court of San Diego County declined to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor. Copeland appealed, arguing that substantial evidence did not support the finding that Wagner was a “witness” within the meaning of section 136, subdivision (2) at the time of the alleged intimidation, that the jury instruction improperly expanded the definition of “witness,” and that the prosecution violated his First Amendment right to free speech.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the term “witness” as defined in section 136, subdivision (2) does not include potential future witnesses to a civil dispute. Therefore, there was not substantial evidence that Wagner was a “witness” as used in the statute of conviction. Additionally, the court found that the model instruction given to the jury misstated the law in a prejudicial manner by improperly expanding the definition of “witness” to include potential future witnesses.As a result, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, holding that the conviction was not supported by substantial evidence and that the jury instruction contained a prejudicial misstatement of the law. View "P. v. Copeland" on Justia Law
United States v. Harry
Defendant-Appellant Kenston Harry was convicted of possessing controlled substances with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute the same. The case centers on the use of a stationary pole camera by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to monitor the exterior of Harry's business, Action Audio, for approximately 50 days without a warrant. The camera captured footage of the business's exterior, parking lot, and occasionally the interior when the garage door was open. Harry was arrested after investigators found narcotics and firearms at Action Audio and his residence.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut denied Harry's motion to suppress the pole-camera evidence, which was introduced at trial. The jury convicted Harry, and the district court sentenced him to ten years for the fentanyl- and cocaine-related charges, including conspiracy, and five years for the marijuana charge, to run concurrently. The court also denied Harry's request for safety-valve relief from the mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the use of the stationary pole camera did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search, as Harry did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the publicly visible areas of his business. The court also found that the district court did not err in denying Harry safety-valve relief, as he failed to prove that the firearms found were not connected to his drug-trafficking activities. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Harry" on Justia Law
Gray Television, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission
Gray Television, a broadcaster in Alaska, sought review of a final forfeiture order by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC had imposed the maximum forfeiture penalty on Gray for violating the prohibition on owning two top-four stations in a single designated market area (DMA). Gray acquired the CBS network affiliation of KTVA-TV for its own station, KYES-TV, which resulted in Gray owning two top-four stations in the Anchorage DMA. Gray did not seek a waiver from the FCC for this transaction.The FCC issued a Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture (NAL) against Gray, proposing a penalty of $518,283, the statutory maximum. Gray responded, arguing that the transaction did not violate the rule because KYES was already a top-four station according to Comscore ratings data. Gray also contended that the FCC failed to provide fair notice of its interpretation of the rule and that the enforcement action violated the First Amendment and the Communications Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the FCC's determination that Gray violated the rule, finding that the FCC reasonably relied on Nielsen ratings data, which showed that KYES was not a top-four station at the time of the transaction. The court also held that the FCC's interpretation of the rule was reasonable and that Gray had fair notice of the rule's application to its transaction.However, the court vacated the forfeiture penalty and remanded for further proceedings. The court found that the FCC failed to provide adequate notice to Gray that the proposed penalty was based on a finding of egregiousness, which violated due process. Additionally, the court held that the FCC did not adequately explain its consideration of Gray's good faith in determining the penalty amount. View "Gray Television, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law
United States v. Cisneros
In January 2023, law enforcement executed a search warrant at Juan David Cisneros's residence, resulting from a narcotics investigation. They found ammunition in his bedroom but no drugs or firearms attributable to him. Cisneros admitted to using the ammunition previously but claimed his mother-in-law purchased it. He was charged with possessing ammunition as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Cisneros's motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. Cisneros pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal on Second Amendment grounds. The court adopted the Presentence Investigation Report, which included a four-level enhancement for possessing ammunition in connection with drug trafficking, and sentenced him to ninety-six months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Cisneros's facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) was foreclosed by precedent, and his as-applied challenge failed under plain error review. The court affirmed his conviction, finding no clear or obvious error in the application of § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment.However, the court found that the district court plainly erred in applying the sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing ammunition in connection with another felony offense. The court noted that there was no evidence the ammunition facilitated drug trafficking, as required by precedent. This error affected Cisneros's substantial rights, as it likely resulted in a longer sentence. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated Cisneros's sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Cisneros" on Justia Law
Ermold v. Davis
Plaintiffs David Moore and David Ermold sued Kim Davis, the clerk of Rowan County, Kentucky, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for refusing to issue them a marriage license, claiming it violated their constitutional right to marry. This refusal occurred after the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which legalized same-sex marriage nationwide. Davis, citing her religious beliefs, stopped issuing all marriage licenses until the state provided her with an accommodation. Plaintiffs sought damages for the emotional distress caused by Davis's actions.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on liability, and a jury awarded them compensatory damages. Davis appealed, arguing she was entitled to qualified immunity, had defenses under the Free Exercise Clause and the Kentucky Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and that the evidence of emotional distress was insufficient to support the jury's award.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Davis was not entitled to qualified immunity because Obergefell clearly established the right to same-sex marriage, and Davis's actions violated that right. The court also rejected Davis's Free Exercise Clause defense, stating that the First Amendment does not protect state actions that violate constitutional rights. Additionally, the court found that Kentucky's RFRA did not apply in this case because the state was not a party to the lawsuit.The court further upheld the jury's award of damages, finding that the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence of emotional distress. The court noted that the plaintiffs' detailed testimony about their emotional harm was corroborated and not merely conclusory. Davis's request for remittitur was not considered because it was raised for the first time in her reply brief. The Sixth Circuit thus affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. View "Ermold v. Davis" on Justia Law
