Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Five individuals, who were either peaceful protesters or independent journalists, attended demonstrations at the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement facility in Portland, Oregon. During these events, they were exposed to tear gas and pepper balls used by federal agents to disperse crowds. The protests involved both peaceful activities and significant unrest, including vandalism, blocking entrances, and attacks on law enforcement. The plaintiffs claimed that federal agents specifically targeted them in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon against federal officials and the Department of Homeland Security. After discovery and an evidentiary hearing, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction restricting the use of non-lethal munitions to situations involving an imminent threat of physical harm, prohibiting their use on certain parts of the body, imposing limits on pepper spray, and requiring redesign of agent uniforms for better identification. Additionally, the District Court provisionally certified a class of all individuals who had protested or reported on DHS activities at the Portland ICE facility. The government’s motion to stay the injunction pending appeal was denied by the District Court but granted by the Ninth Circuit.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated both the preliminary injunction and the provisional class certification. The court held that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment retaliation claim, as law enforcement may use non-lethal force to clear crowds and restore order without facing an imminent threat of physical harm. The record did not support claims of an unwritten policy or intent to retaliate against First Amendment activity. The court also found the injunction overbroad and unworkable, and the class failed to meet Rule 23’s commonality and indivisible remedy requirements. The preliminary injunction and class certification were vacated. View "DICKINSON V. TRUMP" on Justia Law

Several tenants of an apartment complex located across the street from a federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facility in Portland, Oregon, claimed harm from exposure to tear gas used by federal law enforcement officers to disperse disruptive crowds during demonstrations. The plaintiffs, including individuals and entities associated with the apartment complex, argued that the government’s deployment of tear gas infringed their substantive-due-process rights under the Fifth Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining several federal agencies from using tear gas for crowd control outside the ICE facility. The district court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their substantive-due-process claim and determined that the government’s actions could violate a constitutional right to bodily integrity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s preliminary injunction. Applying de novo review to the underlying legal issues, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its prior stay of the injunction and concluded that the plaintiffs lacked a substantive-due-process right to be free from incidental exposure to tear gas used for non-lethal crowd control. The court held that such a right is not deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition nor implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, as required by Supreme Court precedents, including Washington v. Glucksberg and Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. The panel further clarified that a substantive-due-process challenge to executive action requires both conscience-shocking conduct and deprivation of a historically rooted right, rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that only the shocks-the-conscience standard should apply. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction. View "REACH COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY" on Justia Law

A group of Oklahoma voters challenged the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1027, which imposed new restrictions and requirements on the state’s initiative and referendum petition process. Key provisions included requiring petition circulators to be registered Oklahoma voters, placing caps on the number of petition signatures that could be collected from individual counties, banning incentive-based compensation for circulators, prohibiting out-of-state contributions for petition circulation, and imposing new disclosure requirements regarding circulator compensation and funding. The petitioners argued that these changes made the petition process prohibitively expensive and violated their fundamental rights to propose and sign petitions.The Oklahoma Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction due to the urgency and statewide importance of the issues raised, given the immediate impact of S.B. 1027 on pending and future initiative petitions. No lower courts reviewed the merits of this case before the Supreme Court’s intervention; the challenge was brought directly to this court through an application for declaratory relief and prohibition of enforcement.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that several core provisions of S.B. 1027 violated both the U.S. and Oklahoma Constitutions, specifically the First Amendment and state constitutional rights to speech, assembly, and petition. The court found that the offending provisions—including the registered voter circulator requirement, county signature caps, incentive-based compensation ban, out-of-state contribution ban, and disclosure requirements—were unconstitutional and could not be severed from the Act. As a result, the court declared S.B. 1027 void in its entirety, restoring the prior statutes governing the petition process. The court granted the petitioners’ request for declaratory relief. View "McVAY v. LEPAK" on Justia Law

Congress established the U.S. Agency for Global Media to oversee several federally funded international news broadcasters and later created the International Broadcasting Advisory Board as an independent agency with authority over hiring and firing the heads of these networks. Michael Abramowitz was appointed head of Voice of America with unanimous Board approval. After a change in presidential administration, most Board members were fired and the Agency’s Acting CEO, along with a Senior Advisor, attempted to remove Abramowitz without Board approval, placing him and other employees on indefinite administrative leave and later reassigning him. Abramowitz refused the reassignment and was subsequently notified of his removal.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted preliminary injunctions to restore Voice of America programming and, after proceedings, granted partial summary judgment and a permanent injunction barring Abramowitz’s removal without Board approval. The district court found it had federal-question jurisdiction over the claim and that the Agency’s actions violated statutory requirements, specifically 22 U.S.C. § 6205(e), which protects the independence of network heads by requiring Board approval for removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The appellate court held that the district court had jurisdiction, as Congress did not intend for claims under section 6205(e) to be channeled through the Civil Service Reform Act’s administrative framework. The court concluded that section 6205(e) is constitutionally valid under Article II, as Congress may vest removal authority in department heads, and the Broadcasting Board qualifies as such. The Agency’s unilateral removal of Abramowitz was contrary to law. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s permanent injunction, holding that injunctive relief was appropriate and necessary to protect the statutory safeguard of the broadcaster’s independence. View "Abramowitz v. Lake" on Justia Law

