Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After serving a prison sentence for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, the defendant began a term of supervised release, which included a condition that he refrain from any use of alcohol. The defendant, who is a practicing Messianic Jew, asked the court to modify this condition to allow him to drink a glass of wine during religious ceremonies on his Sabbath, arguing that the complete alcohol ban violated his rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and imposed a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The defendant had a lengthy history of alcohol abuse intertwined with criminal behavior, including prior convictions related to intoxication and repeated violations of probation and supervised release conditions. Medical reports and court findings noted his inability to control alcohol consumption and recommended complete abstinence.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois denied the defendant’s motion to modify the supervised release condition. The court found that the government had a compelling interest in prohibiting the defendant from consuming alcohol entirely, given his history of rapid escalation from initial drinking to dangerous behavior. The court also found that alternatives—such as monitoring with breathalyzers—were not feasible for ensuring compliance and public safety, and therefore, a total ban was the least restrictive means to further the government’s interests.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit held that, under RFRA, the complete alcohol ban was the least restrictive means to further the government’s compelling interests in public safety, rehabilitation, and preventing recidivism, given the defendant’s history. The court also held that the condition did not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary under § 3553(a). The district court’s denial of the motion to modify supervised release was affirmed. View "USA v Broadfield" on Justia Law

A utility company, Southern California Gas (SoCalGas), entered into a 2022 franchise agreement with the City of Los Angeles, allowing it to install, maintain, and operate its natural gas system under city streets. In exchange, SoCalGas agreed to pay the City a franchise fee equal to 5.5% of its gross receipts from natural gas sales within the City. Of this, 3.5% was passed to SoCalGas customers as a surcharge, which was later approved by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). The franchise agreement was adopted after extensive, arm’s-length negotiations and CPUC review.A putative class action was filed by a customer, alleging that the surcharge component of the franchise fee constituted an unlawful tax under article XIII C of the California Constitution because it was not submitted for voter approval. The plaintiff argued the fee should have been apportioned between charges for physical use of city property and charges for the general business privilege, with the latter portion requiring voter approval. The Superior Court for Los Angeles County granted summary judgment for the City, finding the franchise fee, including the surcharge, exempt from voter approval as a charge for the use of local government property under section 1, subdivision (e)(4) of article XIII C.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Court held that the franchise fee, including the portion passed through as a surcharge, was not a tax within the meaning of article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e)(4), because it was compensation for the use of city property and not subject to voter approval. The Court further held that the fee did not need to be apportioned or shown to be reasonably related to the value of the franchise, but found that, even if such a requirement existed, the City met it through bona fide negotiations. View "Nguyen v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

Eight Massachusetts voters challenged the Attorney General’s summary of an initiative petition proposing a reduction of the state personal income tax rate from 5% to 4%. The summary stated that the proposed law would lower the tax rates on (1) personal taxable income consisting of interest and dividends, and (2) personal taxable income “other than interest, dividends or capital gain income, such as wages and salaries.” The plaintiffs argued that this language incorrectly informed voters that the long-term capital gains tax rate would remain unchanged, when in fact the petition would also lower that rate due to the way current law links the tax rate for most long-term capital gains to the rate for other income.After the Attorney General certified the petition and issued the summary, proponents collected over 85,000 signatures. The Secretary of the Commonwealth confirmed the required signatures and transmitted the petition to the House of Representatives. The plaintiffs then filed this action in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, seeking a declaration that the summary was unfair under Article 48 of the Massachusetts Constitution, and to enjoin the Secretary from placing the petition on the ballot. The proponents intervened, and the case was reserved and reported to the full Supreme Judicial Court on stipulated facts.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the Attorney General’s summary was not “fair” as required by Article 48 because it materially misstated the effect of the proposed law by excluding the reduction in the long-term capital gains tax rate, which would occur under current law. The Court concluded that this was not a minor omission but a significantly misleading statement likely to affect voters’ understanding. The Court ordered that the petition could not appear on the 2026 Statewide election ballot and remanded for entry of judgment enjoining the Secretary from placing the measure on the ballot. View "Finfer v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to temporary closures of Boca Chica Beach in Cameron County, Texas, which were authorized to accommodate nearby rocket launches by SpaceX. Plaintiffs, several nonprofit organizations, alleged that the closures interfered with their members’ right to access the beach, a right protected under the Texas Constitution and the Open Beaches Act. They sought declaratory relief, claiming that the statutes permitting these closures conflicted with Article I, Section 33 of the Texas Constitution, which guarantees public access to Texas beaches.The respondents originally filed suit in district court against the Texas General Land Office, its commissioner, Cameron County, and the Texas Attorney General. The defendants responded with pleas to the jurisdiction, arguing that the plaintiffs, as private parties, lacked standing and that the governmental defendants were immune from suit because Section 33(d) of the Texas Constitution expressly states it does not create a private right of enforcement. The trial court agreed and dismissed the suit with prejudice. The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas reversed, holding that at least one plaintiff had standing, and concluded that it was not necessary to determine whether the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims were facially valid before deciding the question of immunity.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Article I, Section 33(d) of the Texas Constitution precludes private enforcement of the public’s right of access to beaches, limiting enforcement authority to governmental actors. Because the claims were brought solely by private parties, they were deemed facially invalid, and the governmental defendants’ immunity from suit remained intact. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. View "PAXTON v. SaveRGV" on Justia Law

