Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

SO Apartments, LLC and Elm Creek, LLC (the “Complexes”) challenged the City of San Antonio’s Proactive Apartment Inspection Program (PAIP), which was created to address property maintenance code violations. The PAIP requires multifamily apartment complexes with five or more units to enroll if they receive three or more code citations over six months that are not cured. Enrolled complexes are subject to monthly inspections and a $100 per-unit, per-year fee. The Complexes received multiple code violation notices, failed to cure them, and were fined and enrolled in the PAIP, resulting in significant fees.The Complexes filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, arguing that the PAIP violated the Fourth Amendment by allowing warrantless inspections, the Eighth Amendment by imposing excessive fines, and the Fourteenth Amendment by denying procedural and substantive due process. The district court denied their request for a preliminary injunction, finding they failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, that the balance of harms favored them, or that an injunction would serve the public interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the PAIP does not authorize warrantless searches, as it does not explicitly state that city officials can conduct searches without a warrant. The $100 per-unit fee was found to be administrative rather than punitive, and thus not excessive under the Eighth Amendment. The court also found that the PAIP provided adequate procedural due process through its notice and appeal processes. Lastly, the court determined that the Complexes failed to show that the PAIP’s requirements were so egregious as to violate substantive due process. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. View "SO Apartments v. City of San Antonio" on Justia Law

On March 2, 2022, Rondell Yokenya Baker was stopped twice by Deputy Lloyd while driving through Wyoming. The first stop was for speeding, during which Baker failed to produce a rental agreement for the car. After issuing a warning, the officer let Baker go but suspected drug trafficking. About 50 miles later, Baker was stopped again for speeding. This time, a K-9 unit was present, and the dog alerted to drugs in the car, leading to the discovery of methamphetamine, fentanyl pills, and cocaine.Baker moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the second stop was unreasonably prolonged to conduct the dog sniff, violating the Fourth Amendment as per Rodriguez v. United States. The District Court for the District of Wyoming initially granted the motion, finding no reasonable suspicion for the second stop. However, upon the government's motion to reconsider, the court reversed its decision, ruling the stop was a valid pretextual stop under Whren v. United States and that the dog sniff did not unreasonably prolong the stop.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the actions taken by Deputy Lloyd, including asking Baker to exit the vehicle and rolling up the windows, were reasonable safety measures related to the traffic stop. The court found that these actions did not divert from the traffic mission and that the dog sniff occurred contemporaneously with the traffic stop, thus not prolonging it. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Baker's motion to suppress the evidence. View "United States v. Baker" on Justia Law

