Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Antoine Cook was arrested after his then-girlfriend, E.C., contacted his parole officer and reported both his arrest for domestic violence and their recent drug use. When parole officers arrived at the hotel, E.C. had Cook’s cell phone and stated it was her only means of communication. She provided the officers with the phone’s passcode and consented to their request to search the device. On the phone, officers found incriminating images and videos depicting drugs and firearms. Based on this evidence and a subsequent consent search of the hotel room, officers discovered ammunition and controlled substances.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied Cook’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the cell phone, holding that Cook’s parole conditions permitted warrantless searches. The district court also rejected Cook’s challenges regarding the authority to consent to the phone search and permitted the evidence from the hotel room. Cook was later convicted by a jury on counts of possessing methamphetamine and cocaine with intent to distribute, and being a felon in possession of ammunition. He appealed, arguing improper denial of the suppression motion, ineffective assistance of counsel, and judicial bias.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that E.C. had common authority over the cell phone and could consent to its search, obviating the need to consider parole-based search arguments. The court also found no plain error in the seizure of the phone, as officers had probable cause and Cook’s possessory interest was not meaningfully interfered with while he was in custody. The court declined to address the ineffective assistance of counsel claim due to an insufficient record and found no evidence of judicial bias by the district judge. View "United States v. Cook" on Justia Law

A police officer in Decatur, Alabama, was involved in a fatal shooting that occurred while a tow-truck driver attempted to repossess a vehicle from a homeowner’s property. The tow-truck driver had experienced a prior confrontation with the homeowner, who allegedly pointed a gun at him and ordered him to leave. When the tow-truck driver returned with several police officers prepositioned for safety, the homeowner again emerged armed and pointed his gun, first at the tow-truck driver and then in the direction of one of the officers. The officer fired, resulting in the homeowner’s death.After being indicted for murder, the officer moved for pretrial dismissal, claiming statutory immunity under Alabama’s defense-of-persons statute, which justifies the use of force under certain conditions and provides for immunity from prosecution if the statute’s requirements are met. The Morgan Circuit Court held a pretrial hearing but denied the motion, reasoning that the peace-officer-specific use-of-force statute was the applicable law rather than the more general defense-of-persons statute. The court focused on whether the officer acted as a “reasonable police officer” and whether he was acting within the scope of his police authority, ultimately setting the case for trial but staying proceedings pending appellate review. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed this approach, also applying the peace-officer statute.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the lower courts had applied the incorrect legal standard by relying on the peace-officer statute instead of the defense-of-persons statute. The Supreme Court held that the officer had a clear legal right to have his immunity claim evaluated under the defense-of-persons statute, which applies to all persons, not just police officers, and provides for pretrial immunity. The Court issued a writ of mandamus, directing the circuit court to vacate its previous order and reevaluate the officer’s claim under the correct statute. View "In re: State of Alabama v. Marquette" on Justia Law

Eric Holmes was convicted by an Indiana jury in 1992 of two counts of murder, attempted murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery, stemming from an incident at a restaurant. During sentencing, the jury could not unanimously recommend the death penalty, so the trial judge, as allowed by Indiana law at the time, found aggravating circumstances and imposed a death sentence. Holmes exhausted his direct appeals and post-conviction relief in state court, then filed a federal habeas corpus petition.While that federal petition was pending, Indiana amended its death penalty statute in 2002 to require jury findings on aggravating circumstances, in response to Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona. In Saylor v. Indiana, the Indiana Supreme Court vacated a death sentence for a defendant whose jury had unanimously recommended against death, holding it inappropriate to execute someone sentenced under the old procedure. Holmes sought similar relief in state court, but the Indiana Supreme Court denied his request, distinguishing his case because his jury had not reached a recommendation at all, as opposed to Saylor’s unanimous recommendation against death.Holmes then filed a second federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, claiming the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection. The district court dismissed the petition as “second or successive,” lacking jurisdiction. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court’s procedural ruling, finding Holmes’s equal protection claim was not “second or successive” because it was not ripe during his first petition. However, the court affirmed the dismissal on the merits, holding the Indiana Supreme Court had a rational basis for treating Holmes differently, since his jury had not reached a unanimous recommendation, and thus there was no Equal Protection violation. View "Holmes v Neal" on Justia Law