Several property owners in New Braunfels, Texas, challenged a city zoning ordinance that prohibits short-term rentals in residential districts. The ordinance, originally enacted in 2006 and amended in 2011, was in place prior to the appellants’ purchase of their properties. Despite knowing about the restrictions, the appellants either engaged in or sought to engage in short-term rental activities and, after being denied zoning changes to permit such use, filed suit against the city. Their claims alleged the ordinance violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States and Texas Constitutions.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially dismissed the appellants’ claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a prior decision, vacated and remanded, allowing the appellants to proceed to discovery. After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court again ruled in favor of the city, granting summary judgment on all claims. The appellants then sought review of this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Texas law does not recognize a protected property interest in the right to lease one’s home on a short-term basis, which is required for a due process claim. It further found that the ordinance’s restrictions on short-term rentals survive rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, as the city’s goal of preserving the residential character of neighborhoods is a legitimate government interest, and the line drawn between short-term and longer-term rentals was not arbitrary. Accordingly, the court found no constitutional violation and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the city. View "Marfil v. City of New Braunfels" on Justia Law

After law enforcement arrested the defendant for unlawfully discharging a firearm, they executed a search warrant at his home. During the search, officers seized multiple firearms, suspected silencers, and other related paraphernalia. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives evaluated the items and determined the suspected silencers met the statutory definition of devices designed for silencing, muffling, or diminishing the report of a firearm. The defendant admitted to manufacturing and possessing the silencers.A federal grand jury charged the defendant with possession of unregistered firearms, specifically silencers, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and possession of a firearm without a serial number under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(i). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that both statutes violated the Second Amendment facially and as applied to him. The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied the motion, finding silencers to be “dangerous and unusual weapons” not protected by the Second Amendment. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the constitutional issue, and was sentenced to twenty-four months in prison and three years of supervised release.Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied de novo review to the preserved constitutional questions. The court acknowledged that, per Supreme Court precedent, silencers qualify as Second Amendment “Arms.” However, in light of United States v. Peterson, 161 F.4th 331 (5th Cir. 2025), the Fifth Circuit held that the National Firearms Act’s shall-issue regime for silencer registration is presumptively lawful unless a challenger shows it has been put toward abusive ends, such as through exorbitant fees or lengthy delays. Because the defendant did not allege such abuse, the court held that § 5861(d) did not violate his Second Amendment rights and affirmed the conviction. View "USA v. Comeaux" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to Ohio’s Parental Notification by Social Media Operators Act, which requires operators of certain social media platforms to obtain verifiable parental consent before unemancipated children under sixteen can enter into contracts to use their services. The Act defines covered operators based on features such as enabling social interaction, profile creation, and content sharing, and details factors to determine whether a site targets or is likely to be accessed by minors. The law imposes civil penalties for non-compliance and grants enforcement authority to the Ohio Attorney General.When the Act was set to take effect, NetChoice, LLC—a trade association representing major online platforms—sued the Ohio Attorney General in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. NetChoice argued the Act was unconstitutional on First Amendment and vagueness grounds, asserting that it would chill protected speech and was impermissibly vague about which platforms were covered. The district court agreed, finding that NetChoice had standing, that the Act was a facially unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech that failed strict scrutiny, and that it was unconstitutionally vague. The court permanently enjoined enforcement of the Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that NetChoice lacked third-party standing to assert the First Amendment rights of its members’ minor users due to a conflict of interest between the trade group and the affected minors. The court further found that, even considering NetChoice’s own First Amendment and vagueness claims, NetChoice failed to show the Act was facially unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit held that the Act, while content-based and subject to strict scrutiny, was narrowly tailored to compelling state interests in protecting children and was not impermissibly vague in all its applications. The case was remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the Attorney General. View "NetChoice, LLC v. Yost" on Justia Law

