Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Walt Disney Company and International Business Machines Corporation (IBM), both multinational corporations, and their dispute with the Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York. The corporations challenged the state's taxation scheme that was in effect from 2003 to 2013. The scheme allowed corporations that paid franchise taxes in New York to deduct income received as royalty payments from members of the same corporate group in calculating their taxable income. The deduction was only allowed if the royalty payment came from a related entity that had already paid a New York tax on the same income. The state Department of Taxation and Finance determined that both corporations improperly deducted royalty payments they received from affiliates in foreign countries that were not subject to New York franchise taxes. The corporations argued that the denial of the deduction was contrary to the statute and violated the Commerce Clause's prohibition on discrimination against foreign commerce.The corporations challenged the denial of their royalty tax deductions and the notices of deficiency with the New York State Division of Tax Appeals. The Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) determined that the deduction authorized under the law only applied where the royalty came from a subsidiary that had been subjected to the add back requirement contained in the law. The ALJs denied the petitions and sustained the notices of deficiency. The Tax Appeals Tribunal subsequently affirmed both decisions. The corporations then commenced proceedings in the Appellate Division, which affirmed the determinations and dismissed the petitions. The corporations appealed to the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that the Appellate Division correctly interpreted the statutes as permitting a tax deduction only where a related subsidiary was subject to the add back requirement. The court also found that any burden on interstate or foreign commerce created by this tax scheme was incidental and did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The court rejected the corporations' argument that the tax scheme was facially discriminatory against out-of-state commerce and failed the internal consistency test. The court concluded that the tax scheme treated groups with related members who did not pay taxes in New York the same as those with related members who did, and that the scheme did not result in duplicative taxation in all situations. View "In re Walt Disney Company and Consolidated Subsidiaries v Tax Appeals Tribunal" on Justia Law

The case involves an insurance dispute between Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America and A-Quality Auto Sales, Inc., along with its owners, Felicia and Shawn Richesin. The Richesins purchased a Subaru for resale through their dealership, A-Quality Auto Sales. After having the car inspected and repaired by RNS Auto Services, they experienced mechanical issues while driving it. Ms. Richesin was severely injured when she exited the vehicle on the side of the highway and was struck by another car. RNS had a garage insurance policy with Travelers, which provided commercial general liability coverage with a per-occurrence limit of $500,000 and a general aggregate limit of $1,000,000. The Richesins sought additional compensation from RNS and Travelers for Ms. Richesin's injuries.In the lower courts, the Richesins filed a suit against Travelers and other parties in New Mexico state court. The state court dismissed all claims against Travelers, citing a lack of privity between the injured party and the insurer. Later, the Richesins and RNS entered into agreements that led to Travelers paying the Richesins $500,000, which Travelers believed to be the policy limit. The Richesins, however, argued that there were multiple occurrences and therefore the policy's aggregate limit of $1,000,000 was available. Travelers then filed a complaint in federal district court seeking a judicial declaration that the accident was a single occurrence and the policy coverage limit for the accident was $500,000.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of declaratory judgment. The court held that the dispute was ripe for resolution under Article III of the Constitution. It also ruled that the district court did not err by declining to abstain under the Brillhart and Younger abstention doctrines. The court further held that the district court did not err by denying the Richesins' Rule 56(d) motion, thereby denying them discovery needed to meaningfully oppose Travelers' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the accident was a single occurrence and the policy coverage limit for the accident was $500,000. View "Travelers Casualty Insurance Co. of America v. A-Quality Auto Sales" on Justia Law

The case involves Jennifer Root Bannon, who sued six law enforcement officers and the City of Boston on behalf of her brother's estate. Her brother, Juston Root, was fatally shot by the officers after a series of events that began with him pointing a gun at a hospital security guard and a responding police officer, leading the officers on a high-speed chase, and disregarding police instructions to drop his weapon. Bannon claimed that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion that the officers acted reasonably under the circumstances during the fatal shooting and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The court also held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and affirmed the grant of summary judgment on Bannon's other claims. The court found that no reasonable jury could conclude that the officers acted unreasonably in employing deadly force against Root in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court also independently concluded that the officers were entitled to summary judgment on Bannon's § 1983 and MCRA claims based on qualified immunity. View "Bannon v. Godin" on Justia Law