Three individuals departed from Dana Point Harbor in Southern California at night, ostensibly for a lobster-fishing trip. When the boat returned, one person was missing, and his body was later found floating in the ocean with evidence of drowning, gunshot wounds, and blunt force trauma. Location data placed the incident within three nautical miles of the California coast. The surviving participants did not report the death. Following an investigation, federal authorities charged one of the surviving individuals with first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of murder.The United States District Court for the Central District of California heard the case. The defense argued that the federal government lacked jurisdiction because the death occurred within the three-nautical-mile territorial sea, which they claimed was under California's exclusive criminal jurisdiction. The district court rejected this argument, finding that federal jurisdiction extended twelve nautical miles from shore under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. At trial, the jury was instructed accordingly and convicted the defendant on all counts. During jury deliberations, a juror experiencing distress and mental health concerns, which were linked to pressure from other jurors regarding the verdict, was excused and replaced by an alternate, with the agreement of both parties. The reconstituted jury returned guilty verdicts.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the federal government’s jurisdiction under Title 18 did extend to the first three nautical miles from shore. However, the appellate court found that the removal of the juror violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict because her dismissal stemmed from her views on the merits of the case. The Ninth Circuit vacated the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA V. LE" on Justia Law

A 17-year-old individual was charged as an adult for the shooting death of a 15-year-old girl during a drive-by incident at a public park in Cheyenne, Wyoming. The evidence showed that the defendant was the front passenger in an SUV from which shots were fired into a group of teenagers. Investigators recovered shell casings and the fatal bullet, and testimony indicated the victim was killed by a bullet likely fired from the defendant’s position. While the defendant denied involvement and claimed no one in the SUV had a gun, multiple witnesses and forensic analysis pointed to his participation.The District Court of Laramie County denied the defendant’s motion to transfer the case to juvenile court, citing the seriousness of the offense, lack of adequate juvenile facilities, and insufficient evidence for rehabilitation within the juvenile system. At trial, the jury was instructed on both the charged offenses and lesser included offenses. The jury acquitted the defendant of first-degree murder and conspiracy but convicted him of second-degree murder. The defendant was sentenced to 25–35 years imprisonment. He subsequently filed two post-conviction motions under Wyoming Rule of Appellate Procedure 21, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failures at the juvenile transfer hearing, trial, and sentencing. The district court denied these motions.On consolidated appeal to the Supreme Court of Wyoming, the defendant argued sufficiency of evidence, error in jury instructions regarding transferred intent, and that Article 1, Section 10 of the Wyoming Constitution required a stricter standard for ineffective assistance claims than the federal Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the conviction and denial of post-conviction relief. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for second-degree murder, the jury instruction on transferred intent was not plainly erroneous, Article 1, Section 10 does not require a more protective prejudice standard than Strickland, and the defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel. View "Munoz v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who pleaded guilty to first degree child molestation and was sentenced to prison and a term of community custody. As a part of his community custody conditions, the trial court prohibited him from possessing or accessing “sexually exploitive materials (as defined by Defendant’s treating therapist or [Community Corrections Officer]).” The condition did not define “sexually exploitive materials,” nor did it reference any statute or provide illustrative examples. The defendant argued that this condition was unconstitutionally vague.The Washington Court of Appeals, in a split decision, upheld the condition. The majority reasoned that two statutes—though not referenced in the condition or the defendant’s proceedings—could provide sufficient clarity as to what “sexually exploitive materials” meant. The dissent, however, found that the phrase was undefined, not clarified by the referenced statutes (which described different crimes or phrases), and thus failed to give ordinary people notice of what conduct was prohibited.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. The court concluded that the community custody condition was unconstitutionally vague because it did not define “sexually exploitive materials,” provide statutory or case law definitions, or include clarifying examples. The court emphasized that due process requires conditions to be clear enough for an ordinary person to understand what is prohibited and to protect against arbitrary enforcement. Furthermore, because the condition implicated First Amendment rights, it also had to be narrowly tailored and directly related to the state’s goals of public safety and rehabilitation. The court found that the condition failed these requirements and reversed the Court of Appeals, remanding the case for further proceedings. The court held specifically that the condition as written does not provide constitutional notice, does not protect against arbitrary enforcement, and is not narrowly tailored. View "State v. Jeffries-Porter" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to death for a 2003 murder. The victim, a young man, was found strangled and stabbed in a motel room. The defendant had worked with the victim and became a suspect when his vehicle matched that associated with another double homicide. Physical evidence included a hair and shoe impressions linking the defendant to the scene. The prosecution also presented evidence of the defendant’s involvement in other similar murders. At trial, the State argued that the murder involved sadistic sexual assault, relying in part on DNA evidence found on the victim, which was attributed to another individual living at the motel.Following the conviction, the defendant sought postconviction relief in the Circuit Court, arguing, among other things, that the State had withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The evidence in question consisted of Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) call logs indicating that analysts believed the DNA found was unlikely to be the result of secondary transfer, contrary to the State’s theory at trial. The postconviction court found that this evidence was withheld and was favorable to the defense, but concluded it was not exculpatory and denied relief.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the appeal. The Court held that the State violated its obligations under Brady by suppressing material impeachment evidence regarding the likelihood of secondary DNA transfer. The undisclosed evidence could have impeached key State witnesses and undermined the prosecution’s theory. The Court found that the suppressed evidence was material and that its absence prejudiced the defendant, creating a reasonable probability of a different verdict. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the postconviction court’s denial of relief, set aside the conviction, and remanded for a new trial. View "Jones v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