A Michigan-based real estate developer and related parties sought to redevelop a commercial property in the City of Pontiac to include medical marijuana cultivation and processing facilities. After purchasing the property in 2019, the developer obtained rezoning approval from the city, but the process of securing required permits and special exceptions for tenants became protracted. The city clerk cited deficiencies in tenant applications and, at one point, argued that the project violated city ordinances regarding overlay districts for marijuana businesses. Despite eventual approvals—including a court order requiring the city to issue permits—the tenants withdrew due to the delays, and the project collapsed. Subsequently, the developer’s affiliate lost another business opportunity, which plaintiffs attributed to city officials’ retaliation.The plaintiffs filed suit in Oakland County Circuit Court, seeking injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, and later brought civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The district court granted summary judgment for the city and the city clerk, finding insufficient evidence of constitutional violations and concluding that the delays and alleged retaliation did not violate the plaintiffs’ rights.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked a cognizable property interest under the Due Process Clause because city approval for marijuana facilities was discretionary, not a matter of right. The court also found that the delays did not constitute a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment, as the length and nature of the delays were not extraordinary. The equal protection claim failed for lack of evidence that similarly situated applicants were treated more favorably. Finally, the court determined that the plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claim could not proceed against the city because the mayor lacked final policymaking authority over zoning and no municipal policy or custom was established. View "Rubicon Real Estate Holdings v. City of Pontiac" on Justia Law

Dusty Ray Spencer was convicted of murdering his wife, Karen Spencer, in 1992. The incident involved a series of violent altercations in the weeks preceding the murder, culminating in Spencer attacking Karen in their backyard, inflicting fatal stab wounds and blunt force trauma. Karen’s teenage son, Timothy Johnson, witnessed and attempted to intervene during both the January 4 and January 18 attacks. Spencer was apprehended and tried, with the jury recommending the death penalty by a seven-to-five vote.Following conviction, the trial court sentenced Spencer to death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the conviction but vacated the death sentence due to improper consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors, remanding for reconsideration. After further proceedings, the trial court again imposed the death penalty, which the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. Spencer’s subsequent collateral attacks on his conviction and sentence in both state and federal courts were unsuccessful. In May 2026, nearly three decades after his sentence became final, Governor DeSantis signed Spencer’s death warrant, prompting Spencer to file a third successive motion for post-conviction relief and a request for a stay of execution.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the trial court’s summary denial of Spencer’s latest motion. The Court held that Spencer’s claims—challenging the lethal injection protocol based on alleged deviations and his cirrhosis, and asserting a categorical exemption from execution due to his advanced age—were untimely and without legal merit. The Court found that Spencer failed to demonstrate any exception to the one-year filing requirement, did not meet the legal standard for a method-of-execution claim, and was foreclosed from relief based on age. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief and declined to stay the execution. View "Spencer v. State" on Justia Law

Several members of the public submitted requests to a large social media company seeking information about political advertisements displayed on its platforms to users in Washington State. The company did not dispute that its responses to these requests failed to comply with Washington’s Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA) and the law’s implementing regulations, as it did not provide all the required information. The State of Washington, through the Attorney General’s Office, filed suit against the company, alleging multiple violations of the FCPA’s disclosure requirements.The case was heard in King County Superior Court, where both sides moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State, holding the company liable for violating the FCPA, and imposed maximum statutory penalties for each advertisement for which the required information was not disclosed. The court found the violations to be intentional, trebled both the civil penalties and attorney fees, and granted an injunction. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rulings on liability, statutory interpretation regarding penalty calculation, and the constitutionality of the penalty assessed.Before the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, the company argued that the FCPA’s disclosure requirements violate the First Amendment as applied, that the penalty was improperly calculated, and that the penalty violated the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause. The Supreme Court, with no single majority opinion, affirmed the company’s liability under the FCPA, holding that the law as applied does not violate the First Amendment. The court also let the penalty judgment stand, as no majority view existed to reverse or modify it, and further held by a majority that the penalty does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed, upholding both the liability finding and the civil penalty. View "State v. Meta Platforms, Inc." on Justia Law