Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, Appalachian Power Company and Wheeling Power Company sought to recover approximately $552.9 million in under-recovered costs for the period from March 1, 2021, through February 28, 2023. The Public Service Commission of West Virginia disallowed $231.8 million of the requested amount, concluding that the companies had made imprudent and unreasonable decisions regarding their coal stockpiling, which led to higher costs from purchasing energy rather than generating it themselves. The Commission allowed the recovery of the remaining $321.1 million over a ten-year period with a 4% carrying charge.The Commission's decision followed a series of proceedings, including the 2021 and 2022 ENEC cases, where it had expressed concerns about the companies' reliance on purchased power and their failure to maintain adequate coal supplies. The Commission had previously ordered the companies to increase self-generation and maintain a minimum 69% capacity factor for their coal-fired plants. Despite these directives, the companies continued to rely heavily on purchased power, leading to significant under-recoveries.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission's finding that the companies acted imprudently and unreasonably. However, the Court reversed the Commission's disallowance of $231.8 million, finding that the Commission had relied on extra-record evidence (coal reports) without giving the companies notice or an opportunity to address this evidence, thus violating their due process rights. The Court remanded the case to the Commission to allow the companies to address the coal reports and the calculation of the disallowance. View "Appalachian Power Company and Wheeling Power Company v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, a group of American service members and their families affected by the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, sought to enforce multi-billion-dollar judgments against Iran. They aimed to obtain $1.68 billion held in an account with Clearstream Banking, a Luxembourg-based financial institution, representing bond investments made in New York on behalf of Bank Markazi, Iran’s central bank. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Clearstream and Bank Markazi to turn over the account contents. Clearstream and Bank Markazi appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ turnover claim against Bank Markazi. However, it determined that the district court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Clearstream. The court also found that Clearstream’s challenge to the constitutionality of 22 U.S.C. § 8772, which makes certain assets available to satisfy judgments against Iran, failed. Despite this, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs without applying state law to determine the ownership of the assets.The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's order and judgment. It remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to determine whether Bank Markazi is an indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and to apply state law to ascertain the parties' interests in the assets before applying 22 U.S.C. § 8772. View "Peterson v. Bank Markazi" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to New York State Environmental Conservation Law § 11-0535-a, known as the State Ivory Law, by The Art and Antique Dealers League of America, Inc. and The National Antique and Art Dealers Association of America, Inc. The plaintiffs argued that the State Ivory Law, which restricts the sale and display of ivory, is preempted by the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) and violates their First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs' preemption claim, ruling that the State Ivory Law was not preempted by the ESA. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Basil Seggos, on the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim, while denying the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the same claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the preemption claim, holding that the State Ivory Law is not preempted by the ESA. The court found that the ESA's preemption clause does not void state laws that are more restrictive than federal law unless they prohibit conduct authorized by a federal exemption or permit, which was not the case here.However, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the First Amendment claim. The court held that the Display Restriction, which prohibits the physical display of ivory items not authorized for intrastate sale, violates the First Amendment. The court found that the restriction was more extensive than necessary to serve the state's interest in preventing illegal ivory sales and that less restrictive alternatives could achieve the same goal. The court directed the district court to grant summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the First Amendment claim and to issue an injunction barring enforcement of the Display Restriction against the plaintiffs and their members. View "The Art & Antique Dealers League of Am., Inc. v. Seggos" on Justia Law

In August 2021, New York City’s Department of Education mandated COVID-19 vaccinations for all staff and contractors working in school settings. This mandate was updated over time, including a religious exemption process. The plaintiffs, New York City public sector employees, challenged the constitutionality of the mandate and the exemption process, both facially and as applied.The Southern District of New York denied a preliminary injunction and dismissed the consolidated amended complaint on the merits. The Eastern District of New York also denied a similar preliminary injunction motion. The plaintiffs appealed these decisions, leading to a consolidated review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.The Second Circuit affirmed in part and dismissed in part the denials of preliminary injunctions, affirmed the dismissal of the facial challenges, and affirmed in part while vacating and remanding in part the dismissal of the as-applied challenges. The court found that the request to rescind the vaccine mandate was moot due to its official rescission and denied the request for reinstatement and backpay, as the plaintiffs could not show irreparable harm post-termination. The court upheld the dismissal of the facial challenges, finding no evidence that the Citywide Panel process preferred certain religions or was infected with religious animus. However, the court vacated and remanded the as-applied challenges