Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries
Dessins v. City of Sacramento
In 2022, the City of Sacramento proposed a new storm drainage fee to fund repairs, maintenance, and improvements to its storm drainage system. The fee was calculated based on parcel size and land use, expected to generate approximately $20 million annually, with City-owned properties contributing about $496,000. The City conducted an election, mailing ballots to property owners, including itself, as it owned one percent of the properties. The fee was approved with 22,178 votes in favor and 20,229 against. Without the City's votes, the fee would not have passed.Dessins LLC, a property owner who voted against the fee, filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint against the City and the City Council, arguing that the City's votes should not have counted. The Superior Court of Sacramento County ruled in favor of the City, concluding that the City was entitled to vote in the election. Dessins then appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the City, as a property owner of properties subject to the fee, was entitled to vote under article XIII D, section 6, subdivision (c) of the California Constitution. The court found that the plain language of the provision allowed the City to vote and that the City's vote did not subvert the purposes of Proposition 218. The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, allowing the storm drainage fee to stand. View "Dessins v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law
Sheppheard v. Morrisey
Plaintiffs-Appellants Thomas Sheppheard, Tyler Randall, and Adam Perry, on behalf of minor child J.P., filed a class action lawsuit against the Governor of West Virginia and the Acting Cabinet Secretary of the West Virginia Department of Homeland Security. They sought relief under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, alleging unconstitutional conditions of overcrowding, understaffing, and deferred maintenance in West Virginia's prisons, jails, and juvenile centers. They claimed these conditions amounted to deliberate indifference to their health and safety.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia dismissed the case for lack of standing. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish that their injuries were traceable to the actions of the Governor or the Secretary, or that their injuries would be redressed by a favorable decision. The court noted that the issues were largely due to funding decisions by the West Virginia legislature, which was not a party to the suit. The court also highlighted that the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation, not the Governor or the Secretary, had the authority to address the conditions in the facilities.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not show that their injuries were caused by the Governor's or the Secretary's actions. The court also found that the requested relief, such as appropriations and policy changes, could not be granted by the court as it lacked the power to compel the Governor or the Secretary to take such actions. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs' injuries were not redressable through the requested judicial intervention. View "Sheppheard v. Morrisey" on Justia Law
USA V. VLHA
Defendants James Vlha and Travis Schlotterbeck were convicted for conspiring to manufacture firearms for sale without a federal license and for selling a firearm to a felon, respectively. They engaged in manufacturing and selling semiautomatic AR-15 firearms without a license in Bellflower, California, and sold these firearms to undercover agents and a confidential informant believed to be a felon. They were charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) and § 922(d)(1). Defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the statutes violated the Second Amendment, but the district court denied their motion. They entered conditional pleas and appealed the decision.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the indictment. The defendants then entered conditional pleas, preserving their right to appeal the district court's decision. They timely appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court held that the Second Amendment does not protect the conduct regulated by 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) because requiring commercial firearm manufacturers to obtain licenses does not meaningfully constrain would-be purchasers from obtaining firearms. The court also held that Schlotterbeck’s facial and as-applied challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) fail because the prohibition on selling firearms to felons does not meaningfully constrain the possessory rights of felons, who do not have possessory rights under the Second Amendment. The court concluded that the text of the Second Amendment does not cover the conduct regulated by these statutes, and thus, the defendants' constitutional challenges fail. The convictions were affirmed. View "USA V. VLHA" on Justia Law
United States v. Deng
