Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A father, H.S., was in federal custody during a hearing to terminate his parental rights to his child, A.S. He attended the hearing via Zoom, while the hearing was otherwise conducted in person. The father argued that his limited ability to participate in the hearing amounted to a due process violation.The Leavenworth District Court held a permanency hearing and concluded that reintegration was no longer a viable plan for A.S., and that permanent custodianship or adoption was in the child's best interests. Subsequently, the State moved to terminate the parental rights of both parents. During the termination hearing, the father attended remotely but was unable to testify or meaningfully participate. The district court found the father unfit and terminated his parental rights. The father appealed, claiming insufficient evidence and a due process violation. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, rejecting the father's claims.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on the due process claim. The court held that the father's due process rights were violated because he was not given the opportunity to testify, communicate with counsel, or otherwise fully participate in the hearing. The court emphasized that a parent's right to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their child is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that the risk of erroneous deprivation of this interest was high due to the procedures used, and that the State's interests did not justify the limitations placed on the father's participation.The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the district court, and remanded the case for a new termination hearing that ensures the father's due process rights are protected. View "In re A.S." on Justia Law

A self-described "lay midwife" was charged by the State of Nebraska with practicing a profession without a credential after being ordered to cease and desist. The midwife, who did not hold a state-issued credential, provided prenatal and postnatal care and assisted with childbirth. The charges were based on her alleged violation of the Uniform Credentialing Act (UCA).In Madison County, the district court sustained the midwife's plea in abatement, finding that "nurse midwives" were not required to hold credentials under the UCA. The court also suggested that the UCA would be unconstitutionally vague if it required a credential for practicing "nurse midwifery." Similarly, in Douglas County, the district court sustained a plea in abatement on the same grounds, dismissing the charges against the midwife.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district courts had misconstrued the UCA. The court held that the UCA requires individuals to hold a credential to engage in practices such as attending childbirth and providing related care, which fall under the scope of medicine and surgery, advanced practice registered nursing, and certified nurse midwifery. The court also found that the evidence presented was sufficient to show probable cause that the midwife had committed the charged crime.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the district courts' orders sustaining the pleas in abatement and dismissing the charges. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, including consideration of the midwife's motions to quash and demurrers. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 1998, Michael Johnson, then 17, conspired with Aaron Johnson to murder Aaron’s roommate, Dustin Sean Parker. They planned the murder for hours, eventually deciding to bludgeon Parker to death with a metal barbell. After killing Parker, they wrapped his body in plastic bags and buried it in the woods. Johnson later bragged about the murder, leading to his arrest and conviction for deliberate-design murder. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.The Rankin County Circuit Court initially sentenced Johnson to life without parole. Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, which deemed mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles unconstitutional, Johnson sought post-conviction relief. The trial court vacated his sentence and held a new hearing, considering the Miller factors. Despite this, the court reinstated Johnson’s life sentence, ruling that the parole statute's application was not unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. Johnson argued that the trial court misapplied the law and facts and that Mississippi Code Section 99-19-101 required jury sentencing for juveniles. The court found that recent statutory amendments did not entitle Johnson to jury sentencing, as he was convicted before July 1, 2024. The court also upheld the trial court's application of the Miller factors, noting Johnson’s age, the premeditated nature of the crime, and the lack of evidence suggesting his immaturity or inability to understand the consequences of his actions. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, maintaining Johnson’s life sentence without parole. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, including the National Republican Senatorial Committee, National Republican Congressional Committee, Senator J.D. Vance, and former Representative Steve Chabot, challenged the Federal Election Campaign Act’s limits on coordinated campaign expenditures. They argued that these limits, which restrict political parties from spending money on campaign advertising with input from the candidate, violate the First Amendment. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Federal Election Commission from enforcing these limits, claiming that the restrictions increase costs, create redundancies, and hinder effective communication and spending.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio certified the constitutional question to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The district court found that the plaintiffs raised a non-frivolous question and established a factual record before certifying the question. The district court asked whether the limits on coordinated party expenditures in the Federal Election Campaign Act violate the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with "party coordinated communications."The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case en banc. The court held that the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II) remains binding and that the Act’s limits on coordinated party expenditures do not facially violate the First Amendment. The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that changes in legal doctrine, statutory amendments, and factual developments since 2001 undermined Colorado II. The court also denied the plaintiffs' as-applied challenge, noting that it was too broad and would effectively nullify Colorado II. The court concluded that the limits on coordinated party expenditures do not violate the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with "party coordinated communications." View "National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

In August of 2020, Matthew Ostrander, a homeless fugitive, was arrested in Gainesville, Florida, for failing to register as a sex offender following a 2007 child pornography conviction. At the time of his arrest, Ostrander possessed four electronic devices, three of which contained 480 computer-generated images (CGI) of children involved in sexual activity. These images did not depict real children. Ostrander was charged with knowing possession of an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(b)(1), (d)(4).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida denied Ostrander's motion to dismiss the possession charge, ruling it was untimely and without merit. After a two-day trial, a jury found Ostrander guilty. Ostrander appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the statute and the sufficiency of the evidence and alleging prosecutorial misconduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the statute was not facially unconstitutional, as it was neither overbroad nor vague. The court found that the statute's legitimate sweep outweighed any potential unconstitutional applications. The court also determined that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Ostrander's conviction, as a reasonable jury could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented. Finally, the court found no prosecutorial misconduct that would have affected the jury's verdict. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Ostrander's conviction. View "U.S. v. Ostrander" on Justia Law