for plaintiffs Natasha Solon and Heather Clark, who plausibly alleged that their religious accommodation requests were improperly denied. View "New Yorkers for Religious Liberty v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The defendant, Matthew Clark, is charged with a felony count of criminal threatening with a deadly weapon. The complainant recorded a conversation with the defendant without his consent, in which he made potentially incriminating statements. The complainant later reported the incident to law enforcement and provided them with the recording.The defendant moved to suppress the recording, arguing it was made without his consent in violation of RSA chapter 570-A, which he claimed required suppression of any such recording. The State objected. The Superior Court denied the motion, concluding that suppression under RSA 570-A:6 is required only for felony violations of the Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Law. The court determined that the complainant's recording constituted a misdemeanor violation since she was a party to the communication, and thus, suppression was not warranted.The defendant moved for reconsideration, reasserting his argument that any violation of RSA chapter 570-A requires suppression. The trial court denied the motion and certified three interlocutory questions to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. The Supreme Court held that suppression under RSA 570-A:6 is required only when the information is part of or derived from a communication intercepted in violation of the felony provision of the Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Law. The court clarified that a one-party recording can be either a misdemeanor or a felony depending on the mental state of the person making the recording. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine whether the complainant's recording constituted a felony violation due to her subsequent disclosure to law enforcement. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

Laura Marie Obert, a former Broadwater County Commissioner, was investigated by the Montana Department of Justice Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) in 2015 for allegedly receiving unlawful overtime pay and potential ethics violations. In 2016, Obert entered a deferred prosecution agreement with the Assistant Attorney General, agreeing to repay the excess wages and abstain from voting on matters where she had a conflict of interest. In 2019, based on new allegations of violating the agreement, Obert was charged with felony theft and misdemeanor official misconduct. The district court dismissed these charges in 2021, finding Obert had complied with the agreement and there was insufficient evidence for the misconduct charge.Obert then sued the State of Montana and Broadwater County Attorney Cory Swanson, alleging breach of contract, bad faith, due process violations, and malicious prosecution. The First Judicial District Court dismissed her claims, leading to this appeal.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and made several determinations. It reversed the lower court's dismissal of Obert's breach of contract and good faith and fair dealing claims, holding that these claims were not time-barred and did not accrue until the criminal charges were dismissed. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Obert's bad faith claim, finding no special relationship existed between Obert and the State that would support such a claim. The court also upheld the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim, ruling that Swanson was protected by prosecutorial immunity as he acted within his statutory duties. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the due process claim, concluding that Obert's procedural due process rights were not violated as the State followed proper procedures in charging her and the district court provided an appropriate forum to address the alleged breach of the agreement. View "Obert v State" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Kansas's restrictions on private parties partially filling out mail-ballot applications before sending them to registered voters. Plaintiffs, VoteAmerica and Voter Participation Center (VPC), argue that these restrictions violate their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. They seek an injunction to prevent Kansas officials from enforcing the law.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas ruled in favor of the plaintiffs after a bench trial based on stipulated facts. The court applied strict scrutiny to the law, finding that it violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The court held that the mailing of prefilled applications was protected speech and that the law was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The court also found that the law infringed on the plaintiffs' associational rights and declared the law unconstitutionally overbroad.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court first determined that the prefilled applications should be considered separately from the cover letter included in the mailings. It then concluded that mailing the prefilled applications constitutes speech protected by the First Amendment. However, the court rejected the application of strict scrutiny under the Meyer-Buckley framework, finding that the law did not restrict access to a fundamental avenue of political discourse. The court also rejected the argument that the law was subject to strict scrutiny due to speaker discrimination, as the law's speaker-based exception did not reflect a content preference.The Tenth Circuit held that the proper level of scrutiny for the law is intermediate scrutiny, as the law is a content-based but viewpoint-neutral regulation. The court reversed the district court's rulings on the overbreadth and freedom-of-association claims, remanding for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants on these claims. The court also remanded the free-speech claim for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, applying intermediate scrutiny. View "VoteAmerica v. Schwab" on Justia Law