Three New York State residents brought a lawsuit challenging several New York City rules regulating the acquisition, sale, registration, and carry of handguns. The plaintiffs alleged that these rules violated their rights under the Second Amendment. One plaintiff claimed he could not afford the mandatory fees required to obtain a handgun license. Two other plaintiffs, who held licenses, asserted that City rules prevented them from registering more than two handguns to their carry licenses and from carrying more than one handgun at a time. They also challenged a rule imposing a 90-day waiting period between handgun purchases, and the prior-authorization process for acquiring handguns.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the City’s motion to dismiss the complaint. That court dismissed some claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiffs failed to show injury-in-fact necessary for standing regarding certain acquisition and registration requirements. It found standing for other claims, such as the one-gun-carry rule, the two-gun-registration rule, the 90-day purchase rule, and the licensing fees. However, the court dismissed these claims for failure to state a claim, concluding at the first step of the Bruen analysis that the challenged rules did not regulate activity covered by the Second Amendment’s plain text.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of claims for lack of jurisdiction and the dismissal of the fees challenge, relying on Kwong v. Bloomberg. However, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of challenges to the one-gun-carry rule, the 90-day purchase limitation, and the two-gun-carry-license registration rule. The court held that these rules regulate conduct covered by the Second Amendment, requiring further analysis at the second step under Bruen. The case was remanded for further proceedings regarding those claims. View "Mills v. New York City" on Justia Law

Five individuals who participated as peaceful protesters and independent journalists at demonstrations outside the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facility in Portland, Oregon, alleged that federal law enforcement officers targeted them with non-lethal crowd-control munitions such as tear gas and pepper balls. The plaintiffs claimed this was retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights. The protests, which occurred between June 2025 and February 2026, often involved both peaceful dissent and significant unrest, including vandalism, trespassing, and obstruction of law enforcement. The plaintiffs were exposed to crowd-control devices during these protests, frequently while in proximity to unlawful activity.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting federal officers from using non-lethal munitions except against individuals posing an imminent threat of physical harm, and ordered that agents’ uniforms be redesigned with conspicuous identifying markings. The district court also certified a provisional class encompassing all individuals who had protested or reported on DHS activities at the Portland ICE facility since June 2025, and denied the government’s motion to stay the injunction pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s orders. The Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and provisional class certification, holding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on their First Amendment claim. The court found no evidence of an unwritten policy or pattern of retaliation by DHS and held that law enforcement may use non-lethal force to clear crowds and restore order without waiting for an imminent threat of physical harm. The injunction was found to be overbroad, improperly granting relief to non-parties, and unworkable. The class certification was vacated for lack of commonality and failure to satisfy Rule 23(b)(2)’s indivisible-remedy requirement. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