Kristina Gulley, who previously served as justice of the peace for District 10 in Pulaski County, Arkansas, sought reelection after having been disqualified in earlier proceedings due to two prior misdemeanor hot-check convictions from 1997 and 2003. Multiple prior legal actions had resulted in findings that these convictions constituted “infamous crimes” under article 5, section 9 of the Arkansas Constitution, rendering her ineligible to run for or hold public office. Despite these rulings, Gulley again filed as a candidate in the 2026 primary election. Registered voters in the district challenged her eligibility, seeking a declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus to prevent her name from appearing on the ballot and to prohibit counting any votes cast for her.The Pulaski County Circuit Court held an expedited hearing, denied Gulley’s requests for a continuance and for relief from judgment, and reaffirmed her ineligibility based on the prior convictions. The court found that neither the sealing of her record nor a gubernatorial pardon restored her eligibility to run for office, and it ordered the Board of Election Commissioners not to certify her as a candidate or count votes for her. Gulley appealed, challenging the circuit court’s findings on factual and constitutional grounds. However, she did not obtain a stay of the court’s order or the certification of the election results.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Arkansas determined that the appeal was moot because the March 2026 primary election had already occurred, and the election results had been certified. The court held that no effective relief could be granted as to the election in question, and none of the recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Arkansas granted the motion to dismiss the appeal as moot and dismissed the case. View "GULLEY v. JEFFREY" on Justia Law

A recently enacted Georgia law restricts minors’ ability to create accounts on social media platforms. The statute requires covered platforms to verify users’ ages, prohibits minors under sixteen from creating accounts without parental consent, and limits how personal data may be used for advertising to minors. The law defines “social media platform” broadly, but includes numerous exceptions for platforms with different primary functions. An internet trade association, representing major social media companies, challenged the law before its effective date, arguing that it violates the First Amendment, is unconstitutionally vague, and is preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted a preliminary injunction, preventing enforcement of the law. The court found that the association had associational and third-party standing, that the law was likely a content-based speech restriction failing strict scrutiny, was unconstitutionally vague, and was preempted by federal law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether the association had standing and whether it demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. The circuit court held that the association had associational standing to challenge the law on behalf of its members. However, the court concluded that the association failed to meet the burden required for a facial First Amendment challenge under the standard set forth in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, because it did not adequately address the full range of the law’s applications and did not demonstrate that unconstitutional applications substantially outweighed constitutional ones. The court also found that the vagueness and Section 230 preemption claims were unlikely to succeed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the standing determination, vacated the preliminary injunction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "NetChoice v. Attorney General, State of Georgia" on Justia Law

Florida enacted a statute (HB3) restricting minors’ access to social media platforms that employ certain “addictive features,” such as infinite scrolling, push notifications, and auto-play. Platforms meeting defined criteria—including algorithmic content selection and significant minor usage—must prohibit account creation by those under 14 and require parental consent for those aged 14–15. The Computer & Communications Industry Association and NetChoice, representing affected platforms, challenged the law on First Amendment grounds, asserting both facial and as-applied claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida initially denied a preliminary injunction for lack of associational standing, but after the plaintiffs amended their complaint and renewed their motion, the court granted a preliminary injunction. The district court found that the trade groups had standing, abstention under Younger v. Harris was unwarranted, and that although HB3 was a content-neutral regulation, it was insufficiently tailored to survive intermediate scrutiny, thus likely unconstitutional.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit first held that the plaintiffs had associational standing to challenge HB3 on behalf of their members. The court also determined that the district court properly declined to abstain under Younger because substantial proceedings had already occurred in federal court before the state enforcement action was initiated. Addressing the merits, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that HB3 is a content-neutral regulation implicating the First Amendment, but it likely survives intermediate scrutiny due to its age-based tailoring and focus on addictive features. The court rejected the facial challenge, holding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated, as required by Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, that HB3’s unconstitutional applications substantially outweighed its constitutional ones. The disposition affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Computer & Communications Industry Association v. Attorney General, State of Florida" on Justia Law