the State of Missouri bears no legal liability for any judgment against MOHELA. The Act makes clear that MOHELA’s debts and obligations are not debts or obligations of the State. See MO. REV. STAT. § 173.410. This includes any judgments against MOHELA. The State’s lack of legal liability for MOHELA’s debts and judgments is a strong indicator that MOHELA’s finances are independent from the State’s. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 51; Duke, 127 F.3d at 978.In sum, the third Steadfast factor weighs against arm-of-the-state status. MOHELA receives no direct financial assistance from the State, has the ability to generate its own revenue, retains control over its own funds, and the State bears no legal liability for MOHELA’s debts or judgments.d. Factor Four: State or Local AffairsThe fourth Steadfast factor considers whether the entity is concerned primarily with state or local affairs. This factor examines the entity’s function, composition, and purpose. See Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 528; Steadfast, 507 F.3d at 1253. Here, the district court concluded that this factor weighed in favor of arm-of-the-state status, and we agree.MOHELA’s primary function is to help Missourians access student loans needed to pay for college. See MO. REV. STAT. § 173.360. This is a statewide concern, not a local one. MOHELA’s activities are not confined to any particular locality within Missouri; rather, they are intended to benefit residents across the entire state. See Biden, 143 S. Ct. at 2366 (noting that MOHELA was established to perform the “essential public function” of helping Missourians access student loans).Moreover, MOHELA’s board is composed of members appointed by the Governor and representatives from state agencies, further indicating that its focus is on statewide, rather than local, affairs. See MO. REV. STAT. § 173.360. The fact that MOHELA’s profits are used to fund education in Missouri, including providing grants and scholarships for Missouri students, also supports the conclusion that MOHELA is concerned with state affairs. See Biden, 143 S. Ct. at 2366.In conclusion, the fourth Steadfast factor weighs in favor of arm-of-the-state status.3. The Second Step of the Arm-of-the-State Test: The Twin Goals of the Eleventh AmendmentBecause the Steadfast factors point in different directions, we proceed to the second step of the Hennessey test and consider the twin goals underlying the Eleventh Amendment: avoiding an affront to the dignity of the state and the impact of a judgment on the state treasury. See Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 528.As discussed above, the State of Missouri bears no legal liability for any judgment against MOHELA. This means that a judgment against MOHELA would not impact the state treasury. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 51; Duke, 127 F.3d at 978. The lack of impact on the state treasury is a strong indicator that MOHELA is not an arm of the state. See Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 528.Regarding the dignity of the state, MOHELA operates with substantial autonomy and is financially independent from the State. The State has not clearly demarcated MOHELA as sharing its sovereignty. See Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 529. Therefore, treating MOHELA as an arm of the state would not accord with the dignity interests protected by the Eleventh Amendment.In conclusion, considering the twin goals of the Eleventh Amendment, we determine that MOHELA is not an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Good v. United States Department of Education" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Glenn Bowles, Kenneth Franks, and Robert Gardner, challenged the constitutionality of Michigan's Court of Claims Act. Bowles and Franks, former police academy instructors, faced employment actions after allegations of misconduct, while Gardner, a former doctoral student, faced expulsion and subsequent employment issues due to his advocacy for migrant workers. They argued that the Act violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights by requiring Court of Appeals judges to serve on the Court of Claims, thus creating potential bias in appellate reviews and denying them jury trials.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed their complaint. The court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing as they did not demonstrate how the Court of Claims Act directly caused their injuries. Additionally, the court held that Bowles's claims were precluded due to a prior federal lawsuit and concluded that the plaintiffs' constitutional claims lacked merit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Sixth Circuit agreed that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court noted that the plaintiffs' injuries were not fairly traceable to the actions of Michigan's Governor and Attorney General, who were named as defendants. The court also found that the requested relief, an injunction against the enforcement of the Court of Claims Act, would not redress the plaintiffs' employment-related injuries. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds, modifying the judgment to a dismissal without prejudice. View "Bowles v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

In September 2020, Child Protective Services removed twelve-year-old Z.S. and her siblings from their home due to domestic violence allegations against their stepfather, Michael J. In May 2021, Z.S. disclosed to her aunt and therapist that Michael J. had sexually abused her. Subsequently, Michael J. was indicted on multiple sexual offense charges, including second-degree sexual assault and incest. During the trial, the prosecution relied heavily on Z.S.'s testimony, as there was no physical evidence. Michael J. denied the allegations and testified in his defense, supported by his wife, who claimed he was never alone with Z.S. However, Z.S.'s sister contradicted this, stating they were often left alone with him.The Circuit Court of Fayette County allowed the prosecution to ask potential jurors during voir dire if they would convict Michael J. based solely on Z.S.'s testimony if they found it believable. All potential jurors agreed. Michael J. objected, but the court overruled the objection. The jury found Michael J. guilty on all charges, and he was sentenced to 61 to 145 years in prison. Michael J. appealed, arguing that the voir dire question was improper and prejudiced the jury.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and concluded that the prosecution's voir dire question was an improper commitment question. It violated Michael J.'s constitutional right to an impartial jury by asking jurors to pledge to convict based on the victim's testimony alone, without considering the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found that this likely prejudiced the jury and reversed the lower court's decision, remanding the case for a new trial. View "State of West Virginia v Michael J." on Justia Law