The defendant, Victor Tavares, was convicted by a jury on two counts of first-degree sexual assault and one count of conspiracy to commit first-degree sexual assault. The charges stemmed from an incident that occurred at a party in 2012, where Tavares and another man, Franklin Johnson, were accused of sexually assaulting a woman named Mary. The evidence against Tavares included Mary's testimony, a used condom found at the scene, and DNA evidence linking Johnson to the condom. Tavares, who represented himself at trial and on appeal, raised twelve issues for consideration.Before the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, Tavares argued that the trial court erred in several ways, including by not dismissing the indictment based on the rule of consistency, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and the General Assembly's lack of authority to enact criminal laws. He also claimed that the trial court improperly conducted voir dire and allowed the introduction of Johnson's DNA evidence.The Supreme Court rejected all of Tavares's arguments. It held that the trial court properly conducted voir dire and correctly allowed the introduction of Johnson's DNA evidence. The court also found that the General Assembly had the authority to enact the criminal laws under which Tavares was charged and convicted. Furthermore, the court ruled that the doctrines of collateral estoppel and the rule of consistency did not apply in this case. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed Tavares's conviction. View "State v. Tavares" on Justia Law

The case involves Norton Outdoor Advertising, a company that operates billboards within the Village of St. Bernard, Ohio. The Village revoked one of Norton's permits after it constructed two variable-message signs. The Village's ordinance regulates signs based on whether what is being advertised is located on or off the premises of the sign. The ordinance also has an exemption that functions beyond this on- and off-premises dichotomy, which is content based.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled in favor of the Village, finding that Norton lacked standing to challenge any provisions of the ordinances other than the ban on variable-message displays. The court found these provisions to be content-neutral regulations under the Supreme Court precedent and that the regulations satisfied intermediate scrutiny.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court found that the Village's ordinance, which included a content-based exemption, must satisfy strict scrutiny. The court concluded that the Village's ordinance was not narrowly tailored to fulfill a compelling interest and therefore could not stand as written. The court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings, including consideration of whether the unconstitutional provision is severable. View "Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Village of St. Bernard" on Justia Law