CEDAR PARK ASSEMBLY OF GOD OF KIRKLAND, WASHINGTON V. KREIDLER
A church in Washington, Cedar Park Assembly of God, challenged the state's Reproductive Parity Act (Parity Act), which mandates insurance carriers to cover all federally approved contraceptives and, if maternity care is included, abortions. The church argued that this law violated its First Amendment rights and religious autonomy because it could not find a comparable health plan that excluded abortion coverage after its insurer, Kaiser Permanente, stopped offering such a plan.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment in favor of the state officials, Myron Kreidler and Jay Inslee, who were sued in their official capacities. The district court found that the church did not have standing to challenge the Parity Act because it could not demonstrate that its inability to obtain a suitable health plan was directly caused by the Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and vacated the district court's summary judgment, remanding with instructions to dismiss the action for lack of standing. The Ninth Circuit held that Cedar Park Assembly of God failed to establish that its injury was traceable to the Parity Act or that invalidating the Act would redress its injury. The court noted that Washington's conscientious-objection statute allows insurers to accommodate religious objections, and nothing in the Parity Act prevents insurers from offering plans that exclude abortion coverage. The court concluded that the church's injury was due to the independent decisions of insurers, not the Parity Act, and thus, the church lacked standing to sue. View "CEDAR PARK ASSEMBLY OF GOD OF KIRKLAND, WASHINGTON V. KREIDLER" on Justia Law
Vet Voice Foundation v. Hobbs
In Washington State, most voters cast their votes by mail, and each voter must swear under oath that they are eligible to cast that ballot. Election workers must verify that the signature on the voter’s sworn ballot declaration matches the signature on file. If the signature cannot be verified, the ballot may be challenged, and if the voter does not cure their ballot in time, their vote will not be counted. The plaintiffs argue that this signature verification process results in some lawfully cast ballots not being counted, thus violating the due process, privileges and immunities, and freedom of elections clauses of the state constitution.The trial court denied all parties' summary judgment motions and adopted the Anderson-Burdick framework to determine the level of scrutiny for the case. The court concluded that additional factual development was required and reserved ruling on whether signature verification was severable from the rest of the statutory scheme. The defendants moved to certify the trial court’s order for immediate review, which the plaintiffs did not oppose. The court certified two questions for review: the appropriate standard of judicial review for the plaintiffs’ facial challenges and whether any party is entitled to summary judgment under that standard.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that signature verification, when coupled with the increasingly expansive cure system, does not facially violate the state constitution. The court held that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment, reversing in part, affirming in part, and remanding for entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court emphasized that the right to vote is fundamental and that the signature verification process, as part of a robust system of checks, provides both security and ease of voting. View "Vet Voice Foundation v. Hobbs" on Justia Law
State v. Mercedes
Mary Mercedes was accused of animal cruelty based on evidence obtained during a warrantless search of her property. Officers visited her property multiple times after receiving complaints about the condition of her animals. During these visits, Mercedes allowed the officers to view the animals, and based on their observations, a search warrant was later issued. The officers then seized the animals, and Mercedes was charged with two counts of animal cruelty.The trial court granted Mercedes's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the property visits, ruling that the officers' consent to enter was invalid without providing Ferrier warnings, which inform individuals of their right to refuse, limit, and revoke consent. The trial court dismissed the charges due to lack of probable cause. The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that Ferrier warnings were not required for the search of Mercedes's outdoor property and remanded the case to determine if her consent was voluntary.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that Ferrier warnings are required only when officers seek to enter a person's home to conduct a warrantless search for evidence of a crime. Since the officers' visits to Mercedes's property were for investigative purposes and did not involve entering her home, Ferrier warnings were not necessary. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine if Mercedes's consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. View "State v. Mercedes" on Justia Law
Gonzales v. Markland
Donika Rae Gonzales was convicted in 2014 by a jury of first-degree manslaughter and aggravated assault for beating her boyfriend’s four-year-old son to death. Gonzales filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the jury district, which included residents from both Brule and Buffalo Counties, diluted the percentage of prospective Native American jurors, violating her constitutional rights. She also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for her attorney’s failure to introduce certain evidence at trial. The habeas court found that the jury district violated both federal and state constitutions and reversed her conviction without addressing the ineffective assistance claims.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit initially sent jury questionnaires to only Buffalo County residents, but due to an inadequate number of responses, included Brule County residents as well, based on a 2011 standing order. Gonzales agreed to hold the trial in Brule County and use a combined jury pool from both counties. The jury pool consisted of 236 jurors, with 22% Native American representation, compared to 29% in the combined population of the two counties. Gonzales appealed her conviction, but it was summarily affirmed by the South Dakota Supreme Court in 2016.The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the habeas court’s decision. The court held that the use of a jury district comprising Buffalo and Brule Counties did not violate the South Dakota Constitution’s requirement for a trial by a jury of the “county or district” where the offense occurred. The court also found that Gonzales failed to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement, as the absolute disparity in Native American representation was only 7%, below the constitutional threshold. Consequently, Gonzales’ ineffective assistance claims were also deemed without merit, and the order granting habeas relief was vacated. View "Gonzales v. Markland" on Justia Law