J.O. has been under a conservatorship since 2016, with the San Joaquin County Public Conservator serving as his conservator and represented by County Counsel. In December 2023, Judge Guy Castillo began presiding over most mental health cases in the San Joaquin County Superior Court. Starting in May 2024, County Counsel adopted a practice of filing “blanket” motions under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 to disqualify Judge Guy Castillo from all cases involving the Public Conservator. On July 10, 2024, County Counsel filed both a petition to extend J.O.’s conservatorship and a section 170.6 motion; the motion was initially denied as premature. J.O. subsequently sought to have the Public Conservator removed and his sister appointed. County Counsel filed another section 170.6 motion, which was granted, removing Judge Guy Castillo from J.O.’s case. J.O. objected, arguing the blanket challenges were improper and aimed at forcing Judge Guy Castillo’s reassignment following her admonishment of County Counsel’s attorney; Judge Guy Castillo was later reassigned.The San Joaquin County Superior Court overruled J.O.’s objection, relying on Solberg v. Superior Court, which permitted blanket section 170.6 challenges. The California Court of Appeal denied writ relief. The Supreme Court of California granted review, overruling Solberg in part, and held that blanket abuses of section 170.6 could unconstitutionally interfere with core judicial functions and are subject to as-applied separation-of-powers challenges. The Supreme Court established a burden-shifting procedure to evaluate whether such challenges are made in bad faith and remanded the matter to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, determined the case was not moot and issued a writ directing the Superior Court to vacate its order granting County Counsel’s section 170.6 motion. The court ordered a hearing consistent with the Supreme Court’s procedure to determine whether County Counsel’s motion was made in bad faith. View "J.O. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Secretary of Homeland Security invoked Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 to initiate a border construction project in the Big Bend Sector along the U.S.–Mexico border. Determining this area to be one of high illegal entry, the Secretary exercised statutory authority to waive several environmental and conservation laws to expedite construction. Subsequently, an individual river guide, an environmental nonprofit, and a historic church preservation organization filed suit, challenging the Secretary’s waiver determinations. Their claim focused on the argument that the Secretary violated the major questions doctrine under Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution, contending that the waivers exceeded statutory authority.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction, halting the Secretary’s waivers and associated border construction. The court acknowledged its jurisdiction was limited to constitutional claims but concluded that the major questions doctrine constituted a constitutional clear statement rule, grounded in separation of powers, thus qualifying as a constitutional claim. The court additionally found that the respondents’ major questions doctrine claim was likely to succeed, reasoning that the Secretary lacked clear congressional authorization to issue the waivers.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed an application for stay of the District Court’s injunction. The Court granted the stay, holding that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondents’ major questions doctrine claim, as the claim did not allege a violation of the Constitution but instead challenged the Secretary’s statutory authority. The Court emphasized that claims asserting the Executive exceeded statutory authority are not constitutional claims, and that the major questions doctrine is a canon of statutory interpretation, not a constitutional cause of action. The Supreme Court also found that the balance of equities favored the Government, given Congress’s clear preference for expeditious border construction. The injunction was stayed pending further proceedings. View "Mullin v. Friends of the Ruidosa Church" on Justia Law

A real estate developer in Michigan entered into a lease agreement with a machinery manufacturer, promising to construct a facility on its property within a tight ten-month timeline. The property lacked access to a public sewer, requiring the developer to obtain a septic permit from the county health division before construction could begin. The developer and the township attempted to negotiate an arrangement to allow construction to proceed without the permit, but negotiations failed. The developer applied for necessary site plan approvals and began the permitting process, but did not combine lots as required by the health division, resulting in delays. Eventually, the lease was terminated after construction could not proceed on schedule.The developer filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the township and its supervisor, alleging violations of equal protection, due process, and First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a state-law claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all federal claims except for one First Amendment retaliation claim and the state-law claim, which settled before trial. The developer appealed the district court’s summary judgment rulings on its equal protection, due process, and First Amendment retaliation claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the township had a rational basis for its permitting decisions, did not deprive the developer of a protected property interest without due process under Michigan law, and imposed constitutionally permissible, content-neutral restrictions on communications to comply with Michigan’s Open Meetings Act. The court concluded that no constitutional violations occurred and affirmed summary judgment for the township and its supervisor. View "GSL Holdings, LLC v. Charter Township of Lyon Township" on Justia Law

A group of nine tenured professors at a public Kansas university were terminated after the Kansas Board of Regents (KBOR) temporarily amended its policy, citing COVID-19-related financial pressures. The amendment permitted universities to suspend or terminate tenured faculty without the usual protections, including hearings or proof of financial exigency. ESU administrators drafted a framework for implementing these terminations, which KBOR approved. The professors received termination letters referencing general financial concerns, but allegedly lacking specific reasons. The professors claimed ESU was not facing financial exigency, and that their terminations were motivated by their political activities and beliefs. All nine appealed through the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH); six had their terminations reversed and three had them affirmed. Litigation ensued, with the professors asserting constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including due process, liberty, association, and equal protection claims.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss most claims, finding that qualified immunity did not bar them. It ruled the professors had adequately alleged deprivation of a property interest in continued employment without due process and allowed other constitutional claims to proceed. The court dismissed liberty interest claims against KBOR and some administrators where no statements were attributed to them, but denied dismissal for others allegedly involved in drafting termination letters.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the appeal at the motion-to-dismiss stage, adopting facts as alleged. It held that the professors had a state-created property interest in tenure and that the process used to terminate their employment plausibly violated clearly established procedural due process rights. The court affirmed denial of dismissal for procedural due process and related conspiracy claims, but reversed as to substantive due process claims, finding no clearly established violation. It also reversed denial of dismissal for liberty, association, equal protection, and conspiracy claims against KBOR and certain administrators, instructing the district court to dismiss those claims, while leaving claims against the university president intact. View "Miracle v. Hush" on Justia Law