Law enforcement officers suspected Bandak Wiyual Deng of involvement in a shooting at a park on February 10, 2022. Surveillance video showed an individual matching his characteristics exiting a car with what appeared to be a gun. The car, a black Ford Taurus, lacked a license plate or paper registration tag. A confidential informant recorded a conversation with Deng, where Deng mentioned needing a gun for a funeral and a previous shooting. On the day of the funeral, officers stopped Deng, found marijuana and a gun in his car, and Deng admitted to using drugs and touching the gun.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa upheld the government's peremptory strikes of two prospective jurors and refused to admit parts of Deng's interview with law enforcement. Deng's motion for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) violated the Second Amendment, was denied. The jury convicted Deng.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in overruling Deng’s objections to the peremptory strikes, as the government provided race-neutral explanations. The court also found that any potential error in the district court's evidentiary rulings was harmless, given the ample evidence supporting Deng’s conviction. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of Deng’s motion for a judgment of acquittal, rejecting his facial challenge to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Deng" on Justia Law
State v. Schultz
The case concerns a defendant who responded to an online advertisement posted by an undercover law enforcement officer posing as a woman offering sexual services, including access to two fictitious underage girls, one purportedly 12 years old. The defendant agreed to meet at a hotel to engage in sexual conduct with the supposed minors and was arrested upon arrival. He was charged with two counts of Sexual Abuse of Children under Montana law, with enhanced penalties based on the alleged ages of the victims.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, denied the defendant’s motion to strike the mandatory sentencing enhancements, which imposed a 25-year parole restriction for offenses involving victims 12 years old or younger. The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of Attempted Sexual Abuse of Children, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion regarding the sentencing enhancement. The court imposed the State’s recommended sentence, including the mandatory enhancement, and dismissed the second count.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the mandatory minimum sentence enhancement for sexual child abuse applies when the “victim” is a fictitious child created by law enforcement in a sting operation. The court held that the statutory language requiring enhanced penalties based on the age of “the victim” refers to actual, specified child victims, not to fictional or simulated victims. The court concluded that the Legislature’s use of different language in the statute—distinguishing between “a child” in defining the offense and “the victim” in penalty enhancements—demonstrates an intent to limit enhanced penalties to cases involving real children. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s imposition of the mandatory enhancement and remanded for resentencing under the general penalty provision. View "State v. Schultz" on Justia Law
Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Napa
The case involves Pacific Bell Telephone Company and other utilities suing the County of Napa and the state Board of Equalization for a refund of property taxes and declaratory relief. The utilities argue that from 2018 to 2023, the tax rates used to compute the debt-service component of their property taxes were higher than those applied to other properties, violating the California Constitution's requirement that public utility property be taxed in the same manner as other property.In the lower court, the trial court sustained the respondents' demurrer to the utilities' complaint without leave to amend, based on the precedent set by the Sixth District Court of Appeal in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, which held that the California Constitution does not mandate that public utility property be taxed at the same rate as other property. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the respondents.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing with the reasoning in Santa Clara and another case, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Merced. The court concluded that the constitutional provision does not require the same or comparable debt-service tax rates for public utility and nonutility property. The court also rejected the utilities' claim that the tax rates violated the principle of taxation uniformity embodied in the California Constitution. The judgment in favor of the respondents was affirmed. View "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Napa" on Justia Law
Darian McKinney v. DC
Darian McKinney, a health and physical education teacher, was employed by the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) for four years. During his tenure, he was investigated for sexual harassment, leading to a grievance he filed against DCPS. Both disputes were resolved through a Settlement Agreement, under which McKinney resigned but was allowed to reapply for teaching positions. However, when he reapplied, DCPS blocked his return, citing a failed background check.McKinney sued the District of Columbia, alleging that DCPS breached the Settlement Agreement by not fairly considering his employment applications and deprived him of property and liberty without due process. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Settlement Agreement did not obligate DCPS to fairly consider McKinney’s applications, only to allow him to apply. The court found no basis in the contract’s language or law for McKinney’s demand for fair consideration. Additionally, the court ruled that McKinney did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in his original job, the contingent job offers, or his eligibility for DCPS positions. The court also found that McKinney’s claim of deprivation of liberty without due process was forfeited as it was not raised in the lower court.The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of McKinney’s complaint. View "Darian McKinney v. DC" on Justia Law