Steve Wynn, a prominent figure in Nevada gaming and politics, filed a defamation lawsuit against The Associated Press (AP) and its reporter, Regina Garcia Cano. The lawsuit stemmed from an article published by AP that reported on allegations of sexual assault against Wynn from the 1970s. The article was based on complaints obtained from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. Wynn claimed the allegations were false and that AP published the article with actual malice.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County granted AP's special motion to dismiss under Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes, which are designed to protect free speech and petitioning activities from meritless lawsuits. The district court found that the article was a good faith communication related to an issue of public concern and that Wynn failed to show a probability of prevailing on his defamation claim. Wynn appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that AP met its burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis by showing the article was a good faith communication on a matter of public interest. The court also clarified that under the second prong, a public figure plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably infer, by clear and convincing evidence, that the publication was made with actual malice. Wynn failed to meet this burden, as his evidence did not demonstrate that AP published the article with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's order granting the special motion to dismiss. View "Wynn v. The Associated Press" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, property developers owning three hotels, alleged that Defendants, rival developers operating the Hollywood Athletic Club, abused the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) processes to extort funds in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Defendants challenged several of Plaintiffs' hotel projects through CEQA objections and lawsuits, which Plaintiffs claimed were baseless and intended to obstruct their developments.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine protected Defendants' petitioning activities from statutory liability under the First Amendment. The district court found that Defendants' actions were not objectively baseless and thus did not fall within the sham litigation exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The case was transferred from Judge Wright to Judge Gutierrez, who reconsidered and reversed the prior denial of summary judgment, concluding that the previous decision was clearly erroneous and would result in manifest injustice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in reconsidering the prior judge's ruling. It also agreed that Defendants' CEQA challenges were not objectively baseless, as the actions had some merit and were not brought solely for an improper purpose. The court emphasized that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides broad protection to petitioning activities to avoid chilling First Amendment rights. Consequently, the court did not need to address Defendants' additional arguments regarding the applicability of RICO to litigation activities. View "RELEVANT GROUP, LLC V. NOURMAND" on Justia Law

Brian Houston, representing a putative class, filed a lawsuit against Maricopa County and Sheriff Paul Penzone, alleging that the County's practice of posting arrestees' photographs and identifying information on its Mugshot Lookup website violated his substantive and procedural due process rights and his right to a speedy public trial. Houston's mugshot and personal details were posted online for three days following his arrest, even though he was never prosecuted. He claimed this caused him public humiliation, reputational harm, and emotional distress.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed Houston's claims. The court found that the Mugshot Lookup post was not a condition of pretrial detention and that Houston failed to show a cognizable liberty or property interest under state law for his procedural due process claim. The court also dismissed his Sixth Amendment claim, noting that Houston was not prosecuted and thus had no trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of Houston's substantive due process claim, holding that Houston sufficiently alleged that the Mugshot Lookup post caused him actionable harm and that the County's transparency justification did not rationally relate to the punitive nature of the post. The court affirmed the dismissal of Houston's procedural due process claim, as he did not demonstrate a protected liberty or property interest under state law. The court also affirmed the dismissal of his Sixth Amendment claim, as Houston was not prosecuted and thus had no right to a speedy trial.The Ninth Circuit concluded that Houston adequately pleaded a substantive due process claim but failed to state claims for procedural due process and Sixth Amendment violations. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "HOUSTON V. MARICOPA COUNTY" on Justia Law

In the wake of George Floyd's death in May 2020, Los Angeles experienced widespread protests. The plaintiffs, including Black Lives Matter Los Angeles and several individuals, filed a class action lawsuit against the City of Los Angeles and then-LAPD Chief Michel Moore. They alleged that the LAPD used excessive force, arrested protestors without probable cause, and restricted their First Amendment rights. The lawsuit sought to certify four classes: a Direct Force Class, an Arrest Class, an Infraction Class, and an Injunctive Relief Class.The United States District Court for the Central District of California certified all four classes. The court found that the plaintiffs had raised common questions about whether LAPD customs or policies caused their injuries. However, the district court did not rigorously analyze whether the damages classes satisfied the commonality requirement under Rule 23(a) or whether common questions predominated over individual ones under Rule 23(b)(3). The court also failed to address whether the Injunctive Relief Class met the commonality requirement under Rule 23(a).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s class certification order. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not rigorously analyze whether the plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence to meet the class certification requirements. Specifically, the district court did not adequately address the commonality and predominance requirements for the damages classes or identify common questions for the Injunctive Relief Class. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case with instructions for the district court to fully address Rule 23’s class certification requirements. View "BLACK LIVES MATTER LOS ANGELES V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

Three Kentucky Republican Party county executive committees challenged the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance’s prohibition on expending funds to support a state constitutional amendment on the November general election ballot. The committees sought an advisory opinion from the Registry, which concluded that they could not use funds raised for party nominees to support a constitutional amendment and would need to form a political issues committee for such expenditures. The committees argued that this restriction violated their First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky denied the committees' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the requirement to form a political issues committee imposed only a minimal burden on their First Amendment rights, justified by the governmental interest in transparency and disclosure. The court concluded that the Registry’s actions met the standards of strict scrutiny, exacting scrutiny, or rational basis review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and granted an injunction pending appeal. The court found that the executive committees were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim. It determined that the Registry’s prohibition on spending in support of a constitutional amendment burdened the committees' political speech. The court applied strict scrutiny, concluding that the Registry’s restriction was not narrowly tailored to the asserted interest in disclosure. The court noted that less restrictive alternatives, such as imposing disclosure requirements on executive committees, could achieve the same ends without restricting speech. The Registry was enjoined from enforcing its advisory opinion against the committees, and expedited briefing was ordered for the appeal. View "Boone County Republican Party Executive Committee v. Wallace" on Justia Law