Gary Hicks, a corrections sergeant, was suspended for 10 days by the Illinois Department of Corrections after an internal investigation into his Facebook posts, which were described as "Islamophobic" and "offensive" by a news article. The investigation concluded that Hicks violated Department policies prohibiting conduct unbecoming of a State employee or that may reflect unfavorably on the Department. Hicks admitted to making the posts, which included derogatory comments about various groups and a prayer for a civil war or government overthrow. He sued the Department and officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation and a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the Department’s policies.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on both claims. The court held that Hicks’s suspension did not violate the First Amendment because his posts were not on matters of public concern, and the Department’s interest in maintaining discipline outweighed his interest in speaking. The court also found that the Department’s policies were not impermissibly vague as applied to Hicks’s conduct and granted qualified immunity to the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court concluded that the Department’s interest in managing its affairs outweighed Hicks’s interest in posting the content, thus he could not sustain a First Amendment retaliation claim. Additionally, the court found that the Department’s code of conduct was not impermissibly vague as applied to Hicks, as a reasonable officer would understand that his posts were unbecoming and could reflect unfavorably on the Department. Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants on both the First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. View "Hicks v. Illinois Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Stephanie Wilson was driving a 2006 Saturn Ion with Malcolm Smith as a passenger when they were pulled over by a police officer surveilling a house for narcotics activity. The officer observed what he believed to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction involving Smith. After stopping the vehicle for a traffic violation, the officer found five empty syringes but no drugs. Wilson denied the officer's claim that she admitted to driving Smith to purchase drugs. The vehicle was seized, and nearly four months later, forfeiture proceedings were initiated.The Wayne Circuit Court granted summary disposition in favor of Wilson, finding that the officer's observation of a hand-to-hand transaction did not necessarily involve drugs. The court did not specify the grounds for its ruling. The plaintiff's motions for reconsideration and relief from judgment were denied. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Wilson used her vehicle to facilitate a drug purchase, making it subject to forfeiture.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that under MCL 333.7521(1)(d), a vehicle is subject to forfeiture only if it is used to transport illicit property for the purpose of its sale or receipt. The Court found that the elements of the statute were not concurrently fulfilled in this case. Specifically, while Wilson's vehicle was used to drive to a location where drugs were purchased, there was no evidence that the vehicle was used to transport drugs for the purpose of sale or receipt. Therefore, the vehicle was not subject to forfeiture under the statute. The Wayne Circuit Court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of Wilson was reinstated. View "In Re Forfeiture Of 2006 Saturn Ion" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, five Muslim U.S. citizens, allege they have been placed on the Terrorist Screening Dataset, commonly known as the "terrorist watchlist." This list includes the No-Fly List, which prevents individuals from boarding flights, and the Selectee List, which subjects individuals to enhanced security screening. Four plaintiffs claim they are on the Selectee List due to repeated enhanced screenings, while one plaintiff, Adis Kovac, claims he is on both the No-Fly List and the Selectee List. Each plaintiff sought redress through the Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP), but only Kovac received confirmation of his No-Fly List status.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas against various federal agency heads, alleging violations of their constitutional rights and unlawful agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court dismissed several claims, including due process and equal protection claims, and later dismissed Kovac’s No-Fly List claims as moot after he was removed from the list. The remaining APA claims were addressed at summary judgment, where the district court ruled that the agencies had statutory authority to maintain the watchlist and that the TRIP procedures were not arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the relevant federal agencies have clear statutory authority to create, maintain, and use the watchlist for screening airline passengers. The court found that the statutory framework, including the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the Homeland Security Act, and subsequent legislation, provided unambiguous authority for the watchlist. The court did not address whether the major questions doctrine applied, as the statutory authority was clear. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the watchlist’s use in contexts unrelated to airport security. View "Kovac v. Wray" on Justia Law

In July 2020, Taylor Hildreth was a passenger in a car stopped by police at known narcotics locations. The driver consented to a search, and Hildreth admitted to having drugs in his pant leg, which led to the discovery of methamphetamine, Xanax, and drug paraphernalia. A loaded firearm was found in the glove compartment, which Hildreth admitted was his, knowing he was barred from possessing it due to a prior felony conviction. Hildreth was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm and released on pretrial supervision. He was later arrested for assaulting his father, violating his pretrial conditions, and was ordered to in-patient drug treatment, which he completed after an initial discharge for policy violations.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas reviewed the case. Hildreth pleaded guilty to the firearm possession charge. The presentence investigation report (PSR) calculated a total offense level of eighteen and a criminal history category IV, resulting in a Guidelines range of forty-one to fifty-one months. The PSR recommended no adjustment for acceptance of responsibility due to Hildreth's continued criminal conduct. The district court denied the adjustment and imposed an upward departure, sentencing Hildreth to eighty months' imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Hildreth raised four challenges: the inclusion of a prior misdemeanor in his criminal history, the denial of an acceptance of responsibility adjustment, the upward departure in sentencing, and the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court found no clear or obvious error in including the misdemeanor, upheld the denial of the adjustment based on continued criminal conduct, found no abuse of discretion in the upward departure, and rejected the constitutional challenge based on existing precedent. The Fifth Circuit affirmed Hildreth's sentence and conviction. View "U.S. v. Hildreth" on Justia Law

On June 7, 2019, around 4:20 a.m., two police officers detained Anthry Milla, who was sitting in his car in his driveway. The officers were investigating a nearby stabbing but had no description of a suspect. Milla was cooperative but closed his car door when the officers approached. The officers, suspecting involvement in the stabbing, detained Milla at gunpoint, searched his car, and found no evidence. Milla's parents confirmed his identity, and he was released after about eight minutes.Milla filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Fourth Amendment violations. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment to the officers, finding their actions justified under the totality of the circumstances. The court also held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, as they did not violate Milla's constitutional rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and vacated the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the officers lacked reasonable, particularized suspicion to detain Milla. The court emphasized that proximity to a crime scene and Milla's actions, such as closing his car door, did not constitute reasonable suspicion. The court also vacated the district court's award of qualified immunity, as the officers' actions were not justified under established Fourth Amendment standards. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Milla v. Brown" on Justia Law