The case involves Salt Lake County's challenge to the constitutionality of the Aircraft Valuation Law, which provides a preferred method for determining the fair market value of aircraft for tax purposes. The County argued that the application of the law to Delta Air Lines' aircraft resulted in an assessment below fair market value, violating the Utah Constitution. The County also contended that the law, on its face, violated the Utah Constitution by divesting the Utah State Tax Commission of its power to assess airline property.The Utah State Tax Commission had previously upheld the 2017 assessment of Delta's property, which was calculated according to the Aircraft Valuation Law. The Commission found that the County did not provide clear and convincing evidence that the legislature's preferred method of valuation did not reasonably reflect fair market value.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah rejected the County's arguments. The court held that the County failed to fully utilize the statutory safety valve, which allows the Commission to use an alternative valuation method if the preferred method does not reasonably reflect fair market value. The court also rejected the County's facial challenge to the Aircraft Valuation Law, concluding that the County did not show that the law prohibits the legislature from prescribing a preferred method for valuing aircraft. Therefore, the court affirmed the Commission's decision. View "Salt Lake Co v. Tax Commission" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Wayne Holroyd, who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 280 grams of crack cocaine. After his plea but before his sentencing, Congress amended the "safety valve" provision of the statute used to compute Holroyd's sentence, expanding the eligibility of a drug offender to be sentenced without regard to the statutory mandatory minimum. However, the district court sentenced Holroyd to the statutory minimum of 120 months' imprisonment. Holroyd argued that his counsel should have contended that he was eligible for sentencing without regard to the statutory minimum under the recently revised safety valve provision.The district court sentenced Holroyd to the mandatory minimum of 120 months' imprisonment. Holroyd's counsel did not move for reconsideration. Holroyd contended that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective in representing him at sentencing because counsel failed to give the correct interpretation to the safety valve provision. He argued that his two past convictions did not exclude him from the safety valve under the provision because the word "and" between subparagraphs must be read conjunctively so that only a defendant who has convictions satisfying all subparagraphs cumulatively is ineligible.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence. The court held that Holroyd's counsel's decision not to argue at sentencing or to move for reconsideration on the basis of Holroyd's eligibility for the safety valve was not deficient representation. The court noted that the Supreme Court recently adopted a different construction of the safety valve provision, which held that a defendant satisfies the criminal-history requirement only when he does not meet any of the disqualifying criteria. As Holroyd had a 6-point criminal history based on two previous 3-point offenses, he did not satisfy the criteria and was therefore ineligible for the safety valve. View "United States v. Holroyd" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of several Nevada statutes regulating "ghost guns," or unfinished firearm frames or receivers. The respondent, Polymer80, Inc., a manufacturer of gun-related products, argued that the definition of "unfinished frame or receiver" in the statutes was impermissibly vague, making the statutes unconstitutional. The district court agreed with Polymer80, concluding that the definition did not clearly explain key terms or notify individuals when raw materials would become an unfinished frame or receiver. The court also found that the definition allowed for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada disagreed with the lower court's findings. The court found that the terms used to define "unfinished frame or receiver" had ordinary meanings that provided sufficient notice of what the statutes prohibited. The court also concluded that the statutes were general intent statutes that did not lack a scienter requirement and did not pose a risk of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision, holding that the statutes were not unconstitutionally vague. View "Sisolak v. Polymer80, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around an initiative petition proposed by Nevadans for Reproductive Freedom (NRF) to establish a constitutional right to reproductive freedom. The petition would grant every individual the right to make decisions regarding all matters related to pregnancy, including prenatal care, childbirth, postpartum care, birth control, vasectomy, tubal ligation, abortion, abortion care, management of a miscarriage, and infertility care. Respondents Donna Washington and Coalition for Parents and Children challenged the petition in district court, alleging that it failed to meet statutory and constitutional requirements and sought to prevent the Secretary of State from placing the initiative on the ballot. They argued that the initiative petition violated the single-subject requirement because it considered multiple medical procedures, instead of being limited to only pregnancy or abortion. The district court granted the injunction, finding the initiative petition invalid for three reasons: it does not contain a single subject, its description of effect is misleading, and it requires an expenditure of money without raising the necessary revenue.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court's decision. The court found that all the medical procedures considered in the initiative petition concern reproduction and are germane to each other and the initiative's single subject of establishing a right to reproductive freedom. The court also concluded that the description of effect was legally sufficient and the initiative petition does not require an expenditure of funds. Therefore, the court held that the district court erred in preventing the Secretary of State from placing the initiative petition on the ballot. View "Nevadans for Reprod. Freedom v. Washington" on Justia Law

Tyrone Cameron was convicted of being a felon in possession of ammunition following a three-day trial. The district court sentenced him to 120 months' imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release. Cameron appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, that his conviction violated the Second Amendment, that the district court should not have admitted his prior felony convictions involving firearms into evidence, and that the government engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments.The district court had reviewed the evidence, including surveillance footage and testimonies, and found sufficient circumstantial evidence to support Cameron's conviction. The court also admitted Cameron's prior felony convictions into evidence, which were relevant to show that Cameron knew he was a felon and knowingly possessed ammunition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that a reasonable jury could have found there existed ample circumstantial evidence to support Cameron’s conviction. The court also rejected Cameron's Second Amendment challenge, noting that the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen did not cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons. The court found no error in the district court's admission of Cameron's prior felony convictions, as they were relevant to the case and not unfairly prejudicial. Lastly, the court found no prosecutorial misconduct, as the government's remarks during closing arguments were permissible interpretations of the evidence. View "United States v. Tyrone Cameron" on Justia Law