Evers v. Marklein
The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of certain Wisconsin statutes that grant the Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules (JCRAR) the power to pause, object to, or suspend administrative rules. The Governor and other petitioners argue that these statutes amount to unconstitutional legislative vetoes, as they allow JCRAR to halt the implementation of rules without passing legislation. The Legislature contends that these statutes are permissible extensions of legislative power, maintaining that rulemaking must remain subordinate to the legislature.The lower courts had previously upheld the constitutionality of similar provisions. In Martinez v. DILHR, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a three-month rule suspension by JCRAR did not violate the Wisconsin Constitution's bicameralism and presentment requirements. This reasoning was later extended in SEIU, where the court upheld the multiple suspension provision, allowing JCRAR to suspend rules repeatedly.The Wisconsin Supreme Court, currently reviewing the case, adopted the reasoning from Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, which requires bicameralism and presentment when legislative action alters the legal rights and duties of others outside the legislative branch. Applying this standard, the court found that the challenged statutes empower JCRAR to take actions that alter the legal rights and duties of the executive branch and the people of Wisconsin without requiring bicameralism and presentment. Consequently, the court held that the statutes WIS. STAT. §§ 227.19(5)(c), (d), (dm), and 227.26(2)(d), (im) facially violate the Wisconsin Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements and are therefore unconstitutional. View "Evers v. Marklein" on Justia Law
US v. Simmons
Stephen Simmons pled guilty to violating the National Firearms Act by possessing an unregistered auto sear, a device that converts semi-automatic firearms to fire like machineguns. On the day of his offense, Simmons tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana. Although he was not prosecuted for any drug-related crime, the district court applied multiple sentencing enhancements, penalizing him for possessing the unregistered auto sear, additional auto sears, silencers, and firearms as an unlawful user of controlled substances. Simmons argued that these enhancements violated his Second Amendment rights and that the term "unlawful user of any controlled substance" was unconstitutionally vague.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia applied sentencing enhancements that increased Simmons's offense level due to his status as an unlawful user of controlled substances and his possession of multiple and stolen firearms. The court calculated his total offense level as 25, resulting in an advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 57 to 71 months' imprisonment. After applying a downward variance, the district court sentenced Simmons to 36 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Simmons's Second Amendment challenge, noting that he conceded he had no constitutional right to possess auto sears or silencers, which are not protected by the Second Amendment. The court also dismissed his vagueness claim, as Simmons's conduct clearly fell within the definition of an "unlawful user" of controlled substances. However, the court found that the district court erred in applying sentencing enhancements for possessing ordinary firearms not covered by the National Firearms Act, as these firearms were not relevant to the offense for which Simmons was convicted. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit vacated Simmons's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "US v. Simmons" on Justia Law
United States v. Moses
Ronell Moses was driving through his Pittsburgh suburb when Officer Dustin Hess, in a marked police SUV, smelled burnt marijuana and saw that Moses's car windows were tinted very dark, both of which are illegal. The officer followed Moses to his home, where Moses parked in his driveway. The officer walked up the driveway, searched Moses's car, and found a loaded, stolen pistol. Moses, a felon on probation, was arrested and charged with possessing a gun and ammunition as a felon.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied Moses's motion to dismiss the indictment, which challenged the constitutionality of the law under the Second Amendment. The court also denied his motion to suppress the gun, rejecting his claim that the officer had invaded his home's curtilage without a warrant. Moses then pleaded guilty conditionally, preserving his right to appeal the curtilage issue and the constitutionality of the law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the officer did not invade Moses's curtilage by walking halfway up the driveway, as the driveway was not an extension of Moses's home. The court applied a de novo standard of review to curtilage decisions, aligning with other circuits. The court also held that the officer's actions were constitutional and that Moses, as a felon on parole, could be prosecuted for possessing a gun. The court affirmed Moses's conviction. View "United States v. Moses" on Justia Law