Police officers responded to a 911 call about a suspicious individual in a residential neighborhood. Officer Sanchez encountered Victor Grandia Gonzalez, who matched the description given by the complainant. Gonzalez was walking in the street, wearing dark clothing, and carrying a backpack. He appeared nervous and sweaty. Officer Exantus, after speaking with the complainant, learned that Gonzalez had been seen looking into mailboxes and concealing himself between cars. Upon arrival, Exantus patted down Gonzalez and found scissors. Gonzalez admitted to living out of his car and showed a photo of his ID listing a home county 30 minutes away. Based on these observations and the complainant’s report, Gonzalez was arrested for loitering and prowling. A search of his backpack revealed stolen mail.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Gonzalez’s motion to suppress the mail evidence and statements, finding that the officers had probable cause for the arrest. Gonzalez pleaded guilty to one count of possessing stolen mail but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling. He was sentenced to time served and two years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require a misdemeanor to occur in an officer’s presence for a warrantless arrest. The court found that the officers had probable cause to arrest Gonzalez for loitering and prowling under the totality of the circumstances, including the complainant’s report and the officers’ observations. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Friends of George’s, Inc. (FOG), a theater organization that performs drag shows, challenged Tennessee’s Adult Entertainment Act (AEA), which criminalizes adult cabaret entertainment in public or where minors could view it. FOG argued that the AEA was facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The district court agreed, declaring the AEA unconstitutional and permanently enjoining District Attorney General Steven Mulroy from enforcing it within Shelby County, Tennessee. Mulroy appealed, questioning FOG’s standing and the merits of the injunction.The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee initially granted FOG a temporary restraining order against the AEA. The court later ruled in favor of FOG, finding that the AEA violated the First Amendment and was unconstitutionally vague. The court permanently enjoined Mulroy from enforcing the statute within his jurisdiction. Mulroy appealed this decision, arguing that FOG lacked Article III standing and that the AEA was constitutional.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that FOG did not meet its burden to show standing. The court held that FOG failed to demonstrate an intention to engage in conduct arguably proscribed by the AEA, as FOG’s performances were described as having artistic value suitable for minors. The court also found that FOG did not face a certainly impending threat of prosecution under the AEA. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing. View "Friends of George's, Inc. v. Mulroy" on Justia Law

The case involves Robert Paul Rundo and Robert Boman, who were charged with conspiracy to violate the Anti-Riot Act and with substantively violating the Act. The indictment alleges that Rundo is a founding member of the "Rise Above Movement" (RAM), a militant white supremacist group. Rundo and Boman, along with other RAM members, attended several political rallies where they violently attacked counter-protesters. The indictment details their involvement in rallies in Huntington Beach, Berkeley, San Bernardino, and Charlottesville, where they engaged in organized violence and later boasted about their actions online.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially dismissed the indictment, finding the Anti-Riot Act unconstitutional due to facial overbreadth under the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, holding that the Act was not facially overbroad except for certain severable portions. On remand, the district court dismissed the indictment again, this time based on a claim of selective prosecution. The district court concluded that the government selectively prosecuted RAM members while ignoring the violence of Antifa and related far-left groups, suggesting that the prosecution was based on the offensive nature of RAM's speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that Rundo did not meet his burden to demonstrate that similarly situated individuals were not prosecuted and that his prosecution was based on an impermissible motive. The court found that the district court erred by comparing collective conduct to individual conduct and by holding that individual Antifa members were similarly situated to Rundo. The Ninth Circuit also held that Rundo failed to show that his prosecution was based on an impermissible motive, noting that timing and other factors cited by the district court were insufficient. The court reinstated the indictment and remanded the case for trial. View "USA V. RUNDO" on Justia Law